MEDITATION ON EMPTINESS
Also by Jeffrey Hopkins

Emptiness Yoga

The Tantric Distinction

Tibetan Arts of Love

The Dalai Lama at Harvard with the Dalai Lama

Deity Yoga with the Dalai Lama

The Kalachakra Tantra: Rite of Initiation for the Stage of Generation with the Dalai Lama

Kindness, Clarity, and Insight with the Dalai Lama

The Meaning of Life From a Buddhist Perspective with the Dalai Lama

Tantra in Tibet with the Dalai Lama

The Buddhism of Tibet and the Key to the Middle Way with Lati Rinpoche

Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism with Kensur Ngawang Lekden

Cutting Through Appearances with Geshe Lhundup Sopa

Death, Intermediate State, and Rebirth in Tibetan Buddhism with Lati Rinbochay

Fluent Tibetan: A Proficiency Oriented Learning System, Novice and Intermediate Levels with William Magee and Elizabeth Napper

Health Through Balance: An Introduction to Tibetan Medicine with Dr. Yeshi Donden

Meditative States in Tibetan Buddhism with Lati Rinbochay, Locho Rinbochay, and Leah Zahler

The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses with Lati Rinpoche

Tantric Practice in Nyingma with Khetsun Sangpo Rinbochay

Walking Through Walls: A Tibetan Presentation of Calming Meditation with Geshe Gediin Lodro
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Emptiness is the very heart of Buddhist practice in Tibet. In tantra even the visualized gods, goddesses, channels, suns, moons, and so forth are qualified by emptiness. Without an understanding of emptiness the practice of Buddhism, be it sutra or tantra, cannot be complete.

Emptiness is explained in different ways by the four Buddhist schools of tenets: Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Madhyamika. The Madhyamika view and, within the division of Madhyamika into Svaatantrika and Prasangika, the Prasangika view form the basis for the transformational psychology of tantra. Thus, this book on Prasangika-Madhyamika is written with the intent of presenting not only what emptiness is but also how emptiness is realized in meditation, so that emptiness may become more than a concept of abstract philosophy.

Phenomena are empty of a certain mode of being called ‘inherent existence’, ‘objective existence’, or ‘natural existence’. This ‘inherent existence’ is not a concept superimposed by philosophical systems but refers to our ordinary sense of the way that things exist—as if they concretely exist in and of themselves, covering their parts. Phenomena are the things which are empty
of inherent existence, and inherent existence is that of which phenomena are empty. Emptiness or, more properly, an emptiness is a phenomenon’s lack of inherent existence; an emptiness is a negative or utter absence of this concrete mode of being with which we are so familiar.

Reasoning is the method used to establish that emptiness, or a lack of substantiality, is the mode of being of objects, and it also constitutes a yogi’s approach to direct realization of emptiness. Having precisely identified this sense of the massiveness or concreteness of objects, a yogi reflects on the impossibility of such through thoroughly familiarizing himself with one of the sets of reasonings that show this lack of natural existence to be the mode of being of an object. He gains an inferential understanding of the emptiness of one object and extends this understanding to all objects. Then gradually, through the force of greater and greater familiarity, he passes to a simultaneous, direct cognition of the emptiness of all phenomena in all world systems. He thereby begins to cleanse his mind of its tendencies to misconceive the nature of phenomena; his cognition of emptiness is like medicine for eradicating his assent to the false appearance of things as inherently existent. Finally, he eradicates even the false appearance of inherent existence to his senses, thereby removing all obstacles to knowledge of everything, and becomes omniscient. He does not eradicate existence; he eradicates only the false sense of inherent existence.

Whether this book is merely abstract philosophy or whether it becomes relevant to everyday experience depends on gaining a sense of what inherent existence would be and then seeing that everything one perceives appears this way. The pivot of the practice of emptiness and of the generation of the wisdom that realizes emptiness is the identification that objects appear as if they exist in and of themselves. Then, an attempt is made to try to find these objects which so boldly appear to be self-existent; the mind becomes totally absorbed in attempting to find an object—among its parts, as the composite of its parts, as something separate from the parts, and so forth. If the search is done with keen interest, the significance of not being able to find the
object will be earth-shaking. A yogi will then gain firsthand experience of the falling to extremes against which Buddha so frequently warned. Previously, the yogi took the independent existence of things as the very basis of his life; now that he cannot find anything to call an object, he falls to the opposite extreme of utter nihilism. The middle way, which is not a blending of these extremes but an utter refutation of both inherent existence and total non-existence, becomes relevant and comprehensible for the first time. The two extremes are identified in experience, and it is possible to realize a sense of valid, nominal existence through gaining the understanding that emptiness is an elimination only of inherent existence. Emptiness becomes the context within which a yogi purifies his perception, imagining the world to be the habitation of a deity and himself to be a deity—all within the continuous understanding of unfindability.

Emptiness is the same in both sutra and tantra; the difference between the two systems with regard to emptiness is in the description of the consciousness that cognizes it. In Highest Yoga Tantra there are special subtle minds, normally of no help to an individual, which become aids on the path to Buddhahood when they are generated in meditation for the purpose of realizing emptiness. An understanding of emptiness is a prerequisite for such realization, and this book attempts to present emptiness as it is taught in that system considered in Tibet to be the acme of philosophical systems, the Prasangika-Madhyamika. The system is based on the teachings of the Indian sage, Nagarjuna, who founded Madhyamika through his definitive presentation of the explicit meaning of Buddha’s Perfection of Wisdom Sutras (Prajnaparamita). Nagarjuna’s thought was further clarified as being Prasangika-Madhyamika by Chandrakirti, and in the domain of emptiness Chandrakirti’s system has held almost complete sway in the various Tibetan orders.

The sources for this explication of emptiness are almost entirely from the Ge-luk-ba order of Tibetan Buddhism, which stems from the teachings of Dzong-ka-ba (Tsong-kha-pa, 1357-1419). Jam-yang-shay-ba’s (Jam-dbyangs-lchad-pa, 1648-1721) Great Exposition of Tenets, a Ge-luk-ba presentation of the
Prasangika-Madhyamika emptiness and a textbook for the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastery in Hla-sa, Tibet, forms the basis for this book.

I first encountered the *Great Exposition of Tenets* in 1963 when I began studying with Geshe Wangyal, a Kalmuk-Mongolian scholar and adept from Astrakhan, who spent thirty-five years studying in Tibet in the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastery. At that time the *Great Exposition of Tenets* seemed to be hopelessly complicated. Nevertheless, Geshe Wangyal’s teaching was inspiring, and near the time of my departure from his monastery in Freewood Acres, New Jersey, in 1968, he advised me to read all of Jam-yang-shay-ba’s *Great Exposition of Tenets*. I put this in mind and while acting as a resource assistant at Haverford College in 1968 began to read a little from a condensation of the *Great Exposition of Tenets* done by Jam-yang-shay-ba’s next incarnation, Gön-chok-jik-may-wang-bo (dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, 1728-91). Upon going to the University of Wisconsin I was able to study and translate this short text with Geshe Lhundup Sopa, a scholar of Se-ra Monastery who was first among the First Rank of the ge-shays receiving degrees in 1962 and who came to Madison from Geshe Wangyal’s monastery. His excellent answers to my questions made it possible to put together an outline map of Buddhist philosophy as viewed by the Ge-luk-ba order of Tibetan Buddhism.

All this prepared me for my first encounter with a former Abbot of the Tantric College of Lower Hla-sa, Kensur Lekden, another Go-mang scholar who came to Geshe Wangyal’s monastery in the fall of 1968 just after I left. I had returned there during a vacation and was captivated from the very start by his lucid, compact, free-flowing presentation of almost any aspect of Buddhist philosophy. I returned to the monastery in the summer of 1969 and, following Geshe Wangyal’s advice, began listening to Kensur Rinbochay’s (Precious Former Abbot Lekden’s) commentary on the *Great Exposition of Tenets* and on the Mongolian scholar Nga-wang-bel-den’s (*Ngag-dbang-dpal-lidan*, born 1797) *Annotations*, an explanation of the difficult points of
Introduction

I tape-recorded his teachings and translated most of Jam-yang-shay-ba's exposition of the non-Buddhist systems as described in Buddhist literature. Toward the end of the summer we skipped over the lower Buddhist systems and read the presentation of Prasangika tenets in the twelfth chapter.

Returning to Madison, I began translating the chapter on Prasangika, and in January of 1969 when Professor Richard Robinson, the co-founder of the Buddhist Studies program in Madison, and I founded Tibet House in Cambridge, Wisconsin, we invited Kensur Rinbochay to teach us. Kensur Rinbochay gave two series of fourteen lectures on the three principal aspects of the path to enlightenment and on Chandrakirti’s Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle Way’ (Madhyamakavatara), which I translated at Tibet House. (These have been published as the first part of Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism.) Professor Robinson also invited Kensur to give a seminar at the University of Wisconsin on Prasangika philosophy which we conducted after Professor Robinson’s untimely death in the summer of 1970.

At Tibet House, Kensur Rinbochay taught me the rest of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets (approximately three hundred folios), Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations (four hundred sixteen folios), and almost all of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (four hundred twenty-four out of five hundred folios), the Go-mang textbook for Madhyamika studies. I thereby was able to cover most of the Madhyamika reading which a monk in the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastery would traditionally do. Kensur Rinbochay was famous for his abilities as a lecturer, and he, indeed, could weave a fascinating and often moving story of philosophical and spiritual ideas. His kindness in explaining again and again the important points of Buddhist philosophy was a lesson in compassion and a demonstration of how Buddhist philosophy was for him a vivid, living phenomenon.

Kensur Rinbochay left Tibet House in August of 1971 by which time I had finished translating Jam-yang-shay-ba's
presentation of emptiness in his *Great Exposition of Tenets*. My intention was to present a book on the meditation on emptiness, and to that end had obtained a Fulbright-Hays fellowship for a year's study in Germany and India. Four days after I left for Germany in November of 1971, Kensur Rinbochay died of congestive heart failure. In Germany at the University of Hamburg, I studied for three months with Geshe Gediin Lodro, a Gomang scholar of a later generation than that of Geshe Wangyal and Kensur Rinbochay. A special feature of the Gomang scholars, probably stemming from Geshe Jinba around the turn of the century, is an unusual ability to explain philosophy, not just react to it, as sometimes happens when debate is a principal mode of instruction, and Geshe Gediin Lodro soon showed himself to be a scholar of scholars. When he received his ge-shay degree in India in 1961, he not only was first among those of the First Rank but was also first among three who in an extraordinary year had been given the honor of being first among those of the First Rank. Geshe Gediin Lodro's knowledge was invaluable; he knew not only how to answer questions but also how to lead to the heart of conceptual problems so that the entire context of a question would come to life. Possessing an extraordinary ability both to answer and lecture on minute questions about Buddhist philosophy, he was the ideal person to smooth out the last remaining questions on the translation.

Proceeding on to India, I went to Dharmsala in the north where the Dalai Lama has his headquarters. I arrived just in time for sixteen four-hour public lectures by His Holiness on Dzong-ka-ba's *Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path* and was fascinated to find that this reincarnated Lama was not only highly educated but also extremely practical. I had no intention of staying in Dharmsala, but the single figure of the Dalai Lama kept me there, coming back to his audience room again and again to ask my most difficult questions on the philosophy and practice of emptiness. His answers were illuminating to say the least, and after six months he had answered my questions to the point where I had no more to ask—a state which I frankly had had no hope of achieving. I had the good fortune to attend lectures by
His Holiness on Nagarjuna’s Six Collections of Reasonings during which he gave the oral transmission and explanation. His Holiness commissioned me to translate Nagarjuna’s Precious Garland (RatnavalT) along with a short poem by the Seventh Dalai Lama, The Song of the Four Mindfulnesses, and his own short treatise on emptiness, Key to the Middle Way, as well as his The Buddhism of Tibet. (These have been published as the first two volumes of the Wisdom of Tibet Series.) I had many interviews with the Dalai Lama about the translations, and the discovery that he was to my sight utterly worthy of being the spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet defied my cynical sense of world order.

While in Dharmasala, I also studied a Nying-ma-ba presentation of tenets as found in the first part of the Precious Treasury of the Supreme Vehicle (Thegpa'i mchog rinpo che mdzod) by Longchen-rap-jam (kLong-chen-rab-'byams, 1308-63) with the Nying-ma-ba lama Khetsun Sango. In addition, later when Khetsun Sango visited the University of Virginia in 1974, we read Longchen-ba’s presentation of the sutra schools in his Treasury of Tenets (Grubpa'imtha'rinpo che 'imdzod). Khetsun Sango also had acquired a photographic reprint of the Sa-gya-ba Dak-tsang’s (sTag-tshang, born 1405) Understanding All Tenets, which in 1972 was otherwise unavailable. A reading of it revealed how much Jam-yang-shay-ba relied on the very text that he was primarily refuting and showed the continuity of tradition between Sa-gya and Ge-luk.

Contact with a Ga-gyu-ba presentation of Madhyamika was gained through reading parts of a commentary on Chandrakirti’s Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s ‘Treatise on the Middle Way’ by Mi-gyo-dor-jay (Mi-bskyod-rdo-rje, 1507-54), the eighth Karma-ba. Acquaintance gained in this way with Nying-ma, Sa-gya, and Ga-gyu interpretations was crucial to understanding Jam-yang-shay-ba’s presentation in that it provided the historical background of many positions.

Though those texts contributed greatly to my understanding, this book primarily presents a particular interpretation within the Ge-luk-ba order with an aim of imparting a sense of a living
system that affects the outlook, meditation, and goals of its scholar-yogi adherents. Thus, this book is not framed as an argument; still, through the stylistic choice of points of emphasis there is an implicit argument against accepting many modern views on Madhyamika as applying to all interpretations of that system. Almost all contemporary renderings of Madhyamika run contrary to Ge-luk-ha authors such as Jam-yang-shay-ba on many central points. It should be clear by the end of this book that the traditional interpretation given here does not agree with, and in fact refutes, all of the following positions with respect to Prasangika-Madhyamika:

1. Their outlook is nihilistic, agnostic, or sceptic.
2. They are anti-reason.
3. The uncommon view of the system is that words are inadequate to evoke an experience of objects like that of direct perception.
4. They have no system, no views on cause and effect or rebirth, no positive theses, and no negative theses.
5. They are merely debaters.
6. Wisdom is emptiness.
7. Wisdom is contentless.
8. Emptiness is the Absolute.
9. The two truths are two ways of viewing the same object.
10. That objects possess a definite nature is the object of negation in the view of emptiness.
11. Their system is a turning away from philosophical analysis to the vulgar views of the world.
12. All views are bad.
13. Withdrawal from thought is the best meditation. Or, words are enemies. Or, the source of all suffering is words.
14. Reasoning is used only to refute other systems.
15. What is seen in direct sense perception is the truth; what the senses reveal cannot be denied in any way; one must appreciate the uncommon thingness of each phenomenon as its suchness.
16. Direct perception of suchness requires a leap.
There is no I at all.
The selflessness of persons denies the existence of persons.
Conventional truths are established only by ignorance.
Conceptuality is ignorance.
Nagarjuna’s ‘Treatise on the Middle Way’ must be viewed in isolation.
Emptiness does not exist.
Form is one with emptiness.
Nagarjuna did not set forth the path.
Teachings about the path are for those of low intelligence.
Dependent-arising and emptiness are one.
Emptiness and dependent-arising are a paradox.
None of the Hinayana categories are accepted.
Analysis is not meditation.
Meditation is just stabilization.
Phenomena are whatever one thinks they are.
Conventional truths are negated by ultimate truths.

The dependent-arising of this presentation of meditation on emptiness is itself a demonstration of Buddha’s focal teaching, of his ‘slogan’, as the Dalai Lama put it, of dependent-arising. My aim is not to present original reflections on emptiness but to portray as well as I can how emptiness is a practical force within the Gelukpa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. The material is largely drawn from the oral explanations which I have received and from Jam-yang-shay-ba’s ‘Great Exposition of Tenets’ and ‘Great Exposition of the Middle Way’ as well as Jang-gya’s (‘ICang-skya, 1717-86) ‘Presentation of Tenets (Grub mtha’i mam gzhag).’ The flavor of the oral tradition is presented with a view to capturing how the doctrine of emptiness figures in the lives of the practitioners who embody it.
Technical Note

Renderings of the Tibetan alphabet in roman letters are almost as numerous as the scholars who have worked with Tibetan. However, Turrell Wylie, after careful analysis, has set forth in a reasoned presentation ('A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription', HJAS, Vol. 22, pp.261-7, 1959) a simple system capable of representing the letters of the Tibetan alphabet. Therefore, his system is followed here (except in that the first pronounced letter is capitalized in names).

As he says, his is only a system of transliteration, not aimed at facilitating pronunciation and, therefore, is restricted in this book to parenthetical citation, glossary, and bibliography. Tibetan names must be rendered in a pronounceable form if Tibetan Buddhist studies are to rise out of the arcane, and thus it is necessary to devise a system specifically for that purpose, not seeking a form reconstructable into Tibetan (which has many unpronounced letters). Again, practically everyone who has worked with Tibetan has attempted this, though some have either given up or not even tried, opting instead for the unpronounceable transliteration form. This writer has long thought that if Tibetan names could be written in a simple pronounceable form, people unfamiliar with the language could remember
Meditation on Emptiness

them, as a consequence of which Tibetan Buddhism would not seem so distant. The one obstacle has been that several names are already known in a misleading form. For instance, the capital of Tibet is Hla-sa, pronounced with the 'b' first, though it has almost always been spelled Lhasa. Indeed, this is like the English word 'where' in which 'h' is pronounced first, but it seems unlikely that anyone would think to do this for 'Lhasa'.

Also, due to the fact that most transliteration systems treat the first, fifth, ninth, thirteenth, and seventeenth letters of the Tibetan alphabet as ka, ca, ta, pa, and tsa, respectively, most writers have used these in the 'phonetic' form. Thinking that this might be due to a difference in dialect, this writer has been hesitant to interfere with this policy; however, it has been found that these letters are not pronounced this way in any Tibetan dialect. Rather, they are pronounced more like ga, ja, da, ba, and dza, the mark above the consonant indicating that the tone is 'high', meaning that the sound is pronounced not deep in the throat but higher or more forward and tending to be sharp and short.

The third, seventh, eleventh, fifteenth, and nineteenth letters (when they are in the root position with a head or a prefix) are pronounced ga, ja, da, ba, and dza in a low tone (which need not be indicated by a line underneath since these letters are usually pronounced that way in English). In a simple, easily pronounceable system of 'phonetics' for use in books and essays, but not for real phonetic spelling in the sense of including all minor variations, these English letters can indicate the Tibetan despite changes due to prefixed and headed letters.

Most writers have used kha, cha, tha, pha, and tsha for the second, sixth, tenth, fourteenth, and eighteenth letters, the 'b' indicating that these letters are aspirated (spoken with breath such that one can even feel it on the hand close to the mouth). However, it seems to this writer that ka, ta, pa, and tsa are aspirated in English anyway, or at least semi-aspirated, whereas kha etc. are both unfamiliar and confusing, frequently leading to mispronunciation—tha and pha being associated with those letters in English words such as 'thin' and 'phone'. Thus, it seems appropriate to delete 'b' from these letters.
This yields a table of conversion from transliteration to 'essay phonetics' as follows: (In each pair, the transliteration form is on the left and the 'essay phonetic' form on the right.)

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In this book, the 'essay phonetic' forms are used with the following refinements to reflect actual pronunciation: k and p are substituted for g and h in suffix position; nga, nya, na, ma, and la are used when these letters appear after a prefix or under another letter, as their pronunciation becomes high at that time; also, dbyang is rendered as yang and dbang as wang for the same reason.

For vowels, 'a' indicates the vowel sound of 'opt'; 'i', of 'it' or 'eat'; 'u', of 'soon'; 'ay', of 'bake'; 'e', of 'bet'; 'o', of 'boat'; and 'o' indicates the vowel sound of 'er' (minus the 'r').

The names of Tibetans and Mongolians who live in or have published in the West are spelled as they spell them. Aside from these, all other Tibetan names have been rendered in the system given above in order to bring their pronunciation more in accord with actual spoken Tibetan in the central dialect; the transliterated form of each name is given in the index.

The hyphens between syllables are retained in the 'essay phonetic' form so that the beginning and end of syllables can be easily distinguished.

Throughout the book 'cognize' and 'realize' are used synonymously to translate one Tibetan word, rtogs pa. Similarly, 'impute' and 'designate' both translate 'dogs pa, and thereby 'basis of imputation' and 'basis of designation' are interchangeably used for gdags gzhi. Also, nine Sanskrit words are treated as
English words, resulting in the dropping of their diacritics. These are Bodhisattva (hero with respect to contemplating enlightenment), Buddha (one who has awakened from the sleep of ignorance and spread his intelligence to all objects of knowledge), karma (action, and often also the predisposition established by an action), mandala (a divine circle—a deity’s body or the habitat of a deity), nirvana (passage beyond sorrow), sutra (abridged expression of profound meaning—the word of Buddha except for tantra), tantra (continuum, referring here to the continuum of words that express the topics of a base, path, or fruit continuum), vajra (best of stones, diamond, symbolizing an immutability or indivisibility of method and wisdom), and yogi (a meditator who has joined or yoked mental stability and insight). A glossary of key terms giving the Sanskrit and Tibetan equivalents is given at the end of the book.

The transliteration scheme for Sanskrit names and titles is aimed at easy pronunciation, using sh, sh, ch and chh rather than s, s, c and ch. With the first occurrence of each Indian title, the Sanskrit is given, if available. The full Sanskrit and Tibetan titles are to be found in the bibliography which is arranged alphabetically according to the English titles of sutras and according to the authors of other works.

Note to the 1996 edition

Please excuse the frequent appearance of "he" and "his" instead of "they" and "their" or "she" and "her." Although the book was written at a time when the convention was still to use the masculine for the generic, I do not consider convention to be an excuse. My heartfelt apologies.

J.H.
List of Abbreviations

(For the full entries of the Tibetan texts see the Bibliography.)

Alaya: Dzong-ka-ba's Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Points of the 'Afflicted Mind and Basis-of-All'
Ann: Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets'
Concentrations: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses
Dak: Dak-tsang's Revelation of All Tenets
Den-dar: Den-dar-hla-ram-bo's Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many
Gon: Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Precious Garland of Tenets
GM: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
GT: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Jang: Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Kay-drup: Kay-drup's General Presentation of the Tantra Sets, as found in Lessing and Wayman's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras (The Hague: Mouton, 1968)
Lectures: Pa-bong-ka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path
MHTL: Dr. Lokesh Chandrap's Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1963)
Meditation on Emptiness

P: *Tibetan Tripitaka* (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Foundation, 1956)


Toh: *A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons*, ed. by Prof. Hukuji Ui, and *A Catalogue of the Tohoku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism*, ed. by Prof. Yensho Kanakura (Sendai, Japan: 1934 and 1953)

Tu-gen: Tu-gen Lo-sang-cho-gyi-nyi-ma’s *Mirror of the Good Explanations*
Acknowledgements

I wish to express deep gratitude to the late Professor Richard Robinson who encouraged me to write this book on how the meditation of emptiness figures in a living tradition. Also, I wish to thank Anne Klein, Joe Wilson, and John Strong for reading the text at various stages and making many helpful suggestions. A great debt of gratitude is owed to Professor Richard B. Martin, South Asian Bibliographer at Alderman Library, University of Virginia, for extensive bibliographic assistance.

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Many thanks to Daniel Perdue and Gareth Sparham for their painstaking proofreading of the galleys. Also, the greatest gratitude is due Elizabeth Napper for countless editorial suggestions, making the index, and marking the galleys.
Part One
Meditation
Part One
Meditation
Krakuchchhanda: the first Buddha of this era
1 Purpose and Motivation

Sources
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets

The Perfection of Wisdom Sutras set forth emptiness as the final mode of existence of all phenomena.\(^1\) Nagarjuna explained the approaches to that emptiness, and Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti lucidly commented on Nagarjuna’s explanations in exact accordance with his thought. It is necessary to rely on the perfection of wisdom as these masters explain it, not only to attain omniscience, but even to attain liberation from cyclic existence. One who wishes to become a Hearer Superior, Solitary Realizer Superior, or Bodhisattva Superior must rely on this perfection of wisdom. The Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (A shtasahasrikāprajñāpāramī)\(^2\) says:

Subhuti, one who wishes to realize the enlightenment of a Hearer is to learn just this perfection of wisdom. Subhuti, one who wishes to realize the enlightenment of a Solitary Realizer is to learn just this perfection of wisdom.
The Bodhisattva, the Great Being who wishes to realize the supreme perfect complete enlightenment, is also to learn just this perfection of wisdom.

Nagarjuna’s works teach that realization of the subtle emptiness of all phenomena is a prerequisite for the path of liberation from cyclic existence. His *Precious Garland* (35ab) says:

As long as the aggregates are [misconceived],
So long is there [misconception of an I].

One cannot free oneself from cyclic existence merely through cognition of the coarse selflessness of the person. One must realize the final subtle suchness of the person and of the mental and physical aggregates.

One must eradicate the innate non-analytical intellect that misconceives the nature of the person and other phenomena. It is not sufficient merely to withdraw the mind from conceiving a self of persons and of phenomena, or merely to stop the mind’s wandering to objects, for these do not constitute realization of emptiness. If they did, then deep sleep and fainting would absurdly involve realization of emptiness. Aryadeva says:

When selflessness is seen in objects,
The seeds of cyclic existence are destroyed.

Chandrakirti says in his *Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle Way’* (VI 16):

[Extreme] conceptions arise with [the conception of inherently existent] phenomena.
It has been thoroughly analyzed how phenomena do not [inherently] exist;
When [the conception of an inherently existent] phenomenon does not exist,
These [extreme conceptions] do not arise, just as there is no fire when there is no fuel.

Bhavaviveka says:

With the mind in meditative equipoise,
Wisdom analyzes in this way
The entities of these phenomena
Apprehended conventionally.

Shantideva says:
When one has searched [for these] as realities,
Who desires and what is desired?

Dharmakirti says:
Without disbelieving the object of this [misconception]
It is impossible to abandon [misconceiving it].

With one voice all the Mahayana masters proclaim that analysis of objects, and not mere withdrawal of the mind from them, is the path to liberation.
One must analyze well whether the inherent existence of phenomena, as it is conceived by the innate non-analytical intellect, exists or not. Through reasoning and scriptural citation one must ascertain that objects do not exist as conceived and penetratively understand the falseness of inherent existence. It is very important to analyze again and again with discriminating wisdom. The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra (Sama-dhiraja) says:

If the selflessness of phenomena is analyzed
And if this analysis is cultivated,
It causes the effect of attaining nirvana.
Through no other cause does one come to peace.

The Cloud of Jewels Sutra (Ratnamegha) says, ‘Analyzing through special insight and realizing the lack of inherent existence constitute understanding of the signless.’ The Questions of Brahma Sutra (Brahmapariprcchcha) says, ‘The intelligent are those who correctly analyze phenomena individually.’

The great Mahayana masters taught many forms of reasoning, directed toward the ascertainment of suchness, in order to illuminate the path of liberation for the fortunate and not for the sake of mere disputation. Drong-ka-ba says, ‘All of the analytical
Meditation on Emptiness

reasonings set forth in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakashastra) are only for the sake of sentient beings' attaining liberation. The wish to attain liberation from cyclic existence is the motivation for entering into analysis of phenomena and attaining realization of emptiness.

Among Buddhist practitioners, those of lesser capacity enter into religious practice for the sake of attaining a happy migration in a future life. They have seen the sufferings of bad migrations and seek to avoid pain through endeavor at virtue. One cannot make effort at religious practice merely for the sake of improving the present lifetime and be considered a practitioner of Buddhism; at least, a Buddhist's motivation is aimed at attaining a happy migration as a human or a god in a future life. Others, who have greater capacity, seek to leave cyclic existence completely. They see that the attainment of a happy migration in the next life is not sufficient because they must still grow old, become sick, die, and be reborn again in accordance with their former deeds. Their motivation for practice is the wish to attain liberation from cyclic existence for themselves. Still others, who have even higher capacity, realize the extent of their own suffering, infer the suffering of others, and practice so that they may become free from cyclic existence and attain Buddhahood in order to help all sentient beings to do the same.

Thus, it is very important that a motivation be stated verbally and explicitly before meditation:

I am meditating on emptiness and analyzing phenomena in order to attain liberation from cyclic existence and omniscience so that I may help all sentient beings to do the same.

The other possible motivation is:

I am meditating on emptiness and analyzing phenomena in order to attain liberation from cyclic existence.

The former is far more powerful because, through it, the meditation is related to all sentient beings. The force of the meditation increases as many times as the beings with whom it is related.
Emptiness itself is a very powerful object of meditation. Aryadeva says:

Those of little merit would not even
Have doubts about this doctrine [of emptiness].
Even suspicion [that objects are empty]
Wrecks [the seeds of] cyclic existence.

Even a suspicion that emptiness—the lack of inherent existence—is the mode of being of phenomena disturbs the very causes that produce the rounds of powerless suffering. For, when one has such suspicion, the actual mode of being of objects acts for the slightest bit as an object of one's mind. Dzong-ka-ba says:

Aspirational prayers should be made for the ability to
listen to the treatises on the profound [emptiness], to
memorize them, to think about their meaning, to medi-
tate on them, and over the continuum of lives to have
faith in them, all without harming ascertainment of the
dependent-arising of cause and effect.

Jam-yang-shay-ba warns that though the transmission of the
Buddhist teaching to Tibet was prophesied in sutra, it was also
prophesied that there would be few who would take the perfec-
tion of wisdom all the way through to the process of meditation. He says there are many who memorize the words and many who propound the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras but few who actually achieve the perfection of wisdom. He adds that there are uncountable numbers who through the force of the five ruina-
tions do not want to meditate on emptiness but still claim to
meditate on the 'natural mind' or something other than empti-
ness that lacks the elaborations of duality. Since 'natural mind',
'freedom from the elaborations of duality', and so forth are none
other than emptiness itself, and since it is meditation on empti-
ness that puts an end to the elaborations of misconception, it is
mistaken to think that there is another final object of meditation.
The various teachings that Buddha does not even abide in the
middle way, or that Buddha ultimately does not even teach
emptiness must be understood as referring to his not abiding
in, or his not teaching, an inherently existent middle way, or inherently existent emptiness.

Those who actually do not meditate on emptiness but claim to do so mistakenly think that merely by withdrawing the mind from objects and by ceasing thought they can realize the suchness of phenomena. Rather, analysis is the very foundation of meditation on emptiness.
2 Self: The Opposite of Selflessness

Sources
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Corresponding section of the translation pp.625-36

Emptiness in all four Buddhist schools is a 'self-emptiness', but this does not mean that objects are empty of themselves.1 If objects were empty of themselves, then no object, not even an emptiness, would exist. Rather, 'self-emptiness' in the Prasangika system specifically refers to an object's lack of its own inherent existence.

The term 'self-emptiness' distinguishes the Buddhist emptiness from systems such as Samkhya, which assert that the person is empty of being the various other objects of the world. Such an emptiness is an 'other-emptiness', and realization of it is attained through distinguishing one thing from another, as in the case of distinguishing the person (purusha) from the nature (prakrti) that gives rise to all appearances according to the Samkhya system. Realization of a 'self-emptiness', on the other hand, involves distinguishing the absence of a false predicate of an object, for example, the absence of its own inherent existence,
and does not involve distinguishing one entity from another entity. Still, when emptiness is cognized directly, the objects that are the bases of the quality of emptiness do not appear to the mind. Based on this, some, including the Jo-nang-bas of Tibet, misinterpreted the Buddhist emptiness as an 'other-emptiness'. That which is negated in the Prasangikas' subtle theory of selflessness is self, defined as inherent existence. The hypothetical synonyms of self in the Prasangika system are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Synonym</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>true establishment (satya-siddhi/hava, bden par grub pa/dngos po)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>true existence (satya-sat, bden par yodpa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ultimate existence (paramartha-siddhi, don dam par gruh pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>existence as [its own] suchness (tattva-siddhi kho na nying du gruh pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>existence as [its own] reality (samyak-siddhi, yang dog par gruh pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>natural existence or existence by way of its own character (svalakshana-siddhi, rang gi mcdn nying kisy gruh pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>substantial existence (djayavya-sat, rdzash yod)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>existence able to establish itself (tshugs thub tu gruh pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>existence from the object's side [rather than being imputed from the subject's side] (svairi-siddhi, rang ngos nas gruh pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>objective existence (vishaya-siddhi) yul gyi steng nas gruh pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>existence through its own power (svairi-siddhi) rang dbang du gruh pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>existence in the object that receives designation (prajnapari-vishaya-siddhi, btags yul gyi steng nas gruh pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>existence right in the basis of designation (gdags gzhi'i go sa gnon pa'i tshul du yod pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>inherent existence (svabhava-siddhi, rang tzhin gyis gruh pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>existence through its own entity (svabhavuta-siddhi, ngo bo nying gyis gruh pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>existence in the manner of covering its basis of designation (gdags gzhi'i go sa gnon pa'i tshul du yod pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>existence from the side of the basis of designation (gdags gzhi'i ngos nas gruh pa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Self: The Opposite of Selflessness

The members of this list are only ‘hypothetical’ synonyms because in Buddhist logic ‘synonym’ (ekartha) means ‘one object’, and thus all synonyms necessarily exist. Since these terms for ‘self’ refer to non-existents, they can only be ‘hypothetical’ synonyms.

The subtle self that is negated in the Prasangika view of selflessness implies an independent entity; thus, all these terms are opposites of dependent-arising. Each illuminates a little more the meaning of non-dependence. For instance, ‘existing from the side of the basis of designation’ means that if one searched to find the object designated, one would find it either among the bases of designation, or as their composite, or as the composite of their former and later moments. ‘Substantially existent’ means not existing through the force of expressions but existing through the object’s own power. ‘Existing able to establish itself means not established through the force of terms and expressions but existing in the object’s basis of designation by way of the object’s own entity. ‘Existing through its own power’ means existing through the object’s own particular mode of being.

The Prasangikas’ unique meaning of ‘dependence’ is ‘establishment through the power of a designating consciousness’. Phenomena depend on thought in the sense that only if the thought that designates an object exists, can that object be posited as existing (conventionally), and if the thought that designates an object does not exist, the (conventional) existence of that object cannot be posited. Since this applies to all objects, nothing exists inherently.

It is similar to the imputation of a snake to a rope. If a speckled and coiled rope is not seen clearly, the thought can arise, ‘This is a snake’. At that time, the composite of the parts of the rope and the parts themselves cannot at all be posited as a snake; the snake is only imputed by thought. In the same way, when in dependence upon the mental and physical aggregates the thought ‘I’ arises, the composite of the former and later moments of the continuum of the aggregates, or the composite of the aggregates at one time, or the individual aggregates themselves cannot in the least be posited as the I. Also, there is nothing that is a separate
Meditation on Emptiness

entity from the aggregates or their composite which can be apprehended as I. Therefore, the I is only established by thought in dependence on the aggregates and does not exist inherently, as it appears to do.

The same type of analysis can be applied to a person and his/her relationship to the six constituents that are his/her bases of imputation or designation—earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness. A person is not a collection of these, nor any of them individually, nor anything separate from them. A person is thereby shown not to exist inherently.

Prasangika is the only school that accepts all the above mentioned terms as synonyms; the non-Prasangika schools do not attach the same significance to these terms and thus organize them differently (see Chart 1). For instance, the Chittamatrins certainly would not say that dependent phenomena (paratantra) are independent just because they inherently exist; for them ‘inherent existence’ merely means that objects have their own mode of being. The Prasangikas, however, answer that the very words, ‘inherent existence’ or ‘own mode of being’, imply independence.

Also, the non-Prasangikas say that if phenomena were only designated in the sense of being unfindable among their bases of designation, they would not exist at all because the unfindable could not possibly be functional. However, for the Prasangikas the other schools have missed the meaning of ‘only designated’ or ‘only imputed’ (prajnapti-matra, btags pa tsam); Prasangikas say that although this term means that the object designated is not its basis of designation, it does not imply non-functionality. It is a central but difficult point of the Prasangika-Madhyamika system that what is merely designated can be functional, just as a girl created by a magician can attract an unwitting audience.

It is said that often when a yogi thinks he is progressing in understanding the presentation of emptiness, he loses ground in understanding the presentation of conventional objects and that often when he thinks he is progressing in understanding the presentation of conventional objects, he loses ground in understanding the presentation of emptiness. It must be borne in
Chart 1: Modes of Existence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ultimate existence</td>
<td>true establishment</td>
<td>natural existence</td>
<td>inherent existence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paramartha-siddhi</td>
<td>satya-siddhi</td>
<td>svalakshana-siddhi</td>
<td>svabhāva-siddhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>don dam par grub pa</td>
<td>bden par grub pa</td>
<td>rang gi mtshan nyid</td>
<td>rang bzhin gyis grub pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existence as [its own]</td>
<td>suchness</td>
<td>kyis grub pa</td>
<td>(the object’s) side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tattva-siddhi</td>
<td></td>
<td>svarupa-siddhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>de kho na nyid du</td>
<td></td>
<td>rang ngos nas grub pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>grub pa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existence as [its own]</td>
<td>reality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>samyak-siddhi</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yang dag par grub pa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>true existence</td>
<td>satya-sat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bden par yod. pa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Prāṣāṅgikas view all four columns as equally non-existent, ultimately and conventionally. The Svātāntrikas find columns one and two the same, denying these of all phenomena both ultimately and conventionally; they find columns three and four the same, affirming these conventionally for all phenomena, but not ultimately. The Chittarmatrins affirm all four columns for emptiness and impermanent phenomena and deny the first three columns, but not the fourth, for imputed existents such as space. The Sautrāntikas Following Reasoning affirm all four columns for impermanent phenomena and deny the first three, but not the fourth, for permanent phenomena. The Vaibhāṣikas affirm all four columns for ultimate truths, such as partless particles and partless moments of consciousness; however, they affirm only the second, third, and fourth columns for conventional truths, such as tables and houses.
mind that for one who has found the Prasangika view, progress in the presentation of emptiness aids in the presentation of conventional objects and progress in the presentation of conventional objects aids in the presentation of emptiness.

Through refuting only inherent existence and not refuting mere existence, the Prasangikas avoid the extreme of annihilation. Through affirming only nominal existence and not affirming inherent existence they avoid the extreme of permanence. In other words, they describe precisely how things do and do not exist. The lack of even nominal or designated existence would be an extreme of annihilation—an extreme of non-existence—because objects do exist imputedly. Inherent existence would be an extreme of permanence—an extreme of existence—because objects do not inherently exist.

The extremes are no nominal existence, which would mean no existence whatsoever, and inherent existence—the first being 'finer' and the second being 'coarser' than the correct presentation. The main extreme conceptions, therefore, are the conception that things do not designatedly exist and the conception that things exist inherently. The extremes do not exist, but their conceptions do and can be destroyed.

Many think that the Prasangikas have fallen to an extreme of nihilism, being no different from the Nihilists who deny the existence of rebirth, and so forth. The Prasangikas themselves refuse any similarity; they say that one cannot ascertain the emptiness of former and later births through just the non-perception of former and later births. One must first identify what former and later births are and identify their existence. Then, through reasonings such as the present birth's becoming a past birth when the future birth becomes the present birth, one identifies that past, present, and future births are mutually dependent and thus do not exist inherently. Identifying that former and later births do not exist inherently, one ascertains the emptiness of births. Such identification both of the positive subject (births) and the negative predicate (non-inherent existence) is essential, for one cannot ascertain an emptiness just by seeing nothing.
The Nihilists referred to here are the Dialectician Nihilists and not the Meditating Nihilists, for some of the latter attain meditative clairvoyance and thereby realize a limited number of former and future births. The Dialectician Nihilists assert that future lives do not exist because no one is seen to come here to this life from a former life and no one is seen to go from this life to a future life. The Madhyamikas, on the other hand, assert that future lives do not exist inherently because they are dependent-arisings or, in other words, because they are designated by terms and thoughts. However, they do not deny the existence of former and future lives. Both the theses and the reasons of the Nihilists and the Madhyamikas are very different.
Kanakamuni: the second Buddha of this era
3 Meditation: Identifying Self

Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets*
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jung-gya's *Presentation of Tenets*
The Fifth Dalai Lama's *Sacred Word of ManjushrT*
Kay-drup's *Manual of Instructions on the View*
Ling Rinbochay's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.684-5

Jam-yang-shay-ba delineates five stages in meditation on emptiness.12 These outline the progress of one newly developing the powers of meditation:

1. how a beginner develops experience with respect to the view of emptiness
2. how to cultivate a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding
3. how to cultivate actual special insight based on actual calm abiding
4. how to cultivate direct cognition of emptiness
5. how to meditate on emptiness during the second stage of Highest Yoga Tantra.
FIRST STAGE OF MEDITATION ON EMPTINESS
How a beginner develops experience with respect to the view of emptiness

During the first stage a yogi gains an initial familiarity with the meaning of emptiness through one of several reasonings. He proceeds through three basic essentials in meditation: identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness, ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason, and establishing the reason's presence in the subject.

The initial object of meditation is the selflessness of the person; the reasoning used is the sevenfold reasoning as set forth by Chandrakirti.

1 Identifying the object negated in the theory of selflessness
First, one concentrates and clears one's mind. Sitting quietly, one waits for the I to appear. If it does not, an appearance of it is created by thinking 'I', and with a subtle type of consciousness one watches the appearance.

If the consciousness that watches the appearance is too strong, one will not see the I, or it will appear and quickly disappear. Therefore, one should allow the consciousness conceiving I to be generated continuously, and through watching this I as if from a corner, one will gain a firm sense of it.

One could also imagine that one is being accused, even falsely, and watch the sense of I. One could remember an incident of false accusation, during which one thought, 'I did not do this, I am being wrongly accused.' By watching the I who is accused, a firm sense of the way that the non-analytical intellect apprehends I can be ascertained.

If the memory of such an accusation is not strong, a yogi cultivates it until the sense of I as misconceived by the innate non-analytical intellect is obvious. This innate mind does not analyze whether the I is the same as or different from mind and body. Without any reasoning and through the force of habituation, it conceives of an I that is as if self-sufficient, able to establish itself, naturally or inherently existent from the very start and fused with the appearance of mind and body.
Though such an I does not in reality exist, an image or concept of it does exist and will appear. It is initially difficult to identify the appearance of a concrete I, but in time it becomes obvious. Sometimes the I appears to be the breath, and sometimes the stomach as when one has an upset stomach and says, ‘I am sick.’ Sometimes the I appears to be the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or mental consciousness. In sum, the I appears at times to be physical and at times mental. The Fifth Dalai Lama says that in the end the appearance of the I and the appearance of the mind and body are as if mixed like water and milk, undifferentiated, but so clear as to seem graspable with the hand.

Dzong-ka-ba’s disciple Kay-drup says in his Manual of Instructions on the View:

If the mind thinking ‘I’ is not generated, you should fabricate the thought ‘I’ and immediately thereafter analyze its mode of appearance. You will thereby come to know its mode of appearance without mixing it with any other object. If you look gently from a corner without losing the consciousness thinking ‘I’, there is a separate mode of appearance of I to the consciousness which thinks ‘I’, and this appearance is not any of the mental and physical aggregates. The I does not appear to be just a nominal designation, but appears as if self-established. Through holding that the I exists the way it appears, you are bound in cyclic existence.

Can the I appear to be self-established if its appearance is undifferentiatedly mixed with that of mind and body? It would seem logically impossible for it to be self-established and yet mixed, but the innate intellect apprehending I does not analyze its object logically before, during, or after its apprehension. The appearance of a self-established I is mixed with the appearance of factors of mind and body but is not exactly the same. The present Dalai Lama’s Senior Tutor, Ling Rinbochay, said that if someone sticks a pin in your finger, you feel that the pin has been stuck in you and not just in your finger. You have a distinct sense of the I that is hurt.
In order to ascertain this appearance, it is extremely important to prolong subtle examination of it without letting it immediately disappear. Some teachers advise watching the I for a week or even months before proceeding to the second step.

It is interesting to note that the jiva or ‘limited individual being’ in Vedanta is often said to be the size of the thumb and located in the ‘heart’. In Vedanta the jiva is to be merged with the infinite self, Brahman, and in Buddhism the appearance of a concrete I is analyzed, found to be non-existent, and overcome, resulting eventually in a direct realization of emptiness in which the subject, the wisdom consciousness, is merged with its object, emptiness, like fresh water poured into fresh water.
4 Meditative Investigation

Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Corresponding section of the translation pp.687-94

2 Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason
The second of the three basic steps in meditation on the personal selflessness is the ascertainment that if the I exists the way it is conceived, then it must be either the same entity as the mental and physical aggregates or a different entity from those aggregates.7

If the I inherently exists, it must be either inherently the same entity as the aggregates or inherently a different entity from the aggregates. Sameness and difference of entity are mutually exclusive; if two things exist, they must be either the same or different. If the I is found to be neither inherently the same entity as the mind and body nor a different entity from them, then the I does not inherently exist.

Through the seven-fold reasoning, one attempts to infer that the I does not inherently exist as it appears to do. Such an inference cannot be generated if one has not ascertained that non-inherent existence pervades, or occurs with, every instance of not being
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inherently the same as or different from the aggregates. In other words, a yogi must realize that whatever is inherently neither the same entity as nor a different entity from its basis of designation does not inherently exist. One must come to a firm conclusion that there is no third possibility of concrete existence. When one does, one begins to doubt the existence of the self in much the same way as one starts to doubt an old friend.\(^\text{18}\)

3 Establishing the presence of the reasons in the subject

The seven-fold reasoning in brief is:

'I' do not inherently exist because of (i) not being the aggregates, (ii) not being an entity other than the aggregates, (iii) not being the base of the aggregates, (iv) not inherently being based on the aggregates, (v) not inherently possessing the aggregates, (vi) not being just the composite of the aggregates, and (vii) not being the shape of the aggregates.

The third step in meditation on emptiness—after identifying the inherently existent I and ascertaining that it must be either the same as or different from mind and body—is the establishment of the first reason as a quality of the I—proving that the I is not mind and body. Many reasons are suggested here, and each should be considered thoroughly until one is found which disturbs the notion that the I is mind and body.” (The reasonings are explained in detail in Part Two.)

i Establishing that the I is not mind and body

The I is not the mental and physical aggregates because then the assertion of an I would be senseless. ‘I’ would be just another name for the aggregates.

The I is not the aggregates because just as the aggregates are many, so the selves would be many, or just as the I is one, so the aggregates would be one.

The I is not the aggregates because the I would be produced and would disintegrate just as the aggregates are produced and disintegrate. The I is not inherently produced and does not
inherently disintegrate because if it did, memory of former births would be impossible. For, the two Fs of the different lifetimes would be unrelatedly different because they would be inherently other.

The I is not inherently produced and does not inherently disintegrate because then deeds done (karma) would be wasted as there would be no transmission of the potencies accumulated from actions since the Fs of the different lifetimes would be unrelated others.

The I is not inherently produced and does not inherently disintegrate because the I would meet with the results of actions not done by itself. If, on the other hand, the potencies accumulated from actions were transmitted, an I which was totally different from the I that committed the deeds would undergo the results of those deeds.

ii Establishing that the I is not different from mind and body
The I is not an entity other than mind and body because if it were, the I would not have the character of the aggregates, such as production, disintegration, abiding, form, experiencing, and realizing objects.

The I is not a separate entity from the mental and physical aggregates because if it were, there would be no basis for the designation I. The I would be a non-product, and non-products are changeless whereas the I obviously changes.

The I is not a separate entity from the aggregates because if it were, there would be no object to be apprehended as I. The I would be a non-product like nirvana or a non-existent like a flower in the sky.

The I is not a separate entity from the aggregates because if it were, the I would be apprehendable apart from the aggregates just as the character of form is apprehendable separate from the character of consciousness. But it is not.

iii Establishing that the I is not the base of mind and body
The I is not inherently the base of the mental and physical aggregates like a bowl for yogurt or like snow that exists throughout and surrounds a forest of trees because if it were, the I and the
aggregates would be different entities. This has already been refuted in the second reasoning.

iv Establishing that mind and body are not the base of I
The I is not inherently based on the aggregates like a person living in a tent or like a lion living in a forest because if it were, the I and the aggregates would be different entities. This has already been refuted in the second reasoning.

v Establishing that the I does not inherently possess mind and body
The I does not inherently possess the aggregates in the way that a person possesses a cow because if it did, the I and the aggregates would be different entities. The I does not inherently possess the aggregates in the way that a person possesses his body or a tree its core because then the I and the aggregates would inherently be the same entity. These positions have already been refuted in the second and first reasonings.

vi Establishing that the I is not the composite of mind and body
The I is not just the composite of the aggregates because the aggregates are the basis of the designation I and an object designated is not its basis of designation. The I is not the composite of the aggregates because the composite of the aggregates does not inherently exist; if the composite of the aggregates were inherently one with the aggregates, the composites would be many like the aggregates, or the aggregates would be one like the composite. Also, if the composite of the aggregates were a different entity from the aggregates, it would be apprehendable apart from the aggregates and would not have the character of the aggregates. But this is not so.

vii Establishing that the I is not the shape of the body
The I is not the shape of the body because shape is physical and if the I were merely physical, it would not be conscious. Also, the shape of the body does not inherently exist because it is a composite of the shapes of the limbs of the body.

Without any further cogitation, one realizes that the I does not
inherently exist. One has already ascertained that non-inherent existence follows if a phenomenon is in none of these seven relationships with its bases of designation, and now one has seen that the I and body and mind can have none of these seven relationships. Therefore, the I does not exist as a concrete entity as it is perceived.

For beginners it is necessary to become acquainted with the reasoning over a long period of time before an understanding of emptiness can be generated. However, reasons do not require endless establishment because if every reason had to be established by another reason, one would never realize the main thesis. The reasons are established to a point where experience manifestly establishes them. If a person lacks this experience, it is necessary to seek other means, such as examples, to gain the necessary experience that establishes the reasons.
5 Dependent-Arising

Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Ngo-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Corresponding sections of the translation pp.673-6

If a yogi is directed by his guru to meditate on the non-inherent existence of the I through the reasoning of dependent-arising, he would meditate on the thought:

I do not inherently exist because of being a dependent-arising.

The meditation has three steps:

1. Identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness
   This step is the same as that described in chapter three for the sevenfold reasoning. The yogi identifies the appearance of an I as if it covers its bases of designation and identifies how the mind assents to this appearance.

2. Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason
   One ascertains that whatever is a dependent-arising does not
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inherently exist because inherent or independent existence is the opposite of dependent-arising.

3. Establishing the presence of the reason in the subject

The I is a dependent-arising because of being produced by contaminated actions and afflictions since the life of a being in cyclic existence is created by predispositions established by an action motivated by ignorance. (Even the virtuous deeds that give rise to happy migrations and the non-moving deeds that give rise to lives in the form and formless realms are motivated by ignorance with respect to the nature of the person.) The I is a dependent-arising because of achieving its entity in dependence on its parts—its former and later moments, mind and body, and so forth. The I is a dependent-arising because of being imputed in dependence on a consciousness that designates, 'I'.

Without any further cogitation one cognizes that the I does not inherently exist because one has previously ascertained that whatever is a dependent-arising does not inherently exist and has now established the presence of the reason—being a dependent-arising—in the subject I. The brevity of the reasoning of dependent-arising illustrates why yogis initially use the sevenfold reasoning, which reveals in detail how the I cannot be found under analysis. The sign of dependent-arising is sufficient to show that the subject cannot be found under analysis; however, repeated investigation of dependent-arising is required before it is seen that analytical unfindability or non-inherent existence is concomitant with being a dependent-arising.

The reasoning of dependent-arising is also used for phenomena other than persons, such as the body:

The body does not inherently exist because of being a dependent-arising.

1. Identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness

One identifies an appearance of body wherein it seems as if inherently existent and self-established within the context of being undifferentially mixed with the appearance of the five
limbs and trunk. It is an appearance of body as if it covers the five limbs and trunk.

2. **Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason**
Whatever is a dependent-arising does not inherently exist because inherent existence means that which exists in and of itself, independent of others.

3. **Establishing the presence of the reason in the subject**
The body is a dependent-arising because of being produced by the blood of the mother and the semen of the father. The body is a dependent-arising because of attaining its own entity in dependence on its parts—arms, legs, head, trunk, and so forth. The body is a dependent-arising because of being imputed in dependence on arms, legs, head, trunk, and so forth.

Without any further cogitation one realizes that the body does not inherently exist. Again, the brevity of the reasoning may not be sufficient for a beginner in which case one could turn to the sevenfold reasoning:

The body does not inherently exist because of (1) not being the arms, legs, etc., (2) not being a separate entity from the arms, legs, etc., (3) not being the base of the arms, legs, etc., (4) not inherently depending on the arms, legs, etc., (5) not inherently possessing the arms, legs, etc., (6) not being the composite of the arms, legs, etc., and (7) not being the shape of the arms, legs, etc.
If the diamond slivers are used as the mode of analysis, the meditation has six steps based on the thought:

1. Identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness
   This step is the same as in the last two meditations. The appearance of a body covering the limbs and trunk is mixed with the appearance of the limbs and trunk and yet appears to exist in itself, to exist concretely.

2. Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason
   Whatever is not produced from self, from inherently existent others, from both, or causelessly is not inherently produced because inherent production is limited to these four possibilities.
Production is either caused or uncaused; and, if caused, the only possibilities are that the causes are the same entity as the effect, or a different entity from the effect, or both.

3 Establishing the presence of the first reason in the subject
The body is not produced from self (from what is the same entity as itself) (a) because, if it were, its production would be senseless and endless, (b) because what already exists in something is not produced from that something, (c) because it would contradict what the world manifestly sees, and (d) because the producer and the produced would be one.

4 Establishing the presence of the second reason in the subject
The body is not produced from causes which are inherently existent others because if it were, the body could be produced from anything that was other than it. For, inherently existent others are non-related others since otherness is their nature.

The body is not produced from causes which are inherently existent others because the body and its causes are not inherently existent others since the body does not exist simultaneously with its causes. For instance, the body at age ten does not exist simultaneously with the body at age five which is a cause of it. However, if cause and effect were inherently other, the body that is approaching production would have to exist at the time of the activity of its approaching production because this activity depends on it.

Also, for causes, such as the parents or the body of an earlier age, to be causes of the present body which are inherently other than it, the causes would still have to exist because it is in relation to the causes that the body is other. How can a thing be inherently other than a thing that does not exist?

5 Establishing the presence of the third reason in the subject
The body is not produced from both itself and others because all the fallacies of production from self and from other descend on such a theory.
6 Establishing the presence of the fourth reason in the subject
The body is not produced causelessly because then the copulation of the parents for the sake of conceiving a child would be senseless. The mother’s care of the child in the womb and later after birth would be senseless. Taking effort to nourish the body for the sake of future health would be senseless. For, the body would arise causelessly.

The body is not produced causelessly because if it were, a body could be produced even from a chair or a door, because everything would arise from everything.

The yogi first identified the body as a product and then saw that what is inherently produced must be produced according to one of four possibilities. Thus, upon the establishment of the four reasons as qualities of the body, he realizes without further cogitation that the body is not inherently produced. He then draws out the implications of this realization to include the cognition that the body does not inherently exist. For, if the body is a product and it is not inherently produced, it does not inherently exist.
Kāshyapa: the third Buddha of this era
7 Realization

Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den’s Annotations
Kensur Lekden’s oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.651-8

In the Prasangika system, the sevenfold reasoning, dependent-arising, and the diamond slivers are the three main forms of reasoning for establishing selflessness. Three other forms are the refutation of the four extreme types of production, the refutation of the four alternative types of production, and the reasoning establishing the lack of being one or many.

In the refutation of the four extreme types of production a yogi would most likely take a phenomenon included within the personal continuum such as body or mind, but he might also take as his subject an external phenomenon, such as an apple:

An apple is not inherently produced because (1) an existent is not inherently produced, (2) a non-existent is not inherently produced, (3) what is both existent and non-existent is not produced, and (4) that which is neither existent nor non-existent is not produced.
1 Identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness
The yogi identifies the appearance of an apple wherein the apple seems as if it exists there from its own side without being designated by the subject. The very appearance of an apple toward the subject is the appearance of an inherently existing apple.

2 Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason
Whatever product is not ultimately produced as an existent, a non-existent, what is both existent and non-existent, or what is neither is not inherently produced. For, the possibilities of the nature of an effect are limited to these four.

3 Establishing the presence of the first reason in the subject
An inherently existent apple is not produced because what inherently exists must always exist and thus there would be no need for it to be produced. Or, an apple which is in all ways existent at the time of its causes is not produced because causes and conditions cannot create anything that already exists.

4 Establishing the presence of the second reason in the subject
A non-existent apple is not produced because if it were, the horns of a rabbit or the hairs of a turtle could also be produced. Or, an apple is not newly inherently produced because of not existing at the time of its causes, as is the case with a lotus in the sky. For, whatever is inherently produced must always exist because if it did not exist at some time, it would always be inherently non-existent.

Also, an apple would have to exist at the time of its causes because the action of the apple’s approaching production exists simultaneously with the action of its causes’ approaching cessation. Since the apple is the base of the action of its approaching production, it must exist together with its action if the two are findable. Thus, the apple would have to exist at the time of the seed of the tree that produces it, but this is not the case.

5 Establishing the presence of the third reason in the subject
An apple that is both existent and non-existent is not produced because there is no such thing, since existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive.
Establishing the presence of the fourth reason in the subject

An apple that is neither existent nor non-existent is not produced because there is no such thing.

The yogi then realizes without further cogitation that an apple does not inherently exist; in other words, he knows that a concrete apple such as earlier appeared to his mind does not exist. A vacuity that is the negative of such an apple appears to his mind, and he remembers the meaning of this vacuity much as a man, who searched thoroughly for his prize bull in his four pastures and did not find it, would not forget the loss of his bull when he returned home.22

In the refutation of the four alternative types of production the subject meditated upon might be an eye consciousness:

An eye consciousness is not inherently produced because of not being a case (1) of one inherently producing one, (2) of many inherently producing one, (3) of one inherently producing many, or (4) of many inherently producing many.

1 Identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness

The yogi identifies the appearance of an eye consciousness as if it exists in its own right without dependence on designation by thought or terms, as if it exists covering the moments of consciousness which are its basis of imputation.

2 Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason

Whatever product is not a case of one producing one, many producing one, one producing many, or many producing many is not inherently produced because the possibilities of inherently existent production are limited to these four.

3 Establishing the presence of the first reason in the subject

An eye consciousness is not a case of one cause inherently producing one effect because if it were, two of the three aspects of an eye consciousness (being a conscious entity, having power with
respect to colors and shapes, and being generated in the image of its object) would be uncaused.

4 Establishing the presence of the second reason in the subject
An eye consciousness is not a case of many causes inherently producing one effect because if it were, only one of the three aspects of an eye consciousness would be produced.

5 Establishing the presence of the third reason in the subject
An eye consciousness is not a case of one cause producing many effects because if it were, the three aspects of an eye consciousness would not have individual causes.

6 Establishing the presence of the fourth reason in the subject
An eye consciousness is not a case of many causes producing many effects because if it were, the one general eye consciousness would be uncaused and its three aspects caused.

Thereby, the yogi without further cogitation realizes that an eye consciousness is not inherently produced and thus does not inherently exist. He absorbs the import of this realization, and if it becomes weaker, he performs the analysis again until the cognition of unfindability returns in force. He tries to become accustomed to this unfindability so that he will never think the opposite again.

The reasoning establishing the lack of being one or many has already been illustrated in the sevenfold reasoning in the sense that the I does not inherently exist because of not inherently being one with or different from the aggregates. However, another form of the reasoning establishing the lack of being one or many is illustrated here in the example of a house:

A house does not inherently exist because of not inherently being one and not inherently being many.

1 Identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness
The yogi calls to mind a house and identifies the appearance of the house as a whole existing in its own right. The inherently
existent house is what he might point to when pointing a house out to someone else. Findability is portability,\textsuperscript{23} and the yogi works for a long time to catch a sense of just what is being pointed out, knowing that it is important to stay with an appearance of inherent existence both so that it becomes well known and so that the ramifications of its absence can be felt.

2 \textit{Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason}
Whatever is neither inherently one nor inherently many does not inherently exist because these two positions exhaust all possibilities of inherently existent things. The yogi accustoms himself to this fact by considering hundreds of objects, such as house, boards, group, members, glass, mind, and so forth and seeing that from a specific point of view they are each either one or many. For instance, a group is definitely one from the point of view of the entity, group, and the members of a group are definitely many when considering the constituents of the group.

3 \textit{Establishing the presence of the first reason in the subject}
A house is not inherently one because of having parts. Whatever has parts cannot have an inherent nature of oneness because then a plurality of parts would be impossible.

4 \textit{Establishing the presence of the second reason in the subject}
A house is not inherently many because there is no inherently existent oneness. When a part of a composite is refuted, the composite which is composed of those parts is also refuted. Since the many is composed of ones, refuting inherently existent oneness refutes inherently existent manyness.

Through having ascertained the pervasion and having established the reasons as qualities of the subject, the yogi realizes without any further cogitation that a house does not inherently exist. He knows then that there is nothing he can actually point to when identifying a house. He knows that there is no house which covers its parts. He remains in the force of this realization as long as he can, not allowing the vacuity which is a negative of a pointable house to become a mere nothingness.
Meditation on Emptiness

The main object of meditation during the first stage of meditation on emptiness is the I. Through the sevenfold reasoning the yogi comes to realize that a self-established I, covering its bases of designation, does not exist at all anywhere at any time. He perceives an utter vacuity that is the absence of such an I, and he ascertains the mere elimination of the I that is negated in the view of selflessness with nothing positive in its place. He sustains this space-like realization, which is so called because just as space is the mere absence of obstructive contact, so the selflessness that he sees is the mere absence of such a self. When his certitude of the non-existence of an inherently existent I weakens, he again reflects a little on the reasoning and renews the strength of the view of the emptiness of a self-established I.

The yogi during this stage of meditation has generated an inferring consciousness that realizes the emptiness of the person, and this consciousness has no ascertainment of knower and the object known. All the elaborations of subject and object are said to disappear in the sense that a consciousness that infers emptiness does not ascertain subject and object; however, subject and object still appear at this time. Though appearing, they are not determined, for a consciousness inferring emptiness does not identify the object, emptiness, and the subject, the cognizing wisdom. The only phenomenon that is ascertained is the mere absence of a self-established I such as usually appears to the mind. It is not even thought, ‘This is emptiness.’

In an inferential realization of emptiness, an emptiness is cognized conceptually or through the medium of an image. Despite the profound nature of such inferential intuition, direct realization is yet to be attained.
8 Calm Abiding

Sources
Pa-bong-ka’s Lectures on the Stages of the Path
Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses
Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Tenets
Lati Rinbochay’s oral teachings
Geshe Gediin Lodro’s oral teachings

SECOND STAGE OF MEDITATION ON EMPTINESS
How to cultivate a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding

The second stage of meditation on emptiness is the mode of cultivating a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding. During it, the yogi achieves calm abiding, defined as a stabilization arisen from meditation and conjoined with special pliancy. Etymologically, calm abiding (shamatha, zhi gnas) is explained as the mind’s abiding (shana, zhi) on an internal object of observation upon the calming (shama, zhi) of distraction to the outside.
PREREQUISITES FOR ACHIEVING CALM ABIDING

The causal collections or prerequisites for achieving calm abiding are six.27

1. Staying in an agreeable place
This has five features:
   a. Good acquisitions. One needs easily obtainable sustenance not involving wrong livelihood or offerings from sinful persons.
   b. Salutary location. Staying in an area blessed by the presence of former holy persons affords blessings, but if such is not available, one should at least not stay where those who have lost their vows dwell, where the spiritual community has undergone disturbance, or where there are fierce animals, robbers, non-human evil spirits, and so forth.
   c. Salutary place. The place should not generate hot or cold diseases, and the area and water should be agreeable.
   d. Salutary friends. It is harmful for beginners to stay alone without friends, and thus one should have at least three companions whose views and behavior are concordant and whose presence promotes conscientiousness. Also, since sound is the thorn of concentration, one needs to be free of the sound of humans during the day and of dogs and water, etc., at night.
   e. Possession of the pleasant 'articles' of yoga. Through hearing and thinking one should eliminate false ideas with respect to the object of meditation and become skilled in the essentials of practice.

2. Few desires
One should not have desire for food, clothing, and so forth, either of good quality or in great quantity.

3. Knowing satisfaction
One should be satisfied with gaining only mediocre food and clothing, for if one is not and instead is attached to them, one will be distracted to the purposes of accumulating and keeping wealth, and meditative stabilization will not be generated.

4. Pure ethics
The pacification of subtle internal distraction depends on
abandoning coarse external distractions; hence, ill behavior of body and speech should be restrained and pacified through proper ethics, for if one is dominated by coarse discursiveness, one’s mind will not abide in a natural state.

5  Forsaking commotion
If commotion is not abandoned, time will be passed in senseless activities and conversation, etc. Thus, for the sake of generating concentration, one needs few purposes and few activities—this coming of its own accord if a meditator has few desires and knows satisfaction. For one-pointed practice, astrology, medical practice, prophecy, performing rites, and so forth must be forsaken. Also making effort at something of small purpose, such as a minor topic of scholarship, does not achieve the essential purpose, much like being attached to sugar-cane but not taking the sugar.

6  Thoroughly abandoning thoughts of desire and so forth
One must turn the mind away from these through contemplating their faults and reflecting on impermanence.

Pa-bong-ka states that if all these prerequisites are complete and one practices with effort, the achievement of calm abiding will not take more than six months.

THE OBJECT OF CALM ABIDING
Calm abiding must be achieved with respect to an internal or imagined object, and thus even when non-Buddhists use a pebble or stick as the object, these are only bases of later imagination by the mental consciousness; one cannot achieve calm abiding with the eye consciousness. The Buddhist scholar-yogi Nagabodhi, being unable to achieve progress with other objects, imagined that the horn of a buffalo had grown from his own head, since he was familiar with it; however, in general for a Buddhist not just any object is suitable. Rather, the object itself should aid in the process of eliminating the chief faults obstructing meditative stabilization, laxity and excitement. To aid in eliminating laxity, it should be easier, upon observing the object,
Meditation on Emptiness

to generate faith and enthusiasm, and to aid in eliminating excitement, it should be easier to hold the mind to that object and generate sobriety.

The object with respect to which calm abiding is achieved should possess a special purpose. Observation of emptiness, as here in the second stage of meditation on emptiness, has the special feature of facilitating generation of special insight, but emptiness—due to its profundity—is a difficult object for beginners. Unless memory of the realization of emptiness during the first stage remains firm, since one must temporarily forsake analysis and remain only in stabilizing meditation in order to achieve calm abiding, the ascertainment of emptiness can weaken to the point where one is no longer meditating on emptiness but on nothingness. Such meditation would only increase ignorance, and thus many choose a different object.

It is said that the desirous should concentrate on ugliness, reflecting on (1) the ugliness of pain, (2) the relative ugliness of the beautiful in dependence on something more beautiful, (3) the ugliness of the afflictions, (4) the ugliness of rapid disintegration, or (5) the ugliness of filthy substances. The hateful should concentrate on love, wishing help and happiness for friends, enemies, and neutral persons. The ignorant should concentrate on the dependent-arising of cyclic existence (see pp.275-83). The proud should concentrate on the six constituents in their own continuum—earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness (see p.627)—thereby overcoming the conception of the body as an amorphous whole and attaining a discrimination of ugliness by seeing the parts, such as fat; by this means pride is deflated. Those with too much discursiveness should concentrate on the inhalation and exhalation of breath. These five types of objects are called objects of observation for purifying behavior and have the special feature of facilitating the conquest of desire and so forth and thus aid in the generation of meditative stabilization.

Those in whom either desire, hatred, obscuration, pride or discursiveness predominate should choose an object as outlined above because without overcoming the vibrancy of the afflictions by way of those objects of observation, firm meditative
stabilization cannot be attained. Hence, the desirous temporarily should not use joy, love, or the like as the object of observation. Similarly, the hateful should not concentrate on suffering, and those with predominate discursiveness should not use bright objects, etc. A particular object of observation, however, is not specified for those whose afflictions are small or of equal strength; they may use any of these.

It is said that observation of the body of a Buddha is better than all others because it not only has the special feature of facilitating the achievement of meditative stabilization through its blessings but also has the special feature of completing the collections of merit as well as enhancing later cultivation of deity yoga in tantra. At the point when the object of observation—a Buddha body—becomes firm, ordinary appearances are replaced by pure appearances, and one sees a Buddha night and day; through this, one becomes a suitable vessel for Secret Mantra. Also, through a Buddha’s always appearing to the mind, one accumulates the merit of seeing a limitless number of Buddhas, whereby innumerable benefits, such as not being overcome by pain even in dire circumstances, arise.

Thus, in order to aid in the development of calm abiding, the yogi might not take emptiness as his object of observation. However, once the object is chosen, he would not switch from it to another until a fully qualified calm abiding has been achieved, much as one would not change the place of friction when trying to ignite a fire by rubbing two sticks together. During this period, continuous effort without, for instance, resting for a day or two, is required.

**FAULTS AND ANTIDOTES IN DEVELOPING CALM ABIDING**

In the process of developing calm abiding a yogi overcomes five faults through eight antidotes (see Chart 2).

1. **Laziness**

The first fault, laziness, involves either not wishing to engage in cultivating meditative stabilization or the inability to continue
Chart 2: Faults of Meditative Stabilization and their Antidotes

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<td>(anabhisamskara, 'du mi byed pa)</td>
<td>equanimity (upekshha, btang snyoms)</td>
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<td>[over-]application</td>
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the practice once begun. Laziness is of three types: indolence through attachment to sleep and so forth; adhering to non-virtuous activities of desire and so forth; and a sense of inadequacy, thinking, 'I cannot do this'. Thus, laziness is not just sluggishness but also the factor of enthusiasm for afflictions, as well as a false sense of inadequacy. The three types of laziness cause procrastination and are overcome through faith, aspiration, exertion, and pliancy.

Faith is mainly conviction in the qualities of meditative stabilization and its fruits, but also includes both the faith of clarity, which is a captivation with those qualities, and the faith that is the wish to attain those qualities. In order to attain faith in meditative stabilization, it is necessary to contemplate the disadvantages of
not having stabilization—such as losing the value of virtuous practice through distraction—and the advantages of having it—such as steadiness of mind whereby feats, clairvoyance, magical emanation, and so forth can be achieved. Also, with stabilization sleep turns into meditative stabilization, afflictions lessen, and spiritual paths are easily generated in the mental continuum. The faith that sees these qualities induces aspiration, which involves a seeking of meditative stabilization.

Aspiration, in turn, induces effort, which here is an enthusiasm for meditative stabilization, leading to exertion, which acts as the antidote to the three types of laziness. As will be explained later, exertion eventually generates a mental and physical pliancy or serviceability that is the final antidote to laziness.

2 Forgetting the advice

The second fault, forgetting the advice from one's lama on the object of meditation, means to lose the object of observation, the pole to which the elephant of the mind is being tied with the rope of mindfulness in order to be brought under control by the hook of introspection. Forgetfulness here is an afflicted mindfulness—taking to mind a non-virtuous object through the power of excitement, laxity, and so forth. It is overcome through mindfulness which is defined as having the function of non-forgetfulness with respect to a familiar phenomenon. This non-afflicted mindfulness has three features:

a. **Objective feature:** a familiar object. If emptiness is the object of observation, familiarity with it was gained during the first stage of meditation on emptiness; there, with realization of non-inherent existence, one 'found' the object. If, on the other hand, the body of a Buddha is the object of observation, familiarity is gained through repeated viewing of a picture or image and then causing it to appear to the mind.

b. **Subjective feature:** non-forgetfulness within observation of that object. With mindfulness, the aspects of the object appear continuously without forgetfulness, as in being mindful of food when hungry.
c. **Functional feature:** causing the mind not to scatter to other objects of observation.

One must hold to the object of observation with a tight mode of apprehension without distraction; only that object should appear to the mind.

3 **Non-identification of laxity and excitement**

Then, when mindfulness is able to hold the mind to the object of observation, the third fault, non-identification of laxity and excitement, arises. Laxity is defined as the mental factor of declination in the mind's mode of apprehension when cultivating virtue; it is an internal distraction, a depression in the intensity of the mind's clarity. In a coarse neutral form of laxity the object is not seen, as if one had entered into darkness. This is a time of suddenly losing the intensity of the factor of clarity, losing the object, and being unable to move the mind to any object; in this state, the mind abides in a subjective clarity, but without intensity, and is unable to remain on the object of observation. Another form of coarse laxity occurs when the mind has stability in the sense of abiding on its virtuous object of observation but lacks clarity; this is a virtuous form of laxity due to the mind's abiding on a virtuous object. Subtle laxity occurs when one has the stability of not losing the mode of apprehension of the object as well as clarity, but lacks an intensity of clarity due to having loosened the strength of the mode of apprehension.

Since both subtle laxity and actual meditative stabilization have stability and clarity, it is difficult to distinguish between the two. The factor distinguishing meditative stabilization, however, is an intensity of clarity. An absence of intensity refers to a looseness of mind and can occur within the stability of being able to stay on the object; firming of the factor of stability within this looseness acts as a cause of subtle laxity. Having an intensity of clarity, on the other hand, means that the mind dwells tightly on the object of observation. Having or not having this intensity is compared to loosely or tightly holding a bowl, or the difference between usual faith in a lama and the particularly strong faith that is occasionally generated when a tightening in the mode of apprehension occurs.
Since in a state of subtle laxity the movement of the breath in the nostrils can stop, resulting in a firm mind for even an entire day, some have mistaken this for meditative stabilization and have even advised loosening the mode of apprehension of the object. They have confused this with a similar occurrence in the stage of completion of Highest Yoga Tantra upon the entering, remaining, and dissolving of the winds in the central channel; in the latter, however, the movement of the abdomen also stops and profound states are induced. From mis-identifying subtle laxity as meditation, not only can the four concentrations and four formless absorptions not be achieved, but also in this lifetime itself forgetfulness will increase and wisdom diminish, resulting in cultivating—as if intentionally—the means of achieving rebirth as an animal.

Though lethargy and drowsiness can lead to laxity, laxity is neither of them. Lethargy is a heaviness of body and mind, included within obscuration and accompanying all root and secondary afflictions (see p.265), whereas laxity is a factor of withdrawal inside and thus cannot accompany the afflictions of desire, hatred, and so forth, which are distractions outside. Lethargy darkens and obscures the mind whereas laxity does not. However, the mention of laxity here as a fault in meditative stabilization implicitly includes lethargy, sleep, and so forth. Within laxity itself, two types are to be distinguished, one which is an over-withdrawal of the mind inside and another which is a mere diminishment of the mind’s mode of apprehension.

Excitement is a disquiet of the mind and scattering to an object of desire—mindfulness of a pleasant object, such as remembering at night a dance seen during the day. Since excitement is a secondary affliction included within the factor of desire, not all scatterings are instances of excitement, as when the mind scatters to an object of anger or even to another virtuous object. Although all scattering harms meditative stabilization and is implicitly included in the mention of excitement, it is not stated explicitly because those newly cultivating meditative stabilization are of the Desire Realm. They must mainly cease attachment to pleasant forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects whereas
scattering to virtuous or hated objects is less frequent and for shorter periods. However, when cultivating calm abiding, scattering to pleasant or unpleasant objects or to virtuous ones, such as becoming mindful of making donations, interrupts the stabilizing of the mind and, therefore, must be stopped.

Coarse excitement is a case of losing the object of observation in forgetfulness, whereas in subtle excitement the object is not lost but a corner of the mind is involved in fast-moving thought such that a pleasant object is about to appear to the mind. The state of subtle excitement is compared to water moving about under ice on a frozen river.

The antidote to non-identification of laxity and excitement is introspection that quickly recognizes them. Like a spy, introspection investigates and determines whether or not laxity and excitement have arisen. Constant cultivation of introspection would prevent stability; yet, if introspection were not cultivated at all, one would not know the faults that had already occurred, like allowing a thief to enter and carry off the wealth; therefore, one must prepare mindfulness beforehand and then occasionally initiate inspection of whether laxity and excitement have arrived or not. As in the example of (1) holding a cup of tea with the hand, (2) holding it firmly, and (3) investigating with the eye to see if it is tilted, (1) mindfulness holds to the object of observation, (2) the mode of apprehension is tightened, and (3) introspection analyzes whether laxity and excitement have arisen or not.

4 Non-application
When either laxity or excitement have arisen, non-application of their antidotes is a fault. Application—the mental factor of intention which here is an engagement in a virtuous object—is necessary as its antidote.

Antidotes to laxity: Since subtle laxity is a case of having both the stability of being able to remain on the object and subjective clarity but of lacking intensity, it is not necessary to leave the meditative session or switch to another object when it arises. Rather,
it is sufficient merely to tighten the mode of apprehension; however, if it is tightened too much, excitement will be generated, and thus a moderation of tightness and looseness is necessary, as is the case with the strings of a violin for achieving a pleasant sound. If one suspects that excitement is about to be generated, one should loosen the mode of apprehension a little, whereas if one suspects that laxity is about to be generated, one should tighten a little. The mid-point between these is known only through experience. However, just as there is greater danger from an enemy within one’s own circle because of the difficulty of identification, so there is greater danger of mistaking laxity for meditative stabilization, and thus tightness should be emphasized.

If, having tried to tighten the mind, one is unable to remove the fault of subtle laxity and experiences a lack of clarity in the mode of apprehension, coarse laxity has arrived. This is the fault of over-withdrawing the mind inside; to counter it, one should 'extend' the object a little, increasing it in brilliance or noticing its details. If this still does not remove laxity, one should leave the object of observation and invigorate this depressed mind by cultivating joy—reflecting on the difficulty of finding the meaningful life of leisure and fortune as a human, on the auspicious attributes of the Three Jewels, on the advantages of relying on a spiritual guide, or on the benefits of the altruistic intention to become enlightened. One can also take to mind a luminous object or imagine great acts of charity. If the mind heightens through such techniques and awakens, one should again apprehend the original object of observation. For those who are not used to these techniques, it is difficult for them to help immediately; however, for one who is familiar with them, contemplating, for instance, the difficulty of finding this meaningful life of leisure and fortune is like throwing cold water on the face.

However, if laxity is still not removed, one can use the forceful method of imagining one’s own mind as a drop of white light at the heart and with the sound ‘phat’ causing it to exit from the crown of the head, ascend high in the sphere of the sky, and mix undifferentiably with the sky.
If laxity is still not removed, one should leave the session and remove the causes that generate it—lethargy, sleep, darkened mind, and so forth—by staying in a cool area, going to a high place with a vast view, walking about, washing the face with cold water, and so forth. When, having done this, the mind has awakened, one should, as before, apprehend the object of observation.

**Antidotes to excitement.** Subtle excitement is a case of distraction within not losing the object; its arising is due to the fault of having tightened the mind too much, and thus one should loosen the mode of apprehension a little. If that does not help and one is still distracted, then coarser excitement has been generated. Since this is caused by a happy mind, one should not be too happy, for progress will be impeded, as was the case with Buddha's father who did not achieve the state of Stream Enterer due to being too happy at his son's success. At this point, it is not necessary to leave the session; rather, one should contemplate sources of sobriety, such as death, impermanence, cyclic existence, and the sufferings of bad migrations.

If excitement is still not removed, one can use a forceful method of eliminating it, such as observing the inhalation and exhalation of the breath when dominated by discursiveness; exhaling, one should think, 'Going there', and when inhaling, 'Coming here'. Or, one can mentally count the breaths, counting in rounds up to ten, back to one, up to ten, back to one, and so forth. If, though this is done, excitement is not eliminated, one should temporarily leave the session.

Since beginners can only remain in contact with the object of observation for short periods, initially one should meditate in brief sessions even eighteen times a day; in due course stability will be achieved of its own accord, at which time the session can be lengthened. It is important not to try at first to meditate for long periods; otherwise, upon sight of the meditation cushion, one will feel nausea and laziness. The session should be left while it is going well, when one still feels that it would go well if continued.
5 Over-application

When laxity and excitement have been eliminated, application of their antidotes is a fault preventing stability of mind; as its antidote one uses equanimity, that is, one desists from applying the techniques for pacifying laxity and excitement, such as invigorating the mind, withdrawing it inside, and so forth. This is a loosening of, or leaving off, the exertion involved in those antidotes—an equanimity that causes the mind to abide naturally on the object of observation accompanied by intense clarity. This occurs on the ninth state of mind (to be explained below) when one loosens the exertion of the introspection investigating whether laxity and excitement have arisen without, however, loosening either mindfulness or the intensity of the mode of apprehension of the object.

As Pa-bong-ka concludes:36

Having completed the prerequisites for calm abiding in a place having the five qualifications and so forth, one sits on a comfortable cushion [in a posture] having the seven features of Vairochana. A Shakyamuni, only a finger-length high, separates from the lama on one's head and is set in space [about six feet] in front of one's navel [or at eye level]. Initially, the object of observation will not be clear and one does not need to make it so. For if mere generalities of the parts—head, arms, legs and so forth—and a mere sense of flashing gold appear and if mindfulness keeps the mind undistractedly [on the object] without forgetfulness and with a tight mode of apprehension, this mode of sustaining [meditation] through such mindfulness alone contains all the ways of eliminating laxity and excitement. This is an unparalleled quintessential instruction to be held in the heart by great meditators, for the tight mode of apprehension eliminates laxity and non-distraction eliminates excitement.

If, when meditating this way, stability arises, then because one has come closer to laxity, one should be wary of it, [increasing] clarity and tightening the mode of
apprehension. However, if clarity arises, one is closer to excitement and thus should be wary of excitement and seek stability.

One should not pretend to be achieving meditative stabilization while not knowing what is needed to possess it; rather, one should definitely achieve a meditative stabilization possessing the two features of (1) stability in general but mainly (2) clarity with a tight mode of apprehension. As explained above in detail, mindfulness holds the object of observation without losing it, and at that time whether coarse or subtle laxity or excitement are about to arise, introspection immediately recognizes them, and they are stopped through directly relying on their specific antidotes. Then, when laxity and excitement are eliminated, one should not make the exertion of the antidotes but abide one-pointedly on the object of observation, sustaining it with great clarity that possesses intensity.

NINE STATES IN DEVELOPING CALM ABIDING

There are nine states or levels in the process of developing calm abiding (see Chart 3), of which the first two occur during the first stage of meditation on emptiness; the remaining seven occur during the second. Although actual meditative stabilization (samadhi) is associated with calm abiding, each of the preliminary nine states is called a meditative stabilization due to being an instance of the development of the mental factor with that name (see p.247).

1 Setting the mind

The first state is a meditative stabilization that, following the hearing of advice for meditation, withdraws the mind from all external objects of observation and aims it at an internal object. It is achieved through the power of hearing advice from a lama about an object of observation because initially one merely sets the mind on the object based on that advice, not from a natural
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familiarity gained by thinking on it again and again. Aside from only occasional placement on the object, the mind mostly cannot remain on it, and thus a continuum of setting cannot be established.

Through the force of engaging in investigating and analyzing what the mind is doing, one recognizes the mind’s becoming lost due to scattering and excitement and consequently has the sense that thoughts are increasing. However, thought has not actually become more manifold; it is just being identified.

If the emptiness of the I is used as the object, the wrong view of the inherent existence of the person predominates due to previous familiarity such that the correct view is actually only an occasional interruption in the stream of distraction.

2 Continuous setting
The second state is a meditative stabilization that involves an ability to lengthen a little the continuum of observing an object without distraction. It is achieved through the power of thought because, due to sustaining the continuum of tying the mind to the object of observation through repeated thought, one is for the first time able to extend that continuum a little. One can remain undistracted for the period that it would take to recite one hundred om manipadme hum. Still, distraction during this phase exceeds abiding on the object.

The first two states arise in the manner of forcible engagement since it is necessary to force or tighten the mind with striving. Despite this, laxity and excitement frequently and continuously arise, the one being generated after the other like a waterfall, such that the mind cannot be set in meditative stabilization.

During the second state one has the sense that thought is resting because it sometimes quiets and sometimes is generated. The difference between the first two states is that during the second the mind remains longer on the object of observation, be it the non-inherent existence of the person or the body of a Buddha, etc.

3 Re-setting or withdrawal and setting
The third state is a meditative stabilization that, due to slight
familiarity with the object of observation, returns or re-ties the mind to it through mindfulness’s immediate realization of distraction. Like putting a patch on cloth, the mind is returned to the continuum of observation through immediate recognition of distraction, which, therefore, is less frequent than in the previous state. This is the time when powerful mindfulness is generated, and thus the third state is said to be achieved through its power.

The difference between the second and third states is that the third involves a shorter continuum of distraction, and thus here ‘meditation’—from the trilogy of hearing, thinking, and meditating—begins, although in a looser sense one was meditating earlier. In the same vein, ‘analytical meditation’ is technically possible now even though analysis occurred earlier. However, since analysis at this point would obstruct attainment of calm abiding, the yogi does not analyze but instead attempts to remain one-pointedly on, as in the two examples, the emptiness realized analytically during the first stage of meditation or the body of a Buddha.

4 Close setting
The fourth state is a meditative stabilization that involves an improved stability of mind, its having been withdrawn from the vast array of objects by the power of mindfulness. During the previous state distraction was abandoned through recognizing it, and thus the mind is now, with effort, set just on its object. From having generated strong mindfulness, losing the object no longer occurs; thus, the fault of forgetting the lama's advice on the object no longer arises. This ability to remain on the object without losing it is the great difference between the third and fourth states.

The fourth state is achieved through the power of mindfulness because strong mindfulness is able to tie the mind closer and closer to its object of observation. With this state, like an adult, mindfulness has matured, or, in other words, its power has been completed. Although the object is never lost and thus coarse excitement has ceased, powerful laxity and excitement still occur; hence it is necessary to rely on their antidotes.
Disciplining

The fifth state is a meditative stabilization that involves a liking for meditative stabilization through having seen with experience its advantages. With the fulfillment of powerful mindfulness in the last state, introspection also becomes powerful, whereby it recognizes the faults of scattering to objects of discursiveness as well as secondary afflictions and does not allow such scattering. Thus, this state and the next are said to be achieved by the power of introspection.

Since during the fourth state the mind was strongly withdrawn inside, the danger of subtle laxity on the fifth is great. One must with powerful introspection distinguish subtle laxity and, through contemplating the advantages of meditative stabilization, revivify the mind. The withdrawal of the mind practiced over the first three stages culminates in the fourth with the ability to stay on the object, but this withdrawal itself proceeds too far, and now it is necessary to apply the antidotes to subtle laxity. Through contemplating the auspicious qualities of meditative stabilization, such as the resultant clairvoyances and the ability to penetrate the meaning of difficult topics such as emptiness, one takes joy in meditative stabilization. The difference between this and the former state is that now coarse laxity does not arise.

Pacifying

The sixth state is a meditative stabilization that stops distraction, knowing its faults through experience in dependence on introspection. Due to the mind's becoming overly invigorated during the fifth state, here on the sixth the danger of generating subtle excitement is great. Powerful introspection recognizes it, whereupon even subtle excitement is viewed as a fault and stopped. Thus, the difference between this and the former state is that now there is no great danger that subtle laxity will arise and the arising of subtle excitement is less frequent. During the sixth state the power of introspection becomes fully developed.

Thorough pacifying

The seventh state is a meditative stabilization that involves
enthusiasm for abandoning with exertion desirous attitudes, mental discomfort, lethargy, sleep, and so forth. Since the powers of mindfulness and introspection were fulfilled on earlier levels, it is difficult for laxity and excitement to arise; however, one must generate effort, view even subtle laxity and excitement as faults, and abandon them as much as possible. The difference between this and the former state is that here one does not need great qualms about the danger of coming under the influence of subtle laxity and excitement.

Whereas during the fifth and sixth states one has qualms that laxity and excitement could damage one's concentration, during the seventh, effort is able to stop them such that they cannot greatly interrupt the process. Thus, the seventh and eighth states are achieved by the power of effort in the sense that through exertion even subtle discursiveness and secondary afflictions are abandoned, whereby laxity and excitement cannot interrupt meditative stabilization.

Although during the third through seventh states one can remain for a considerable time in a continuum of meditative stabilization without generating laxity and excitement, laxity and excitement do interrupt again and again at least in a minor way, and thus these states are characterized by interrupted engagement. During the first two states the mind is more out of meditative stabilization than in it, and thus the designation 'interrupted engagement'—meaning an interruption of meditative stabilization—is not used with respect to them. Forcible engagement is specified for the first two states even though it occurs in the first seven, because the third through seventh also involve interrupted engagement.

8 Making one-pointed, or making continuous
The eighth state is a meditative stabilization that involves the ability of continuous placement in meditative stabilization for an entire session without interruption by laxity and excitement due to the exertion of applying their antidotes. At the beginning of the session one relies on a little exertion directed at maintaining mindfulness with respect to the antidotes to laxity and excitement.
whereby one is able to sustain the session without even subtle laxity or excitement during that period.

The eighth state is achieved through the power of this small effort, and because not even subtle laxity and excitement arise, the state is characterized by uninterrupted engagement. During the earlier states, the enemies—laxity and excitement—were powerful, then decreased in strength, and now have completely degenerated; therefore, it is no longer necessary to rely on the exertion of introspection analyzing whether laxity or excitement have or are about to arise. The difference between the seventh and eighth states is this absence of laxity and excitement.

9 Setting in equipoise

The ninth state is a meditative stabilization devoid of the activity of thought due to the fact that meditative stabilization shines forth of its own accord from familiarity, without depending on the striving and exertion of maintaining mindfulness of antidotes. It is achieved through the power of familiarity with one-pointedness during the eighth state such that one engages wholly in meditative stabilization spontaneously, without exertion. Thus, the ninth state is characterized by spontaneous engagement, like recitation by one trained in it.

The difference between the eighth and ninth states is that the latter does not depend on striving and exertion. A similitude of calm abiding—a one-pointed mind included within the Desire Realm—is achieved.

CALM ABIDING

Calm abiding is attained when the ninth state is conjoined with a fully qualified pliancy—a serviceability of body and mind. During the ninth state one can effortlessly abide in meditative stabilization free from even subtle laxity and excitement, but this is only a similitude of calm abiding. To attain actual calm abiding, special joy and bliss of physical and mental pliancy must be developed through again and again familiarizing with meditative stabilization.

The slight form of pliancy that is generated at the beginning of
Calm Abiding

The ninth state increases to the point where mental pliancy is generated. This means that winds or currents of energy involved in unsalutary physical states are first calmed and leave the body through the top of the head, where a sense of bliss is generated, like the touch of a hot hand after shaving the head. Immediately thereafter, a mental pliancy, which is a pacification of the unsalutary states that make the mind heavy and prevent its usage in virtue at will, is generated, affording a serviceability of mind. Through its power, a wind of serviceability that induces physical pliancy moves throughout the body, causing separation from unsalutary physical states of roughness and heaviness and affording an ability to use the body at will in virtuous actions without any sense of hardship. In this way, a physical pliancy of smoothness and lightness in which the body is light like cotton and seems as if filled with this wind of physical pliancy is generated.

In dependence on this, a bliss of physical pliancy that has a nature of very pleasant smoothness and lightness is generated. Then, continued meditative equipoise generates a bliss of mental pliancy, in which one's body seems to dissolve into the object of observation and no other phenomena appear, whereupon the mind is so buoyantly joyous that it is as if unable to remain on its object. When this buoyant joy is purified a little and the sense of bliss diminishes slightly, one attains an immovable pliancy concordant with meditative stabilization in the sense that the mind remains stably on the object of observation. Simultaneous with this, actual calm abiding is attained.

With calm abiding, one attains a mind included within the Form Realm as well as a preparation (samantaka) for the first concentration which is called 'not unable' (anagamya) because this mind can serve as the mental basis for the path consciousnesses that are the antidotes to all afflictions of the three realms—Desire, Form, and Formless. Thus, calm abiding is achieved when the mind is conjoined with physical and mental pliancy and is also in control in the sense of one's being able to direct it to whatever object of observation one wishes.

When calm abiding is achieved, there are many signs of progress:
Meditation on Emptiness

1 the mind has the capacity to purify afflictions
2 when in meditative equipoise, pliancy is quickly generated
3 even subsequent to meditative equipoise, features of pliancy are generated
4 with pliancy and meditative stabilization mutually increasing each other, sleep and meditative stabilization become mixed, and many pure appearances are seen in dreams
5 during meditative equipoise all coarse appearances disappear, and the mind seems to have mixed with space
6 when arising from the session, one has the sense of adventitiously gaining a body
7 fewer afflictions are generated, and those that arise are weak and are immediately extinguished of their own accord
8 the five obstructions-(1) aspiration to objects of the Desire Realm, (2) harmful intent, (3) lethargy and sleep, (4) excitement and contrition, and (5) doubt—mostly do not arise
9 the mind's factor of stability is firm like a mountain and the factor of clarity is such that it seems one could count the particles in a wall.

Though such calm abiding is a prerequisite for cognizing emptiness directly, its attainment alone does not cause one to achieve any of the five Buddhist paths - accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation, or no more learning. Non-Buddhists proceed to generate the four concentrations and four formless absorptions, but since calm abiding alone can serve as the mental basis of path consciousnesses that overcome the afflictions from the root, it is not necessary for a Buddhist to do so (though all eventually do). The Buddhist turns to the cultivation of special insight.

Identifying the second stage of meditation on emptiness
If the yogi uses emptiness as the object of observation during cultivation of calm abiding, the experience with emptiness which he gained during the first of the five stages of meditation on emptiness becomes firmer during the second stage. One who is newly achieving calm abiding temporarily forsakes analysis
during this second stage. Since during the first he developed a conceptual understanding of emptiness through inference by means of extensive analysis, during the second he concentrates on this image or concept of emptiness, desisting from further analysis while in the formal meditative session as it would interrupt his progress toward calm abiding. Between sessions, however, he might resort to analysis to renew his understanding of the absence of inherent existence; then, during the formal session, he merely sets his mind on emptiness with continuous mindfulness and so forth as explained above.

When he finally achieves calm abiding with respect to emptiness, he returns to analysis, but this time with a highly developed mind in that it is stable, clear, intense, and serviceable. Still, too much analysis tends to disturb the factor of stability; so, he alternates between analytical and stabilizing meditation, using the same modes of analysis as in the first stage and then setting the mind on the content understood. If analysis is not done, the ascertainment of emptiness lessens, and if after analyzing, the mind is not set on the content thus ascertained, clarity is not attained.

When an object other than emptiness—such as the body of a Buddha—is used as the object of observation in developing calm abiding, the second stage of meditation on emptiness occurs after having attained calm abiding, at which point the yogi renews analytical investigation of emptiness. In either case, he must first achieve calm abiding and then strive to conjoin this stabilized mind with analysis of emptiness. The activity of analysis causes the mind of calm abiding to become slightly non-manifest, requiring the yogi to pass again through the nine states, but the second stage of meditation on emptiness is mainly the eighth state, making one-pointed.

In summary, whether one uses emptiness or another object as the object of observation in the development of calm abiding, one must achieve calm abiding first and then conjoin that mind with analytical investigation, cultivating a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding. Even though one formerly attained actual calm abiding, one is not, on the second
stage, able to retain a fully qualified calm abiding while analyzing. Analysis and stabilization are alternated for the sake of inducing calm abiding again, but this time with the difference of being induced by analytical meditation on emptiness, which during the second stage induces the eighth state of one-pointedness or even the ninth state of equipoise, but not actual calm abiding. When analytical meditation itself induces the eighth state, a yogi attains a similitude of calm abiding and a similitude of meditative equipoise (*samahita, mnyam bzhag*).
9 Special Insight

Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Presentation of the Grounds and Paths
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
His Holiness the Dalai Lama's oral teachings

THIRD STAGE OF MEDITATION ON EMPTINESS
How to cultivate actual special insight based on actual calm abiding

The third stage consists of the mode of cultivating actual special insight based on actual calm abiding. During the initial part of this phase, stabilizing meditation and analytical meditation are harmonized by alternating from the one to the other, for too much analysis would promote excitement and reduce the factor of stability whereas too much firmness would cause one not to want to analyze.
As explained in the previous chapter, one who previously used the body of a Buddha as the object of observation in cultivating calm abiding has switched to emptiness, analyzing the final nature of the I. Since he must pass through all four mental engagements—forcibly, interruptedly, non-interruptedly, and spontaneously engaging—with respect to the emptiness of the I, he must again with tight mindfulness keep on the object, investigating its nature in the manner set forth for the first stage of meditation on emptiness, without straying to other objects or modes of analysis. When, through introspection, the meditator sees that excitement is about to arise, he alternates to stabilizing meditation, concentrating just on the meaning found through analysis. At this point, calm abiding is again induced with emptiness as the object of observation, however, this is still not special insight, which arises only when analytical meditation itself induces stability and thereby mental and physical pliancy.

Through this process of repeated alternation between analytical and stabilizing meditation, special insight—defined as a wisdom of thorough discrimination of phenomena conjoined with special pliancy induced by the power of analysis—is generated. Its causal prerequisites are to have relied on an excellent being, to have sought much hearing of the doctrine, and to have contemplated properly the meaning heard. Etymologically, special insight (vipashyana, lhag mthong) means sight (pashya, mthong) exceeding (vilhag) that of calm abiding because a clarity is afforded through analysis, different from the non-analysis during calm abiding. The arising of clarity upon repeated thought and analysis with regard to either a true or false object is a fact of dependent-arising. For, if rather than just remaining in stabilizing meditation after achieving calm abiding, one performs analytical meditation, one is able to induce a very firm meditative stabilization and powerful wisdom consciousnesses that act as powerful antidotes overcoming afflictions, and one is able easily to make previously non-manifest objects, such as emptiness, manifest.

Since both pliancy and the calm abiding of a one-pointed mind are induced by the power of analysis, the special insight which is
a thorough discrimination of phenomena and the calm abiding which is a one-pointedness of mind operate in parallel at the same time and with equal power.\textsuperscript{50} Hence this is a union of special insight and calm abiding; within stabilization one is capable of strong analysis, which in turn induces even greater stabilization. Previously, analytical meditation was cultivated so that the mind would become of the entity of special insight, but at that time one did not have actual special insight which must be conjoined with calm abiding induced by analytical meditation; calm abiding and analysis were like the two ends of a scale, the one becoming slightly non-manifest when the other became manifest. Now, however, one has wisdom that is arisen from meditation, as contrasted to the wisdom arisen from thinking which was the ascertainment of emptiness by inferential valid cognition attained during the first stage and the wisdom arisen from hearing which was attained when the structure of the verbal teaching was determined. For beginners, that which differentiates a state arisen from meditation is the attainment of pliancy, and thus calm abiding marks the beginning of such states; however, with the attainment of special insight one has a wisdom arisen from meditation, pliancy having been induced by analysis. Unlike states arisen from hearing and thinking during which the object—emptiness—and the subject—the wisdom consciousness—appear to be unrelatedly distant and cut off, one now has the experience of piercing the object of observation, without the sense of subject and object as distant and cut off. Even though some dualistic appearance remains, the very coarse dualistic appearance of subject and object at the times of hearing and thinking has disappeared. One has the sense of approaching the state in which the wisdom consciousness and emptiness are like water put in water. It is for the sake of achieving such steady meditation that desisting from applying the antidotes to laxity and excitement is cultivated during the ninth state of equipoise.

Upon the attainment of a union of calm abiding and special insight with emptiness as the object, the path of preparation is attained.\textsuperscript{51} The path of preparation—which cannot be attained if one’s object is something other than emptiness, such as the four
noble truths or the coarse personal selflessness—is the second of
the five paths, accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation,
and no more learning. The Mahayana path of accumulation,
which is so named because it marks the beginning of amassing
the collections of merit and wisdom for the sake of enlighten-
ment, was attained earlier when, after long training, one spon-
taneously generated the wish to attain highest enlightenment in
order to establish all sentient beings in final happiness. The path
of preparation is so named because the attainment of a union of
calm abiding and special insight with emptiness as the object pre-
pares a yogi for his initial direct cognition of emptiness. On the
path of preparation the conceptual aspect of the realization of
suchness is gradually removed in four periods:

1  Heat
The heat period of the path of preparation is a sign that the fire
of the non-conceptual wisdom of the path of seeing will soon be
generated. One newly attains a meditative stabilization that has
clear conceptual perception of suchness.

2  Peak
Prior to the peak period of the path of preparation, roots of
virtue could be annihilated through the force of anger and so
forth, but now one has reached the peak, or end, of the instability
of virtuous roots. One newly attains a 'nirvana' that is a passing
beyond the sorrow of the annihilation of roots of virtue and
newly attains a meditative stabilization that is a heightening of
conceptual perception of suchness.

3  Forbearance
During the forbearance period of the path of preparation one
newly attains an endurance, or lack of fear, with respect to the
profound emptiness. One also attains a 'nirvana' that is a passing
beyond the sorrow of bad migrations because one will no longer
be born as a hell-being, hungry ghost, or animal through the
force of contaminated actions and afflictions (though one might
choose to be born there to be of service to such beings). One
thoroughly attains conceptual, clear perception of suchness
and newly attains a meditative stabilization wherein an appearance of the object meditated—emptiness—is no longer ascertained in contradistinction to the subject—the mind of special insight.

4 Supreme mundane qualities

This period of the path of preparation is the supreme of worldly qualities. One newly attains a meditative stabilization that immediately precedes a speedy generation of the path of seeing.

During the first two periods of the path of preparation, heat and peak, subject and object appear during meditative equipoise, and the meditator can ascertain both. A mere vacuity of the object negated, inherent existence, appears; the yogi can delineate this appearance or concept of emptiness as the object and himself as the subject. Even if the emptiness being conceptually cognized is the emptiness of oneself, one nevertheless has a sense of object and subject, emptiness on the one hand and a consciousness realizing it on the other, though not in the coarse way that these appear prior to attaining special insight. One is abiding in the space-like meditative equipoise, and the phenomenon which was investigated to determine whether it inherently exists or not and which is qualified by this emptiness no longer appears at all.

During the periods of heat and peak the capacity to forsake the conception of inherent existence with respect to objects increases, and due to this, the coarser potencies of manifest innate conceptions of inherent existence diminish. Thus, at the time of forbearance the yogi can no longer ascertain the appearance of the object meditated, emptiness. However, this does not mean that he ceases to ascertain emptiness; rather, the conceptual aspect of the ascertainment disappears to the point where, even though there still is an appearance or image of emptiness, he can no longer recognize it as such. Then, at the time of supreme mundane qualities the cognizing subject also cannot be ascertained. The sense of the object disappears first because it is more difficult to forsake adherence to the inherent existence of the subject.
FOURTH STAGE OF MEDITATION ON EMPTINESS

How to cultivate direct cognition of emptiness

The fourth stage of meditation on emptiness occurs in direct realization of emptiness. During the period of supreme mundane qualities at the end of the path of preparation, one can no longer ascertain the factors of an object meditated and a subject meditating; however, subtle forms of both still appear. Subsequently, through continuous meditation, all appearances of subject and object are extinguished in suchness—emptiness—and subject and object become like water poured into water, undifferentiable. Emptiness is then realized directly without the medium of an image, and the path of seeing, the initial direct cognition of the truth, is attained.

Through the path of seeing, ayogi removes artificial conceptions of inherent existence, those acquired not from beginningless conditioning but from contact with false systems of teaching. False teachings fortify the innate misconception of the inherent existence of persons and other phenomena, which is acquired from beginningless misconception of the nature of things and is overcome on the path of meditation through continuous conditioning to the truth.

The meditative equipoise of the path of seeing is divided into two parts, an 'uninterrupted path' that abandons the artificial afflictions and a 'path of release' that is the state of having abandoned those artificial afflictions. An uninterrupted path is so named because without interruption or interval a yogi will pass on to a path of release that is a condition of having been released from these afflictions. The uninterrupted path of a path of seeing corresponds to the 'eight forbearances', and the path of release corresponds to the 'eight knowledges' (see Chart 4).

During the eight forbearances the realization of the lack of inherent existence is applied to objects and subjects—to the four noble truths and the subjects that realize the absence of inherent existence with respect to them. Through direct realization of the emptinesses that qualify these objects, artificial conceptions of inherent existence with respect to the four noble truths are
Chart 4: *Path of Seeing*
(read from bottom to top)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>true paths</th>
<th>subject</th>
<th>subsequent knowledge*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>object</td>
<td>subsequent forbearance+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>true cessations</td>
<td>subject</td>
<td>subsequent knowledge*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>object</td>
<td>subsequent forbearance+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>true origins</td>
<td>subject</td>
<td>subsequent knowledge*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>object</td>
<td>subsequent forbearance+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>true sufferings</td>
<td>subject</td>
<td>subsequent knowledge*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>object</td>
<td>subsequent forbearance+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*path of release
+uninterrupted path
(The eight forbearances occur simultaneously as one uninterrupted path, and the eight knowledges occur simultaneously as one path of release).

simultaneously abandoned. In other words, the initial direct realization of emptiness causes the artificial conception of inherent existence to be abandoned simultaneously with respect to true sufferings (such as an afflicted being wandering in cyclic existence), true origins (such as a conception of true existence itself), true cessations (such as the absence of an affliction brought about by cultivation of its antidote), and true paths (such as a realization of emptiness). The emptiness of the wisdom consciousness cognizing these is also realized at the same time; this realization is nevertheless called ‘subsequent’ because in the lower systems of tenets there is a step by step
procedure, even though in this system an actual temporal sequence does not occur.

The eight knowledges, the knowledge that those artificial conceptions of inherent existence have been abandoned, are the path of release. The presentation of eight parts to the uninterrupted path and eight parts to the path of release details phenomena, qualified by emptiness, which a yogi might take as objects of meditation on the paths of accumulation and preparation, and the simultaneous functioning of the eight indicates the great power of direct realization of emptiness. For the Hinayana schools, it is possible to ascend these sixteen steps one by one; the Vaibhashikas propound such a gradual ascent as the only mode of the path of seeing whereas the Sautrantikas assert that sharper beings cover the sixteen in two steps. The Prasangikas, on the other hand, assert that the path of seeing is necessarily limited to this two step simultaneous procedure because a consciousness directly cognizing emptiness necessarily realizes the emptiness of all objects of knowledge, and thus it is not necessary to pass from one to the other among the various phenomena qualified by emptiness.

For a Hearer or Solitary Realizer, the uninterrupted path of a path of seeing marks the commencement of being a Superior (Aryan, 'Phags pa) and of being an Approacher to the level of a Stream Enterer. The path of release of the path of seeing marks the attainment of the level of an Abider in the fruit of a Stream Enterer. For a Bodhisattva, the uninterrupted path of the path of seeing marks the commencement of being a Superior and of attaining the first of the ten Bodhisattva grounds (bhiimi, sa).

In one meditative sitting a yogi passes from the fourth and last level of the path of preparation, called 'supreme mundane qualities', through the uninterrupted path and path of release of the path of seeing. When he rises from meditative equipoise, he has a consciousness called 'subsequent attainment' that is influenced by the previous direct realization of emptiness. Although phenomena appear to be inherently existent, he, like a magician viewing his own creations, knows that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence. Later, when he forgets his direct realization,
he has a 'distracted subsequent attainment'. His other meditative consciousnesses, such as those of compassion and of the realization of impermanence, are paths of seeing because they are in his continuum, but they are neither paths of seeing as meditative equipoise nor paths of seeing as subsequent attainment; they are a third category which is neither.

Though all artificial conceptions of inherent existence are removed on the first Bodhisattva ground and though during meditative equipoise the innate conception of inherent existence is dormant, a conception of inherent existence can arise again outside of direct contemplation of emptiness. The grosser, or artificial, stains were removed on the path of seeing, and now on the path of meditation the subtler stains, the innate sense of inherent, true, natural, or objective existence are removed, not just temporarily, but forever—never to arise again.

A path of meditation is a continuous familiarizing with the emptiness that was initially and directly cognized on the path of seeing. In meditative equipoise a Bodhisattva, Hearer, or Solitary Realizer again and again enters into direct realization of emptiness, and in subsequent attainment practices the deeds appropriate to his motivation. A Bodhisattva, ground by ground focuses on a different perfection:

first ground: giving
second ground: ethics
third ground: patience
fourth ground: effort
fifth ground: concentration
sixth ground: wisdom
seventh ground: method
eighth ground: wishes
ninth ground: power
tenth ground: exalted wisdom.

All ten perfections are practiced on each ground, but a different one is brought to fulfillment on each. A perfection brought to fulfillment remains thus, and another is brought to its level. Finally, on the tenth ground, all ten perfections are in a state of complete development.
On the first ground, a Bodhisattva, after rising from meditative equipoise, can in one instant:

1. see a hundred Buddhas
2. receive the blessings of a hundred Buddhas
3. go to a hundred Buddha Lands
4. illuminate a hundred lands
5. vibrate a hundred worldly realms
6. live for a hundred eons
7. see with true wisdom the past and future for a hundred eons
8. enter into and rise from a hundred meditative stabilizations
9. open a hundred different doors of doctrine
10. ripen a hundred sentient beings
11. emanate a hundred of his own body
12. cause each of the hundred bodies to be surrounded by a hundred Bodhisattvas.

On the second ground, these twelve qualities are a thousand; on the third, a hundred thousand; on the fourth, a hundred ten million; on the fifth, a thousand ten million; on the sixth, a hundred thousand ten million; on the seventh, a hundred thousand ten trillion; on the eighth, a number equal to the particles of a billion worlds; on the ninth, a number equal to the particles of ten million billions of worlds; on the tenth, a number equal to the particles of an inexpressible number of an inexpressible number of Buddha Lands.

As he ascends the grounds, a Bodhisattva gains the capacity to be born as a being of greater and greater influence. As his virtues increase, he is able to outshine, or suppress, greater numbers of beings and more powerful beings, not for the sake of exercising power but for the sake of helping them. As Nagarjuna says in the fifth chapter of his Precious Garland:

Just as the eight levels of Hearers
Are explained in their vehicle,
So are the ten Bodhisattva
Grounds in the Mahayana.
The first of these is the Very Joyful
Since the Bodhisattva is rejoicing.
He forsakes the three entwinements and is born
Into the lineage of the Tathagatas.

Through the maturation of these qualities
The perfection of giving becomes supreme.
He vibrates a hundred worlds
And becomes a great lord of the world.

The second is called the Stainless
Because the ten [virtuous] actions
Of body, speech, and mind are stainless
And he naturally abides in them.

Through the maturation of these qualities
The perfection of ethics becomes supreme,
He becomes a Universal Monarch helping beings,
Master of the glorious [four continents]
And of the seven precious substances.

The third ground is called the Luminous because
The pacifying light of wisdom arises.
The concentrations and clairvoyances are generated,
While desire and hatred are extinguished completely.

Through the maturation of these qualities
He practices supremely the deeds of patience
And putting an end to desire completely
Becomes a great wise king of the gods.

The fourth is called the Radiant
Because the light of true wisdom arises
In which he cultivates supremely
The harmonies of enlightenment.

Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes
A king of the gods in [the Land] Without Combat.
He is skilled in quelling the arising of the view
That the transitory collection [is a real self].
The fifth is called the Very Difficult to Overcome
Since all demons find it extremely hard to conquer him.
He becomes skilled in knowing the subtle Meanings of the noble truths and so forth.
Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes A king of the gods abiding in the Joyous Land.
He overcomes the sources of afflictions And of the views of all Forders (Tirthika).
The sixth is called the Approaching because he is Approaching the qualities of a Buddha;
Through familiarity with calm abiding and special insight He attains cessation and is thus advanced [in wisdom].
Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes A king of the gods [in the Land] of Liking Emanation.
Hearers cannot surpass him, he pacifies Those with the pride of superiority.
The seventh is the Gone Afar because The number [of his qualities] has increased, Moment by moment he can enter The equipoise of cessation.
Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes a master Of the gods [in the Land] of Control over Others' Emanations.
He becomes a great leader of teachers for he knows Direct realization of the [four] noble truths.
The eighth is the Immovable, the youthful stage. Through non-conceptuality he is immovable And the spheres of his body, speech, and mind's Activities are inconceivable.
Through the maturation of these qualities He becomes a Brahma, master of a thousand worlds.
Foe Destroiers and Solitary Realizers and so forth
Cannot surpass him in establishing the meaning [of
the doctrines].

The ninth ground is called
Good Intelligence.
Like a regent he has attained correct individual
Realization and therefore has good intelligence.

Through the maturation of these qualities
He becomes a Brahma who is master of a million
worlds.
Foe Destroiers and so forth cannot surpass him
In responding to questions in the thoughts of sentient
beings.

The tenth is the Cloud of Doctrine because
The rain of excellent doctrine falls.
The Bodhisattva is consecrated
With light by the Buddhas.

Through the maturation of these qualities
He becomes a master of the gods of Pure Abode.
He is a supreme great lord, master
Of the sphere of infinite wisdom.

A yogi who has attained direct realization of emptiness cannot
remain in that realization while perceiving the phenomena quali-
fiied by emptiness and also cannot perceive phenomena while
directly realizing emptiness. He loses the direct cognition of
emptiness when he rises from meditative equipoise, for the
appearance of conventional phenomena rules out a direct cogni-
tion of emptiness and a direct cognition of emptiness rules out
the appearance of conventional phenomena. In terms of how
emptiness and other phenomena appear to him, the two truths
are as if contradictory; such are the obstructions to omniscience
—the simultaneous realization by one consciousness of all phe-
nomena, both the phenomena qualified by emptiness and the
emptinesses themselves. A Bodhisattva has a great wish to rid
himself of this obstruction because it prevents him from knowing those things that make attempts to help other beings fruitful. Although he does not actually begin to abandon the obstructions to omniscience until the eighth Bodhisattva ground, the wish to do so is his basic motivation during the seven preceding grounds as he is ridding himself forever of the various degrees of the conception of inherent existence, the root of the obstructions to liberation.

On each ground a Bodhisattva abandons varying degrees of the innate conception of inherent existence and the poisons it induces along with their seeds. These objects of abandonment are arranged in relation to the three realms and the nine levels. The three realms are the Desire, Form, and Formless Realms; of the nine levels, the first corresponds to the Desire Realm, the next four to the four divisions of the Form Realm, called the Four Concentrations, and the last four to the four divisions of the Formless Realm, called the Four Formless Absorptions. The Four Concentrations and Four Formless Absorptions are places of rebirth where beings have particularly strong concentrative powers; these powers can be achieved within a lifetime in the Desire Realm, and thus the three realms outline the possible states of consciousness in terms of concentrative ability within a human lifetime in the Desire Realm and also present in condensed form all the possible states of rebirth within cyclic existence.

The conception of inherent existence and its attendant afflictions are divided into eighty-one steps, nine each with respect to the nine levels, so that each level has a series of nine obstacles that are to be abandoned: big big, middle big, and small big; big middle, middle middle, and small middle; big small, middle small, and small small (see Chart 5). The Prasangikas assert that no one proceeds through these eighty-one steps one by one; rather, the nine big big innate afflictions are simultaneously abandoned; the nine middling big are simultaneously abandoned, and so forth through the small small. One proceeds in nine steps with each step having an uninterrupted path, which is a path of direct cognition of emptiness actively forsaking a
Chart 5: Innate Afflictions Forsaken on the Path of Meditation in Terms of the Three Realms and Nine Levels (read from bottom to top)

- Peak of Cyclic Existence 73-81 (ninth level)
  - Nothingness 64-72 (eighth level)
  - Infinite Consciousness 55-63 (seventh level)
  - Infinite Space 46-54 (sixth level)
- Fourth Concentration 37-45 (fifth level)
- Third Concentration 28-36 (fourth level)
- Second Concentration 19-27 (third level)
- First Concentration 10-18 (second level)

afflictions regarding Formless Realm

Small - small small 9
- middling small 8
- big small 7

Small - middling small 6
- middling middling 5
- big middling 4

Small - big small 3
- middling big 2
- big big 1

afflictions regarding Form Realm

Small - small small 9
- middling small 8
- big small 7

Small - middling small 6
- middling middling 5
- big middling 4

Small - big small 3
- middling big 2
- big big 1

afflictions regarding Desire Realm (first level)

Small - small small 9
- middling small 8
- big small 7

Small - middling small 6
- middling middling 5
- big middling 4

Small - big small 3
- middling big 2
- big big 1

corresponding affliction, and a path of release, which is a consciousness directly cognizing emptiness within the condition of having abandoned that affliction. The ‘active forsaking’ of an affliction does not mean that the path and the affliction combat
each other; rather, simultaneously with the production of an uninterrupted path the corresponding affliction ceases.

To destroy the big big afflictions only a small small path is needed, much the same as when initially cleaning a garment the grosser stains are easily cleaned with a little washing. To destroy the small small afflictions a big big path is needed, and the same is to be respectively applied to the intermediate degrees.

On each of the second through eighth Bodhisattva grounds a portion of the innate afflictions is forsaken:

second ground:  the nine big big
third ground:  the nine middling big
fourth ground:  the nine small big
fifth ground:  the nine big middling
sixth ground:  the nine middling middling
seventh ground:  the nine small middling
eighth ground:  the nine big small, the nine middling small, and the nine small small simultaneously.

The grounds are not enumerated for Hearers and Solitary Realizers even though they abandon the same afflictions as do Bodhisattvas. As Hearers and Solitary Realizers abandon the various degrees of afflictions, they are classified into the 'eight levels of approaching and abiding' with respect to their attainment of the fruits of a Stream Enterer, Once Returner, Never Returner, or Foe Destroyer (see Chart 6).

With the attainment of the path of release of the path of seeing, a Hearer or Solitary Realizer is an Abider in the fruit of a Stream Enterer. While making effort to overcome the first six of the nine degrees of innate afflictions pertaining to the Desire Realm, he is an Approacher to the level of Once Returner, and once these six are overcome, he becomes an Abider in the fruit of Once Returner. He will return to the Desire Realm by the power of afflictions only once more, at which time he will strive to overcome the remaining three degrees of innate afflictions pertaining to the Desire Realm, becoming an Approacher to the level of a Never Returner. With success in overcoming all afflictions pertaining to the Desire Realm, he becomes an Abider in the fruit of a Never
Chart 6: *Eight Levels of Approaching and Abiding*
(read from bottom to top; afflictions refer to those in Chart 5 on p. 105)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>afflictions being forsaken</th>
<th>afflictions already forsaken</th>
<th>path</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abider in the fruit of a Foe Destroyer</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approacher to the fruit of a Foe Destroyer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abider in the fruit of a Never Returner</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abider in the fruit of a Once Returner</td>
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<td>Abider in the fruit of a Stream Enterer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approacher to the fruit of a Stream Enterer</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Abider in the fruit of a Foe Destroyer

Approacher to the fruit of a Foe Destroyer

Abider in the fruit of a Never Returner

Approacher to the fruit of a Never Returner

Abider in the fruit of a Once Returner

Approacher to the fruit of a Once Returner

Abider in the fruit of a Stream Enterer

Approacher to the fruit of a Stream Enterer

Returner, never again returning to the Desire Realm due to the afflictions although he might return to the Form and Formless...
Realms within cyclic existence many times. When he makes effort to overcome the remaining seventy-two degrees of innate afflictions pertaining to the Form and Formless Realms, he becomes an Approacher to the level of Foe Destroyer, and when all innate afflictions have been overcome, he is an Abider in the fruit of a Foe Destroyer.

When, as in the Prasangika system, the afflictions are forsaken simultaneously rather than serially, a yogi first abandons simultaneously the first, tenth, nineteenth, twenty-eighth, thirty-seventh, forty-sixth, fifty-fifth, sixty-fourth, and seventy-third degrees of the afflictions. Thus, it is said that while abandoning this first of the nine rounds, he already is an Approacher to the fruit of a Foe Destroyer.

When a Hearer or a Solitary Realizer has abandoned all nine rounds of the innate afflictions, he is a Foe Destroyer and has attained the path of no more learning of his vehicle. However, he has not ceased learning in general; he is urged by Buddhas to enter the Mahayana both in order to help other beings and to perfect his own aims. Though he has eliminated the innate afflictions and thereby removed the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence, he has not even begun to remove the non-afflicted ignorance that constitutes the obstructions to omniscience—the appearance of inherent existence and the stains of viewing the two truths as separate entities.

Upon their generation of a spontaneous, strong wish to attain highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings, Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers enter the Mahayana path of accumulation. They proceed through the paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, and meditation and ascend the Bodhisattva grounds, eliminating not the innate afflictions, because these have already been destroyed through the Hinayana path, but the obstructions to attainment of the many special qualities of Bodhisattvas. They must spend one period of countless eons on the paths of accumulation and preparation and another period of countless eons on the first eight grounds doing this.

On the eighth ground all Bodhisattvas—those who proceed only on the Mahayana path and those who first completed the
Hinayana path—finally begin to eliminate what they have sought to overcome since their entry into the Mahayana, the obstructions to omniscience. They spend one period of countless eons proceeding from the second part of the eighth ground to Buddhahood, forsaking by degrees the stains that prevent them from full effectiveness in their efforts to help other beings. The obstructions to omniscience (literally, obstructions to objects cf knowledge: jneyavarana) plague all sentient beings, not just eighth ground Bodhisattvas, for the appearance of inherently existent objects to the sense and mental consciousnesses lends a false support to the innate conception of inherent existence, the assent to this false appearance. However, only eighth ground Bodhisattvas have the capacity to begin to counteract the appearance of inherent existence. The long endeavor in amassing the collections of merit and wisdom has been for the purpose of so empowering the mind that it is possible to counteract these most subtle obstructions.

The obstructions to omniscience are divided into four degrees that are to be eliminated on the last three grounds, called 'pure' because eighth through tenth ground Bodhisattvas are purified of the innate afflictions:

- second part of eighth ground: big obstructions to omniscience
- ninth ground: middling obstructions to omniscience
- first part of tenth ground: coarse small obstructions to omniscience
- last part of tenth ground: subtle small obstructions to omniscience.

The final uninterrupted path in the continuum of a sentient being eliminates the subtlest obstructions to Buddhahood, and the corresponding path of release is Buddhahood itself. In order to generate this final uninterrupted path, however, it is necessary to enter the path of tantra. Even though the Buddhahoods described in sutra and in tantra are the same, the paths of sutra alone can carry a yogi only to the tenth Bodhisattva ground. To achieve Buddhahood, it is necessary to supplement these paths with the paths of Secret Mantra.
Tantra

Sources
His Holiness the Dalai Lama's oral teachings
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Illumination of the Tantric Texts

A Bodhisattva spends at least three countless eons on the paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, and meditation and reaches the last part of the tenth ground, but in order to remove the subtle small obstructions to omniscience he still must enter the Secret Mantra Vehicle. His path has been very long; if he were fully qualified and had entered the tantric vehicle from the beginning, he would have been able to attain Buddhahood in just one lifetime. Tantra is the quick path for those who are fit receptacles, but not for those who cannot bear the difficulties of the long path. To practice tantra requires even greater compassion and greater intelligence than are required on the sutra path; thus, though many persons in the degenerate era are interested in tantra, tantra is not for degenerate persons.

Tantra is limited to persons whose compassion is so great that they cannot bear to spend unnecessary time in attaining Buddhahood, as they want to be a supreme source of help and happiness
for others quickly.\textsuperscript{62} The most qualified of tantric practitioners complete the path in one lifetime, and it is said that those who are less qualified but maintain their vows will attain the supreme achievement in either seven or sixteen lifetimes.

In order to enter the tantric path it is necessary to have good understanding of the three principal aspects of the path to full enlightenment: the thought to leave cyclic existence, the aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings, and the correct view of emptiness.\textsuperscript{63} Therefore, it is impossible to enter the Mantra Vehicle before the first of the five stages of meditation on emptiness; however, it could be entered anytime after the yogi had gained an acquaintance with emptiness, the first of these five stages, provided he had the other qualifications of compassion and so forth.

There is an exoteric explanation that once a Bodhisattva has attained a non-tantric path of seeing he must wait until he reaches the tenth ground to enter the tantric path.\textsuperscript{64} However, according to an oral transmission, a Bodhisattva can enter the Mantra Vehicle at any time; his great compassion and sharpness of mind as well as his ability to create manifestations which visit Buddhas in different lands insures that he would know of the tantric path and seek it. Thus, the second, third, and fourth of the five stages of meditation on emptiness could be replaced by similar stages within the practice of tantra, beginning at any point within these three. It is not obligatory to pass through the ten Bodhisattva grounds to enter the practice of tantra, nor is it obligatory to pass through the three lower tantra to enter Highest Yoga Tantra.

**CALM ABIDING AND SPECIAL INSIGHT IN TANTRA**

Tantra in general is divided into four types which in ascending order are: Action (\textit{Kriya}), Performance (\textit{Charya}), Yoga (\textit{Yoga}), and Highest Yoga (\textit{Anuttarayoga}). The mode of developing a union of calm abiding and special insight with emptiness as the object is similar in the first three tantra sets to that in the sutra teachings in the sense that, after attaining calm abiding,
analytical meditation and stabilizing meditation are alternated in order to prevent respectively laxity and excitement, or lack of penetrating ascertainment and lack of stability. However, unlike the sutra system, all four tantras emphasize a union of manifestation and emptiness—the vivid appearance of oneself as a deity in conjunction with conceptual cognition of emptiness.

In other words, it is accepted in the tantric systems that a phenomenon which is qualified by emptiness can continue to appear to an inferential consciousness that realizes its emptiness. Both the vivid appearance of a deity and realization of the deity’s non-inherent existence are practiced by one consciousness. In most interpretations of the sutra systems, however, a phenomenon qualified by emptiness does not appear to an inferential consciousness cognizing its emptiness; just its emptiness appears. Thus, in the sutra systems the union of wisdom and method refers merely to cognition of emptiness as supplementing the Bodhisattva deeds, or the Bodhisattva deeds as supplementing cognition of emptiness. In tantra, on the other hand, one consciousness is sufficient to contain the practice of the profound—the wisdom realizing non-inherent existence—and the practice of the vast—the appearance of oneself as a deity. Furthermore, because from the beginning a yogi imagines himself as having the body, enjoyments, abode, and activities of a Buddha, he amasses far more quickly the merit necessary to produce a Buddha’s Form Body, and in this sense tantra is the quick path.

In the yoga of union of the profound and the manifest, a meditator reflects on emptiness through any of the reasonings outlined in the first stage of meditation on emptiness. According to the three lower tantras, he achieves calm abiding and then alternates between analytical meditation and stabilizing meditation, within continuous realization of emptiness and within vivid appearance of himself as a deity. However, in Highest Yoga Tantra it is not necessary either to achieve calm abiding first or to perform such alternation. Highest Yoga Tantra is divided into stages of generation and completion, during both of which the yoga of the union of manifestation and emptiness is performed, but with a difference. In the stage of generation, due
to the force of holding the mind fully to a subtle object in a special place within the body, such as a tiny drop or letter at the heart, and due to the type of object being meditated, the winds gradually abide inside, whereby excitement can be quickly stopped. Thus, the yogi can perform strong analytical meditation without concern that he will lose the factor of stability. When the eighth state preliminary to calm abiding is achieved, a type of analytical meditation involving the emanation and withdrawal of, for instance, vajras, easily stops coarse conceptuality and induces the simultaneous achievement of calm abiding and special insight. Attainment of the union of calm abiding and special insight is thus very fast in Highest Yoga Tantra—provided that the meditator is qualified.

**FIFTH STAGE OF MEDITATION ON EMPTINESS**

How to meditate on emptiness during the second stage of Highest Yoga Tantra

In the second and final stage of Highest Yoga Tantra, that of completion, there are a series of techniques, suited to the meditator's physical constitution and mental temperament, that cause the winds (prana) to enter, remain, and dissolve in the central channel. The purpose is to manifest a series of four subtle minds and, in turn, to use the subtlest, the mind of clear light, to cognize emptiness. When the winds have fully entered, remained, and dissolved in the indestructible drop in the center of the heart, emptiness is directly cognized by the very subtle mind of clear light. At this point in just one period of the path of seeing, the yogi forsakes not only the artificial but also the innate afflictions. The emptiness that is cognized is exactly the same emptiness that is taught in sutra; however, the bliss consciousness that cognizes emptiness is far subtler than the corresponding consciousness presented in the sutra systems.

Since even some Hearers are said to forsake the innate afflictions in as little as three lives, the extraordinary speed of Highest Yoga Tantra is not just the instantaneous abandoning of the artificial and innate afflictions on the path of seeing; it also refers to
the swift abandonment of the obstructions to omniscience. Rising from the path of seeing, a yogi's very subtle mind and the very subtle wind that is its mount serve as the causes of an illusory body which is pure in the sense that the afflictions have been abandoned and is actual in the sense that it is not just imagined. With this special mind and body, the obstructions to omniscience are quickly eliminated, and Buddhahood is realized.

During the stage of completion in Highest Yoga Tantra the emphasis is not on meditation analyzing emptiness by way of reasoning but on stabilizing meditation for the sake of gathering the winds in order to manifest a subtle consciousness cognizing emptiness. However, these stabilizing concentrations cannot be effective unless they are built on firm ascertainment of emptiness attained through analytical reasoning, undertaken during the stage of generation and before. It is within the context of an ascertainment of emptiness that a yogi concentrates on the physical and psychic centers although during the actual session itself he desists from applying his mind to analytical reasoning. Still, analytical meditation of a different type is required in order to generate a sharpness and brightness of concentration, in dependence on which the winds are gathered, thereby generating through meditation the same subtle minds that are actualized powerlessly and without benefit at death. The deepest and subtlest of these minds and the wind that is its mount are the actual substances that develop into a Buddha's mind and body. Though it may be possible without the view of emptiness to actualize some of these subtle consciousnesses, it is impossible without the view of emptiness to actualize the most subtle. As the tutor of the Eighth Dalai Lama, Ye-shay-gyel-tsen (Ye-shes-rgyal-mtshan) reports:

It is said that this profound view of the middle way is the life of both the sutra and tantra paths. Also, it is said that particularly with respect to Highest Secret Mantra there is no chance of having an actual path of Mantra without this view.
Shākyamuni: the fourth Buddha of this era
11 Buddhahood

Sources
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings

On the path Bodhisattvas familiarize themselves in innumerable ways with the six perfections. They develop limitless wishes and dedications, and they experience in myriad forms the joys of the wisdom that cognizes the profound suchness of all phenomena in the manner of a fusion of subject and object. Whether following the sutra or tantra path, the Bodhisattva's base is the same: the aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings. The deeds are, in general, also the same: the six perfections. In the sutra systems a limitless variety of these deeds is prescribed whereas in tantra an additional method, yoga of the union of the profound and the manifest, is used to empower the mind to combat the obstructions to omniscience. The effect of these paths is the attainment of a Buddha's Form Body and Truth Body which are the fulfilment of the aims of both oneself and others.

The uninterrupted path at the end of the tenth ground is called
the end of the continuum as a sentient being because although a Buddha is sentient, he does not have a mind that has obstructions yet to be eliminated. The uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum of a sentient being is the antidote to the very subtle obstructions to omniscience; it cognizes the suchness of all phenomena in the manner of being of one taste with suchness. Like fresh water poured into fresh water, there is no distinction experienced between the wisdom consciousness and emptiness. Still, it has the potentialities that will make possible, immediately afterwards, the instantaneous appearance of the inconceivable qualities of a Buddha.

While the yogi is in deep contemplation on emptiness only, he passes into a condition wherein, simultaneous with continuous direct cognition of emptiness, all the phenomena that are qualified by emptiness appear to him. He passes to the final path of release, and while in a meditative equipoise in which there is not the slightest interference of duality, this same consciousness directly cognizes all the many varieties of objects of knowledge as clearly as one sees an olive in the palm of one's hand. Since the potencies of mistaken dualistic appearance have been eradicated, the yogi attains the divine eye that has no impediments with respect to objects of knowledge and is not impeded from seeing one object by seeing another. He has exhaustively eliminated the obstructions to omniscience, has actualized the limit of reality, has actualized the Truth Body, and has become thoroughly and completely enlightened with respect to all phenomena.

The bodies of a Buddha are variously enumerated as one, two, three, four, or five. These are more extensive or condensed forms of each other and thus to not indicate a difference of meaning.

One: Truth Body
Two: Truth Body and Form Body
Three: Truth Body, Enjoyment Body, and Emanation Body (the last two being included within Form Body above)
Four: Nature Body, Wisdom Body, Enjoyment Body, and Emanation Body (the first two being included within Truth Body above)
Five: Nature Body, Wisdom Body, Actual Enjoyment Body, Imputed Enjoyment Body (such as the body of a tenth ground Bodhisattva), and Emanation Body (the middle two being included within Enjoyment Body above).

When the wisdom of meditative equipoise at the end of a yogi’s continuum as a sentient being (that is, his uninterrupted path consciousness directly cognizing emptiness) becomes the final path of release, this wisdom of meditative equipoise itself becomes the Wisdom Body, a composite in one entity of both meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment. This means that all phenomena, emptinesses and conventionalities, are directly cognized all of the time. The emptiness of this final uninterrupted path becomes the Nature Body, the absence of all obstructions in the continuum of a Buddha.

The Truth Body is so called because its two parts, the Nature Body and the Wisdom Body, are respectively the ultimate true cessation and the ultimate true path. A Nature Body is of two types, a naturally pure Nature Body which is the absence from beginningless time of inherent existence in the pure sphere of Buddhahood, and an adventitiously pure Nature Body which is the absence in the pure sphere of Buddhahood of the adventitious stains—the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience—through the application of their antidotes. Both are non-products and mere absences, but only the first is called a non-product because it lacks production, duration, and disintegration and lacks a beginning, middle, and end. The second type of Nature Body is called ‘spontaneous’ because the aspect of having utterly eliminated the subtle motivational effort that initiates deeds of body and speech allows for the spontaneity of the Enjoyment and Emanation Bodies.

Both aspects of the Nature Body are emptinesses which are the absence of inherent existence of a Buddha’s omniscient mind; the naturally pure Nature Body is an emptiness from the point of view that the mind is always naturally free of inherent existence. The adventitiously pure Nature Body is this emptiness from the viewpoint of its being a quality of a mind that has been cleansed
of all contaminations. Thus, both Nature Bodies are emptinesses and ultimate truths.

The Nature Body is said to have five qualities:

1. non-production, because of having no production, duration, or disintegration and no beginning, middle, or end
2. non-difference, because of being undifferentiable from the final nature of phenomena in terms of not being a different entity from phenomena
3. non-perversity, because it has not fallen to the two extremes of reification of what does not exist and denial of what does exist
4. purity, because of being free of the afflicting obstructions, the obstructions to omniscience, and the obstructions to meditative absorption
5. clear light, because the stains do not inherently exist, because it is not fully cognizable by the intellect, and because it is an object of perception by yogis in individual meditative equipoise.

The Nature Body is vast because it is not knowable as being limited to any measure. It is innumerable because it surpasses the number of sands of the Ganges. It is unthinkable because it cannot be conceived as any of the four alternatives. It is unequal because one who has actualized it is unequal with all who have not. It is completely pure because the defects of the afflictions and their predispositions have been completely abandoned.

The Wisdom Body is the final, perfect wisdom. It is called the wisdom cognizing the mode of existence of phenomena in the sense that it perceives all emptinesses. It is called the wisdom cognizing the varieties of phenomena in the sense that it also perceives all conventionalities. In brief, the Wisdom Body is a Buddha’s omniscient consciousness; his eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses are each omniscient. Thus, a single moment of any consciousness cognizes all phenomena; his eye consciousness perceives not just colors and shapes, but also sounds, odors, and so forth, including the emptiness of each phenomenon perceived. A Wisdom Body is everywhere because a
Buddha's wisdom consciousness cognizes the emptiness of everything non-dualistically.

When a Bodhisattva arrives at the end of the continuum of being a sentient being, his body ornamented with a similitude of the major and minor marks of a Buddha becomes a Buddha's Enjoyment Body. Through the power of former wishes and without any intellection, various Emanation Bodies are issued from the Enjoyment Body, appearing simultaneously in countless lands throughout the ten directions and aiding sentient beings in accordance with their interests, dispositions, and beliefs. One does not first become a Buddha and then think about what needs to be done; one responds immediately and without thought or effort to the needs of all sentient beings. The Enjoyment Body and Emanation Bodies are achieved simultaneously because (1) both are fruits of training in the equality of cyclic existence and peace; (2) both are fruits of training to produce pure lands for Enjoyment and Emanation Bodies in order to provide bases for sentient beings to gain enlightenment; and (3) both are fruits of training in wisdom and method such that at the time of highest enlightenment there are no obstructions with respect to the perfection of all qualities.

An Enjoyment Body abides in a Highest Pure Land (Akanishta). Highest Pure Lands are above the seventeen types of lands in the Form Realm and thus are called 'Highest' (literally, 'not below'). Each Buddha has his own Highest Pure Land produced by his limitless collections of merit and wisdom and as vast as space; it is achieved from a portion of his wisdom and is not composed of particles of matter.

An Enjoyment Body is said to have five qualities:

1. An Enjoyment Body is impermanent, but it continuously displays the same type of body ornamented with the major and minor marks of a Buddha; therefore, it is immortal.
2. An Enjoyment Body continuously speaks the same type of doctrine, the Mahayana, and thus is a Body that enjoys or uses the Mahayana doctrine as opposed to the Emanation Bodies which abide in Pure Lands and preach both Hinayana and Mahayana.
An Enjoyment Body continuously displays the activities that arise from wisdom and compassion.

These activities of body, speech, and mind are performed without effort.

Though an Enjoyment Body does not exist as many different personal continuums, it displays many Emanation Bodies.

It is said that even though the displayer of Emanation Bodies is an Enjoyment Body, Emanation Bodies are not Enjoyment Bodies but are of the same continuum as an Enjoyment Body.

Through the force of compassion and wishes over countless eons the ultimate wisdom itself appears in the aspect of a body. Each of the parts of the body directly cognizes all phenomena and proclaims inconceivable intonations of doctrine; mind and body are no longer separate phenomena. Not only is the Enjoyment Body an appearance of the wisdom consciousness itself, but also the pure numberless phenomena that a Buddha cognizes from his own point of view are the entity of this wisdom itself. In dependence on others, a Buddha also perceives impure phenomena which have as their final cause afflicted ignorance (the conception that phenomena inherently exist) and non-afflicted ignorance (the appearance of these phenomena as if inherently existent).

Based on the accumulation of inconceivable merit for untenable eons and based on repeated, inconceivable, powerful wishes while a Bodhisattva, an Enjoyment Body continuously displays countless Emanation Bodies that appear in accordance with the dispositions of beings and act for the sake of furthering their aims of attaining high status as humans and as gods and attaining the definite goodness of liberation and omniscience. Spontaneously and without thought a Buddha, like a wish-granting jewel, achieves the aims of beings but does not stir for an instant from the sphere of the final nature of phenomena.

There are three main types of Emanation Bodies:

1. artisans, such as a guitarist, goldsmith, or scribe
2. constructions, such as a tree or a deer
3. supreme beings, who display the twelve activities of a Bodhisattva who becomes a Buddha.
Responding to sentient beings' needs throughout time and space, Emanation Bodies appear, perform their task without effort, and are withdrawn. A sentient being's noticing or not noticing them as such depends on his fortune which is formed through the potencies established on the mind by his virtuous and non-virtuous deeds. As long as space exists, the various activities of a Buddha, arising from great compassion, come into existence spontaneously and continuously.
Part Two
Reasoning into Reality
Introduction

Sources
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.636-8

Phenomena are divided into persons and phenomena, with the latter 'phenomena' meaning 'phenomena other than persons'. Objects are so divided because adherence to the inherent existence of persons and adherence to the inherent existence of other internal phenomena, such as the body, are the two principal binders of beings in cyclic existence. Persons are enjoyers or users, and other phenomena are the enjoyed or the used.

The non-inherent existence of persons is the personal selflessness (pudgalanairatmya), and the non-inherent existence of other phenomena, such as mind, body, hand, house, and mountain, is the selflessness of other phenomena (dharmanairatmya). The two selflessnesses—of persons and of other phenomena—are not divided by way of different objects of negation—different interpretations of 'self—but by way of classes of objects that are the bases of the quality of non-inherent existence.
The Mahayana schools other than Prasangika do not divide the two selflessnesses this way. For the Chittamatrins and Svatantrikas, the selflessness of phenomena (non-difference of entity of object and subject for the Chittamatrins and non-true existence for the Svatantrikas) applies to all phenomena including persons. For them, the selflessness of phenomena is subtler than the selflessness of persons, and thus the personal selflessness can be realized without realizing the subtler selflessness of phenomena. They assert a difference of intelligence between Hearers, who meditate mainly on the personal selflessness, and Bodhisattvas, who meditate on the subtler selflessness of phenomena.

For the Prasangikas, the two selflessnesses are equally subtle and an inferential realization of one yields an ability to realize the other. Furthermore, when emptiness is directly cognized, all emptinesses are directly cognized, and, therefore, even Hearers and Solitary Realizers on the path of seeing cognize the subtle emptiness of all phenomena directly. Still, Bodhisattvas are said to be more intelligent than Hearers in the sense that they approach emptiness from many and various points of view, as in the twenty-seven chapters of Nagarjuna’s *Treatise on the Middle Way*, instead of through only one or two.

There is a question as to whether the selflessness of persons in the Chittamatra and Svatantrika systems applies only to persons or to all phenomena. This selflessness is the non-existence of a self-sufficient person, and some say that to speak of a ‘person’ with respect to a phenomenon such as a house is absurd. They say that the personal selflessness of phenomena other than persons refers to their not being objects of use of a self-sufficient person. Others say that phenomena other than persons do not have a self-sufficient entity separate from their parts and that this is their personal selflessness. Still others say that a meditator realizes the non-existence of a self-sufficient person with respect to the mental and physical aggregates, and then by extension realizes that other external phenomena are not a self-sufficient person. In any case, for the Chittamatrins and Svatrantrikas, meditation on the personal selflessness is mainly based on the person but can be extended to a person’s relationship with
external phenomena. Meditation on external objects as not being objects of use of a self-sufficient person is said to be very helpful in breaking the web of relationships that support and nourish the conception of a self-sufficient person.

In the Chittamatra and Svatantryika systems the two selflessnesses differ in degree of subtlety; therefore, these systems have separate sets of reasonings to prove the different types of selflessness. The two selflessnesses in the Prasangika system do not differ in subtlety, but the Prasangikas still use separate sets of reasonings. The self of phenomena is refuted by the diamond slivers, refutation of production of the four extremes, and refutation of production of the four alternatives. The reasoning of dependent-arising refutes the self of both persons and other phenomena. The self of persons is refuted by the five-cornered and seven-cornered sets of reasonings.

The two sets of reasonings are divided not because they exclusively prove either persons or other phenomena to be selfless but because the various Madhyamika masters have mainly used them this way. A student is advised to apply the five-cornered and seven-cornered reasonings to all phenomena, and the three sets of reasonings that examine production can also be applied to persons.
Nāgārjuna
1 The Diamond Slivers

Sources
Jang-gya’s Presentation of Tenets
Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Nga-wang-bel-den’s Annotations
Geshe Gediin Lodro’s oral teachings
Dzong-ka-ba’s Essence of the Good Explanations and Illumination of the Thought
Corresponding section of the translation pp.639-50

Nagarjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way begins with an analysis of production that mainly refutes the inherent existence of products other than persons. In the Treatise and in Chandrakirti’s Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle Way’ the diamond slivers are the main means for approaching the absence of true production.

It is said that through understanding this absence of true production it is easy to understand the other nine of the ten samenesses of phenomena. Realization of the ten samenesses is explained in the Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Dashabhumika) as the means by which a fifth ground Bodhisattva proceeds to the sixth ground. The ten samenesses are:
Meditation on Emptiness

1 sameness of all phenomena as signless, or the sameness of all phenomena in the absence of signs such as white, red, and so on for a consciousness in meditative equipoise on the nature of phenomena

2 sameness of all phenomena as natureless, or as free from being established by way of their own nature

3 sameness of all phenomena as productionless, or as free from naturally existent production in the future

4 sameness of all phenomena as non-produced, or the sameness of all past and present phenomena as free from naturally existent production and cessation

5 sameness of all phenomena as vacuous, or the sameness of things yet to be produced and things already produced as void or empty of natural existence

6 sameness of all phenomena as pure from the start, or as purified of natural existence, not through scripture and reasoning, but from the start

7 sameness of all phenomena as free from the elaborations of thought, or as free from the elaborations of dualistic perception for a consciousness in meditative equipoise on the nature of phenomena

8 sameness of all phenomena in being ultimately non-adopted and non-discarded (as in the case of adopting virtues and discarding non-virtues)

9 sameness of all phenomena in being like a magician's illusions, dreams, shadows, echoes, moons in the water, reflections, and emanations, or in being empty of inherent existence as illustrated by these seven examples

10 sameness of all phenomena in not having the duality of things (bhava) and non-things (abhava), or the sameness of products in not inherently being things and of non-products in not inherently being non-things.

The seventh is an attribute of the first; the third, fourth, and fifth are attributes of the second; and the rest are attributes of both the first and the second.

Nagarjuna chose to explain the sameness of non-production because through it the other samenesses are easily understood.
The main means that he chose to establish non-true production is the diamond slivers.

STATEMENT OF THE REASONS

The diamond slivers are so called because each is a powerful means of destroying the conception of inherent existence. The reasoning is composed of a thesis:

The subjects, things, are not inherently produced.

And a four-cornered proof:

Because of not being produced from themselves, from naturally existent others, from both, or causelessly.

These four reasons are themselves each theses which are non-affirming negatives. They do not imply anything positive in their place, such as the existence of no production from self. Still, they do imply another non-affirming negative—that things are not inherently produced—because although non-affirming negatives lack positive implications, they can imply other non-affirming negatives of the same type. The reasoning which proves that things are not inherently produced does not establish that things are nominally or conventionally produced. The diamond slivers are non-affirming negatives, and just the absence of inherently existent production, not the presence of nominal production, is realized when inferring or directly cognizing the emptiness of production. The four negative theses do serve as proofs of another thesis—that things are not inherently produced—and thus their import can be stated syllogistically, as above.

The reason why no more than four negative theses are needed to prove that things are not inherently produced is that the four are refutations of all possibilities of true production. Production is either caused or uncaused. If caused, the cause and the effect are either the same entity, different entities, or both the same and different. Thus, the possibilities for inherently existent production, or production that can be found under analysis, are only four: production of an effect that is of the same entity as the
cause, production of an effect that is a different entity from the cause, production of an effect that is both the same entity and a different entity from the cause, and causeless production. Because the possibilities of inherently existent production can be limited, when all possibilities have been refuted, inherently existent production has been perforce refuted, and the thesis of no inherently existent production can be realized. If the possibilities could not be limited, one would be forever waiting in a state of doubt for new possibilities, and the thesis could never be realized. Therefore, it is an important step in meditation to investigate and decide firmly, based on the above reasoning, that the possibilities have been limited to those stated and that if those can be refuted, the thesis will be proved.

Since production from imputedly existent others is the only existent type of production, when production from other is refuted under analysis, this alone establishes that things lack inherent existence. Still, it is necessary to examine the problem of production from the viewpoints of other philosophical systems, all of which can be included into these four modes. If three of these modes of production do not stand a chance conventionally, they could not possibly withstand ultimate analysis; however, persons and systems must be approached on their own grounds, and, therefore, all four positions are attacked.

A meditator seeks to generate a consciousness realizing that there is no inherently existent production, and, thus, refutations are not stated aimlessly. The generation of an inferential cognizer (anumanapramana, rjes dpag tshad ma) depends on the establishment of the reasons and the fact that the predicate of the thesis, the absence of inherently existent production, follows from these reasons.

Still, the presence of the reasons (non-production from self and so forth) in the subject (things), the pervasion of the reasons by the predicate of the thesis (not being inherently produced), and the counter-pervasion do not have to be proved in the manner of the logicians through syllogisms. The Prasangikas' main means for generating an inferential consciousness is to state unwanted consequences of the four possibilities and thereby
generate in an intelligent person a consciousness inferring the thesis that there is no inherently existent production. The Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Svatantrykas say that one must first state unwanted consequences in order to break the pointedness or vibrance of the opponent's adherence to his own view but that the consequences must be followed by a syllogistic statement. (The Vaibhashikas are omitted here because of lack of information regarding their positions.)

Although the Prasangikas do not accept the need for this, Jamyang-shay-ba does use the syllogistic mode to present the thesis and the four reasons for the sake of ease in explanation (see p.640): He takes as his subject 'things which have production', a seemingly redundant phrase because, in the strict use of the word, 'things' (bhava) mean products. The reason he qualifies 'things' with 'which have production' is that the Vaibhashikas say that permanent phenomena are 'things'. As his annotator, Ngawang-bel-den, says, he wants to make sure that when he proves that things are not naturally produced, the Vaibhashikas will not say, 'You are proving the already proved because we agree that permanent things are not produced.' The Prasangikas are proving to the non-Buddhist schools and the other Buddhist schools that impermanent things are not inherently produced. Since the Svatantrykas assert that conventionally things are inherently produced, they are included in the opposition.

The thesis of no production from other is qualified as no production from naturally existent others because conventionally things are produced from causes that are other than themselves but do not naturally exist. (The remaining three possibilities do not require qualification because, unlike production from what is merely other, they do not exist even conventionally.) If the qualification were not given for production from other, then there would be no production at all, and this would deny the cause and effect of actions and result in an utter nihilism. Still, some non-Ge-luk-ba interpreters say that the qualification is unnecessary either because phenomena are unpredictable dependent-arisings or because there is no need to present production in Madhyamika itself because the Madhyamikas have no system. Dzong-ka-ba's
position\textsuperscript{84} is that the Madhyamikas obviously have a system; he explains that when Chandrakirti says that production from other does not exist either ultimately or conventionally, he means that production \textit{which can be found under analysis} does not exist even conventionally. The meaning of 'naturally existent production' implies 'production which can be found under analysis', and thus the qualification is necessary in order to eliminate the mistake that mere production from causes that are other is being refuted. Chandrakirti in his \textit{Clear Words (Prasannapada)} often predicates his refutations with 'under such analysis' lending credence to Dzong-ka-ba's view.\textsuperscript{85}

At issue is the best means of leading students—whom all accept as not knowing the difference between naturally existent production and production—to the Madhyamika realization of no production without utterly destroying the possibility of illusory-like production. The criticism of Dzong-ka-ba seems mainly based on the feeling that the qualification of production from other with 'naturally existent' would keep students from realizing the startling import of the Madhyamika sense of no production. Many non-Ge-luk-bas seem to feel that the brilliant philosophical subtlety of Dzong-ka-ba's view is beyond comprehension and thus obscures the path. However, Dzong-ka-ba himself says\textsuperscript{86} that beings who have not entered the Madhyamika view cannot discriminate between conventional existence and inherent existence; thus, his affirmation of the valid establishment of conventional existence should not be taken as confirming the common ignorant misconceptions of the nature of existence. The meaning of conventional or imputed existence must be sought as something new; otherwise, the very reason for Dzong-ka-ba's subtle presentation of cause and effect and so forth in the Madhyamika system will be lost. He calls his followers to realize that even conventionally the validly established phenomena of the world are not their bases of designation.

\section*{NON-PRODUCTION FROM SELF}

The refutation of production of something from self, or from
its own entity, is done through demonstrating the consequent absurdity of senseless production:87

The production again of a sprout is senseless because of having already achieved its own entity. Since the production of a thing means the attainment of its own entity, then if once having achieved its own entity, it is produced again, its re-production is purposeless.

The opponent answers:

Having already attained its own entity and needing production are not contradictory.

His thought is that a sprout, for instance, has attained its own entity in its unmanifest state (in its causes) but still requires production in the sense of manifestation.

This is refuted by the absurdity of endless production:

If so, then sprouts, and so forth would be produced again and again because though they have achieved their own entity, they must be produced.

The opponent might answer:

That which exists non-manifestly as a potential entity must be produced manifestly, but once it has been manifested, it need not be produced. Therefore, both the former and latter consequences do not follow from the reasons given.

The Samkhyas cannot extricate themselves from error this way, for if a manifestation exists from the start, it need not be produced. Also, if a manifestation were reproduced, then its production would be endless. Thus, the fallacies remain. If a manifestation did not exist from the start, one has let fall the position that only what exists formerly in the cause is produced.

Since the already produced—that which has already achieved its own entity—must be produced again, there would be no opportunity for the production of effects, such as sprouts, because the causes, seeds, would be produced endlessly. There is no point in something's being produced from itself.
A Samkhya might respond:

The natures of both the seed and the sprout are a partless one, but the transformations as seed and sprout are different. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the transformations, the seed disintegrates and the sprout is produced. It is not asserted that a sprout is produced from a sprout. So, there is no fallacy.

A Madhyamika answers:

It follows that a sprout would not cause its seed to disintegrate because the natures of the seed and the sprout are one. For example, a sprout cannot cause a sprout to disintegrate.

Though the Samkhya himself does not assert that a sprout is produced from a sprout, his position that the natures of both the seed and the sprout are a partless one forces him to accept the absurdity that the appearance of a sprout could not cause the disintegration of its seed because they are a partless one.

Furthermore, there is a refutation of the oneness of the natures of the seed and the sprout:

It follows that a seed and its sprout would not have different shape, color, taste, powers, and fruition because the natures of the seed and its sprout are one in all respects.

A Samkhya might respond:

The natures of the seed and its sprout are one, but their states are different; therefore, the state of the seed is abandoned when the state of the sprout is assumed.

Answer:

It follows that the nature of a seed is not the nature of its sprout because when the phenomenon of the state of the seed is done away with, there is the phenomenon of the state of a sprout. It so follows because the phenomenon of the state of the seed is the phenomenon of the seed and there is no phenomenon of the seed other than the entity of the seed.
Further, there is an unwanted consequence of the mutuality of apprehension of both seed and sprout in each state:

Just as during the state of the sprout the seed is not apprehendable by a sense consciousness, so it follows that the sprout would be non-apprehendable.

Further:

Just as during the state of the sprout the sprout is apprehendable by a sense consciousness, so it follows that the seed would also be apprehendable. For, the entity of the seed and the entity of the sprout are one in all respects.

Because these consequences cannot be accepted, one should not assert that the natures of the seed and the sprout are one.

All Buddhist schools except Vaibhashika accept that in general an existent is produced and that what is non-existent prior to its production is produced or attains an existent entity. Vaibhashika is omitted because this school asserts that at the time of the seed the future of the sprout exists and that at the time of the sprout the past of the seed exists and, for them, the future of the sprout is a sprout and the past of the seed is a seed. Their view is that things cannot be produced from what does not exist earlier because of the unwanted consequence that production would be adventitious and causeless. Therefore, they assert that an effect exists at the time of its future, which occurs previous to the aggregation of its causes and conditions. The aggregation of its causes and conditions produces the sprout at the time of its present. Thereby, the entity abides before and after its production.

All other Buddhist schools—Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Madhyamika—consider Vaibhashika to be almost like Samkhya on this point. All Buddhist schools except Vaibhashika say that at the time of the seed the sprout is the seed; at that time, the sprout is not a sprout; the sprout does not then exist. The horns of a rabbit (an example of an utter non-existent) also do not exist at that time, but the difference between the horns of a rabbit and a sprout is that at the time of its seed a sprout abides as the
entity of a seed even though it is non-existent. If the sprout were existent, it could not abide as the entity of its seed because it would be a sprout. The Samkhya view is that only the existent can be produced; thus, the Buddhist sense that effects abide as the entity of causes but are non-existent at the time of their causes differs greatly. Just as the yogurt in a bowl is not produced from the bowl, so that which already exists in something is not produced from that something.

NON-PRODUCTION FROM OTHER

There are three ways of refuting production of effects from causes that are inherently other than those effects: 01

1 refuting both inherently existent otherness and inherently existent production
2 refuting inherently existent production
3 refuting inherently existent otherness.

Refuting both inherently existent otherness and inherently existent production

It follows that thick darkness arises from a tongue of flame and that any effect arises from what are commonly considered to be its causes or non-causes because inherently other effects arise in dependence on inherently other causes.

If causes and effects were inherently existent others, then they would not be dependently existent others but would be non-related others. If an effect were produced from a cause that is an unrelated other, it is the same as allowing that it could be produced from everything that is conventionally considered not to be its causes because they are equally other than the effect. In the same way, if a cause produced an effect that is an unrelated other, it is the same as allowing that a cause could also produce any entity, such as a lamp's producing darkness.

A proponent of production from other might object:
This consequence does not apply; though cause and effect are inherently other, an effect which a cause is able to produce is the effect of that cause, and a cause which is able to produce that effect is the cause of that effect. A sprout of rice is not produced from a barley seed and is not produced from its non-producers, such as the future moments of its own continuum. A sprout of rice is produced from that which is included in its same continuum and from producers that are prior to it. Therefore, everything is not produced from everything.

Answer:

This is not correct; once cause and effect are inherently other, this otherness must be their mode of being. Once otherness is their mode of being, they must be utterly non-related. Thus, it is not possible for a rice seed and a barley seed to be different with respect to whether they can produce a shoot of rice or not because they both are inherently other than a rice shoot.

Further:

A seed is not inherently other than a sprout because a seed has no inherently existent otherness. It so follows because if a seed were inherently other than its sprout, then it could not be a dependent existent or nominal other. It would necessarily have a separate entity of otherness such as is mistakenly propounded by the Vaiśeshikas.

Further:

A seed and its sprout are not inherently other because a sprout does not exist simultaneously with its seed. It so follows because if they existed inherently, they would neither depend on nor be affected by anything. They would never disappear, and thus the sprout would have to exist even at the time of the seed. However, they do not exist simultaneously because without a transformation
of the seed there is no production of a sprout. Thus, a seed and its sprout are not inherently other, and production of a sprout from a seed does not exist inherently. For this reason, one should forsake the thesis that things are produced from inherently existent others.

Refuting inherently existent production

If the entities of the phenomena that are effects, such as sprouts, do not exist in their causes either collectively or individually or as things other than their causes, then the entities of the effects to be produced do not exist prior to their production. If so, how could production from other exist?

An effect would have to exist prior to its production if production existed inherently. Once production is accepted, the cause's approaching cessation and the effect's approaching production are simultaneous, as it is even in the Prasangika's own presentation of conventionally existent production. The activity of approaching production depends on the effect because it is the effect that is approaching production. If production were findable under analysis, then, whenever the activity of approaching production existed, the base of this activity, the sprout, would have to exist. For, the two are in a relation of supporter and supporter, and since this is their nature, it cannot change.

The activity of approaching production exists at the time of the cause's approaching cessation, and since the effect must exist along with its activity, the seed and the sprout would have to exist simultaneously. This is impossible because simultaneity would rule out that the one produced the other. If the sprout were already existent, what could a seed do to produce it?

Still, if a seed produces something, this something that is growing forth must exist, but if it already exists, how can it be said that the seed produces it?

If they do not exist simultaneously, how can it be said that production exists inherently? For, the activity of approaching production and that thing which is approaching production
would have to exist simultaneously if production were findable. How could there be growing without the thing that is growing?

Someone might object:

It is seen that one end of a scale moves downward at the same time that the other end moves upward. Just as these activities exist simultaneously, the activities of approaching cessation and of approaching production exist simultaneously. Thereby, it is shown that seed and sprout exist simultaneously.

Answer:

Even if the activities of the rising and lowering of the two ends of a scale exist simultaneously, a seed and a sprout are not similar because they do not exist simultaneously, and, thus, their activities do not exist simultaneously. A sprout's state of presently being produced is its approaching production; therefore, it does not exist at that time. A seed's present ceasing is its approaching cessation; even though the seed is existent, in the next moment it will not exist. Therefore, a sprout and its seed do not exist simultaneously and are not similar to the two ends of a scale.

Buddha used the example of the scale in the Rice Seedling Sutra (Shalistantha) to show that these two actions exist simultaneously as dependent-arisings, when there is no analysis, like a magician's illusions.

Refuting inherently existent otherness

If the effect's own entity does not exist at the time of the cause, then there is no referent in relation to which the causes could become 'other'. Thus, there is no phenomenon of otherness in seeds and so forth, and so no production from other.

Someone might try to avoid this fallacy by stating:

Though there is no inherently existent otherness in what
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does not exist simultaneously, since cause and effect exist simultaneously and are other, there is production from other.

Answer:
What already exists has no need for production.

Errors concerning the refutation of production from other
Many interpreters of Madhyamika think that since two things that are other must exist simultaneously in order to be other and since cause and effect necessarily exist at different times, the production of an effect from a cause other than it is impossible. Dzong-ka-ba rejects this interpretation of the Prasangika refutation of production from other because the very faults that are ascribed to others by the Prasangikas would apply to themselves. In other words, since the Prasangikas assert cause and effect conventionally, they must also assert that conventionally cause and effect exist at different times and that cause and effect are other. If the Prasangikas refuted all otherness in what do not exist simultaneously, it would be impossible for them to present cause and effect.

Therefore, the refutation of production from other refers not to other in general but to 'inherently existent other'. When this is refuted, mere analytically unfindable, conventional otherness of cause and effect is not refuted, and cause and effect can be presented without fault.

If analytically findable production from other existed, then an effect would have to exist at the time of its causes in order for its causes to be other than it, and since cause and effect are necessarily serial, analytically findable otherness cannot obtain between them. Thus, Dzong-ka-ba objects to other interpreters' failure to delineate inherently existent otherness as the object of refutation.

It is necessary to present the reasoning that refutes inherently existent production in such a way that it does not harm one's own presentation of conventional phenomena. For instance, it is said that the action of approaching production can exist conventionally
without the existence of the sprout that is approaching production, much the same as a seed and a sprout do not exist simultaneously even though they are related. Conventionally, a seed is the source or object related to and its sprout is the relater; however, both do not have to exist simultaneously within the context of analytically unfindable nominalities. It is necessary to distinguish between what constitutes ultimate analysis and what constitutes conventional analysis. Making complicated distinctions does not necessarily constitute ultimate analysis. Here, ultimate analysis is a searching for an otherness that can bear analysis, such as investigating whether the something in relation to which a thing is called 'other' is present or not.

Seeing all analysis as ultimate analysis, many interpreters of Prasangika say that the Madhyamikas themselves have no presentation of cause and effect; thus, they think that it is not necessary to qualify production from other with 'inherently existent'. For Dzong-ka-ba, production exists conventionally and validly, and production from the merely other must be accepted because the remaining three possibilities—self, both, and causelessly—are absurd. Therefore, the refutation of production from other must be qualified as 'production from inherently existent other'. From his viewpoint many Madhyamika interpreters have overextended the scope of Nagarjuna’s refutations.

It is a cardinal point in the systems of interpreters of Prasangika who do not accept valid establishment that Prasangikas assert nothing themselves but use only the inner contradictions of others’ assertions to refute them. Thus, some Tibetan scholars say that Prasangikas hold that a reason is not validly established for both parties in a debate because the stater would not know what was validly established for his opponent since he would not know the other’s mind either through direct perception or inference. They add that he himself would not know what was validly established because even when one has 'decided' that something is validly established, error is possible.

Dzong-ka-ba answers that if such an interpretation of Prasangika were true, then Prasangikas could not refute others from the point of view of others’ own assertions because they would not
know what the others actually asserted since they would not know others’ minds. They could not state refutations of others because even though they had 'decided' that something is a refutation, it is possible to be mistaken.

These same interpreters of Prasangika say that pervasion of a reason by a predicate cannot be validly established because through direct perception one only realizes, for instance, that the existence of fire pervades the existence of smoke in a specific place, such as a kitchen. One does not realize that the existence of fire pervades the instances of smoke in all places and at all times. They say that an inferring consciousness cannot realize the pervasion because it would have to cognize all phenomena in order to certify that all instances of smoke in all places and all times are pervaded by the existence of fire. Therefore, they say that there is no valid establishment of the pervasion of a reason (presence of smoke) by a predicate (presence of fire); they say that there is only pervasion that accords with the conventions of the world.

Dzong-ka-ba answers that this is extremely wrong. When one inferentially realizes that on a mountain pass there is fire because of the presence of smoke, as in a kitchen, the pervasion is not of a particular instance of smoke by a particular instance of fire. Rather, the generality 'fire' is realized as pervading the generality 'smoke'. If it were taken that the pervasion referred to fire on a pass pervading smoke on a pass, then, when this pervasion is realized, the thesis would already be realized. In other words, when it is determined that fire on a pass pervades smoke on a pass, one would already have realized the thesis—'On the pass there is fire.'

Furthermore, examples are given in order to facilitate realization of the same predicate, and, therefore, the predicate of the thesis which is implied in the example ('as in a kitchen') must be the same as in the main thesis, 'there is fire'. If the predicate of the example were specified as kitchen-fire, then the main thesis would absurdly have to read, 'on the pass there is kitchen-fire'. Rather, Dzong-ka-ba says that the subject ('on the pass') is the base with respect to which one realizes the presence of fire because of
the presence of smoke and that this base should not be confused with the predicate of the thesis (‘there is fire’) through making it into ‘there is pass-fire’.

According to Dzong-ka-ba, scholars who reject valid inference on the basis of the requirement of having to realize the pervasion of a specific reason by a specific predicate do not understand the Buddhist position on the subject. Rather than using good reasoning, they use a mass of coercives that are exactly alike in their lack of force. He says that they are similar to those who have fallen into a river and are trying to save themselves by grasping at floating grass. Though a specific smoke is seen on the pass, the pervasion based on which one realizes the specific thesis is a general pervasion.

The Sa-gya scholar Dak-tsang (Tag-tshang) refuted Dzong-ka-ba saying that it is contradictory to accept that seed and sprout are different substantial entities (dravya) and then not accept ‘production from other’. Jam-yang-shay-ba turns the same reasoning back on Dak-tsang, saying that Dak-tsang then must accept production from other because the latter implies that he accepts that the ‘other’ of’production from other’ means just an otherness of entity and not ‘inherently existent others’.

Dzong-ka-ba’s assertion is that seed and sprout are other entities and that a sprout is produced from its seed. However, this does not constitute an assertion of ‘production from other’ because the ‘other’ of‘production from other’ means ‘inherently existent other’. Dak-tsang himself does not accept that seed and sprout are even ‘other’, but Jam-yang-shay-ba thinks that Dak-tsang is ‘forced’ to assert this because the term ‘substantial entity’ is a part of common analysis. Since cause and effect must be accepted conventionally and since they must be accepted as other substantial entities, Dak-tsang must accept production from other if he says that ‘other’ means just ‘other substantial entities’ rather than ‘inherently existent others’.

Dak-tsang then would contradict the many dictums of the Prasangika system which say that both ultimately and conventionally production from other is not asserted. Dak-tsang, however, is quite aware that production from other cannot be
accepted even conventionally. For him, it is Dzong-ka-ba who breaks the dictum by applying analysis and then accepting that cause and effect are different entities.

Dzong-ka-ba's answer probably is that once dependently arisen production is accepted, it must be asked whether cause and effect are the same entity or different entities. If it is unsuitable to ask about sameness of entity or difference of entity, or mere self and other, it would be tantamount to saying that any analysis of the terms 'self' and 'other' would immediately involve ultimate analysis, even in cases of looking into whether something done several years ago was done by oneself or another.

Once valid establishment of conventional production is accepted, production must be explained as involving causes and effects which are either the same or different. If it cannot be said that cause and effect are merely other, the whole presentation of reasoning and valid establishment falls to the ground. Dzong-ka-ba's followers cogently say that analysis into whether an apple seed and the tree that will grow from it are merely different is just conventional analysis. Any further investigation into whether they are totally unrelated and so forth would constitute ultimate analysis and would exceed the sphere of the conventional. Thus, the 'other' of 'production from other' refers to others that can be found under analysis. Conventionally existent inherent otherness is also refuted, but mere conventionally existent otherness is not.

Still, when a mother says, 'I gave birth to a boy,' this is not accepted as a case of production from self. Although from the mother's viewpoint her son is produced from herself, conventionally she and her son are other. The world's merely saying something does not make it conventionally existent; reasoned, systematic analysis is not forbidden.

NON-PRODUCTION FROM BOTH SELF AND OTHER

The theistic Samkhyaas assert that all transformations are produced from the nature (prakrti) which is the same entity as its
transformations, as well as from the god Ishvara, who is other than the transformations. Therefore, all transformations are produced from both self and other.

The Jainas assert that, for example, a man named Maitreya who already existed as a living being (jiva) in a former life took rebirth, and thus, Maitreya is produced from himself since Maitreya and his living being are not other. Also, Maitreya is produced from that which is other than himself—parents, virtue, non-virtue, contaminations, and so forth—therefore, he is also produced from the other. In the same way, a pot is the same entity as the clay but a different entity from the potter's activities.

These assertions might seem to combine the advantages of production from self and production from other; however, they also accrue the fallacies of both. Each part of the dual assertion is refuted by the respective refutations of production from self and production from other already given.

NON-PRODUCTION CAUSELESSLY

The Nihilists do not assert that there is utterly no caused production because causation that can be observed, such as the making of a pot, does exist. However, the sharpness of thorns, the plunging downward of water-falls, the colors of flowers, and so forth are said to be causeless, arising just by the nature of the entity. They draw the conclusion that making effort at ethics is a waste of precious time because no moral carry-over from one lifetime to another is seen. Not being seen, such causation does not exist.

The Buddhists say that the sharpness of thorns is produced from the same seeds that produce the thorns. The ascertainment that the sharpness of thorns arises sometimes in some places is a proof that they are produced in dependence on other entities, and these entities upon which they depend are called causes.

If things were uncaused, the planting of fields and the like would be senseless because things would arise themselves.
Anything could arise from anything. If the production of things were adventitious, then just as a bread-fruit tree, for instance, would not be the cause of its own fruit, so because all things, such as lemon and mango trees, are also not causes of bread-fruit, bread-fruit would be produced from them because they are equally non-causes in relation to bread-fruit.¹⁰¹

CONCLUSION

The four possibilities of inherently existent production are thereby proved to be non-existent.¹⁰² It is thus established that things are not inherently produced. This, in turn, establishes that products do not exist inherently because for products to exist inherently they would have to be inherently produced. Realization of the absence of inherently existent production of a product is a realization of its emptiness.

Refutations of the views of philosophical systems on the four possibilities of inherently existent production are not just refutations of rival systems but should be taken as a branch of the process of overcoming one's own innate sense that things are inherently produced.¹⁰³ The innate non-analytical intellect does not conceive cause and effect to be either the same, or inherently different, or both, or neither; however, if the objects that the intellect misconceives as inherently existent did in fact inherently exist, they would necessarily exist in one of these four ways. Thus, through eliminating these four possibilities, the inherently existent products that are the objects of this innate ignorance are shown to be non-existent. By attacking in this way the falsely conceived object, the falsely conceiving subject is gradually overcome. The false subject is removed by overcoming belief in the false object.

Actual realization of an emptiness of inherent production transforms a person's view of the world and frees him or her from the chains of attachment toward products. Ultimately, direct cognition of emptiness in a totally non-dual manner elevates one to the level of a Superior, and through continuous cultivation of this cognition cyclic existence—the beginningless round of birth, aging, sickness, and death—is terminated.
2 The Four Extremes

Sources
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
ChandrakTrti's Commentary on the 'Supplement'
Corresponding sections of the translation pp.651-3

Does a cause produce an effect which is existent, non-existent, both, or neither?\textsuperscript{104} This analysis is a refutation of the four extremes but can also be called a refutation of the four alternatives. (The diamond slivers can also be called a refutation of the four extremes and a refutation of the four alternatives simply because there are four extremes or four alternatives considered.)\textsuperscript{105} As above, the possibilities for inherently existent production are limited to four, and when these four are eliminated, the absence of inherently existent production is established.

The reasoning in brief is:\textsuperscript{106}

An existent effect is not ultimately produced because whatever exists ultimately must always exist, and thus there would be no need for producers, that is, causes.

A non-existent effect is not ultimately produced because if a non-existent effect were produced, the horns of a rabbit could also be produced.
An effect which is both existent and non-existent is not produced because there is no such thing as an existent and non-existent effect; no one thing possesses contradictory natures.

An effect which is neither existent nor non-existent is not produced because there is no such thing.

Or, in another way:

A sprout which is in all ways existent at the time of its causes is not produced by causes and conditions because causes and conditions cannot create anything that already exists.

A sprout is not ultimately produced newly because of not existing at the time of its causes, just as a lotus in the sky, which is utterly non-existent, does not exist at the time of its causes and is not newly produced.

An effect, if ultimately existent, must exist at the time of its causes because whatever is ultimately produced must always exist since if at any time it did not exist, it would ultimately be non-existent forever. The ultimately existent is not fit to depend on causes and conditions; hence, there could be no difference between production when the causes and conditions are complete and non-production when the causes and conditions are non-complete.

Also, an effect would have to exist at the time of its causes because the action of the growing forth of an effect such as a sprout must depend on the sprout. Thus, at the time when the sprout is approaching production (which is the same time that its seed is approaching cessation), the sprout which is the base of the activity of growing forth must exist. Since the cause has not yet ceased at that time, both would exist at the same time.

ChandrakTrti says in his *Commentary on the 'Supplement'*:\textsuperscript{107}

Now, there is no time when a cause, from among cause and effect, depends on an effect [and thus could achieve otherness with respect to an effect]. In order to show this,
it is said [in the Supplement, VI.21], 'If producers are causes producing products other [than themselves], it is to be considered whether they produce an existent, non-existent, that which is both, or that which is neither. If it exists, of what use are producers? What could these producers do for the non-existent? What could they do for that which is neither?'

Causes, that is, producers, are not producers of an existent product because of the fallacies already set forth, such as, 'It is just not reasonable that what has already been produced be produced again.' Thus, there is no need at all of causes [for what already exists].

Also, what could these producers do for a non-existent product? It would be non-existent like the horns of an ass.

It is said, 'For whoever asserts that the effect is existent and for whoever asserts that the effect is non-existent, it would be senseless to set pillars and so forth for a house.'

Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* [XX.21-22] also says:

If the entity of the effect exists,
What will a cause produce?
If the entity of the effect does not exist,
What will a cause produce?

If it is not producing,
A cause is not possible.
If causes are not existent,
Of what would there be an effect?

Even if an effect were both existent and non-existent, what could causes do for it? For, the fallacies previously set forth would follow. 'Bothness' [here] is a thing that is both, or that which exists as both [existent and non-existent]. Possession of the entities of existence and non-existence does not occur in one thing at one time. Therefore, a thing that has such a nature does not exist. Because it is
just not existent, what could causes which are producers do for it?

The Treatise [XXV. 14] says:

How could nirvana
Be both a thing and a non-thing?
These two do not exist in one,
Like light and darkness.

Just so [VIII.7]:

An existent and non-existent doer
Does not do an existent and non-existent [doing].
How could one [entity] have existence and non-existence
Which are mutually exclusive?

Also, what could causes do for an effect which is neither existent nor non-existent? For, an effect that has forsaken the entities of existence and non-existence does not exist. If the existent and non-existent do not occur, that which is both not existent and not non-existent, being the negative of these, would not be any different. When these two are not established, that which is both not existent and not non-existent just does not occur.

The Treatise [XXV. 15] says:

The teaching of nirvana
As [both] not a thing and not a non-thing
Would be established
If things and non-things were established.

ChandrakTrti applies this refutation of the four extremes to various types of production from other, and Nagarjuna and Ausha extend its import to include a refutation of inherently existent abiding and ceasing. For, once there is no inherently existent production, how could there be inherently existent abiding or ceasing?
3 The Four Alternatives

Sources
Nga-wang-bel-den’s Annotations
Geshe Gediin Lodro’s oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.653-8

The principal Indian source for the refutation of the four alternatives is the Svatamtrika Jnanagarbha’s Discrimination of the Two Truths (Satyadvayavibhahga) and his own commentary. Not finding any Prasangika sources, many scholars, including Jang-gya, do not accept this reasoning as Prasangika.” It is not that the import of the refutation of the four alternatives cannot be considered Prasangika but a question of whether this reasoning is emphasized sufficiently among Indian Prasangikas to be considered an integral part of their system.

Jam-yang-shay-ba, however, lists it as one of the Prasangikas’ means of refuting the inherent existence of phenomena, saying that the reasoning refuting the four alternatives is so attractive that it literally captivates the mind of the intelligent (see p.654). It is: A product such as an eye consciousness is not ultimately
produced because ultimately only one effect is not produced from only one cause, ultimately many effects are not produced from only one cause, ultimately only one effect is not produced from many causes, and ultimately many effects are not produced from many causes.

The very meaning of production mitigates against ultimate existence because 'ultimately existing' means 'existing through its own power'. If an entity's existence depends on production, the entity does not exist through its own power. Still, one's mind will not be captivated by this interesting reasoning unless one probes the refutation further. The establishment of the four-cornered reason must be investigated thoroughly in order to gain its import.

An eye consciousness is chosen as the example because the three causes of the production of an eye consciousness are well known in Buddhist literature. An eye consciousness is caused by three factors: a visible form, an eye sense power, and a former moment of consciousness. A visible object—color and shape—causes an eye consciousness to be produced in the image of that object. An eye sense power causes an eye consciousness to have the ability to apprehend colors and shapes and not sounds, odors, and so forth. A former moment of consciousness causes an eye consciousness to be a conscious entity. In other words, the ability of an eye consciousness to apprehend visible objects is derived from its respective sense; its being generated in the image of a particular object is caused by a particular visible form; its being conscious is caused by a previous moment of consciousness.

The refutation of the first alternative, that ultimately only one effect is produced from only one cause, is based on the fact that an eye sense power not only produces an eye consciousness but also produces its own next moment.

If it were said that the single effect produced by an eye sense power is only its own second moment, it would absurdly follow that all beings would be blind because the production of an eye consciousness from an eye sense power would not occur.
If it were said that an eye sense power produces only an eye consciousness, it would absurdly follow that all beings would be blind because there would be no continuous production of two moments of an eye sense.

The first moment of the eye sense would generate an eye consciousness, but because there would be no second moment of the eye sense, a second moment of eye consciousness would be nonexistent, and an ordinary being cannot realize anything in just one moment.

The refutation of the second alternative, that ultimately many effects are produced from only one cause, is accomplished through three absurd consequences:

It would absurdly follow that:
1. the experiential aspect of an eye consciousness would not be the imprint or effect of an immediately preceding moment of consciousness
2. the aspect which is the image's generation in the consciousness would not be the effect of the visible form
3. the aspect of an eye consciousness which is its ability to apprehend a particular type of object would not be the effect of an eye sense power, its special empowering cause.

The reason is that ultimately only one cause would produce many effects, and only one cause would be assigned for these three effects.

The refutation of the third alternative, that ultimately only one effect is produced from many causes, is:

It absurdly follows that only one of the three attributes of an eye consciousness is produced by the three causes of an eye consciousness. Therefore, it absurdly follows that the other two attributes either do not exist or are produced causelessly.

The fourth alternative, that ultimately many effects are produced from many causes, is the most likely alternative, and its refutation is many-sided:
Meditation on Emptiness

It might be said that a composite of the three causes ultimately produces the three attributes and that the three attributes are not ultimately different but only appear to the mind to be different. Then, because they would actually exist one way but appear another way, they would be false and thus could not be truly existent. Further, if the three attributes are not different and do not appear to be different to any mind, the three attributes would be one, and it could not be said that many causes produce many effects.

If the three attributes are ultimately different, it would follow that an eye consciousness and the three attributes of an eye consciousness would be ultimately different. Then, since the composite of the three causes produces the three attributes, one would have to find a cause for the consciousness which is different from them. Furthermore, an eye consciousness and its three attributes are not ultimately different because if they were, the wisdom realizing suchness would have to perceive them as different since difference would be their mode of being, but it does not.

Moreover, an eye consciousness would be produced by a visible form because its being generated in the image of the object is produced by the form. Also, an eye consciousness would not be produced by a visible form because its being a conscious entity is not produced from a visible form. An eye consciousness is not a different entity from its attribute of being produced in the image of its object and also it is not a different entity from its attribute of being a conscious entity. Therefore, it would be both produced from a visible form and not produced from a visible form.

The pivot around which these consequences turn is that if an eye consciousness were ultimately the same entity as its attributes, it would be one with its attributes in all respects. Such are the conditions that an object findable under analysis must fulfill; if the
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sameness of an eye consciousness with its attributes is its inherent nature, how could it also be different from these attributes?

In the same vein:

A visible form absurdly would be both a producer and a non-producer of an eye consciousness. It would produce an eye consciousness because it generates the consciousness in its image, and it would not produce an eye consciousness became it does not generate its quality of being conscious.

If the three attributes are produced from the composite of the three causes, then the causes individually would not be producers. If the three causes are individually the producers, then the effect, the eye consciousness, would be uncaused because only the three attributes of an eye consciousness would be caused. If it is asserted that the three causal factors produce an eye consciousness, then the eye consciousness which is not different from its three different attributes would be uncaused. For, the three attributes would be uncaused, and the eye consciousness is not different from them.

It is said that not finding things such as cause and effect under analysis is somewhat like searching a room from top to bottom for a big, obvious thing such as a good-sized box. One is not able to find it, and the search generates utter conviction that it cannot be found. This analytical consciousness which does not find objects is a wisdom consciousness. Through cultivating it, realization dawns, revealing how objects are utterly unfindable when analyzed in such a manner but are imputedly existent, effective, and validly established.

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Because these four types of production do exist conventionally, it is necessary that the qualification 'ultimately', 'inherently', or 'naturally' be affixed to the refutations. Otherwise, the scope of the refutation would be over-extended. In the Prasangika system
there is nominal production of one from one, many from one, one from many, and many from many.

The best source for showing that one producing one and so forth exist conventionally is in sutra where it is taught that (1) one action can produce one life, (2) one action can produce many lives, (3) many actions can produce one life, and (4) many actions can produce many lives (see p.657). It could be asked whether a single life is only one effect, but such investigations into whether a series can rightly be considered a unit or not is a mode of ultimate analysis. When the continuum of a lifetime is sought in the individual moments of the continuum, it cannot be found. The continuum is not the individual moments nor their composite; if a continuum were a composite of the moments, either each moment would be a continuum or there would be no separate moments.

Conventionally, or nominally, cause and effect are preserved. It is said that just as external cause and effect can differ greatly in size, as in the case of an apple seed's producing an apple tree, even more so does the force and endurance differ between cause and effect in the internal sphere. The mind's power is such that a little non-virtue can cause tremendous havoc and a little virtue can cause tremendous advancement. Just so, one complete action with strong motivation to attain Buddhahood for the sake of living beings can act as the basis not just for one lifetime but for many. The marvels of cause and effect are not lost in the devastating import of no inherent existence. An understanding of emptiness enhances an understanding of cause and effect.
4 Dependent-Arising

Sources
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Corresponding section of the translation pp.659-76

In the Madhyamika system all phenomena, both impermanent and permanent, are dependent-arisings (pratityasamutpada). Through the reason of their being dependent-arisings, their emptiness is established. The Questions of Sagaramati Sutra (Sagaramatipariprchchha) says:

Those which arise dependently
Are free of inherent existence.

The Questions of the King of Nagas, Anavatapta, Sutra (Anavataptanagarajapariprchchha) says:

Those which are produced from causes are not produced.
They do not have an inherent nature of production.
Those which depend on causes are said to be Empty; those who know emptiness are aware.

In this quote, the reason which establishes an emptiness of
products is indicated by 'produced from causes'. The meaning of not being produced is clarified by the next line, 'They do not have an inherent nature of production'; it is not mere production but inherently existent production that is eliminated. Also, Buddha himself clarified his teaching of no production in the Descent into Lanka Sutra (Lahkavatara), 'O Mahamati, thinking of no inherently existent production, I said that all phenomena are not produced.'

In the quote from the Questions of Anavatapta Sutra the words 'those which' indicate the phenomena that are subjects being shown to lack inherently existent production; they are outer phenomena, such as sprouts, and inner phenomena, such as actions. The third line, 'Those which depend on causes are said to be empty', indicates that reliance and dependence on causes is the meaning of being empty of inherent existence. An emptiness of inherent existence is the meaning of dependent-arising; emptiness does not mean the negation of mere production or an absence in phenomena of an ability to perform a function.

The reasoning is:

Sprouts and so forth are not inherently produced because of being dependent-arisings.

The predicate of the thesis ('are not inherently produced') eliminates the extreme of permanence; the reason ('being dependent-arisings') eliminates the extreme of annihilation. Seeing that the reasoning of dependent-arising refutes all extremes and that this teaching is a quality elevating Buddha above all other teachers, Nagarjuna praised Buddha in the opening verses of his Treatise on the Middle Way:

I bow down to the perfect Buddha,
The best of propounders, who taught
That what dependently arises
Has no cessation, no production,
No annihilation, no permanence, no coming,
No going, no difference, no sameness,
Is free of the elaborations [of inherent
Existence and of duality] and is at peace.
The word 'dependent-arising' in Sanskrit is pratityasamutpada. It has two parts: pratitya, a continuative meaning 'having depended', and samutpada, an action noun meaning 'arising'.

The formation of pratitya is:

in - n + prati + su - su + ktva which changes to lyap - l - p + tuk (between i and ya) - k - u + su - su = pratftya.

In other words, the verbal root in, meaning 'going', loses its indicatory letter n, leaving i. To this, prati is affixed, and the nominative case ending su is affixed to prati but immediately erased because prati is an indeclinable. The continuative ending ktva is added to i in the form of lyap, of which the accent letter / and the p that indicates the addition of the augment tuk are dropped. This leaves prati iya. Tuk is added between i and ya, and the indicatory k and pronunciation letter u are dropped. The i of prati and the i of the verbal root are combined, making pratitya. The nominative case ending su is added but is immediately dropped because the continuative pratitya is an indeclinable.

The formation of samutpada is:

pada + ut (before pada) + sam (before utpada) + su (after ut) + su (after sam) - su - su + ghan (which is a vṛddhini- ing of a) + su - u (with the s changing to) ru - U (with the r changing to) h = samutpadah.

In other words, the prefixes ut and sam are added to pada which means 'going'. The nominative case ending is added to these two and then is immediately dropped because they are indeclinables, making samutpada. The vowel of pad is strengthened for the sake of denoting an action noun, making samutpada. The nominative case ending su is added; the u is erased; the 5 changes into ru; the u is erased, and the r changes into visarga, making samutpadah.

Pratitya is thus shown to be a continuative meaning 'having depended' and not a secondary derivative noun as many Madhyamikas and non-Madhyanikas wrongly claim. For them, the t of itya is added because the root i is being used to form an action noun. Ya is then an affix used to form a secondary derivative noun.
Thus, for them itya means 'that which goes', and 'prati' means 'multiple', or 'diverse', or 'this and that'. In this mistaken interpretation pratitya means 'that which goes or disintegrates diversely'. Pratitya being viewed not as a continuative but as a noun, it is wrongly asserted that in the compound pratityasamutpada a genitive plural case ending has been erased and should be added when taken out of compound, making pratityasamutpada. The etymological meaning of pratityasamutpada is thereby wrongly taken to mean 'the composition and arising of effects which disintegrate in each diverse moment and which have definite, diverse causes and conditions'.

Chandrakirti does not say that this meaning is wholly wrong, but that it is a bad etymology because though it would apply to a use of pratityasamutpada in a general sense, it would not apply when pratityasamutpada refers to a specific arising of a single effect from a single cause. However, taken as 'having depended, arising' or 'dependent-arising', it applies to both general and specific references.

The Prasangikas say that samutpada does not just mean 'arising' (lit., 'going out'), in the sense of arising from causes and conditions in the way that a sprout arises from a seed. It also means 'establishment' (siddha, grub pa) and 'existence' (sat, yodpa), (two words that are often used interchangeably in Buddhist terminology). The term pratityasamutpada thereby refers not just to products, or things which arise from causes, but also to non-products since their existence is relative. All phenomena are dependent-arisings.

The term 'dependent-arising' not only refers to a process of production and of coming into existence but also to these things which are produced and come into existence. Phenomena themselves are dependent-arisings; a pot is a dependent-arising; a consciousness is a dependent-arising; an emptiness is a dependent-arising, and so forth.

The non-Buddhist Grammarians object to the term and its meaning, saying that since pratitya is a continuative, the act of depending must precede the act of arising. If that which depends
or meets its causes exists before its arising, then it would contradict the Buddhists’ own dictum that an effect does not exist at the time of the cause. Therefore, the Grammarians reject both the grammatical correctness of the term and the philosophical correctness of its meaning. However, according to Buddhists an effect does not have to exist at the time of its causes for it to depend on those causes; the mere production of an effect by causes is the meaning of ‘dependence’.

Bhavaviveka, in effect, refuses to etymologize the term in detail, thereby suggesting that pratityasamutpada attains its meaning through conventional usage and is not bound to an etymological meaning. Chandrakirti speculates that Bhavaviveka compares it to the compound aranyetilaka which literally means ‘sesame in the forest’ but is used to indicate anything that does not answer to one's expectations. Just as wild sesame yields no oil, so events that do not yield one's expectations are called ‘sesame in the forest’. The etymology, though connected to the meaning, is much narrower than the meaning which is gained through common convention. Chandrakirti speculates that for Bhavaviveka the etymology of the term pratityasamutpada likewise does not bear close scrutiny; by common convention, however, it just means ‘conditionally’, that is, ‘when this is, that arises’.

Chandrakirti disagrees, making reference to a verse in Nagarjuna’s own Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktishashtika) where the master himself obviously etymologizes pratityasamutpada:

\[
\text{Tat tatprapya yadutpannam notpannam tat svabhavatah}
\]

‘That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions] is not inherently produced.’

The word substituted for pratitya is another continuative, prapya, which means 'having attained' (or 'having met' according to the Tibetan translation in this context for prapya, phrad nas). The stanza thereby refutes Bhavaviveka's contention that Buddhapalita erred in taking prapya as the meaning of pratitya. Bhavaviveka’s contention, as is made clear by his commentator Avalokitavrata, is like that of the Grammarians. His
point is that if an eye consciousness, for example, were existent, it could meet with the eye sense and form which are its causes. However, if it were existent at the time of its causes, it would be senseless for the causes to produce it. According to Avalokitavrata, Bhavaviveka's objection is based on the principle that phenomena which meet must be simultaneously existent, but Bhavaviveka himself does not make clear the reasons for his objection. Chandrardrti surmises that perhaps Bhavaviveka means that only physical things can meet; Avalokitavrata's interpretation is broader, but the requirement of simultaneous existence is present for a physical meeting also.

ChandrakFrti's answer to Bhavaviveka's objection is two-fold:

First, Buddha made statements such as, 'This monk has met with (that is, attained) the fruit'. Second, Nagarjuna himself used the word prapya as a substitute for pratitya.

His answer is indeed to the point because Bhavaviveka would not want to quarrel with Nagarjuna.

Interestingly, in Nagarjuna's verse etymology, prati seems to be etymologized as 'this and that' (tat tat); this would affirm the view that prati is to be taken as meaning 'multiplicity', or 'diverse', or 'this and that', contradicting Chandrakirti's contention on this point. Chandrardrti might answer, however, that Nagarjuna is giving an example of things relied upon, not an etymology of pratiti. For, pratiti itself means prapti, 'meeting' or 'attainment', and it modifies i, which usually means 'go', to cause it to mean prapti. Prapti means apeksha, 'reliance', and thus the compound pratityasamutpada means 'arising in reliance' and 'arising in dependence', or, more cogently, 'dependent-arising'. It means the arising of things in dependence on causes and conditions, a very sign of their non-inherent existence.

Prapyasamutpada, apekshyasamutpada, and pratityasamutpada are synonyms; however, they are sometimes explained with individual meanings. Prapyasamutpada, 'arising through meeting', is taken as referring to the dependent-arising which is
the production of things by their causes. This is the meaning that the Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, and Chittamatrins give to 'dependent-arising'; for them, however, dependent-arising is a sign of things' true existence, not a sign of their non-true existence. 'Meeting' can even be taken literally in the sense of indicating that a cause's approaching cessation and its effect's approaching production are simultaneous.

Apekshyasamutpada, 'existing in reliance' or 'relative existence', is taken as referring to the dependent-arising which is the attainment by products and non-products of their own entities in reliance on their parts. This meaning of dependent-arising is a distinguishing feature of the Madhyamika system and is said to be the Svatantrika-Madhyamikas' favored means of proving no true existence, but it is also shared with such Prasangika masters as Aryadeva. Things undeniably appear to the mind to be separate from their parts as when it is thought, 'This house has ten rooms'. The house appears to be one thing and the ten rooms appear to be another.

Pratityasamutpada, 'dependent-existence', is taken as referring to the dependent-arising which is the designation of all phenomena in dependence on the thought that designates them. Without thought to designate the existence of phenomena, the arising of phenomena does not occur. However, phenomena undeniably appear to common beings as if they exist in and of themselves, appearing from the object's side toward the subject rather than appearing to be imputed by the subject toward the object. 'Existing in dependence on a designating consciousness' is the special meaning of dependent-arising in the Prasangika system. The other two meanings are also wholeheartedly accepted by the Prasangikas, but their own special interpretation is to take & pratityasamutpada as referring to the designation of phenomena dependent not just on their parts or bases of designation but also on the thought that designates them.

When Chandrakirti says that dependent-arising is the arising of things dependent on causes and conditions, the words 'causes and conditions' do not refer just to usual causes and conditions such as seeds or ignorance. 'Causes and conditions' also refer to
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the parts of an object—an object's basis of designation—and to the thought that designates the existence of an object. The word 'arising' means not just 'production' but also 'existence' and 'establishment'; all phenomena are dependent existents or relative existents. Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* (VIII. 12) says:

A doer arises dependent on a doing,  
And a doing exists dependent on a doer.  
Except for that, we do not see  
Another cause for their establishment.

It is clear that Nagarjuna does not mean that these two cause each other with each one arising after the other one; such would be impossible. Doer and doing are mutually dependent in terms of the attainment of their entities through designation by thought.

Dependent-arising is the king of reasonings because it can, without residue, overcome both extremes. The reasoning is:

All phenomena do not inherently exist because of being dependent-arisings.

Or, in its most powerful form:

All phenomena do not inherently exist because of being dependently imputed.

Here, 'all phenomena' means 'each and every phenomenon'. Through ascertaining the reason—that all phenomena are dependent-arisings—the extreme of annihilation is avoided, and realization of the dependent-arising of causes and effects is gained. Through ascertaining the thesis—that all phenomena do not inherently exist—the extreme of permanence is avoided, and realization of the emptiness of all phenomena is gained.

Furthermore, through ascertaining the reason—that all phenomena are dependent-arisings—the extreme of permanence is also avoided because it is realized that phenomena are just interdependently existent, not inherently existent. Through
ascertaining the thesis—that all phenomena do not inherently exist—the extreme of annihilation is also avoided because it is realized that only inherent existence is negated, not existence in general. As a yogi progresses in understanding dependent-arising, realization of how the reason and the thesis each avoid the two extremes becomes subtler and subtler.

All other reasonings that prove no inherent existence derive from this king of reasons, dependent-arising. In the Prasangika system the main reasonings proving no inherent existence are the refutation of the four extreme types of production, called the diamond slivers, and the sevenfold analysis of the relationship of the person and the mind-body complex, to be explained in the next chapter. Ultimately, the diamond slivers meets back to dependent-arising as Chandrakirti says in his Supplement (VI. 114):

> Because things are not produced causelessly,
> Or from Ishvara and so forth,
> Or from other, from self, or both,
> They are dependently produced.

The very fact that external phenomena, such as sprouts, and internal phenomena, such as actions, arise dependent on their causes (seeds and ignorance) establishes that their production is empty of natural existence and eliminates that they are produced from self, other, both, or causelessly. This is mainly based on the reasoning of dependent-production, and in this sense the diamond slivers derives from dependent-arising.

The diamond slivers also derives from dependent-designation, which is more difficult to realize than dependent-production. When a yogi searches to find the object that is being imputed in the expression, 'A sprout is growing,' he gains ascertainment that it does not grow from self, other, both, or causelessly. Through the force of this realization he develops ascertainment that the production of sprouts and so forth is just a conventional designation and through this develops ascertainment that if the object imputed in the expression 'production' is sought, it cannot be found. This is how the reasoning which refutes production of
the four extreme types derives from dependent-arising, or dependent-designation.

Ultimately, the sevenfold reasoning refuting an inherently existent person also derives from dependent-arising. As Chandrakirti says (Supplement VI.158):

[The person] is not established in fact
Or in the world in the seven ways,
But without analysis, here in the world
Is imputed in dependence on its parts.

The non-finding of a person as either the same as mind and body, or as different from them, or as their base, or as based on them, or as possessing them, or as their shape, or as their composite induces the ascertainment that a person is just imputed to the mental and physical aggregates. Similarly, a realization that a person is just imputed in dependence upon the aggregates induces the ascertainment that a person is not findable in these seven ways. Thus, the sevenfold analysis can be seen as contained in an investigation of dependent-designation, the subtlest meaning of dependent-arising.

It is even said that emptiness and dependent-arising are synonyms, but this is not in the sense that 'pot' and its definition 'that which is bulbous and able to hold water' are synonyms. Also, the synonymity of emptiness and dependent-arising does not mean that a consciousness which ascertains that effects arise dependent on causes and conditions also ascertains the meaning of their being empty of inherently existent production. Furthermore, the meaning of the term 'dependent-arising' is not asserted to be the meaning of emptiness. An explicit ascertainment of a dependent-arising does not even carry with it an implicit ascertainment of emptiness. Rather, emptiness is synonymous with dependent-arising for Madhyamikas who through valid cognition have refuted inherent existence.

Not just anyone who realizes dependent-arising can realize its synonymity with emptiness since many even see dependent-arising as a reason for asserting inherent existence. However, when a Madhyamika ascertains that external and internal things
are dependent-arisings, he realizes, based on the force of this very understanding, that being empty of inherent existence is the meaning of being a dependent-arising. For, he has realized that what inherently exists does not rely on anything, and he has realized that inherent existence and dependent-arising are contradictory.

Since through dependent-arising itself he has found realization of the emptiness that negates inherent existence, when he sees, hears, or is mindful that sprouts and so forth depend on causes and conditions, he is drawn to thinking of the manner in which these sprouts do not inherently exist. His mind has been thoroughly trained to consider the unfindability of phenomena through merely perceiving that they arise dependent on causes and conditions. He is so conditioned to think of emptiness as soon as he notices causal conditionality that in a future life, even though emptiness is not taught to him, the mere hearing of the doctrine of cause and effect revivifies his former understanding. His probing of the unfindability of phenomena is renewed, and his progress on the path toward direct cognition of emptiness is enhanced. He overcomes the bonds of forgetfulness that accompany the passage from one lifetime to another due to the difficulties of birth and the accustoming to a new body. Since cause and effect are taught practically everywhere, the yogi can 'outwit' the contrary forces that would take him away from continuing penetration of emptiness by taking the doctrine of cause and effect and using it as his means to penetrate emptiness.

Through realizing how the other types of reasoning meet back to dependent-arising, it is seen how working properly on any one of them could involve understanding the meaning of all the others. Through seeing dependent-arising, it is said that a yogi sees Buddha in the sense that Buddha as a Truth Body is not different from the nature of dependent-arisings.121

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Because all phenomena, including emptinesses, are dependent-arisings and thus do not truly exist, Jam-yang-shay-ba (see p.676)
criticizes Dak-tsang for claiming that 'ultimate' (paramartha, don dam), 'validly established' (pramanasiddha, tshad mas grub pa), and 'able to set itself up' (Tib: tshugs thub tu grub pa) are synonyms. Dak-tsang refuses to accept that conventional phenomena are validly established because for him 'validly established' means that an object is able to establish itself independently.\footnote{122} Jam-yang-shay-ba points out that there is no system of tenets, even within Hfnayana, which asserts that what is validly established must also be 'able to set itself up'. For, in the Sautrantika system 'generally characterized phenomena' (samanyalakshana, spyi mtshan) or permanent phenomena are validly established but are not able to establish themselves because they depend on thought.

Still, it does seem that the Vaibhashikas assert that all phenomena are self-established because they assert that every phenomenon has its own self-sufficient entity.\footnote{123} The Vaibhashikas maintain that all existents are 'substantially established' (dravyasiddha, rdzas grub) though they reserve 'substantially existent' (dravyasat, rdzasyod) merely for those phenomena that can bear analysis. For the Vaibhashikas, ultimate truths are not emptinesses, as the Madhyamikas and Chittamatrins assert, but objects such as forms and consciousnesses which, even if analyzed down to their smallest particles or moments, are still instances of form or consciousness. Objects such as tables and chairs, however, disappear from the mind if one considers their individual particles and asks if those are tables; thus, they are conventional truths. However, each particle is still an instance of form; therefore, the Vaibhashikas assert that partless particles, partless moments of consciousness, and permanent phenomena can bear ultimate analysis. For them forms, consciousnesses, spaces, and so forth are ultimate truths. All composite objects, such as chairs and pots, are conventional truths, and Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be implying that though conventional truths are for them 'substantially established', they are not 'able to set themselves up'.

In any case, the Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Madhyamikas agree that what is validly established need not be self-established. Jam-yang-shay-ba says that if one insists that in the Prasangika
system an ultimate, that is, an emptiness, must be both validly established and able to set itself up, one misses the distinctive feature of Madhyamika and the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, this being the dependent existence of everything. However, Dak-tsong does not accept the valid establishment of anything and says further that whatever is 'validly established' must be also 'self-established'. He, therefore, does not himself accept that emptinesses are 'self-established', but Jam-yang-shay-ba forces on him the conclusion that emptinesses are 'self-established' or truly existent because for Jam-yang-shay-ba an emptiness must be validly established just because it exists.

Since an analytical consciousness discovers or finds the unfindability of an object, this unfindability (emptiness) might seem to be inherently existent. It is true that when an analytical consciousness searches to find whether an object inherently exists or not, it does find an emptiness of the object; however, when this very analytical consciousness searches to find the emptiness of the object, it 'finds' or cognizes an emptiness of the emptiness of the object. Thus, though an emptiness is an ultimate truth, it does not ultimately exist. This does not diminish the fact that when conjoined with practice of the Bodhisattva deeds, cognition of and thorough acquaintance with emptiness grant the highest of boons, liberation from cyclic existence and, finally, omniscience.
5 Refuting a Self of Persons

Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Jang-gya’s Presentation of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den’s Annotations
Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.677-97

In general 'self (atman, bdag), 'person' (pudgala, gang zag) and 'I' (aham, nga) are synonyms along with 'creature' or 'being' (purusha, skyes bu), which has also been translated here as 'person'. However, when Prasangikas speak specifically of a self of persons (pudgalatman, gang zag gi bdag), this 'self does not refer to the conventionally existent person which is imputed in dependence on the aggregates of mind and body. In the term 'self of persons', 'self means 'inherent existence', and the word 'persons' means 'nominally exist persons'. Hence, the term 'selflessness of persons' means the non-inherent existence of nominally existent persons. 'Inherent existence' means 'independent existence', 'objective existence', 'natural existence', or 'existence under its own power', etc. The meaning of inherent existence
is best seen when one progresses toward realizing the imputed nature of the person.\textsuperscript{126} Yogis who long to be freed from the round of birth, aging, sickness, and death do not initially meditate on the emptiness of pillars, pots and sprouts but on the emptiness, or selflessness, of persons.\textsuperscript{127} Having gained an understanding of the emptiness of persons, a yogi turns to meditation on the emptiness of the other phenomena which are included within the continuum of a person, such as body and mind, and finally to meditation on the emptiness of phenomena not included within the personal continuum, such as pillars and houses. He might use the king of reasons, dependent-arising, in his meditation on the emptiness of the person, but the fivefold and sevenfold reasonings are renowned among the Prasangikas as the easiest means for gaining a quick and penetrating understanding of emptiness.

The fivefold reasoning is based on a description in sutra of twenty false views of a real self:\textsuperscript{128}

1. viewing forms, i.e., body, as a self
2. viewing the self as inherently possessing forms
3. viewing the self as inherently existing in forms
4. viewing forms as inherently existing in the self
5. viewing feelings as a self
6. viewing the self as inherently possessing feelings
7. viewing the self as inherently existing in feelings
8. viewing feelings as inherently existing in the self
9. viewing discriminations as a self
10. viewing the self as inherently possessing discriminations
11. viewing the self as inherently existing in discriminations
12. viewing discriminations as inherently existing in the self
13. viewing compositional factors as a self
14. viewing the self as inherently possessing compositional factors
15. viewing the self as inherently existing in compositional factors
16. viewing compositional factors as inherently existing in the self
17 viewing consciousness as a self
18 viewing the self as inherently possessing consciousness
19 viewing the self as inherently existing in consciousness
20 viewing consciousness as inherently existing in the self.

These are five sets of four positions; Nagarjuna's fivefold analysis is based on these four positions with the addition of a fifth: viewing the self as a different entity from forms and so forth. Five modes are not mentioned in sutra because Buddha had already taught that without apprehending the aggregates, it is impossible for the innate false view of a self to conceive of a real self. For this reason, a false view of the self as a totally different entity from the aggregates is not innate but artificial, learned through the mistaken teachings of the non-Buddhist Forders. Also, because the innate false view of a real self does not conceive the person and the aggregates to be either one or different, all twenty false views of a self are only artificial. However, if the self existed as conceived by the innate view of a real self, it would be either one with the aggregates or a different entity from the aggregates. Therefore, the self as conceived by the innate misconception of inherent existence is analyzed in the same way as the self that is misconceived through artificial teachings.

The object of observation of an innate false view of an inherently existent person is the nominally existent self or person and not the mental and physical aggregates. However, among the twenty false views of a self, the object of observation is often the aggregates. Still, the aggregates are phenomena related to the self which is the object observed by a false view of a self, and, therefore, even these are named 'false views of a real self. For instance, if forms are viewed as an inherently existent self, the base of the view or the object of observation is a form, and, therefore, such a misconception is a conception of a self of phenomena and not of a self of persons. When, on the other hand, the person is viewed as inherently possessing form, the object of observation is the person, and, therefore, such a misconception is a conception of a self of persons. If the person is viewed as inherently existing in forms, the base of the view or the object of observation is a form,
and, therefore, such a misconception is a conception of a self of phenomena and not of a self of persons. If it is viewed that forms inherently exist in the person, the person is the base of the view or the object of observation, and such a misconception is a conception of a self of persons.

The same distinctions can be extended to the other sixteen views. Thus, some of the so-called 'false views of a real self are actually misconceptions of a self of phenomena other than persons. Since Nagarjuna's fivefold reasoning is based on the modes of the false view of a real self, both the fivefold and the sevenfold reasonings can be said to involve refutation of a self of phenomena other than persons in order to establish the selflessness of the person. Due to the fact that the base or object of observation of the false view of a real self must be the person and not the aggregates, it might be necessary to say that not all twenty false views of a real self are actual false views of a real self but are only named so. The fivefold reasoning as stated in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way is:

The self does not inherently exist because of (1) not being the aggregates, (2) not being other than the aggregates, (3) not being the base of the aggregates, (4) not depending on the aggregates, and (5) not possessing the aggregates. An example is a chariot.

The reason is fivefold, and thus it is called the fivefold reasoning. Chandraldrīti added two more 'corners' to the reason:

(6) not being the shape of the aggregates, and (7) not being the composite of the aggregates.

In a slightly longer form the sevenfold reasoning is:¹²⁹

Except for only being imputed in dependence upon the aggregates which are its basis of imputation, there is no self-subsistent self, for:

1 the aggregates which are the basis of the imputation are not the person
2 the person is not an entity other than the aggregates which are the basis of its imputation
3 the person is not the support of the aggregates which are its basis of imputation
4 the person ultimately does not depend on the aggregates which are its basis of imputation
5 the person ultimately does not possess the aggregates
6 the person is not the shape of the aggregates which are its basis of imputation
7 the person is not the composite of the aggregates which are the basis of its imputation.

For example, if a chariot is sought analytically, there is no self-subsistent chariot to be found.

In the sevenfold reasoning, in order to realize the thesis that the I does not inherently exist, it is necessary first to realize the pervasion of the sevenfold reason by the predicate of the thesis. In other words, one must first realize that whatever does not exist in these seven ways does not inherently exist. After that, one establishes the presence of these seven reasons in the subject, I. By the force of realizing the pervasion of these seven reasons by the predicate of non-inherent existence and by the force of establishing the presence of these seven reasons in the subject, I, the I can be realized as not inherently existent.

First, the predicate of the thesis ('does not inherently exist') is to be applied to an example ('chariot') which is familiar in the world, since an example is easier to understand than the actual thesis. It is not that the emptiness of a chariot is to be realized before realizing the emptiness of a person, but it is important first to see how the mode of analysis works through an example which is easier than the actual subject. Applied to a chariot the reasoning is:

A chariot does not inherently exist because of not being its parts, not being other than its parts, not being in its parts, not being that in which its parts exist, not possessing its parts, not being the composite of its parts, and not being the shape of its parts.
These seven reasons must be established as qualities of the subject, a chariot.

A chariot is not inherently the same entity as its own parts (axles, wheels, etc.) because if it were one with them, just as its parts are many, so the chariot would also be many. Or, just as the chariot is one, its parts also would be one. Furthermore, the agent—the chariot as the whole which conveys its parts when it moves—and the object—the conveyed parts—would absurdly be one.

A chariot is not inherently other than its own parts because if it were other, it would be a different entity from its parts. Things which are different entities and which exist at the same time must be unrelatedly other; therefore, just as a horse and a cow are unrelatedly other and apprehendable separately, so a chariot would have to be apprehendable separately from its own parts. However, it is not so apprehended. Therefore, a chariot is not inherently other than its parts.

A chariot's parts do not inherently depend on the chariot because if they did, the parts and the chariot would have to be inherently other. The impossibility of this has already been explained.

Also, a chariot does not inherently depend on its parts because if it did, the chariot and its parts would have to be inherently other. The impossibility of this has already been explained.

A chariot does not inherently possess its parts either in the manner that a man possesses a cow or in the manner that a man possesses his body. For, the former mode of possession is that of different entities, and the latter mode of possession is that of the same entity. Thus, the chariot and its parts would have to be either different entities or the same entity. Both of these have already been refuted.

A chariot is also not just the composite of its parts because the shapes of the individual parts cannot be a chariot nor can the shape of the composite of the parts be a chariot since it is impossible for the shapes before or after arrangement to be a chariot. If it were said that the shapes of the parts which are not different from their shapes before arrangement are a chariot, then since
there is no difference in shape before and after arrangement, just
as the shapes are not a chariot before arrangement, so they would
not be a chariot after arrangement. If it were said that the shapes
of the parts which are different from the shape that they had
before arrangement are the chariot, then since there would be
different shapes to the axles, wheels, and so forth, after arrange-
ment, these different shapes would have to be apprehensible.
However, they are not.

Also, the shape of the composite of the parts is not a chariot
because the composite of the parts does not inherently exist.
There is no composite of the parts of a chariot separate from the
parts of a chariot because if there were, the composite could be
apprehended without apprehending the parts. Nor is the compo-
site of the parts one with the parts themselves because if it were,
either the composite would be many like the many parts or the
parts would be one like the one composite. Therefore, the
shape of the composite of the parts only imputedly exists and is
not suitable to be a substantially existent chariot. For the Prasan-
gikas, the shape of the composite of the parts is a basis of the
imputation of a chariot, but not even conventionally can it be
considered a chariot.

When a chariot is sought in these seven ways, it is not found,
but a chariot does not thereby become non-existent. Still, the
non-finding of a chariot in these seven ways is true both ulti-
mately and conventionally. Even as a conventional truth a char-
iot is unfindable in these seven ways; however, a chariot convention-
ally exists because the assertion of a chariot is not made from
the point of view of its being established by the reasoning that
analyzes whether it inherently exists or not. A chariot is estab-
lished as existing when there is no analysis to find the object
imputed; it is established only by a non-defective, conventional,
worldly consciousness. Thus, a chariot is presented as only
imputedly existent in the sense that it is imputed in dependence
on its parts (the axles, wheels, etc.) and is not any of them.

The Svatantrikas, Chittamatrins, Sautrantikas, and Vaibha-
shikas all say that if the composite of the parts, or the shape, etc.,
could not be assigned as the whole, the chariot (or whole) would
be non-existent. For there is no whole which is a separate entity from its parts. Therefore, in all these schools chariots and so forth are assigned as some phenomenon from among their bases of designation: either their composite, their shape, or one of the bases of imputation. These schools do not accept that chariots and so forth are just nominally imputed in the sense of being unfindable among their bases of designation. For them, things have their own natural existence. In these schools, to be merely nominally imputed only means that a phenomenon is not something separate from its bases of designation. For instance, though a person appears to be the boss of his aggregates of mind and body, he is shown to be one of the aggregates—either the mental consciousness, or a mind-basis-of-all (alayavijnana, kun gzhi mam shes), or the continuum of the aggregates, or the continuum of the mental consciousness, and so forth.

In the extraordinary Prasangika system, neither the composite of the parts nor the individual parts are taken to be the whole. Still, the Prasangikas are able to present well all the objects and agents of cyclic existence and of nirvana within the context of just nominally imputed wholes, parts, qualities, qualificands, and so forth. Dzong-ka-ba urgently advises that this method of analysis be studied and practiced because it is a profound means of quickly finding the view of emptiness. As Chandrakirti says in the Commentary to the 'Supplement', 'These worldly conventionalities do not exist when analyzed in this way, but exist through non-analytical renown. Therefore, when yogis analyze these through this series [of reasons], they penetrate very quickly to the depth of suchness.'

Through the example of a chariot one gains familiarity with the modes of the sevenfold reasoning. However, unlike the other Buddhist schools, the Prasangikas do not say that for the example of the chariot to be correct the meditator must first realize the predicate of the thesis, 'does not inherently exist', as a quality of the chariot and then proceed to the subject of the original syllogism, the person. If one first had to realize the emptiness of a chariot before realizing the emptiness of a person, then the emptiness of a person would not be the initial object of
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mediation for those who seek liberation. Furthermore, it would be pointless to state many reasons to prove the selflessness of a person because one would realize the emptiness of a person through merely turning one's mind to this subject. For, the emptiness of a chariot would already have been validly cognized, and a realization of the emptiness of one thing is sufficient preparation for the realization of the emptiness of anything else that the mind turns to while still remembering the first realization. In the Prasangika system, examples which are merely more familiar in the world than the subject of the main thesis are often given. This is why mirror images and magician's illusions are so often used as examples; just as a mirror image of a face is empty of being a face, so objects are empty of being inherently existent. However, realization that a mirror image of a face is not a face is not a cognition of the emptiness of a mirror image. It is a conventional analog of the extraordinary and unfamiliar cognition of emptiness.

Thus, a yogi's aim in analyzing a chariot is not to gain a thorough realization of a chariot's emptiness but to gain familiarity with the mode of reasoning so that he can apply it to the person, for it is misconception of the nature of the person that causes transmigration and the repeated rounds of the suffering of birth, aging, sickness, and death. The seven-cornered reason must be established as a quality of the person:133

1. The self and the aggregates are not inherently one because the assertion of a self would then be senseless. For, 'self' would only be a synonym of the aggregates, just as 'rabbit-bearer' (that which has the figure of a rabbit in it) is a synonym of 'moon'. Also, just as the aggregates are many, so the selves would be many. Or, just as the self is one, so the aggregates would only be one. Also, because the aggregates are entities which are produced and which disintegrate, the self also would be produced and would disintegrate.

If it is accepted that the self is nominally produced and nominally disintegrates, there is no fault. However, if
the production and disintegration of the self naturally existed, then there would be three faults: memory of former births would be impossible, deeds done would be wasted, and one would meet with the results of actions not done by oneself. These three faults arise because the selves of former and later births would be naturally individual and thus would be unrelatedly other. Moreover, it is impossible for those which are naturally other to belong to one continuum, just as the being named Maitreya and the being named Upagupta who are other and are contemporaries are not one continuum. For, Chandraldrītī says (Supplement VI.61):

The phenomena which are based on Maitreya and Upagupta
Are different and thus not included within one continuum.
Whatever are naturally separate are not
Fit to be included within one continuum.

If two lives were naturally or inherently other, this otherness would be their nature; a sameness of continuum could not obtain between them.

If the self were inherently produced and inherently disintegrated, Buddha could not have remembered that in the past he was such and such a person because the two persons would be naturally separate. For instance, when someone named Devadatta remembers his past lives, he does not remember that he was Yajna who is his own contemporary. The fallacy of there being no memory of former lives is similar to the consequence that if cause and effect were naturally existent others, then darkness would arise from a tongue of flame. In other words, once the elements of a continuum are naturally existent or analytically findable as others, then a continuity cannot obtain between them, and there can be no continuum.

Deeds done would be wasted because the self which performed the deeds would have utterly ceased by the time the effects are
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experienced in another lifetime. For, the aggregates would inherently disintegrate at the end of a lifetime, and the self would be one with them. If the person did experience the results of former deeds, since those deeds would not have been done by him, he would be undergoing the effects of deeds done by another since each lifetime would be inherently separate from all other lifetimes.

The same faults do not accrue to the Prasangikas' own presentation of the self and of the relationship between deeds done in one lifetime and the effects that are experienced in another lifetime. For the Prasangikas, the 'mere I' gives rise to the thought 'I', and the various selves in the different lifetimes are instances of the 'mere I'. The 'mere I' exists from one lifetime to another just because the expression 'I' is common to former and later lifetimes. Conventionally or nominally, the generality I exists from one lifetime to another, even though the particular beings which are its instances do not live from one lifetime to another. It is said to be much the same as the fact that a gold pot and a bronze pot are pots but a gold pot is not a bronze pot and a bronze pot is not a gold pot. Just so, the particular I of one lifetime is not the particular I of another lifetime, but they are both I. Still, this does not mean that there is a generality which is a separate entity from its individual instances. Just the reasoning that the particular I of each lifetime is an I is sufficient to establish that the 'mere I' exists nominally from one lifetime to another. Any further analysis into the nature of the general and particular I would constitute ultimate analysis in the face of which nothing is found.

2 The self and the mental and physical aggregates are not different entities because if they were, the self would not have the character of the aggregates such as production, disintegration, abiding, form, experiencing objects, and so forth. In that case, there would be no basis for the designation 'self, and there would be no object to apprehend as a self because the person would be a non-product.
All products are included within the five aggregates; thus, if the person did not have the character of the aggregates, it could not be a product. If the person were a non-product, it would have to be either a permanent existent, like nirvana, or a non-existent, like a flower in the sky. Such a phenomenon could not be a basis of the designation 'self and could not serve as an object to be apprehended as a self. For, the self would then be changeless, and a changeless self could not take rebirth, die, cognize objects, and so forth.

Also, if the self were a different entity from the aggregates, then just as the character of consciousness can be apprehended separately from the character of form, so a self without the character of mind and body would have to be apprehendable. However, since the self is not apprehendable separately from the aggregates of mind and body, the self is not a separate entity from the aggregates.

The non-Buddhist Forders assert that the self has a different character from the aggregates when they say that it is beyond mind and body. However, Dzong-ka-ba says that the Forders fail to realize that the self is only a name, that the self only nominally exists. Since the Forders see that it is impossible for the self to be the aggregates of mind and body, they fabricate a view of a permanent self, separate from mind and body. Chandrakirti says that the Forders fall from conventional truths through not realizing the character of the self as a designation dependent on the aggregates and fall from ultimate truths through not realizing the lack of inherent existence of the self. One of the most incisive reasonings refuting a self separate from the aggregates is that it would be useless to call such an unchangeable phenomenon 'self. Without the experiencing of objects or the taking of rebirth the word 'self loses any meaning.

The Vedantins use the term 'self, however, to refer to the non-dual and final nature of the universe. They refer to cognition of the all pervasive Brahman which is the self of the universe as well as one's own actual self. The finitude and diseased nature
of the ordinary self is cancelled in its identification with Brahman, and the distance of Brahman as the ultimate reality is cancelled in its identification with the self. The immediacy of the self remains and is extended through identification to Brahman, and the ultimacy or absolute nature of Brahman remains and is extended through identification to the self. The finite living being (jiva) becomes the infinite Brahman in vivid realization. The transmutation of the living being into Brahman requires a complete destruction of egocentricity. Still, the essence of reality is called 'self.'

In Buddhism, also, when emptiness is directly cognized, the object—emptiness—and the subject—a wisdom consciousness—become like water poured into water, totally undifferentiable. However, the Prasangikas seem to be questioning the value of calling the highest reality 'self' just because such a designation would increase egocentricity. The usage of the word 'self' is not required to preserve a sense of immediacy, for immediacy is the very mode of direct perception as is witnessed every day, and when it is said that reality is perceived directly, a sense of the immediacy of reality is conveyed without reliance on the word 'self.' Also, the teaching of one all-pervasive entity would only block the way to destroying the sense that each individual thing is a truly existent one. The very chains of cyclic existence are forged with the conception of true existence that does not analyze oneness and manyness. Beings are bound in cyclic existence by their failure to investigate whether phenomena, which they habitually conceive to exist inherently, are truly one or truly many. To conceive reality as a truly existent one pervading the many might further the habitual non-analytical intellect that causes the powerless wandering in cyclic existence. If the manifold universe could be subsumed under a truly existent Brahman, it might seem that the many parts of a table, for instance, could be subsumed under a truly existent table.

Still, it is not to be thought that meditations on the all-pervasive are absent in Buddhism. The formless meditative absorptions in which space, consciousness, nothingness, or something subtler than even nothingness are seen as all-pervasive are common to
both Hinyana and Mahayana and the non-Buddhist systems as well. In tantric practice a meditator often views himself and his environment as one entity; the world is visualized as a mandala and is reduced to the size of a drop. Also, the metaphor of water poured into water as a description of the mode of the direct cognition of emptiness intentionally indicates a fusion of subject and object. Technically, everything true of the subject is not true of the object and vice versa, but the experience must be something like that. No ordinary being has ever experienced such a complete oneness, for a oneness is always a composite of parts, and each part is not one with every other part in terms of function, position, and so forth. It is questionable whether the word 'one' can convey any of the sense of such a state. Still, some Tibetan orders do refer to the one mind, or the one sphere of the nature of phenomena, whereas the Ge-luk-bas restrict themselves to a metaphor, the undifferentiability of fresh water poured into fresh water.

The question here is not whether there are practices common to Hinduism and Buddhism that are aimed at developing a sense of pervasion but whether these practices are the primary means of cognizing reality. For the Buddhists such practices are means to enhance the concentrative power of the mind in order to further analytical penetration into the nature of things. This analysis revolves around developing an understanding that oneness and manyness do not naturally inhere in objects. An unsuccessful attempt to find the self under specific types of analysis is seen as a prerequisite for progress toward liberation from cyclic existence. In both sutra and tantra teachings such analysis is a necessity because it is this which breaks the bonds of misconception, and misconception of the nature of things is the ignorance that causes the powerless rounds of birth, aging, sickness, and death. For instance, Buddhists accept that non-Buddhist yogis have attained the marvelous experience of the entry, abiding, and dissolving of the winds into the central channel. However, the Buddhist form of the practice is still considered to be basically different because the non-Buddhists' practice is not preceeded by this type of analysis of phenomena. Thus, it is said that
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without the view of emptiness a yogi cannot cause the winds to dissolve into the indestructible mid-point of the heart center.

What the Prasangika analysis is refuting in the sevenfold reasoning must be clearly defined; the self is not being reduced to miniscule size nor is it being expanded to pervade the universe. The self is realized as an imputation dependent on the mental and physical aggregates. The meditator is told again and again that when he realizes the unfindability of the self, what appears is an utter vacuity which is the mere absence of an inherently existent self. He is told again and again that at the time of direct cognition subject and object become like fresh water poured into fresh water and that the emptinesses of all phenomena are directly cognized without the slightest appearance of those phenomena themselves.

Conventionally, the self and the aggregates are the same entity and different opposites of negatives because even conventionally the self is not the aggregates nor is it a separate entity from the aggregates. A person (or self) is none of the aggregates which are its basis of designation but is an instance of the fourth aggregate, samskaraskandha, or pile of compositional factors. Being impermanent, the self must be an aggregate, and the self is designated as a member of the fourth aggregate because it has the character of all the aggregates. Since the self has the character of all the aggregates, it cannot be designated as a form aggregate, feeling aggregate, discrimination aggregate, or consciousness aggregate. It is, therefore, called a 'compositional factor' aggregate because this aggregate is the repository for all impermanent things which are not included among the other aggregates.

It has been established in the first two 'corners' of the sevenfold reasoning that the self is neither inherently the same as nor different from the aggregates. The remaining five reasons are included in these two positions because sameness and difference of entity are a dichotomy. If the self and the aggregates inherently exist, they must be either one entity or different entities. When these two positions are refuted, the inherent existence of the self is refuted. Thus, even though all possible positions have already been refuted, the other five positions are refuted for the
sake of attacking the various modes of the habitual misconception of a self.

3 The self does not act as the base of the aggregates like a bowl for yogurt or like snow that exists throughout and surrounds a forest of trees. For, in that case the self and the aggregates would be different, and this position has already been refuted.

The examples provide clues for glimpsing and eventually identifying ways in which the non-analytical intellect tends to conceive the self.

4 The self does not inherently exist in or depend on the aggregates like Devadatta living in a tent or a lion living in a forest. For, in that case the self and the aggregates would be different, and this position has already been refuted.

5 The self does not possess the mental and physical aggregates either as a different entity, as in the case of a man possessing a cow, or as the same entity, as in the case of a man possessing his body or a tree possessing its core. For, in the first case the self and the aggregates would be different entities, and in the second case they would be the same entity. Refutations of these positions have already been stated.

The meaning of the word 'have' or 'possess' is being analyzed here. It seems most likely that a self would possess its aggregates in the manner of sameness of entity, but once a sameness of entity is asserted to be findable under analysis, then the possessor and the possessed become one. The concept of 'my body' or 'my mind' cannot bear such analysis.

6 The self is not just the composite of the aggregates of mind and body because the composite is the basis of the designation 'self' and, therefore, cannot be the self.

It is said that a Buddha does not confuse or mix the basis of the
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The five aggregates are accepted as that which is appropriated by a self as when it is said that such and such a person takes rebirth or assumes a new body and mind. The composite of the five aggregates is thus also accepted as the appropriation. If the self were the composite, the appropriator and the appropriated would be one.

If the composite of a person's various consciousnesses—eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses—designation of a phenomenon with the phenomenon that is designated. Jang-gya says that this difficult point is based on a sutra that teaches that just as 'chariot' is imputed to the parts of a chariot, so the person is imputed conventionally in dependence on the aggregates. The Prasangikas view this as meaning that the person is not the aggregates and that this non-identity is clearly perceived by a Buddha.

Furthermore, the composite of the mental and physical aggregates does not inherently exist because the composite is unfindable as either inherently one with or different from the aggregates.

If the composite of the aggregates were one with the aggregates, the composite would be as many as the aggregates, or the aggregates would be one just as the composite is only one. If the composite were inherently different from the aggregates, then it would be apprehended separately from the aggregates and would not have the character of the aggregates, but this is not so.

The reasoning that the object imputed cannot be the basis of the imputation also refutes the view that the self is the continuum of the aggregates because then object imputed and basis of imputation would be one. Also, if the self were the composite of the aggregates, then the self as the agent of the appropriation, or assumption, of the aggregates would be one with the aggregates which are its appropriation.
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—is asserted to be the person, then the absurdity of the plurality of the composites and the persons would follow. Similarly, if it is said that only the mental consciousness is the person, each moment of the mental consciousness would absurdly be a different person because each moment of the mental consciousness is different.

7 The self is not the shape of the aggregates because shape is physical, and if a self were merely shape, then the mind, etc., would not be posited as the self. If it were said that both the physical shape and the mind are the self, then either the self would be two, or shape and consciousness would be one.

In most cases, beings are identified by their shape; the difference between a cow and a human is commonly determined by their different shapes. It is being taught here that common beings confuse the basis of the designation, which is not the person, with the person that is designated. (All animals—cows, horses, and so forth—are accepted as persons.) It is commonly said, for instance, that a dog is black whereas it is meant that the color of its hair is black. The color of a dog is a basis of the designation 'dog', but it itself is not a dog.

The non-finding of the person in any of these seven modes is the meaning of the non-inherent existence of the person. Since even as a conventional truth a person is not findable in these seven ways, even conventionally a person does not naturally exist. However, when there is no analysis to find the object imputed, a person undeniably is validly established as able to perform functions; therefore, the self does nominally exist. Furthermore, when a consciousness thinking, 'I', is generated, it is generated based on the five aggregates. Hence, it is said that a person is only imputed or designated in dependence on the five aggregates.

As Chandrakirti’s Commentary on (Aryadeva’s) 'Four Hundred' (Bodhisattvayogacharyachatuhsatakika) says, ‘Therefore, when analyzed in this manner, an inherent existence of things is not established. Thus, [only] an illusory nature remains
individually for things. Chandrakirti thereby indicates that an illusory object does remain.

The Madhyamika view is the complete negation without residue of inherent existence, which is refuted through analytical reasoning. After the negation, there must also remain a flawless presentation of all the objects and agents of the dependent-arising of cause and effect which are like the creations of a magician, appearing to be inherently existent but actually not inherently existent. Thus, the Madhyamika view is a composite of (1) a non-affirming negative of inherent existence and (2) a presentation of agents and objects which are like illusions. Jang-gya says there are practically none who understand the Madhyamika view, emphasizing that it is extremely difficult to find the correct view. One is exhorted to make great effort to understand this view without allowing the pure teaching to be distorted by one's own tendencies toward nihilism or eternalism.

The mine

When reasoning investigates whether the self inherently exists, it does not find the self in any of the seven ways. This having been done, an inherent existence of the mine is easily refuted. It is not that the very same consciousness that realizes the non-inherent existence of the I realizes that the mine does not inherently exist. Rather, if the yogi merely turns his attention to the mine, its emptiness is easily realized in dependence only on the consciousness that realized the emptiness of the I. Since further reasoning is not required, Madhyamika treatises do not offer a separate reasoning to aid in realizing the non-inherent existence of the mine.

When an emptiness has been realized indirectly and inferentially through the medium of a concept, this realization is sufficient to clear the way for the immediate but subsequent realization of the emptinesses of other phenomena. Separate reasoning is not required even though the realization of one emptiness is not itself a realization of all emptinesses. However, when the emptiness of one thing is cognized directly, the emptiness of all phenomena is cognized directly. It is not that the
emptiness of one thing is the emptiness of everything; rather, the extraordinary mode of the direct cognition of emptiness—in which the object, emptiness, and the subject, the wisdom consciousness, are undifferentiable like fresh water poured into fresh water—allows for cognition of the emptiness of all objects.

Having inferentially realized the emptiness of the I, one can readily realize the non-inherent existence of the mine both as the possessor of mind, body, and so forth and as the phenomena included within the continuum and possessed by the person. Then, passing outside of the sphere of the false view of a transitory collection as a real I and mine, one meditates on the emptiness of phenomena which are mine but not included within the continuum, such as a house, and then meditates on other phenomena which are not mine, such as a city. The same sevenfold reasoning is used to analyze the relationship between the phenomena designated and the bases of designation, as in the example of a chariot. These phenomena cannot be found under analysis and thus do not inherently exist; however, they are still accepted as validly established conventionally when there is no analysis. This acceptance is congruous with Buddha's statement that he does not debate with the world about the existence or non-existence of objects. The sevenfold reasoning does not refute nominal existence, only objectively established existence.

The mere apprehension of I and mine are not erroneous; the error is the further misconception of the nominally existent I and mine as objectively existent. Even Buddhas have valid cognizers that perceive I and mine, but they do not confuse the basis of designation with the phenomenon designated. Some say that this teaching is so subtle and difficult to penetrate that it is not only useless but also injurious. They say that those who cannot discriminate between nominal existence and objective existence would be led into affirming their misconceptions of I and mine as real because Dzong-ka-ba asserts that the mere apprehension of I and mine is valid. Still, this most unusual and penetrating of Dzong-ka-ba's teachings is a call to eradicating misconceptions and should not be taken as affirming one's accustomed conception of oneself. It is undeniable that ordinary beings see the bases of
designations as the phenomena designated, and Dzong-ka-ba’s teaching is clear that even conventionally nothing is its basis of designation. Dzong-ka-ba is able, through the subtlety of affirming the apprehension of I and mine as valid, to present all the objects and agents of cyclic existence and of nirvana under the rubric of valid establishment and thereby block one gate of the road to nihilism. This subtlety does not in any way affirm an ordinary being’s consent to the appearance of objects as objectively existent; eternalism, or the reification of what exists, is not a concomitant of affirming valid existence. As Jam-yang-shay-ba says, to think that the valid establishment of objects implies their objective existence does not pass beyond the thought of non-Madhyamikas.

The cardinal difference between the Prasangikas and the non-Prasangikas, as defined by Dzong-ka-ba, Jam-yang-shay-ba, and so forth, is the Prasangikas’ uncommon notion that the existent person is not any or all of the mental and physical aggregates. The other Buddhist schools accept either the composite of the aggregates, or the continuum of the aggregates, or the mental consciousness, or the continuum of the mental consciousness as the self. For them, actions could have no cause or effect if the self were merely imputed in the sense of being totally Unfindable among the bases of designation of the self. The Prasangikas answer that if objects were analytically findable as the concrete entities they seem to be, cause and effect would be impossible.

According to the Prasangikas, even Hearers and Solitary Realizers cognize the same emptiness as Bodhisattvas; all Superiors realize that persons and other phenomena do not inherently exist. It is necessary to be freed from the afflictions to achieve nirvana, which is the passage beyond the afflictions, and the chief of afflictions is the conception that persons and other phenomena inherently exist. Thus, without destroying this conception, liberation from cyclic existence is impossible. Chandrakirti clearly states that the emptiness of both the person and other phenomena must be cognized in order to achieve liberation. The reason is that the conception of a self of phenomena causes the conception of a self of persons. For Chandrakirti, to be
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liberated from cyclic existence means to have destroyed the conception that persons and other phenomena inherently exist.

When a yogi has penetrated the selflessness of the person, he applies the same reasoning to the mind and body and all other phenomena since the principle of a lack of sameness or difference of a phenomenon designated and its basis of designation can be applied to all phenomena. In other words, the emptiness understood with respect to the person is easily applied to each and every phenomenon. If one gains a penetrating understanding of the imputed nature of the person, it is impossible still to hold the view that the aggregates of mind and body are not merely imputedly existent.

The power of inferential realization of the emptiness of one phenomenon is such that a yogi is caused thereby to drop any tenets asserting the inherent existence of any phenomenon whatsoever. This conveys some sense of the esteem in which an inference of emptiness is held and of how difficult it is to develop. A yogi must proceed through the stage of correct doubt during which he suspects that phenomena are not inherently existent. In time, through long meditation, he develops a reasoned assumption that phenomena do not inherently exist. Eventually, an inference of such is generated, and through becoming familiar with this inference, he directly perceives emptiness in an utterly non-dual cognition.
Part Three
The Buddhist World
Introduction

Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets*
Long-dol's *One Hundred and Eight Bases of Explanation*
Nga-wang-bel-den's *Annotations*
Gyel-tsap's *Commentary on (Maitreya's) 'Sublime Continuum'*
Corresponding section of the translation pp.625-6

Before meditating on emptiness it is necessary to know what exists; otherwise, a yogi will not know what is to be meditated upon as empty of inherent existence.\(^{152}\) Without identifying what exists, one would think that an emptiness means an utter non-existence and not just an absence of inherent existence as a predicate of a conventionally existent object. All the excellent masters asserted that it is incorrect to teach emptiness from the very beginning because, as Jam-yang-shay-ba says, 'If emptiness were taught to the stupid from the beginning, their ignorance would increase, and they would be harmed.'
Nagarjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:

Initially for one seeking suchness
It is taught that everything exists.
Chandrakirti echoes this in his commentary, saying:

If emptiness were taught in the very beginning to those who have not developed their intellect, very great ignorance would be produced; therefore, the Superiors do not teach emptiness in the very beginning.

Also, a great many tantric texts make it clear that no matter how gifted a student is he must practice tantra in stages. Some commentators, however, have mistakenly taken advanced teachings on the final stage of tantra, such as not being allowed to touch images and books made from clay, stone, or wood, and have applied them to sharp beginners. Particularly, many have misapplied the teaching in the Highest Yoga Tantras that analysis is not suitable in the meditative equipoise of the stage of completion, mistakenly claiming that sharp beginners should not analyze but set their minds in utter vacuity. Their view is based on the misconception that all conventional objects are like the horns of a rabbit and the falling hairs seen by a person with cataracts, that is, non-existent. They proclaim that all conventional objects do not exist and that the meaning of conventional existence is 'what exists for a mistaken mind'. They declare that the 'gradual' teachings are for the dull, misapplying teachings pertaining to the final stages of tantra to sharp beginners. They are wrong because even the intelligent must analyze to discover suchness, be it through sutra or tantra practice. A non-conceptual and totally non-dualistic cognition of emptiness must be preceded by an inference of emptiness. "Inference, in general, is the cognition of a hidden meaning through having perceived a sign (reason) and having realized the concomitance of a predicate with this sign. Emptiness is cognized in dependence on a realization of, for instance, dependent-arising. Proper thought is indispensible.

If the emptiness of something is to be realized, this 'something' must be identified; an emptiness is not a vacuity which is merely the non-perception of an object. If the aggregates (skandha, phung po), constituents (dhatu, khams), sources (ayatana, skye mched), and so forth do not appear to the mind, an
explanation of emptiness will be applied 'as if to a midnight sky', and a vacuousness of ignorance will only be increased. Therefore, one must comprehend the Prasangikas' presentation of phenomena.

Jam-yang-shay-ba (see p.626) refers to (in paraphrase) 'the phenomena that are renowned and well known in the world' which are so called because they are established as existing by an innate non-analytical awareness. This is not the mistaken innate intellect that apprehends phenomena as inherently existent, but the valid innate mind. A consciousness that analyzes whether an object can be found among or separate from its bases of imputation does not find objects; therefore, it is not in the face of an analytical consciousness that objects are said to exist. They exist in the face of a valid, innate, non-analytical awareness which every being has, from a hell-being to a Buddha. The objects that are established as existing conventionally by such a consciousness are never refuted; an analytical consciousness refutes merely their ultimate or objective existence.

Phenomena are divided into two classes: an afflicted class consisting of fifty-three phenomena and a pure class consisting of fifty-five phenomena. These one hundred and eight phenomena are the bases of the explanations of emptiness in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras and are called 'the one hundred and eight bases of commentary'. The classification into afflicted and pure classes does not imply that all members of each class are afflictions or pure phenomena; the groupings are merely rough divisions.

The fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class
The five aggregates which are the bases for the further division of most of the other phenomena:
1 forms
2 feelings
3 discriminations
4 compositional factors
5 consciousnesses
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The six senses which are the supports of their respective consciousnesses:
6 eye sense powers
7 ear sense powers
8 nose sense powers
9 tongue sense powers
10 body sense powers
11 mental sense powers

The six consciousnesses which depend on these senses:
12 eye consciousnesses
13 ear consciousnesses
14 nose consciousnesses
15 tongue consciousnesses
16 body consciousnesses
17 mental consciousnesses

The objects of those consciousnesses:
18 visible forms
19 sounds
20 odors
21 tastes
22 tangible objects
23 phenomena

The six contacts (distinguishing objects as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral) which arise upon the aggregations of a sense, an object, and a consciousness:
24 contacts upon the aggregation of an eye sense, a visible form, and an eye consciousness
25 contacts upon the aggregation of an ear sense, a sound, and an ear consciousness
26 contacts upon the aggregation of a nose sense, an odor, and a nose consciousness
27 contacts upon the aggregation of a tongue sense, a taste, and a tongue consciousness
28 contacts upon the aggregation of a body sense, a tangible object, and a body consciousness
The six feelings which are the experiences arising from contacts:

- feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of an eye sense, a visible form, and an eye consciousness
- feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of an ear sense, a sound, and an ear consciousness
- feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a nose sense, an odor, and a nose consciousness
- feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a tongue sense, a taste, and a tongue consciousness
- feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a body sense, a tangible object, and a body consciousness
- feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a mental sense, a phenomenon, and a mental consciousness

The six elements which are the bases of production:

- earth
- water
- fire
- wind
- space
- consciousness

The twelve branches of dependent-arising, which are to be seen as disadvantageous:

- ignorance
- action
- consciousness
- name and form
- six sources
- contact
- feeling
- attachment
- grasping
- existence
- birth
- aging and death
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The fifty-five phenomena of the pure class

The six perfections which are the paths of practice:
1 giving
2 ethics
3 patience
4 effort
5 concentration
6 wisdom

The eighteen emptinesses which are the paths of the view:
7 emptiness of the internal, that is, of the five senses (adhyatmashunyatā)
8 emptiness of the external, that is, of the six types of objects which are the objects of the five senses and of the mental consciousness (bahirdhashunyata)
9 emptiness of the internal and external, that is, of the loci of the senses, the gross orbs of the eyes, etc. (adhyatmabahir-dhashunyata)
10 emptiness of emptiness, that is, of the emptiness that is the nature of phenomena (this eliminates the qualms of those who might think that emptiness truly exists because it is established by a consciousness which analyzes suchness) (shunyatashunyatā)
11 emptiness of the great, that is, of the ten directions (mahashunyatā)
12 emptiness of the ultimate, that is, of nirvana (paramartha-shunyatā)
13 emptiness of products (samskrtashunyatā)
14 emptiness of non-products (asamskrtashunyatā)
15 emptiness of what has passed beyond the extremes, that is, of what is free of the extremes of permanence and annihilation (iatyantashunyatā)
16 emptiness of what is beginningless and endless, that is, of cyclic existence (anavaragrashtunyatā)
17 emptiness of the indestructible, that is, of the indestructible Mahayana (anavakarashunyatā)
18 emptiness of nature, that is, of the emptinesses which are the
nature of phenomena (this eliminates the qualms of those who might think that an emptiness truly exists because a final nature exists without being produced by anyone) (prakrtishunyata)

19 emptiness of all phenomena, that is, of the eighteen constituents, etc. (sarvadharmashiinyata)

20 emptiness of definitions, that is, of the definitions of all phenomena from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses (lakshanash unyata)

21 emptiness of the unapprehendable, that is, of the past, present, and future which are unapprehendable as the cessation of phenomena, their presence, and their non-production (anupalambhash unyata)

22 emptiness of the inherent existence of non-things, that is, of inherently existent non-products (abhavasvabhavashunyata)

23 emptiness of things, that is, of the five aggregates (bhavashunyata)

24 emptiness of non-things, that is, of non-products (abhavashunyata)

The thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment which are the yogic paths, divided into seven sections:

25 four establishments in mindfulness—of body, feelings, thoughts, and phenomena—attained with the lesser path of accumulation. These are meditations on the impermanence, misery, emptiness, and selflessness of one’s own body, feelings, thoughts, and other internal phenomena. Bodhisattvas would extend the field of meditation to include all sentient beings’ bodies, feelings, and so forth.

26 four thorough abandonings—the abandoning of afflictions already generated, the non-generation of afflictions not yet generated, the increasing of pure phenomena already generated, and the generation of pure phenomena not yet generated—attained with the middling path of accumulation. These are called ‘thorough’ abandonings because the mode of practice is suitable, when supplemented by the aspiration
to highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings, to lead one to Buddhahood. Without changing the type of object or mode of cognition, these paths lead to final enlightenment whereas the non-Buddhist 'abandonings' have to be altered in form to lead to the final aim. Even the accomplishments of virtues are 'abandonings' because their respective opposites must be forsaken.

27 four legs of manifestation - aspiration, effort, thought, and analysis. These are called 'legs' because they are prerequisites for magical manifestation. The four exist simultaneously when a manifestation is actually being made, and they are serial when one is practicing magical manifestation, first generating an aspiration to create a manifestation, and so forth. They are attained on the great path of accumulation.

28 five powers—faith, effort, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, and wisdom—attained on the levels of heat and peak of the path of preparation.

29 five forces—faith, effort, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, and wisdom—attained on the levels of forbearance and supreme mundane qualities of the path of preparation.

30 seven branches of enlightenment—mindfulness, discrimination of phenomena, effort, joy, pliancy, meditative stabilization, and equanimity—attained with the path of seeing.

31 eight-fold path—correct views, correct realization, correct speech, correct aims of actions, correct livelihood, correct effort, correct mindfulness, and correct meditative stabilization—attained with the path of meditation. When the state of Foe Destroyer is actualized, all thirty-seven harmonies of enlightenment have been attained.

The paths of calming:

32 four noble truths—true sufferings, true origins of suffering, true cessations of suffering, and true paths out of suffering.

33 four concentrations—first, second, third, and fourth concentrations.

34 four immeasurables—equanimity, love, compassion, and joy.
four formless absorptions—infinitesimal space, infinitesimal consciousness, nothingness, and peak of cyclic existence

eight liberations: these eight are called 'liberations' not because they liberate beings from cyclic existence but because they free beings from the manifest activity of specific afflictions. They are to be distinguished from complete cessations of afflictions which involve the conquest of both the manifest appearance and the potencies of the afflictions.

1. the embodied looking at a form: a yogi considers himself to be a being with a body and cultivates any of the four concentrations which are included in the Form Realm

2. the formless looking at a form: a yogi considers himself to be a being without a body and cultivates any of the four concentrations which are included in the Form Realm

3. beautiful form: a yogi considers himself to have an attractive body and cultivates any of the four concentrations which are included in the Form Realm. (The above three are considered prerequisites for making physical manifestations and are called the three paths of manifestation.)

4. infinite space: a yogi concentrates on space and imagines it is infinite with just space as his object of observation

5. infinite consciousness: a yogi concentrates on consciousness and imagines it is infinite with just consciousness as his object of observation

6. nothingness: a yogi imagines that there is nothing to be apprehended and no apprehender

7. peak of cyclic existence: a yogi imagines that there are no coarse objects to be apprehended but that there are subtle objects of apprehension

8. equipoise of cessation: a yogi enters a state of meditative equipoise which is the absence of the manifest activity of the six consciousnesses

nine serial absorptions—first concentration, second concentration, third concentration, fourth concentration, infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, peak of cyclic existence, and absorption of cessation

paths of insight—meditative stabilization on the three doors
of liberation: wishlessness, signlessness, and emptiness. Wishlessness is the emptiness of a phenomenon from the point of view of its not inherently producing effects. Signlessness is the emptiness of a phenomenon from the point of view of its not having been inherently produced from causes. Emptiness is the emptiness of the entity of a phenomenon itself.

The paths of special qualities:
39 five clairvoyances—divine eye, divine ear, knowledge of others’ minds, memory of former lives, and knowledge of the extinction of contaminations
40 four meditative stabilizations—'going as a hero’, 'sky treasury’, 'stainless’, and 'loftily looking lion’
41 four doors of retention—the retention of patience (for the sake of fearlessness with respect to emptiness), the retention of secret speech (for the ability to make spells to pacify the injurious), the retention of words (for not forgetting names, thoughts, and meanings), the retention of meaning (for not forgetting the individual and general characteristics of phenomena)

The paths of effect:
42 ten powers:158
1 knowledge of sources and non-sources. This is direct knowledge of cause and effect within cyclic existence, such as the arising of pleasure from virtues and of pain from non-virtues, and direct knowledge of causes and effects included within the class of pure phenomena, such as the paths and their fruits. This first power is achieved through steadiness with respect to ascertaining the relation of cause and effect and with respect to the two forms of the mind of enlightenment—the aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all beings as well as its consequent practices and the wisdom directly cognizing emptiness.
2 knowledge of the fruition of actions. This is direct knowledge of the definiteness of actions (such as the fact that non-virtues never cause pleasure and virtues never cause
pain), the increase of the potencies established by actions, the non-wasting of deeds done, and the non-meeting with the effects of actions not done by oneself. It is achieved through conviction in the relationship of actions and their effects.

3 knowledge of those who are superior and those who are inferior, or those who have faith and those having heavy afflictions and so forth. It is achieved through teaching doctrines in accordance with the faculties of trainees.

4 knowledge of the varieties of dispositions. This is the knowledge of the many different lineages in the mental continuums of trainees. It is achieved through teaching doctrines in accordance with the dispositions of trainees.

5 knowledge of the varieties of trainees' interests in the various great and small vehicles. It is achieved through teaching doctrines in accordance with the interests of trainees.

6 knowledge of the paths proceeding to cyclic existences and of the paths to the three enlightenments of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas. It is achieved through practicing the various vehicles and paths.

7 knowledge of the concentrations (dhyana), liberations (vimoksha), meditative stabilizations (samadhi), and meditative absorptions (samapatti), and knowledge of others' afflictions and others' non-contamination. It is achieved through completing the practice of meditative stabilization.

8 knowledge mindful of former states. This is direct knowledge of all former lives of oneself and others. It is achieved through not having spoiled the roots of virtue during the paths of learning.

9 knowledge of one's own and others' deaths and births. This is included within the clairvoyance of the divine eye and is achieved through formerly giving lamps and supramundane paths to sentient beings.

10 knowledge of the extinction of all contaminations. This is achieved through formerly teaching doctrines for the
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sake of extinguishing contaminations and through one's own actualization of such meaning.

The six knowledges of (1) sources and non-sources, (2) fruition of actions, (3) the superior and inferior, (4) varieties of dispositions, (5) varieties of interests, and (6) paths are similar to a diamond instrument piercing the armor of the obstructions to omniscience. The three knowledges of (7) the concentrations and so forth, (8) former states, and (9) death and birth are similar to a diamond instrument destroying the wall of the obstructions to meditative absorption. The knowledge of (10) extinction of all contaminations is similar to a diamond instrument cutting the trees of the afflictive obstructions.

43 four fearlessnesses:159

1 fearlessness with respect to the assertion, 'I am completely and perfectly enlightened with respect to all phenomena.' For, one will not encounter even the name of an opponent who could correctly say that one does not know such and such a phenomenon. It is achieved through lacking any stinginess with respect to the doctrine.

2 fearlessness with respect to teaching that the afflictive obstructions are obstacles to liberation and that the obstructions to omniscience are obstacles to simultaneous cognition of all phenomena, and that, therefore, these are to be ceased. For, one will not encounter even the name of an opponent who could correctly say that reliance on desire and so forth would not obstruct a being from liberation. It is achieved through not falling under the influence of an obstructive doctrine.

3 fearlessness with respect to teaching the paths of deliverance. For, there is no opponent who could say correctly that these paths are not paths leading to liberation. It is achieved through practicing the paths to liberation.

4 fearlessness with respect to asserting that the
contaminations have been extinguished. For, one will not see even the name of an opponent who could correctly dispute the assertion that one has attained the cessation of all afflictions and their potencies. It is achieved through formerly abandoning pride.

44 four sciences—knowledge of doctrines, of the general and specific characters of phenomena, of the many languages so that appropriate definitions can be given, and of the varieties of entities, aspects, relationships, and differences of phenomena in the sense of having the bravery to make these distinctions

45 great love

46 great compassion

47 eighteen unshared attributes of Buddhas:¹⁶⁰

1 being non-mistaken physically, such as not going on the wrong road
2 being non-mistaken verbally
3 not decreasing in mindfulness
4 not ever not being in meditative equipoise
5 not having the various discriminations of one-pointedly apprehending cyclic existence as to be forsaken and nirvana as to be attained, or, in other words, not discriminating cyclic existence and nirvana, or phenomena and their emptiness, as different entities
6 not being disinterested
7 aspiration
8 effort
9 mindfulness
10 wisdom
11 non-degeneration of liberation, that is, non-degeneration from the abandonment of obstructions
12 non-degeneration of the wisdom realizing liberation
13, 14, 15 governing by wisdom the activities of body, speech, and mind
16, 17, 18 non-obstructed wisdom with respect to all objects of knowledge in the past, present, and future due to the absence of any impeding obstructions
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The five beings who actualize the paths:
48  Stream Enterers
49  Once Returners
50  Never Returners
51  Foe Destroyers
52  Solitary Realizers

The three final fruits:
53  knowers of the bases, or Hearers’ cognizers of emptiness
54  knowers of the paths, or Bodhisattvas' cognizers of emptiness
55  omniscient consciousnesses, or Buddhas' cognizers of all phenomena simultaneously.
1 The Selfless

Sources
Kensur Lekden’s oral teachings
Jang-gya’s Presentation of Tenets

Traditionally, a master begins a student’s instruction with a presentation of the Buddhist world. He starts with the selfless as a basis and divides the selfless into the existent and the non-existent:

Chart 7: Divisions of the Selfless

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-existent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>selfless</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nairāmya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bdag med</td>
<td>existent</td>
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<td></td>
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In the Prasangika system ‘the selfless’ means that which does not inherently exist. The first category of the Buddhist world is the non-inherently existent because both existents and non-existents
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do not inherently exist. Since nothing inherently exists, this is the broadest possible category.

Non-existents
Some of the more famous examples of non-existents are the horns of a rabbit, the hairs of a turtle, a garment made of turtle hairs, the diadem of a frog, a blue snow mountain (a snowy mountain appearing to be blue), a double moon, a self-sufficient person, and inherently existent phenomena. The horns of a rabbit do not inherently exist because they do not exist at all. The mere realization of their non-existence reveals that the horns of a rabbit do not inherently exist; therefore, the non-inherent existence of the horns of a rabbit is not an emptiness. An emptiness is not understood through realizing the mere non-existence of an object; it is known through comprehending in an existent object the absence of the quality of inherent or objective existence.

It is said that the horns of a rabbit do not inherently exist, are not inherently existent, and are non-inherently existent. In Buddhist logic none of these statements is necessarily an affirming negation; the fact that the horns of a rabbit are non-inherently existent does not imply that they have some other type of existence. The statement indicates a non-affirming negation.

A synonym of 'non-existent' is 'non-phenomenal non-product'. Non-existents are non-products because they are not produced from an aggregation of causes and conditions; they are also non-phenomena because they do not exist, unlike phenomenal non-products, such as the permanent phenomenon space, which do exist.

Existents
An existent is selfless, or non-inherently existent; its non-inherent existence is an emptiness. Synonyms of 'existent' (sat, yodpa) are 'phenomenon' (dharma, chos), 'object' (vishaya, yul), 'object of knowledge' (jneya, shes bya), and 'established base' (vastu, gzhi grub). Thus, everything that exists is a phenomenon (dharma), so translated because all dharmas are objects of
knowledge and can appear to the mind, even permanent phenomena such as emptiness and space. All existents are phenomena, and there is no noumenon which is a separate entity from the category of phenomena because nothing independently exists. The word ‘noumenon’ is not used in this translation scheme though it might be used for words indicating the nature of phenomena, such as dharmata, as long as it is understood that all noumena are phenomena.

All existents are objects because whether they are subjects or objects they can be objects of a consciousness. All existents are objects of knowledge, or more literally objects of knowing, because all objects are continually known by some consciousness. Without even considering the penetrating clairvoyances of Buddhas and yogis, the various hungry ghosts and unusual types of beings which exist everywhere insure that even particles in the centers of huge rocks are cognized by some being.

All existents are existent bases or established bases because they are established as existing by valid cognizers. Valid cognizers are consciousnesses that are either direct perceivers, which cognize their objects without the medium of images and concepts, or inferring consciousnesses, which cognize their referent objects through images and concepts (see pp. 346-7).

Existents are divided into two types:

Chart 8: Divisions of Existents

- permanent phenomenon
  - nitya
  - rtag pa
- thing
  - bhava
  - dngos po

PERMANENT PHENOMENA

Permanent phenomena are defined as phenomena that do not disintegrate, disintegrating phenomena being those which cease every instant due to causes and conditions. The permanent are
specified as non-disintegrating *phenomena* because the non-existent or non-phenomenal are also non-disintegrating. Because of the inclusion of the word 'phenomena' in the definition of the permanent, non-existents are not permanent, even though they do not disintegrate. A synonym of permanent phenomenon is 'uncompounded phenomenon' (*asamskrtadharma*, 'ṭus ma byas kyi chos).

There are two types of permanent phenomena: the occasional permanent and the non-occasional permanent. Though in common parlance 'permanent' means 'always existent', the philosophers of the Sautrantika school and above have limited its meaning to 'non-disintegrating existent'. Therefore, phenomena that come into existence and go out of existence but do not disintegrate momentarily due to causes and conditions are 'occasional permanents'. For instance, the emptiness of a cup comes into existence when the cup is made and goes out of existence when the cup is destroyed; however, because the emptiness of a cup does not disintegrate moment by moment and does not change momentarily from one thing into another through the action of causes and conditions, it is non-disintegrating. Thus, because the emptiness of a cup is both a phenomenon and non-disintegrating but does not exist forever, it is an 'occasional permanent'. However, emptiness in general, though not existing as a separate entity from its specific instances, is always existent because there never is a moment when there is no instance of emptiness. There are always minds, space, the potential elements, and so forth, and these are all empty of inherent existence.

There is some debate about whether such a presentation makes emptiness an impermanent phenomenon. Since the coming into and going out of existence of an emptiness depend on a phenomenon that is produced and ceased by causes and conditions, it begins to look as if an emptiness is produced and ceased. However, it is said that the coming into existence of an emptiness, which is merely the non-inherent existence of an object, is unlike the production of an object by causes and conditions, and thus no one speaks of the production and disintegration of emptinesses.
Permanent phenomena are divided, but not exclusively (there are other phenomena which are technically permanent, such as the double reverse of pot which only appears to thought through the mental exclusion of non-pot or, more accurately, non-one with pot) into four types:

**Chart 9: Divisions of Permanent Phenomena**

```
permanent phenomenon

- space
  - akāsha
  - nam mkha’

- analytical cessation
  - pratisamkhyanirodha
  - so sor brtags 'gog

- non-analytical cessation
  - apratisamkhyanirodha
  - so sor brtags min gyi 'gog pa

- suchness
  - tathātā
  - de bzhin nyid
```

**Space**

A space is a mere absence of obstructive contact. Space is all pervading because there is an absence of obstructive contact everywhere, even where solid objects exist, for without an absence of obstructive contact an obstructive object could not be there in the first place.

Because a space is a mere absence of obstructive contact, it is a non-affirming negative—there is no positive thing implied in its place—and it is in this sense that an emptiness, which is a non-affirming negative of inherent existence, is said to be similar to a space. Also, space, like emptiness, has parts because each physical object has a lack of obstructive contact, just as each object has a lack of inherent existence. The space of an object refers not to the area of the object but to the absence of obstructive contact associated with it.
Analytical cessations

Analytical cessations are final states of cessation of obstructions upon analysis of the nature of phenomena, which are such that those obstructions will never return. They are enumerated as true cessations, the third of the four noble truths, in terms of the individual obstructions being abandoned on the levels of the paths. 'Cessation' here means the absence of an affliction following abandonment and does not refer to the process of cessation. Analytical cessations are compared to the state of a locked door after a robber has been thrown out of a house in that the obstructions that have been abandoned will never return. Analytical cessations come into existence even though they are not produced; thus, although they never go out of existence, individually they are occasional permanents.

A nirvana is an analytical cessation that comes into existence upon the abandonment of the last affliction. It is not the act of cessation or the act of passing beyond sorrow but a phenomenon possessed in the continuum of a yogi that is the mere absence of the ceased afflictions.

Non-analytical cessations

Non-analytical cessations are compared to the state of having thrown out a robber but having failed to lock the door. They are temporary absences of afflictions and so forth due to the incompleteness of necessary conditions, upon the aggregation of which the afflictions will return. For instance, when a person pays intense attention to what he is seeing, he does not desire food. The desire for food has not disappeared from his mental continuum forever, but has temporarily disappeared. Non-analytical cessations come into existence and go out of existence and so are, in terms of specific instances, occasional permanents.

Suchness

'Suchness' refers to 'emptiness' because whether Buddhas appear or not the nature of phenomena remains as such. A suchness is also a 'natural nirvana' (prakrtiparinirvana, rang bzhin myang 'das) which does not refer to an actual passage beyond sorrow, that
is, an overcoming of the afflictions, but to an emptiness itself that naturally is passed beyond inherent existence. The teaching that cyclic existence and nirvana are not different means that the phenomena of cyclic existence are the same entities as their natural nirvanas, or emptinesses, and not separate entities. It does not mean there is no difference between being afflicted with the conception of inherent existence and not being so afflicted.

THINGS

The other division of existents is comprised of things or actualities. The definition of thing is: that which is able to perform a function (particularly the function of producing an effect). Therefore, according to all schools except Vaibhashika, permanent phenomena are not things. The Vaibhashikas say that permanent phenomena are things because, for instance, a space performs the function of allowing an object to be moved. The other systems of tenets, including Prasangika, say that the presence or absence of another obstructive object is what allows or does not allow an object to be moved, not space itself which is just a non-affirming negative of obstructive contact. Still, even the Prasangikas call emptiness—a non-affirming negative of inherent existence—a ‘cause’ of Buddhahood because without it the transformation of the mind into wisdom would not be possible. However, it is not said that space causes the possibility of movement, just as emptiness does not actually cause Buddhahood.

Things are impermanent (anitya, mi rtagpa) because of being phenomena that disintegrate moment by moment. Though impermanent things are momentary, they are not just one moment; if they were, it could not be said that beings without yogic direct perception ever perceive things because they are not capable of realizing a single isolated instant. The impermanent things that these beings cognize are series of moments; the phenomena are imputed to a series of moments and are unfindable among the various moments or as the series itself. Still, the imputed nature of things does not prevent their performing functions; rather, being merely imputed is a prerequisite for the performance of a
function. If things were frozen in a world of inherent existence, unaffected by causes and conditions and unable to affect anything else, there could not be any cause and effect. Non-inherent existence is the very basis of cause and effect, and the presence of cause and effect is a sign of non-inherent existence.

Things are also products, or caused phenomena, or compounded phenomena (samskrta, dus byas) because they are made (krta, byas) in dependence on the aggregation (sam, 'dus) of causes and conditions. The term ‘thing’ (bhava, dngos po), when used strictly as it is here in the table of phenomena, applies only to products; however when it is used loosely as it often is in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, it refers to both products and non-products as when Buddha says that all things do not ultimately exist.

Things, or products, are divided into three:

Chart 10: *Divisions of Things*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>rupa</th>
<th>gzugs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>thing</td>
<td>jñaña</td>
<td>shes pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-associated compositional factor</td>
<td>viprayukta-samskāra</td>
<td>ldan min ‘du byed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Forms*

*Source:*
Cha-har Ge-shay’s *Identification of Elements, Elemental Evolutes, And So Forth*

Etymologically, a form is so called because it is suitable to become an object of a sense consciousness upon the aggregation of other causes, such as the presence of an eye sense. However, because there are forms that are perceived only by the mental consciousness, this explanation is merely an etymology and not a definition.

Forms are divided into eleven types—the five physical sense
powers, the five objects of the senses, and forms which are objects only of the mental consciousness:

Chart 11: *Divisions of Forms*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Sense</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>visible form</td>
<td>rupa, gzugs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sound</td>
<td>shabda, sgra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>odor</td>
<td>gandha, dri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taste</td>
<td>rasa, ro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tangible object</td>
<td>sprashtavya, reg bya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>form for the mental consciousness</td>
<td>dharmayatanarupa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>chos kyi skye mched pa'i gzugs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sense powers**

The five sense powers are neither the coarse organs, which are the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and body, nor are they consciousness. They are clear matter located in the coarse organs which
cannot be seen with the eye but can be seen by certain clairvoyants. They give their respective consciousnesses dominance or power with respect to certain objects and are thus called 'powers' (:indriya, dbang po). An eye sense has power with respect to visible forms, that is, colors and shapes, but not with respect to sounds, odors, tastes, or tangible objects. An ear sense has power with respect to sounds but not visible forms, and so forth. Sense powers give their respective consciousnesses the ability to apprehend and to be generated in the aspect of their respective objects.

Eye (chakshuh, mig), eye sense power (chakshurindriya, miggi dbang po), eye-constituent (chakshurdhatu, mig gi khams), and eye-source (chakshurayatana, mig gi skye mched) are synonyms. An eye sense power is called an eye-constituent because of being the cause giving rise to the continuation of its own similar type, that is, later moments of itself. It is also called an eye-source because of being a door, cause, condition, or source producing and increasing an eye consciousness. The same terminology is also used for the ear, nose, tongue, and body sense powers.

The particles of each sense power are arranged in a specific shape: eye sense, like that of a bud of a zar-ma flower; ear sense, like the knot of a birch tree; nose sense, like two fine hollow needles at the root of the nostrils; tongue sense, like half moons having the area of only the point of a hair throughout the center of the tongue; body sense, like skin or hide throughout the body. As types of the body sense, the particles of the female organ are arranged like the inside of a drum, and those of the male organ are arranged like a thumb.

The sense power of the mental consciousness is not physical and thus has no shape; a former moment of any of the six consciousnesses acts as the sense power of a mental consciousness. For instance, when one pays attention to a color, an eye consciousness acts like a sense power in that it gives the mental consciousness the ability to perceive a visible object.

A sense power is an uncommon empowering condition (asadharana-adhipatirataya, thun mong mayinpa 'i bdag rkyen) of a consciousness because it gives it power with respect to its own special type of object. Also, a former moment of consciousness
causes it to be an entity capable of experiencing objects. Thus, a mental consciousness has two consciousnesses as its causes: any of the six consciousnesses which is its empowering condition and a former moment of consciousness which is its 'immediately preceding condition' (samanantarapratyaya, de ma dag rkyen).

A consciousness is also caused, or affected, by an object in the sense that an object causes a consciousness to be generated in its image, much as objects cause a mirror to reflect their image. These objects are called 'observed-object-conditions' (alambana-pratyaya, dmigs rkyen). However, the world which is being seen is not just a mental image; the co-ordination of an image in consciousness with an object certifies that the object is being perceived properly, but the object seen is an external object, not an internal image. The Buddhist theory is not that everything being perceived exists inside either the eye or the brain.

Visible forms

Visible forms (rupa, gzugs) are defined as objects of apprehension by an eye consciousness and are to be distinguished from the general term 'form' which is the basis of the division into eleven types of forms. A visible form is called a form-constituent (rupadhatu) because of being a cause giving rise to the continuation of its own similar type, that is, later moments of visible form, and is called a form-source (rupa-ayatana) because of being a form that is a door, cause, condition, or source of an eye consciousness. Visible forms are of two types:

Chart 12: Divisions of Visible Forms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>color</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>varna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kha dog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>visible form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samsthana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dbyibs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Colors. There are twelve colors, four primary and eight secondary (see Chart 13). The four primary colors are the colors of the four elements. Wind is blue; earth, yellow; water, white; and fire, red.
It is not that clouds and so forth are secondary colors but that their colors are secondary colors. However, some scholars do say that illumination, darkness, sunlight, and shadow themselves are secondary colors. Illumination refers to the light of the moon, stars, fire, medicine, and jewels. Darkness refers to a form that
obscures other forms and causes one to see gloom and blackness. Darkness obscures other forms such that they cannot be seen, whereas shadow makes other forms a little unclear but still perceivable; thus, darkness and shadow have a difference of density. Sunlight refers to the illumination of other forms when the sun appears.

The eight secondary colors do not include the secondary colors that are mixes of primary colors, such as green which is a mix of blue and yellow, and thus the category is not all-inclusive.

An eye consciousness actually apprehends only colors and shapes. Although pots, pillars, and so forth appear to an eye consciousness and although it is said that an eye consciousness sees them, pots, pillars, and so forth are not objects of apprehension by an eye consciousness. Rather, the color and shape of pots, pillars, and so forth—that is, their visible form—are objects of apprehension by an eye consciousness and thus are also form-constituents and form-sources. Although pots and pillars are matter and are forms, they are not visible forms, form-constituents or form-sources, but tangible objects, tangible-object-constituents, and tangible-object-sources. Similarly, when one sees the visible form of a human or horse, one sees their shape and color but does not, in a sense, see a human or horse. Also, seeing earth and water is a case of seeing their color, for earth and water are tangible objects, and, therefore, the eye does not see the capacity of hardness or of moistening. Furthermore, when the visible form of a pot is seen, an eye consciousness does not conceive, 'This is a pot'; a mental consciousness is the identifier and designator of names.

Shapes. Shapes are of eight types only (see Chart 14). Long refers to the form of a long board, a long rope, a long (deep) spring, and so forth. Short arises in relation to those. High and low refer to, for instance, a high mountain and a low valley. A square, or perhaps polygon, is technically a shape of equal sides, such as dice, or a pentagon, hexagon, and so forth; however, the shapes of a rectangular box or a board are also included. Round refers to
Chart 14: **Divisions of Shapes**

- **shape**
  - long
    - *dirgha, ring ba*
  - short
    - *hrasva, thung ba*
  - high
    - *unnata, mtho ba*
  - low
    - *avanata, dma' ba*
  - square
    - *vṛṭṭa, lham pa*
  - round
    - *parimandala, zlum po*
  - level
    - *shata, phya le ba*
  - non-level
    - *vishata, phya le ba ma yin pa*

either the globular, like an egg, or the flat, like a mandala. Level refers to any shape having an even surface, whereas non-level refers to a shape with, for instance, bumps and depressions.

**Sounds**

Sounds, which are defined as objects of hearing by an ear consciousness, are of only eight types (see Chart 15). Sound, sound-constituent, and sound-source are synonyms. Although sounds are entities constructed from particles, they are not form-sources, that is to say, visible forms.

**Odors**

Odors, which are defined as objects of smelling by a nose consciousness, are of only four types (see Chart 16). An equal odor, such as the odor of sesame, does not infuse other objects, whereas the opposite is true of an unequal odor such as the odor of garlic. Odor, odor-constituent, and odor-source are synonyms.
Chart 15: *Divisions of Sounds*

- **Sound caused by elements conjoined with consciousness**
  - *upāttamahā-bhūtahetuka, zin pa'i 'byung ba chen po rgyur byas pa*

- **Sound caused by elements not conjoined with consciousness**
  - *anupāttamahā-bhūtahetuka, ma zin pa'i 'byung ba chen po rgyur byas pa*

  **Articulate Sound**
  - *sattvākhyā, sems can du ston pa*
    - **Pleasant sound, e.g., words of doctrine**
      - *yasha, snyan pa*
    - **Unpleasant sound, e.g., harsh words**
      - *ayasha, mi snyan pa*

  **Inarticulate Sound**
  - *asattvākhyā, sems can du mi ston pa*
    - **Pleasant sound, e.g., sound of fingers snapping**
      - *yasha, snyan pa*
    - **Unpleasant sound, e.g., sound of a fist on impact**
      - *ayasha, mi snyan pa*

  **Pleasant sound, e.g., words of doctrine taught by trees**
  - *ayasha, mi snyan pa*

  **Unpleasant sound, e.g., words of scolding from a tree**
  - *ayasha, mi snyan pa*

  **Pleasant sound, e.g., sound of a drum**
  - *ayasha, mi snyan pa*

  **Unpleasant sound, e.g., sound of crashing stones**
  - *ayasha, mi snyan pa*
Chart 16: Divisions of Odors

- **Fragrant odor**: samasugandha
  - equal: *zhim pa’i dri mnyam pa*
  - unequal: *visamasugandha* with *zhim pa’i dri mi mnyam pa*

- **Unfragrant odor**: samadurgandha
  - equal: *mi zhim pa’i dri mnyam pa*
  - unequal: *visamadurgandha* with *mi zhim pa’i dri mi mnyam pa*

**Tastes.**

Tastes, which are defined as objects of taste by a tongue consciousness, are of only six types:

Chart 17: Divisions of Tastes

- **Sweet**: madhura, *mngar ba*
- **Sour**: amla, *skyur ba*
- **Salty**: lavaña, *lan tshva ba*
- **Pungent**: katuka, *tsha ba*
- **Bitter**: tikta, *kha ba*
- **Astringent**: kashaya, *bska ba*

Sweetness arises from a predominance of earth and water; sourness, from a predominance of fire and earth; saltiness, from a
predominance of water and fire; pungency, from a predominance of fire and wind; bitterness, from a predominance of water and wind; and astringency, from a predominance of earth and wind.

Tangible objects.
Tangible objects, which are defined as objects of touch by a body consciousness, are of only eleven types—the four elements and seven tangible objects that are arisen from the elements:

Chart 18: *Divisions of Tangible Objects*

```
tangible object
  tangible object arisen from elements
    bhautika, 'byung 'gyur
  element
    bhuta, 'byung ba
  tangible object
    bhautika, 'byung 'gyur
  element
    bhuta, 'byung ba

  earth
    prthivī, sa
  water
    ap, chu
  fire
    tejas, me
  wind
    vāyu, rlung
  smoothness
    shlakshnatva, 'jam pa
  roughness
    karkashatva, rtsub pa
  heaviness
    gurutva, lci ba
  lightness
    laghutva, yang ba
  cold
    shīta, grang ba
  hunger
    bubhukṣā, bkres pa
  thirst
    pipāsā, skom pa
```
The definition of earth is the hard and obstructive; its entity is hardness, and its function is the obstruction of other physical objects. The definition of water is the damp and moistening. The definition of fire is the hot and burning. The definition of wind is the light and moving.

The particles that serve as the bases for the construction of physical objects are aggregates of the eight substances: earth, water, fire, wind, visible form, odor, taste, and tangible object arisen from elements. (Sound is not included because it does not have a continuum of similar type.) Thus, wherever one of the elements exists, the other three also exist, but there is a difference of strength and, thus, dominance. (Some say that the others dwell in the manner of seeds, that is, in potency.)

The fact that stone, wood, and so forth hold together indicates the presence of the water element in the earth element; that stones and trees move indicates the presence of the wind element in the earth element; that sparks are produced when two stones meet indicates the presence of the fire element. Similarly, that the water element can serve as a support for boats, leaves, and so forth indicates that the earth element is present in the water element; that leaves and roots rot in water and that there are warm springs indicate the presence of the fire element in water; that water flows downward and moves about indicates the presence of the wind element. Similarly, that leaves and grass are held up in the wind indicates the presence of the earth element in the wind element; that there are warm winds and that damp objects dry when spread out to the wind indicates the presence of the fire element in the wind element; that currents of wind are held together in a twister indicates the presence of the water element. Similarly, that one tongue of fire grasps another and that a tongue of fire can support leaves, grass, and so forth indicates the presence of the earth element in the fire element; that tongues of fire do not split apart but burn together indicates the presence of the water element; that tongues of flame move about indicates the presence of the wind element.

The seven tangible objects that are evolutes of the elements arise from the four elements. Smoothness arises from a preponderance

The colors of particles depend upon the element that is predominant. If the earth element is predominant, the color is yellow; if water, white; if fire, red; and if wind, blue. The shapes of particle clusters are determined by the arrangement of color particles and are not separate particles themselves. The particles of color/shape are different from the particles of odor, taste, or touch and thus are classed separately from the four elements as visible objects.

Visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects are all 'atomic' in that they are masses of particles, but these are not necessarily single particles. Otherwise, the only sense objects would be single particles, and there would be no gross objects. Though visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects are 'atomic', many say that these are not 'established atomically' (rdul du grub pa) because the word 'established' carries with it the force of 'truly established' (satyasiddha, bden grub) or its synonym 'truly existent' (satyasat, bden par yod pa). Since 'established atomically' is the definition of matter (kantha, bem po), it can be said that the Prasangikas do not accept 'matter'. This, however, does not mean that particles or gross objects constructed from particles are not accepted in the Prasangika system. Indeed, the word 'matter' seems to refer to the atomically constructed and nothing more; however, the difficulty is not merely in translation. For, in a similar way the Chittamatrins accept forms and particles which are of the same entity as a perceiving consciousness, but they do not accept 'matter' because for them the term itself implies an external object. To say in Tibetan that there are particles and objects constructed from particles but no bem po is as forcefull as saying in English that there are particles and objects constructed from particles but no matter. The word 'matter' carries with it a connotation of findability under analysis,
or true existence. That there are particles and masses of particles is accepted conventionally, but matter, because of the implications of the word, is not accepted even conventionally (according to Jam-yang-shay-ba).

Since visible forms and so forth are atomically constructed, it may be wondered why the four elements which are necessarily present in every particle are classified under tangible objects. The reason is that without touch, the function of earth, hardness and obstructiveness, cannot be experienced. Similarly, without touch, the function of water, dampness and moistening, cannot be experienced; without touch, the function of fire, heat and burning, cannot be experienced; without touch, the function of wind, lightness and moving, cannot be experienced. Therefore, the four elements are classed as tangible objects. Visible forms, odors, tastes, and the other tangible objects are evolutes of the elements.

The five sense powers and the five objects are called the ten obstructive physical objects. Among these, colors and shapes that can be shown to an eye consciousness are called demonstrable obstructive forms; thus, demonstrable form and object of apprehension by an eye consciousness are synonyms. The five sense powers and the four remaining objects—sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects—are undemonstrable obstructive forms.

**Forms for the mental consciousness**

The final category of forms is comprised of forms for the mental consciousness, which are undemonstrable and non-obstructive. They are defined as form aggregates which are objects only of the mental consciousness and thus are classed not as form-sources (rupayatana, gzugs kyi skye mched) but as phenomena-sources (dharmayatana, chos kyi skye mched)⁶⁵ (see Chart 19).

**Forms arising from aggregation.** A single particle does not appear to an ordinary being's sense consciousness, but when the mental consciousness analyzes a gross form into parts, a single particle does appear, and thus it is classed as a form for a mental consciousness.
The shape of a single particle is necessarily round, but its colors are various as described above for the four elements. Since single particles appear only to the mental consciousness, all shapes and colors are not included in the category of visible forms seen by an eye consciousness.

**Space-forms.** Space appears both to an eye consciousness and a mental consciousness and thus the bluish space that appears to an eye consciousness is a visible form whereas the space that appears to a mental consciousness is a form for a mental consciousness.
Meditation on Emptiness

Both are impermanent whereas uncaused space, which is a non-affirming negative of obstructive contact, appears only to an inferential mental consciousness and is permanent. Like emptiness, it is a mere absence of a negated factor—for emptiness, inherent existence, and for space, obstructive contact.

Forms arising from promises. When one takes a vow of individual liberation, a form arises in dependence on the shape of the body, as in crouching, and in dependence on the sounds of speech, as in declaring that one will turn away from killing. This subtle physical entity is said to arise at the moment of first taking the vow and remains with the person until losing the vow or death. Similarly, a form arises from non-restraint as, for instance, in dependence on a butcher's physical and verbal actions in killing animals and selling their flesh. A middling variety of such is a form that arises from physical or verbal virtue. Forms arising from promises are continuations of virtue or sin and arise from revelatory actions of body or speech or arise from cultivating meditative stabilization. Since the motivations of these actions are not knowable by others, they are called 'non-revelatory forms' (avijñaptirūpa, mam par rig byed mayin pa'igzugs).

Imaginary forms. Dream objects, such as elephants, and non-actual objects of meditation, such as corpses filling the world, appear as if they were actual forms but are not; thus, they are classed as imaginary forms. The Prasangikas say that a dream consciousness is solely a mental consciousness appearing in the aspects of the five sense consciousnesses. A dream object is an external object affecting a mental consciousness just as a reflection in a mirror is an external object affecting an eye consciousness. The non-Buddhist Māmsakas say that the light of the eye hits the mirror, and through returning to the eye an image is seen. The Buddhist Vaibhashikas say that a clear type of form arises in the mirror. The Sautrantikas, Chittamatrans and Yogachara-Svatantrikas say that a mirror image is a false appearance to the mind and is not a different entity from the mind. The Prasangikas, however, say that reflections, the falling hairs seen by one with
The Selfless

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cataracts, and mirages are visible forms just as echoes are sounds. A consciousness perceiving these is nevertheless mistaken because, for example, a mirror image of a face appears to be a face and not just a mirror image.

*Forms for one with meditative power.* Forms that appear to one who has attained mastery in meditation are objects of meditation that exist in fact. Mere earth or mere water as a meditative manifestation of one who has attained mastery in meditation is actual and is not an imaginary form. Included in this category are objects of meditative manifestation that can be shown to another being’s eye consciousness, but this does not make the object as it appears to the master a visible form; for him it still is a form for the mental consciousness. This is compared to the varieties of externally existent objects seen by different types of beings, as in the case of a god’s seeing a bowl of fluid as ambrosia and a hungry ghost’s seeing pus and blood in the same place.

*Consciousness*

*Sources:*
Ye-shay-gyel-tsen’s *Clear Exposition of the Modes of Minds and Mental Factors*
Lati Rinbochay’s oral teachings

The second division of things, or impermanent phenomena, is consciousness, defined as the clear and knowing. Consciousness is of two types:

Chart 20: *Divisions of Consciousness*

```
  mind  
  chitta
  sems

consciousness 
  mental factor
  chaitta
  sems byung
```

*Minds*
A mind is a knower of the mere entity of an object, whereas a mental factor is a knower which, on the basis of observing that
object, engages in the object from the point of view of other features, such as function and so forth. Minds and mental factors are different within being the same entity; they possess five similarities which, as described in Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Knowledge (Abhidharmakosha)* are:

1. **Sameness of base.** A mind and its accompanying mental factors depend on the same sense power, as in the case of an eye consciousness and its mental factors which both depend on the physical eye sense power.

2. **Sameness of object of observation.** A mind and its mental factors observe the same object. For instance, when the main eye consciousness apprehends blue, so does the mental factor of feeling that accompanies it.

3. **Sameness of aspect.** For instance, if the main eye consciousness is generated in the aspect (or image) of blue, so is the mental factor of discrimination that accompanies it.

4. **Sameness of time.** A mind and its mental factors are produced, abide, and cease simultaneously.

5. **Sameness of substantial entity.** Just as at any one time the substantial entity of a particular mind is single and there are not many minds of the same type, such as several eye consciousnesses, so the substantial entity of, for instance, the mental factor of intention that accompanies the eye consciousness is also single.

Asanga’s *Compendium of Knowledge (Abhidharmasamuchchaya)* combines the sameness of object of observation and sameness of aspect and adds another, sameness of realm and level. This refers to the fact that if, for instance, the main mind is of the Desire Realm, only mental factors of the Desire Realm will accompany it, and not mental factors of the Form or Formless Realms.

Minds are of only six types (see Chart 21). An eye consciousness is an individual knower depending on the eye and observing visible form. An ear consciousness is an individual knower depending on the ear and observing sound. A nose consciousness is an individual knower depending on the nose and observing odor. A tongue consciousness is an individual knower
Chart 21: Divisions of Minds

- **eye consciousness**
  - chakshurviññāna
  - mig gi rnam par shes pa

- **ear consciousness**
  - shrotraviññāna
  - rna ba'i rnam par shes pa

- **nose consciousness**
  - ghranaviññāna
  - snā'i rnam par shes pa

- **tongue consciousness**
  - jihvāviññāna
  - lce'i rnam par shes pa

- **body consciousness**
  - kayaviññāna
  - lus kyi rnam par shes pa

- **mental consciousness**
  - manaviññāna
  - yid kyi rnam par shes pa

depending on the tongue and observing taste. A body consciousness is an individual knower depending on the body and observing tangible objects. A mental consciousness is an individual knower depending on the mind sense (which is a former moment of consciousness and thus non-physical) and observing phenomena.

The mind cognizing emptiness, either inferentially or directly, is a mental consciousness, not an eye, ear, nose, tongue, or body consciousness, except in the case of a Buddha whose consciousnesses are cross-functional. The mental consciousness has the capacity to penetrate, first conceptually and then non-conceptually, the nature of phenomena, which not only is beyond the realm of a non-Buddha’s sense perception but also is obscured by a false overlay that until Buddhahood accompanies sense perception. In dependence on reasoning, the mental consciousness
first realizes an emptiness of a particular object conceptually—by way of the image of a vacuity which is a negative of inherent existence; then through familiarity with that knowledge, the imagistic element is removed, whereupon the mental consciousness becomes a Superior’s wisdom directly cognizing emptiness.

**Mental factors**
There are fifty-one mental factors which are classed in six groups:

Chart 22: *Divisions of Mental Factors*

- omnipresent factor (5)
  - sarvatraga
  - kun ’gro
  - determining factor (5)
  - viniyata
  - yul nges
  - virtuous factor (11)
  - kushula
  - dge ba
  - root affliction (6)
    - mulaklesha
    - rtsa nyon
  - secondary affliction (20)
    - upaklesha
    - nye nyon
  - changeable factor (4)
    - aniyata
    - gzhan ’gyur

**Omnipresent mental factors.** The omnipresent mental factors are so named because they necessarily accompany all minds, even the wisdom cognizing emptiness. The five omnipresent mental factors are:
Feeling. Feeling is an entity of experience individually experiencing the fruitions of virtuous and non-virtuous actions. Its objects are pleasure, pain, and neutrality. Pleasure is that with which, when it ceases, one wants to meet again; pain is that from which, when it arises, one wants to separate; and neutrality, being neither pleasure nor pain, is that with respect to which, when it arises, neither the wish to meet nor the wish to separate occurs. Pleasure, pain, and neutrality are called ‘fruitions’ in order to emphasize that all generations of pleasure, pain, and neutral feeling are results of former actions.

All pleasures, even that arising from a cool breeze in a hell, arise from virtuous actions (karma, las) accumulated in the past. Similarly, all pains, even a headache in the continuum of a Foe Destroyer, arise from non-virtuous actions accumulated in the past. In other words, pleasure and pain do not arise causelessly, or from a discordant cause, such as the nature (prakrti, rang bzhin) asserted by the Samkhya school or the lord Ishvara as asserted by the Aishvaras. Rather, general pleasure and pain, such as
being born as a human or as a hell-being, arise from general virtuous and non-virtuous actions, such as an ethical deed or the sin of murder. Similarly, the varieties of particular pleasures and pains arise from the varieties of particular virtuous and non-virtuous actions. The development of certainty as to this definite and undeceived relationship of action and effect—of pleasure to virtue and pain to non-virtue—is praised as the basis of all auspicious doctrines and called the correct view of all Buddhists.

Pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha), and neutrality (adukhasa-sukha) can each be divided into physical (kayiki) and mental (chaitasiki) feeling, making six types of feeling. Physical feeling refers to that accompanying any of the five sense consciousnesses, not just that accompanying the body consciousness. It is called physical because the five sense powers are composed of clear matter and because the body sense power pervades the sense powers of eye, ear, nose, and tongue. Mental feeling is that accompanying the mental consciousness.

From the viewpoint of their base or sense power, feelings are of six types:

1. feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness (chakshuhsamspar-shaja vedana)
2. feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a sound, ear sense, and ear consciousness (shrotrasamsparshaja vedana)
3. feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of an odor, nose sense, and nose consciousness (ghranasamsparshaja vedana)
4. feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a taste, tongue sense, and tongue consciousness (jihvasamsparshaja vedana)
5. feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness (kayasamsparshaja vedana)
6. feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness (manahsamsparshaja vedana).
Taking into account pleasure, pain, and neutrality, these six are further divided into eighteen types of feeling.

When divided from the viewpoint of object of abandonment and antidote, there are two types:

1 feeling as the base of attachment (*gredhashritavedana*), which is feeling accompanying attachment to attributes of the Desire Realm
2 feeling as the base of deliverance (*naishkamyashritavedana*), which is feeling accompanying a mental consciousness that has turned away from desire for attributes of the Desire Realm and is included within an actual concentration.

This division into two is made in order to make known how attachment is induced by the power of feeling and how one separates from attachment to feeling in dependence on the concentrations.

There is also a division of feeling into materialistic (*samishavedana*) and non-materialistic (*niramishavedana*). The former is feeling accompanying attachment to contaminated mental and physical aggregates, whereas the latter is feeling accompanying a wisdom consciousness directly cognizing selflessness.

*Discrimination.* Discrimination apprehends, upon the aggregation of an object, sense power, and a consciousness, the uncommon signs of an object. There are two types:

1 non-conceptual apprehension of signs: apprehension of the uncommon signs of an object appearing to a non-conceptual mind
2 conceptual apprehension of signs: apprehension of the uncommon signs of an object appearing to thought.

These two types of discrimination operate on (1) *perceptions*, involving the designation of expressions to objects manifestly perceived, (2) *hearing*, involving the designation of expressions in dependence on hearing believable words, (3) *differentiations*, involving the designation of expressions to objects ascertained in dependence on signs (such as in determining that an article is
good due to possessing the signs of superior quality), and (4) knowledge, involving the designation of expressions to objects ascertained directly.

There is also a division of discrimination into two types:

1 discrimination apprehending signs in objects: apprehension individually differentiating the features of an object, such as blue, yellow, and so forth
2 discrimination apprehending signs in expressions: apprehension individually differentiating the features of expressions, such as in, 'This is a man; that is a woman.'

From the viewpoint of its base, discrimination is of six types:

1 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness (chakshusamsparshaja samjna)
2 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a sound, ear sense, and ear consciousness (shrotrasamsparshaja samjna)
3 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of an odor, nose sense, and nose consciousness (ghranasamsparshaja samjna)
4 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of taste, tongue sense, and tongue consciousness (jihvasamsparshaja samjna)
5 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness (kayasamsparshaja samjna)
6 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness (manahsamsparshaja samjna).

From the viewpoint of object of observation, it is also of six types:

1 reasoned discrimination (sanimittasamjna): (a) discrimination skilled in the relationship of names and meanings, (b) discrimination observing products as impermanent and so forth, and (c) discrimination having a clear subjective aspect and object of observation
unreasoned discrimination (*animittasamjña*): (a) discrimination unskilled in the relationship of names and meanings, (b) discrimination observing products as permanent and so forth, and (c) discrimination lacking clear subjective aspect and object of observation

3 discrimination of the small (*paritta samjña*): (a) discriminations in the continuum of an ordinary being in the Desire Realm who has not attained an actual concentration and (b) discriminations observing attributes of the Desire Realm

4 discrimination of the vast (*mahadgata samjña*): (a) discriminations observing the Form Realm and (b) discriminations in the continuums of beings of the Form Realm

5 discrimination of the limitless (*apramanasamjña*): (a) discriminations observing limitless space or limitless consciousness

6 discrimination of nothingness (*akinchinsamjña*): discriminations observing nothingness (a state beyond coarse feeling and discrimination).

In general, discrimination involves the differentiation and identification of objects; as a mental factor accompanying a non-conceptual mind such as an eye consciousness, it implies a non-confusion of the details of the object without which a later identification could not be made. Discrimination is the heart of identifying the object of negation in the view of selflessness and then reflecting on a reasoning proving non-inherent existence; thus, far from being a hindrance to the path, correct discrimination is to be enhanced.

**Intention.** Intention (or attention) is the mental factor that moves and directs the mind that accompanies it to its object; it has the function of engaging the mind in the virtuous (*kushala, dge ba*), non-virtuous (*akushala, midge ba*), and neutral (*avyakṛta, lungdu ma bstanpa*). Intention is the most important of all mental factors because through its power minds and mental factors engage in objects, like pieces of iron powerlessly moved by a magnet.

From the viewpoint of its base, intention is of six types:

1 intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a
visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness (chakshusamsparsha\textit{j}a chetana).

2 intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a sound, ear sense, and ear consciousness (shrotrasamsparsha\textit{j}a chetana).

3 intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of an odor, nose sense, and nose consciousness (ghranasamsparsha\textit{j}ayd chetana).

4 intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a taste, tongue sense, and tongue consciousness (jihvasamsparsha\textit{j}a chetana).

5 intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness (kayasamsparsha\textit{j}a chetana).

6 intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness (manahsamsparsha\textit{j}a chetana).

Intention is mental action (\textit{manaskarma, yid kyi las}) from among the two types of action (\textit{karma, las}), actions of intention (mental actions) and intended actions (physical and verbal actions).

\textit{Contact.} Contact distinguishes its object—upon the aggregation of object, sense power, and mind—as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral in accordance with subsequent feelings of pleasure, pain, or neutrality; thus, it has the function of serving as a basis for feeling. Since contact distinguishes its object as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral, it serves as a cause for the feelings of pleasure, pain, or neutrality which in turn serve as causes for desire, hatred, and ignorance.

From the viewpoint of its base, contact is of six types:

1 contact upon the aggregation of a visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness

2 contact upon the aggregation of a sound, ear sense, and ear consciousness

3 contact upon the aggregation of an odor, nose sense, and nose consciousness

4 contact upon the aggregation of a taste, tongue sense, and tongue consciousness
5 contact upon the aggregation of a tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness
6 contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness.

**Mental engagement.** Mental engagement directs the mind accompanying it to a specific object of observation (alambana, dmigs-pa). The difference between intention and mental engagement is that intention moves the mind to objects in general whereas mental engagement directs the mind to a specific object.

Without the five omnipresent factors, the experience of an object would not be complete. Without feeling, there would be no experience of pleasure, pain, or neutrality. Without discrimination, the uncommon signs of the object would not be apprehended. Without intention, the mind would not approach its object. Without contact, there would be no basis for feeling. Without mental engagement, the mind would not be directed to a specific object of observation. Thus, all five are needed to experience an object.

**Determining mental factors.** The five determining mental factors are shown in Chart 24.

**Aspiration.** Aspiration observes a contemplated phenomenon and seeks it. Aspiration serves as a base for the initiation of effort in the sense that, for instance, through perceiving the advantages of meditative stabilization, a captivating faith in meditative stabilization is produced, and in dependence on this, a strong continuous aspiration seeking meditative stabilization is generated such that one is able to generate continuous effort. Effort in meditative stabilization, in turn, generates a pliancy of mind and body that bestows an ability to remain in the practice of virtue night and day, thereby overcoming the laziness which is a non-delight in cultivating meditative stabilization and liking for what is discordant with meditative stabilization. Thus, faith, aspiration, effort, and pliancy are the antidotes to laziness.
Aspiration is divided into three types: aspiration wishing to meet, aspiration wishing not to separate, and aspiration that seeks. The last is again divided into aspiration seeking desires, aspiration seeking views, and so forth.

**Belief.** Belief holds an ascertained object to be just as it was ascertained; it has the function of keeping the mind from being captivated by another view. For instance, when one considers Buddha and other teachers and analyzes to discover which is an undeceiving refuge, one ascertains that only Buddha is the teacher of an undeceiving refuge. Then, when the doctrine taught by him and the spiritual community properly achieving his doctrine are ascertained by valid cognition as undeceiving, a firm belief in them as final refuges is gained. Thereupon, Forders and so forth cannot lead one away from this position. One has then entered among the number of Buddhists, and based on this, all auspicious qualities increase.
Mindfulness. Mindfulness is non-forgetfulness with respect to a familiar phenomenon; it has the function of causing non-distraction. Mindfulness has three features:

1 objective feature: a familiar object. Mindfulness cannot be generated toward an unfamiliar object.
2 subjective feature: non-forgetfulness within observation of that object. Even though one might have become familiar with an object previously, if it does not presently appear as an object of mind, mindfulness cannot occur.
3 functional feature: causing non-distraction. Since the stability of the mind increases in dependence on mindfulness, non-distraction is specified as the function of mindfulness.

Mindfulness that possesses these three features is extremely important for both sutra and tantra practice, as all auspicious qualities of the grounds and paths increase in dependence on mindfulness and introspection. In particular, all achievements of meditative stabilization in sutra and tantra are attained through the power of mindfulness.

Stabilization. Stabilization is a one-pointedness of mind with respect to an imputed object; it has the function of serving as the base of knowledge, that is, special insight. The object of stabilization is specified as 'imputed' because when meditative stabilization is cultivated, the mind is held to a mentally imputed or imagined object of observation. This indicates that meditative stabilization is not generated by a sense consciousness, such as by an eye consciousness staring at an object, but by the mental consciousness observing an internal object. Through continuous cultivation of meditative stabilization, the object of observation —whether true or untrue—will be perceived clearly and non-conceptually.

In dependence on the meditative stabilization of calm abiding, which is a setting of the mind internally in equipoise, special insight is achieved through the force of analytical wisdom. Therefore, the function of stabilization is specified as serving as the base of knowledge. Stabilization, in turn, depends on ethics.
Knowledge. Knowledge (or wisdom) individually differentiates the faults and virtues of objects of analysis; it has the function of overcoming doubt. When one analyzes with reasoning and gains ascertainment, doubt is overcome; thus, the function of knowledge is specified as overcoming doubt.

Virtuous mental factors. The eleven virtuous mental factors are:

Chart 25: Divisions of Virtuous Mental Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtuous Mental Factor</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faith</td>
<td>shraddha, dad pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hri, ngo tsha shes pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>apatrapya, khrel yod pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>alobha, ma chags pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>advesha, zhe sdang med pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>amoha, gti mug med pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>virya, brtson 'grus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>prasrabdhi, shin tu sbyangs pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>apramada, bag yod pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>upeksha, btang snyoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>avihimsa, rnam par mi 'tsho ba</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Faith. Faith has the aspect of clarity (prasada, dang ba),
The Selfless

conviction (abhisampratyaya, yid ches), or a wish to attain (abhilasha, 'thob dod) with respect to the existent (such as actions and their effects), the possession of qualities (such as by the Three Jewels), or powers (such as the powers of the path to actualize cessation). It has the function of serving as a basis for aspiration. The faith of clarity, or clarifying faith, is, for instance, the clarity of mind that comes through perceiving the qualities of the Three Jewels; it is called 'clarifying' because just as when a water-clarifying jewel is put in water, the dirtiness in the water is immediately cleansed, so when this type of faith is generated in the continuum, mental troubles are cleared away, whereupon the qualities of realization are suitable to be generated.

The faith of conviction is, for instance, the gaining of conviction in dependent-arising or in actions and their effects through contemplating these doctrines as set forth by the Conqueror. The faith which is a wish to attain is, for instance, the faith thinking, 'I will definitely attain the cessation of suffering', upon contemplating the four noble truths, ascertaining true sufferings and true sources as objects of abandonment and true cessations and true paths as objects of attainment, and realizing that through striving in the proper way these can be attained.

Although the world equates faith (dadpa) and liking (dga'ba), they are not the same. Liking one's child or spouse and liking beer are cases of liking but not of faith. Also, the faith which is a concern and conviction from one's depths with respect to the faults of cyclic existence is faith but not liking. The faith which is a conviction and liking from the depths through contemplating the qualities of a spiritual guide or the benefits of wholesome actions and their effects is both faith and liking.

Furthermore, faith and respect (gus pa) are not the same though they are considered to be so in the world. For instance, liking a spiritual guide is faith, but respecting a spiritual guide involves contemplating his kindness, knowing shame, and valuing him highly; thus, faith and respect are different mental factors.

As explained earlier, effort is the cause of all auspicious qualities, and in order to generate effort, aspiration seeking those...
qualities is necessary. In order to generate aspiration, one must perceive those qualities and have the faith of conviction in them. Thus, faith is frequently praised in the scriptures and their commentaries as the basis of all auspicious attainments.

Shame and embarrassment. Shame is an avoidance of misconduct due to one's own disapproval whereas embarrassment is an avoidance of misconduct due to others' disapproval. These mental factors both have the function of serving as a basis for restraining misconduct. In the case of shame, when one is about to engage in misconduct, one avoids it by thinking, 'This is not something I should do,' whereas in the case of embarrassment, one avoids it by thinking, 'Since others will despise me, this is not suitable.' This latter involves concern for the displeasure of a lama, teacher, or the like.

Shame and embarrassment serve as a basis for restraining misconduct in the sense that to restrain physical, verbal, and mental misconduct, one must definitely have shame and embarrassment; for if one does not have either concern from one's own point of view over the fruition of an action or concern for the discomfort of a lama or teacher, there is no way to cease misconduct.

Non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance. Non-attachment is an emergence from and non-desire for cyclic existence and the articles of cyclic existence. Non-hatred is a factor that, in observing either harmful sentient beings, sufferings, or sources of suffering, conquers the generation of hatred; it is an absence of the intent to harm. Non-ignorance is a knowledge of individual analysis that can serve as an antidote to ignorance; it is either attained from birth through the fruition of actions in an earlier lifetime without depending on contributing causes in this lifetime or arises through application by way of hearing, thinking, or meditating.

Non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance have the function of serving as bases for non-engagement in misconduct, being roots of all virtuous practices, methods for ceasing all misconduct, and the essence of all paths. Since all grounds and paths are for the
sake of abandoning the three poisons of desire, hatred, and ignorance and since these three mental factors cause one to emerge from the three poisons that cause all misconduct, their function is specified as serving as bases for restraining misconduct.

A being of small capacity generates non-attachment to this life and, turning away from this life, seeks his own welfare in future lives. A being of middling capacity generates non-attachment toward all the marvels of cyclic existence and, having reversed his grasping from the depths, seeks release from all cyclic existence. A being of great capacity generates non-attachment to both cyclic existence and a state of solitary peace and seeks the non-abiding nirvana of a Buddha wherein he can remain in meditative equipoise on emptiness while at the same time manifesting countless forms in order to help migrators in cyclic existence. In this way, all paths can be related to non-attachment as well as to non-hatred and non-ignorance.

**Effort.** Effort is a mental delight in virtue; it has the function of fulfilling and accomplishing virtues. Although in the world everything that involves striving is called effort, toil only for the sake of the affairs of this lifetime is not effort but is laziness that is an attachment to bad activities; it is discordant with effort.

There are five types of effort:

1. effort of armoring—this is the thought prior to engaging in virtue that is the mind’s taking delight in that activity. It is like putting on great armor in that it affords a willingness to engage in extended activity.
2. effort of application—a mental delight while engaging in practice
3. effort of non-inferiority—a delight generated such that one will not be discouraged, thinking, 'How could one such as I do this?'
4. effort of irreversibility—a fullness of mental delight such that circumstances cannot divert one from engaging in virtuous activity
All auspicious qualities depend on effort.

Pliancy. Pliancy is a serviceability of mind and body such that the mind can be set on a virtuous object of observation as long as one likes; it has the function of removing all obstructions. It is of two types:

1. physical pliancy—through the power of meditative stabilization physical unserviceability is purified, whereupon the body is light like a ball of cotton and capable of being used in virtuous activity according to one's wish
2. mental pliancy—through the power of meditative stabilization the mind becomes free of unserviceability, whereupon it has the facility to engage in a virtuous aim without impediment.

The function of pliancy is specified as removing all obstructions because through its power all unfavorable conditions of mind and body are purified. Once pliancy is attained, meditative stabilization is increased from within; through this the bliss of pliancy increases, whereupon meditative stabilization again increases. Through this, in turn, the mind becomes empowered, when conjoined with special insight, to overcome obstructions.

Conscientiousness. Conscientiousness keeps the mind from contaminations and causes the achievement of virtue while abiding in effort. It keeps the mind from coming under the influence of the afflictions and has the function of serving as a basis for the achievement of all mundane and supramundane marvels. Conscientiousness is of five types:

1. conscientiousness with respect to the former—a remediying of past faults in accordance with the doctrine
2. conscientiousness with respect to the later—an earnest intention to remedy future faults
3. conscientiousness with respect to the middle—remediying faults without forgetfulness in the present
4 conscientiousness prior to activity—a tightening of the mind, thinking, 'How nice it would be if I could behave and abide in such a way that faults do not arise!'

5 conscientiousness of concordant behavior—abiding and behaving in such a way that faults do not arise.

Conscientiousness is very important as a root of all grounds and paths.

_Equanimitiy_. Equanimity is an evenness of mind, a dwelling in a natural state, and a spontaneous abiding discordant with the afflictions. It is associated with non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance and has the function of not allowing an opportunity for the afflictions.

In dependence on techniques for setting the mind one-pointedly, the nine states of mind (see pp.80-86) are gradually achieved. When the ninth is attained, the exertion of using the antidotes to laxity and excitement is no longer needed. At that point one attains a spontaneous abiding of the mind on its object, and with this state an equanimity that involves non-application of the antidotes to laxity and excitement is attained. Thus, equanimity here is an equanimity of application, not an equanimity of feeling nor the immeasurable equanimity of wishing that all sentient beings abide in an equanimity free of desire and hatred, intimacy and alienness.

The function of equanimity is specified as not allowing an opportunity for the afflictions because when the ninth state of mind is attained, it is easy to overcome the afflictions of the Desire Realm and also at the time of meditative equipoise laxity and excitement do not arise.

Non-harmfulness. Non-harmfulness is a compassionate attitude, included as part of non-hatred, which is patience devoid of intention to injure. It observes suffering sentient beings and thinks, 'May they be free of such suffering!' The function of non-harmfulness, not injuring sentient beings, is said to be the essence of Buddha's teachings.
These eleven virtuous mental factors are called 'natural virtues' because they are virtuous entities in themselves, without depending on consideration of other factors such as motivation and so forth. Though these eleven are the principal virtues, there are four other types:

1. virtue through relation—the minds and mental factors that accompany any of the eleven virtues
2. virtue through subsequent relation—virtuous predispositions established by virtuous minds and mental factors
3. virtue through motivation—physical and verbal actions motivated by faith and so forth
4. virtue through ultimacy—suchness, or emptiness, is designated a virtue because when one observes and meditates on it, all obstructions are purified; however, it is not an actual virtue.

From the viewpoint of state or situation, virtues are divided into eight types:

1. virtue by way of attainment at birth—such as faith that arises through the force of predispositions established in former lifetimes without depending on familiarization in this lifetime
2. virtue by way of application—such as the faith of wishing to attain Buddhahood that arises in dependence on relying on a virtuous spiritual guide, listening to the excellent doctrine, properly taking such to mind, and achieving doctrines that are conducive to attaining nirvana
3. virtue by way of an activity in front—imagining, for instance, a field of assembly of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and so forth in front of oneself, and then bowing down and making offerings
4. virtue by way of helping—actions such as ripening sentient beings by way of the four means of gathering students (giving articles, teaching the means for attaining high status in cyclic existence and definite goodness, causing others to practice what is beneficial, and behaving that way oneself)
5. virtue by way of bearing—such as wholesome actions that serve as the means for attaining high status and definite goodness
6 virtue by way of acting as an antidote—such as actions that possess the special power of directly overcoming objects of abandonment and the unfavorable
7 virtue by way of pacification—such as true cessations
8 virtue by way of concordant cause—such as the five clairvoyances and ten powers that arise through the force of attaining true cessations.

A similar presentation of seven types is made with respect to non-virtues:

1 non-virtue by way of attainment at birth—such as spontaneously engaging in murder due to predispositions from a former lifetime
2 non-virtue by way of application—such as misconduct of body, speech, and mind that arises in dependence on relying on a non-virtuous friend, listening to specious doctrine, improperly taking such to mind, and so forth
3 non-virtue by way of an activity in front—such as offering a blood sacrifice to an image
4 non-virtue by way of harming—such as actions of body, speech, and mind that injure sentient beings
5 non-virtue by way of bearing—such as actions impelling future lifetimes and actions completing the character of a future lifetime that yield only suffering as their fruit
6 non-virtue by way of non-conduciveness—such as bad views that prevent generation of non-contaminated paths
7 non-virtue by way of interruption—such as bad views that interfere with virtuous activity.

Root afflictions. Afflictions, in general, are defined as knowers that, when generated, cause the mental continuum to be very unpeaceful. The six root afflictions, which are so called because they are the sources of all other afflictions, are shown in Chart 26.

Desire. Desire perceives an internal or external contaminated phenomenon to be pleasant from the point of view of its own
entity and thereupon seeks it. It has the function of generating suffering. Like oil that has set in cloth, desire adheres to its object of observation and thus is difficult to separate from it.

Desire is divided into three types: desire of the Desire Realm, desire of the Form Realm, and desire of the Formless Realm. The reason for stating that the function of desire is the generation of suffering is that the root of all suffering is birth, and the main cause of birth in cyclic existence is desire, or attachment.

Anger. Anger is an intention to harm sentient beings, to harm sufferings in one’s own continuum, or to harm phenomena that are sources of suffering (such as thorns). It has the function of causing oneself not to remain in contact with happiness and serves as a basis for misconduct. Through anger, one does not
The Selfless

abide in happiness in this lifetime, and immeasurable suffering is induced in the future.

Pride. Pride depends on the view of the transitory collection as a real I and has the aspect of a puffing up of the mind upon observing one's own wealth, qualities, youth, and so forth. It has the function of serving as a basis for the arising of disrespect and suffering. There are seven types of pride:

1. pride—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one is superior to lower persons
2. excessive pride—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one is superior to equal persons
3. pride beyond pride—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one is greatly superior even to persons who are superior to others
4. pride of thinking I—a puffing up of the mind, observing the appropriated aggregates of mind and body and thinking, 'I'
5. pride of conceit—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one has attained what has not been attained, such as clairvoyance or meditative stabilization
6. pride of slight inferiority—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one is just a little lower than others who are actually greatly superior
7. wrongful pride—a puffing up the mind, thinking that one has attained auspicious qualities when one has actually deviated from the path, such as claiming high attainments when one has actually been carried away by a spirit.

Because pride causes disrespect for high qualities and for those who possess high qualities, it serves to obstruct the new attainment of doctrines of verbalization and realization, to cause rebirth in bad migrations, and, even when reborn as a human, to cause birth in a low class, such as a servant. Thus, it produces the unwanted in both this and later lives.

Ignorance. Ignorance is an absence of knowledge that involves obscurcation with respect to the status of phenomena. It has the
function of serving as a basis for the arising of false ascertain-
ment, doubt, and afflictions. Its principal antidote is the wisdom
cognizing selflessness.

Ignorance is of two types: obscuration with respect to actions
and their effects and obscuration with respect to suchness. The
latter serves as the causal motivation for all rebirth in cyclic exist-
ence, but in terms of operational motivation at the time of
actions, obscuration with respect to actions and their effects is
specified as the cause of accumulating actions that result in birth
in bad migrations whereas obscuration with respect to suchness
is specified as the cause of accumulating actions that result in
birth in happy migrations.

In dependence on ignorance, the other afflictions arise, and in
dependence on them contaminated actions are accumulated.
From those, all sufferings in cyclic existence are produced. There-
fore, all afflictions and faults arise in dependence on ignorance.

Doubt. Doubt is a two-pointedness of mind with respect to the
four noble truths, actions and their effects, and so forth. It has
the function of serving as a basis for non-engagement in virtues.
Doubt obstructs all virtuous activities and especially interferes
with seeing the truth.

Afflicted views. There are five afflicted views: (see Chart 27).

View of the transitory collection. A view of the transitory
collection observes the appropriated mental and physical aggre-
gates and conceives them to be a real I and mine. It is an endur-
ance in the sense of not fearing the mistakenness of inherently
existent I and mine; a desire in the sense of seeking a mistaken
object; an intelligence in the sense of thoroughly discriminating
its object; a conception in the sense of adhering strongly to its
object; and a view in the sense of observing its object. A view of
the transitory has the function of serving as a basis for all bad
views.

It is called the view of the transitory collection because the
mental and physical aggregates, which are the base of the view,
Chart 27: Divisions of Afflicted Views

- view of the transitory collection (as real I and mine)
  - satkayadršhti
  - 'jig tshogs la lta ba
- view holding to an extreme
  - antagraham드ṛśli
  - mthar 'dzin pa'i lta ba
- conception of a (bad) view as supreme
  - drśhiparamarsha
  - lta ba mchog 'dzin
- conception of (bad) ethics and modes of conduct as supreme
  - shīlavrataparamarsha
  - tshul khrims dang brtul zhugs mchog 'dzin
- perverse view
  - mithyadršhti
  - log lta

are impermanent, and thus transitory, and are a composite of the plural, and thus a collection. The name itself indicates that there is no permanent and partless person. (See p. 176 for its divisions.)

A view of the transitory collection conceives of an inherently existent I and exaggerates the distinction between self and other. Thereupon, desire for one’s own side and hatred for others arises. Through viewing the self, pride is generated, a view of the self as eternal or as annihilated at death arises, and the conception of one’s own bad behavior as superior is generated. Similarly, teachers of selflessness and their teachings of cause and effect, the four noble truths, the Three Jewels, and so forth are conceived to become objects of doubt. In this way, the view of the transitory collection acts as the basis of all afflictions. Although usually identified as ignorance, in this context its relation to ignorance is like the relation of a mind conceiving the presence of a snake to the dimness surrounding a rope in a dark area.
**View holding to an extreme.** A view holding to an extreme observes the self as apprehended by the view of the transitory collection and conceives it to be either permanent in the sense of unchanging or annihilated in the sense of not transmigrating to another lifetime. Since it causes descent to the extremes of permanence and annihilation, it has the function of obstructing progress on the middle way free from the two extremes. As above, it is an endurance, desire, intelligence, conception, and view.

**Conception of a (bad) view as supreme.** A conception of a (bad) view to be supreme observes a view of the transitory collection, a view holding to an extreme, a perverse view, or the mental and physical aggregates in dependence on which these views arise and conceives such (1) to be supreme in the sense of claiming it to be perfect, (2) to be chief in the sense of holding that there is nothing greater, (3) to be superior, or (4) to be ultimate in the sense of holding that it has no equal. A conception of a (bad) view to be supreme has the function of serving as a basis for adhering strongly to bad views in that it establishes predispositions for not separating from them in this and future lives. As above, it is an endurance, desire, intelligence, conception, and view.

**Conception of (bad) ethics and modes of conduct as supreme.** A conception of (bad) ethics and modes of conduct to be supreme takes as its object (1) a faulty system of ethics that is intended to abandon faulty ethics, (2) a faulty mode of conduct that prescribes dress, behavior and physical and verbal activities, or (3) the mental and physical aggregates in dependence on which these are performed. It considers these to purify sins, liberate from afflictions, and release from cyclic existence. It has the function of serving as a basis for fruitless fatigue. As above, it is an endurance, desire, intelligence, conception, and view.

**Perverse view.** A perverse view is a denial of cause, effect, functionality, and existent phenomena and can involve holding that Ishvara and so forth are the cause of beings migrating in cyclic existence. Denial of cause is a view that good and bad
behavior and so forth do not exist. Denial of effect is a view that fruitions of virtuous and sinful actions do not exist. Denial of functionality is a view that former and later lives and so forth do not exist. Denial of existent phenomena is a view that, for example, attainment of the state of a Foe Destroyer does not exist.

Perverse views have the function of severing virtuous roots, causing tight adherence to non-virtuous roots, serving as a basis for engaging in non-virtue, and causing non-engagement in virtue. Since denial of cause, effect, and rebirth sever all virtuous roots, these are the worst among all perverse views.

Secondary afflictions. The twenty secondary afflictions, which are so called because they are close to or portions of the root afflictions, are shown in Chan 28.

**Belligerence.** Belligerence is an intention to harm another through striking and so forth when one is in any of the nine situations of harmful intent, thinking:

1 'This person has harmed me.'
2 'This person is harming me.'
3 'This person will harm me.'
4 'This person has harmed my friend.'
5 'This person is harming my friend.'
6 'This person will harm my friend.'
7 'This person has helped my enemy.'
8 'This person is helping my enemy.'
9 'This person will help my enemy.'

Belligerence has the function of serving as a basis for bearing weapons, punishing, and preparing to injure others. It differs from the root affliction anger in that anger is an impatience and intent to harm that arises when a harmful sentient being, or one’s own suffering, or sources of suffering appear to the mind. Belligerence is an extremely disturbed state of mind which, upon a great increase of anger, is a wish to inflict harm on another such as by physically striking that person when he is in one’s presence.
Meditation on Emptiness

Chart 28: Divisions of Secondary Afflictions

- belligerence, krodha, khro ba
- resentment, upanāha, 'khon 'dzin
- concealment, mrakṣa, 'chab pa
- spite, pradāsha, 'tshig pa
- jealousy, irshyā, phrag dog
- miserliness, mātsarya, ser sna
- deceit, maya, sgyu
- dissimulation, shāthya, g.yo
- haughtiness, mada, rgyags pa
- harmfulness, vihimsa, rnam par 'tshe ba
- non-shame, āhrīkya, ngo tsha med pa
- non-embarrassment, anapatrāpya, khrel med pa
- lethargy, styāna, rmugs pa
- excitement, auddhatya, rgod pa
- non-faith, āshraddhya, ma dad pa
- laziness, kausīdyā, le lo
- non-conscientiousness, pramāda, bag med pa
- forgetfulness, mushitasmrītā, brjed nges pa
- non-introspection, asamprajānya, shes bzhin ma yin pa
- distraction, vikṣhepa, rnam par g.yeng ba
Resentment. Resentment is a wish to harm or to answer harm, involving non-release of a continuum of anger. It has the function of serving as a basis for impatience.

Concealment. Concealment is a wish, through the force of ignorance, to hide a fault when another person, such as a spiritual guide, points out that fault. It has the function of increasing faults, of serving as a basis for contrition and not abiding in contact with happiness, and of impelling rebirth in bad migrations.

Spite. Spite is a wish, through the force of belligerence and resentment, to speak harsh words out of ill-will to another who has pointed out a fault. It has the function of causing one not to abide in happiness in this lifetime by causing engagement in many faulty actions, such as speaking harsh words, and by generating many non-meritorious actions. Spite also generates unpleasant fruitions in future lives.

Jealousy. Jealousy is a disturbance of the mind from the depths that involves an inability to bear another's fortune due to being attached to goods and services. It involves hatred and has the function of causing discomfort of mind and not abiding in contact with happiness.

Miserliness. Miserliness is a tight holding onto articles without letting them go through the power of attachment to goods and services. It has the function of serving as a basis for the non-diminishment of possessions, and it generates the unwanted in this and later lives.

Deceit. Deceit is a pretension of having good qualities, whereas one does not, through the force of strong attachment to goods and services. As in the case of the hypocrisy of pretending to have a disciplined mind in order to deceive others, deceit can involve ignorance and desire and has the function of serving as a basis for wrong livelihood. 'Wrong livelihood' refers to deceitfully gaining goods
(1) through hypocrisy, (2) through speaking soft words in accordance with another's thought, (3) through praising others' possessions, (4) through speaking on the faults of miserliness and so forth, and (5) through praising another's act of giving and so forth.

Dissimulation. Dissimulation is a wish to hide one's faults from others through the force of desire for goods and services. Both dissimulation and deceit have the function of preventing the attainment of true preceptual instruction and cause one in this and future lifetimes not to meet with a Mahayana spiritual guide.

Haughtiness. Haughtiness is a puffing up of the mind through taking joy and comfort in observing one's own good health, youth, beauty, power, signs of long life, prosperity, and so forth. It has the function of serving as a basis for all afflictions and secondary afflictions and acts as a root of non-conscientiousness.

Harmfulness. Harmfulness is an unmerciful wish to harm other sentient beings. Involving anger, it is a lack of compassion as in wanting to harm or to cause others to harm, or in taking delight when seeing or hearing of harm to sentient beings. It has the function of injuring others.

Non-shame. Non-shame is a non-avoidance of faults from the viewpoint of one's own disapproval or of religious prohibition. It can involve desire, hatred, and ignorance and has the function of assisting all root afflictions and secondary afflictions. For example, if a monk, when encountering an intoxicant, did not avoid drinking it, thinking, 'This is something I should not do,' he would have the mental factor of non-shame.

Non-embarrassment. Non-embarrassment is non-avoidance of faults from the viewpoint of another's disapproval. It can involve desire, hatred, and ignorance and has the function of assisting all root afflictions and secondary afflictions. If one does
not avoid faults thinking that the Teacher Buddha and clairvoyant gods would be disturbed and others would criticize oneself, one would have non-embarrassment. It and non-shame assist all afflictions and act as causes of all faults, for without a wish to avoid faults, one cannot keep from them. Thus, these two mental factors are said to accompany all non-virtuous minds.

**Lethargy.** Lethargy is a heaviness and unserviceability of body and mind. It involves ignorance and has the function of assisting all root and secondary afflictions, for in dependence on lethargy these increase.

**Excitement.** Excitement is a scattering of the mind to attributes of the Desire Realm experienced previously and an engagement in them with attachment. Excitement is a non-peacefulness of mind that involves desirous engagement in the pleasant; it has the function of preventing calm abiding. Thus, all scatterings of the mind are not instances of excitement since excitement is a portion of desire whereas the mind is frequently distracted to objects by way of afflictions other than desire and even scatters to virtuous objects of observation. Scattering involving desire is both scattering and excitement whereas other instances are just scattering.

**Non-faith.** Non-faith is non-conviction, non-delight, and non-wishing with respect to virtuous phenomena. It involves ignorance and has the function of serving as a basis for laziness. Non-faith is the opposite of the three types of faith; it is non-conviction in actions and their effects, etc., non-delight and dislike of the possessors of auspicious qualities such as the Three Jewels, and non-wishing or non-seeking of liberation and so forth.

**Laziness.** Laziness is a non-delight in virtue due to attachment to lying down and so forth. It involves ignorance and has the function of preventing application in virtue. (See p.71.)

**Non-conscientiousness.** Non-conscientiousness causes a looseness of mind, not keeping it from afflictions and faults and
resulting in non-cultivation of virtuous phenomena. It can involve an abiding in desire, hatred, and ignorance as well as laziness and has the function of serving as a basis for the increase of non-virtues and decrease of virtues.

*Forgetfulness.* Forgetfulness is an unclarity of mind and a forgetting of virtuous objects through mindfulness of objects of the afflictions. It has the function of serving as a basis for distraction in that, based on afflicted mindfulness, the mind is distracted to the objects of observation of the afflictions.

*Non-introspection.* Non-introspection is an unknowing engagement in physical, verbal, and mental deeds. It has the function of serving as a basis for the infractions of codes of ethics.

*Distraction.* Distraction is a scattering of the mind from its object of observation. It can involve desire, hatred, and ignorance and has the function of preventing separation from desire. Excitement is a scattering of the mind to pleasant objects whereas distraction is a scattering to any object.

*Changeable mental factors.* The four changeable mental factors are so called because they become virtuous, non-virtuous, or neutral by the power of the motivation and the minds accompanying them. They are shown in Chart 29.

*Sleep.* Sleep is a powerless withdrawal inside of the engagement by sense consciousnesses in objects. It depends on causes such as heaviness of body, weakness, fatigue, taking the figure of darkness to mind, and so forth. Sleep involves ignorance and has the function of serving as a basis for losing virtuous activities. The proper time for sleep is the middle watch of the night, not the first or last watches nor during the day. During the middle watch of the night one should sleep with a wish to practice virtue, and not motivated by afflictions. Thus, there are two types of sleep, virtuous and non-virtuous, the latter having the function of degenerating virtuous activities.
Contrition. Contrition is remorse or regret for a deed done by oneself in accordance with one's own thought or upon pressure by someone else which one subsequently comes to dislike. It involves ignorance and has the function of interrupting the stability of the mind. Contrition is of three types:

1. virtuous—remorse for sins done previously
2. non-virtuous—remorse for meritorious actions done previously, such as making donations and then feeling sorry for having depleted one's wealth
3. neutral—remorse for activities that neither helped nor harmed others, such as making a mistake sewing.

Contrition for sins is suitable when their fruition has not yet occurred and they can still be affected by confession and so forth. When the fruition of a sin has already occurred, such as in having been born blind, contrition can no longer overcome the effect of the deed.

Investigation and analysis. Investigation is an inquiry into the rough entities of objects as well as their names whereas analysis is a fine discrimination of these. In dependence on their objects,
investigation and analysis are of three types, virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral. The virtuous, such as analyzing selflessness with an intention to emerge from cyclic existence, has the function of serving as a basis for abiding in contact with happiness in that it generates pleasant effects. Non-virtuous investigation and analysis, such as inquiring into pleasant and unpleasant objects motivated by desire and hatred, has the function of serving as a basis for not abiding in happiness in that it generates unpleasant effects. Investigation and analysis into crafts, styles, and so forth without a virtuous or non-virtuous attitude are neutral. (For another way of presenting consciousness see Appendix 1.)

*Non-associated compositional factors*

*Source*

Gon-chok-デン-bay-dron-may’s *Beginnings of Annotations on (Dzong-ka-ba’s) ‘Essence of the Good Explanations’*

The final division of impermanent phenomena is comprised of compositional factors which are neither form nor consciousness. They are called compositional factors because of being factors that allow for the aggregation of causes and conditions and for the production, abiding, and cessation of products. They are called ‘non-associated’ because, unlike minds, they are not associated with minds or mental factors. Non-associated compositional factors are divided into two types:

**Chart 30:** *Divisions of Non-Associated Compositional Factors*

```
non-associated compositional factor
  person
    pudgala, gang zag
  non-person compositional factor
    apudgalaviprayuktasamskara
    gang zag ma yin pa’i ldan min ’du byed
```

A person is a non-associated compositional factor because of being designated in dependence upon a collection of form and consciousness. Since a person is neither form nor consciousness but impermanent, it can be only an instance of the remaining category
of impermanent phenomena, a non-associated compositional factor.

Non-person non-associated compositional factors are of twenty-three types (see Chart 31). These twenty-three are called 'designations to states'. 'Acquisition' is designated to a state of the increase and decrease of virtues and so forth, of which there are two types: 'finding acquisition' which is a new attainment of such increase or decrease and 'possessive acquisition' which is the retention of it.

'Absorption without discrimination' is designated to a state involving a lack of the coarse feelings and discriminations associated with the third concentration and below. It is produced in dependence on the fourth concentration by common beings only. 'Absorption of cessation' is designated to a state achieved only by Superiors in which there is a lack of the coarse feelings and discriminations associated with the peak of cyclic existence (the highest formless level) and below. 'One having no discrimination' is designated to the state of a person born among the gods in the condition of being without coarse feelings and discriminations.

'Life faculty' or 'life' is designated to the state of living; it is the base of consciousness and warmth. 'Similarity of type' is designated to the state or condition of likeness. 'Birth' (or 'production'), 'aging', 'duration', and 'impermanence' are designated to states of the characteristics of things. 'Group of stems', 'group of words', and 'group of letters' are designated to various states of verbal conventions. Stems are bare names without case endings, etc., whereas words are stems with case endings, etc.

'State of an ordinary being' is designated to one who has not attained the qualities of Superiors. (The Vaibhāshikas substitute non-acquisition for this category and do not assert the remaining nine, limiting their presentation of non-associated compositional factors to fourteen.) 'Continuity' is designated to the non-interrupted state of a continuum of causes and effects. 'Distinction' is of three types: distinction of the particular and the general, distinction of virtues and sins and pleasures and pains, and distinction of causes and effects. 'Relatedness' is of three
Chart 31: Divisions of Non-Person Non-Associated Compositional Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Person Non-Associated Compositional Factor</th>
<th>Non-Person Non-Associated Compositional Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>acquisition; prapti, 'thob pa</td>
<td>absorption without discrimination;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absorption without discrimination;</td>
<td>asamjnisamapatti, 'du shes med pa'i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absorption without discrimination;</td>
<td>snyoms 'jug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absorption of cessation;</td>
<td>nirodhasamapatti, 'gog pa'i snyoms 'jug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one having no discrimination; asamjnika,</td>
<td>'du shes med pa pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one having no discrimination; asamjnika,</td>
<td>'du shes med pa pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>life faculty; jivitendriya, srog gi dbang po</td>
<td>similarity of type; nikayasabhagata, rigs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>similarity of type; nikayasabhagata, rigs</td>
<td>'thun pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>birth; jati, skye ba</td>
<td>aging; jara, rga ba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aging; jara, rga ba</td>
<td>duration; sthiti, gnas pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>duration; sthiti, gnas pa</td>
<td>impermanence; anityata, mi rtag pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impermanence; anityata, mi rtag pa</td>
<td>group of stems; namakāya, ming gi tshogs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group of stems; namakāya, ming gi tshogs</td>
<td>group of words; padakāya, tshig gi tshogs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group of words; padakāya, tshig gi tshogs</td>
<td>group of letters; vyānjanakāya, yi ge'i tshogs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group of letters; vyānjanakāya, yi ge'i tshogs</td>
<td>state of an ordinary being; prthagjanatva,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state of an ordinary being; prthagjanatva,</td>
<td>so so skye bo nyid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continuity; pravritti, 'jug pa</td>
<td>distinction; pratiniyama, so sor nges pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distinction; pratiniyama, so sor nges pa</td>
<td>relatedness; yoga, 'byor 'grel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relatedness; yoga, 'byor 'grel</td>
<td>rapidity; java, 'gyogs pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rapidity; java, 'gyogs pa</td>
<td>order; anukrama, go rim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>order; anukrama, go rim</td>
<td>time; kāla, dus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time; kāla, dus</td>
<td>area; desha, yul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area; desha, yul</td>
<td>number; samkhya, grangs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number; samkhya, grangs</td>
<td>collection; samagrī, tshogs pa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
types: ‘means’ which is the collection of, for instance, an artisan’s tools, ‘aggregation’ which is a collection of causes but specifically their reliance on each other within the collection, and ‘suitability’ which is each thing’s having its own function.

‘Rapidity’ is designated to a condition of the arising of effects immediately after their causes and to the speed caused by persons, magical emanations, and so forth. ‘Order’ is designated to a serial state of former and later, high and low, and so forth. ‘Time’ is designated to states of the past, present, and future. ‘Area’ is designated to the composite of a place and the persons therein. ‘Number’ is designated to a condition of measure. ‘Collection’ is designated to the state of a complete collection of causes, and specifically to that completeness.

AGGREGATES, CONSTITUENTS, AND SOURCES

Sources
Kensur Lekden’s oral teachings
Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Tenets

Another way of dividing all impermanent things is into the five aggregates, or, more literally, ‘heaps’ or ‘piles’ (skandha, phung po). These five are:

Chart 32: The Five Aggregates

- forms (rupa, gzugs)
- feelings (vedana, tshor ba)
- discriminations (samjñā, 'du shes)
- compositional factors (samskāra, 'du byed)
- consciousnesses (vijñāna, rnam shes)

The heaps are so called because when Buddha taught them he heaped up various grains—rice and so forth—into five piles, to represent the categories of impermanent phenomena. These heaps are defined as aggregates of phenomena, and, therefore, ‘aggregate’ is often used here as the translation equivalent.
The eleven types of forms and all their instances constitute the first aggregate, 'forms'. The three types of the mental factor 'feeling'—pleasure, pain, and neutrality—and all their instances constitute the second aggregate, 'feelings'. The mental factor of discrimination and all its instances constitute the third heap, 'discriminations'. Non-associated compositional factors and the remaining forty-nine mental factors as well as all their instances constitute the fourth aggregate, 'compositional factors'. The six main minds and all their instances constitute the fifth aggregate, 'consciousnesses'. The person is imputed in dependence upon these aggregates of impermanent phenomena and is unfindable either separate from or among them.

All impermanent phenomena not only of the personal continuum but also of the external world are included in these five. However, the emptiness of the mind, a permanent phenomenon included within the personal continuum, is not counted among the five aggregates because the five aggregates are exclusively impermanent. Thus, all phenomena of the personal continuum are not included in the five aggregates, only the impermanent.

The last four aggregates are mental phenomena and the first is physical; thus, the five are the 'mental and physical aggregates'. Each instance of the five is also called an 'aggregate' because, for instance, a table itself is an aggregate of particles and a consciousness is a continuum of moments. A single particle and a single moment of consciousness are also called a form aggregate and a consciousness aggregate not because they are aggregates of particles or moments but merely from the point of view of designating a part—for example, an instance of a form aggregate—with the name of the whole—'form aggregate'. This mode of appellation in which every instance of an aggregate is itself called an aggregate accords with the relationship between a generality and its instances. If the generality is 'form aggregate', each of its instances must be a form aggregate. To be an instance of a generality (such as pot), a phenomenon (such as a gold pot) must be the same entity as the generality, the phenomenon must be it (a pot), and there must be other instances.
All phenomena, both permanent and impermanent, can be divided into the eighteen constituents (dhatu, khams), which are so called because they give rise to phenomena of similar type. These are the six objects, the six sense powers, and the six consciousnesses, every instance of which is called a constituent:

Chart 33: The Eighteen Constituents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>object</th>
<th>sense power</th>
<th>consciousness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>form</td>
<td>eye sense power</td>
<td>eye consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sound</td>
<td>ear sense power</td>
<td>ear consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>odor</td>
<td>nose sense power</td>
<td>nose consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taste</td>
<td>tongue sense power</td>
<td>tongue consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tangible object</td>
<td>body sense power</td>
<td>body consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phenomenon</td>
<td>mind sense power</td>
<td>mental consciousness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'Phenomenon', the sixth category of objects, refers to other phenomena, those that are not sense objects but are objects only of the mental consciousness, such as impermanence and emptiness. Since sense objects are also objects of a mental consciousness, the category 'phenomena' does not include all objects of a mental consciousness—just its exclusive objects among which mental factors and permanent phenomena, such as space, are included.

Since each of a Buddha's six consciousnesses cognizes all phenomena, this list does not apply to Buddhas. However, the ability of a Buddha to cognize all objects with any consciousness does not imply that there is only one mind which is merely designated with the names of the six consciousnesses when it arrives at the various organs and experiences their respective objects. The cross-functionality of a Buddha's consciousnesses is an extraordinary quality and does not affect the presentation of the consciousnesses and objects of non-Buddhas.

The eighteen constituents include all phenomena, both permanent and impermanent, due to the inclusion of all permanent phenomena in the category 'phenomenon'. These eighteen can be reduced to the twelve sources (ayatana, skye mched) through eliminating the six consciousnesses, yet still contain all phenomena because the six consciousnesses are still included in
the category 'mind sense power'. The mind sense power is a previous moment of any of the six consciousnesses which acts as the base of a mental consciousness much as a physical sense power acts as the base of a sense consciousness.

The twelve sources are so called because they open the way for the production of the six consciousnesses. They are the six objects and the six sense powers:

Chart 34: The Twelve Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>object</th>
<th>sense power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>form</td>
<td>eye sense power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sound</td>
<td>ear sense power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>odor</td>
<td>nose sense power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taste</td>
<td>tongue sense power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tangible object</td>
<td>body sense power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phenomenon</td>
<td>mind sense power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Teachers repeatedly enumerate the twelve sources or the eighteen constituents in order to emphasize a sense of the multiplicity of phenomena that are the bases of imputing or designating a person. The tables are memorized, with students not only repeating the names but causing the phenomena to appear to their minds. This practice helps greatly to crowd out the sense of self and prepare the way for a recognition of the imputed nature of the person. Then, one can proceed to investigate the imputed nature of these phenomena themselves.
2 Dependent-Arising of Cyclic Existence

Sources
Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path
Geshe Lhundup Sopa's oral teachings
Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba's General Meaning of (Maitreya's) 'Ornament for Clear Realization'
Den-ba-dar-gyay's Analysis of Dependent-Arising

The last twelve of the fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class are the twelve members of the dependent-arising of cyclic existence. These twelve are to be viewed as faulty because they obstruct the path to liberation. They are:

1. ignorance (avidya, ma rig pa)
2. action (samskarakarma, 'du byed kyi las)
3. consciousness (vijñana, mam shes)
   a. cause consciousness
   b. effect consciousness
4. name and form (namariipa, minggzugs)
5. six sources (shadayatana, skye mched drug)
6. contact (sparsha, reg pa)
Ignorance does not just mean non-knowledge; it is also a consciousness that conceives the opposite of correct knowledge. Ignorance here is a misconception of oneself as inherently existent and of phenomena included in one's own continuum as being objects controlled by an inherently existent I. Ignorance views the nominally existent I, which is merely designated in dependence upon the mental and physical aggregates, as an inherently existent self and views the aggregates themselves as under the control of this self. Thus, its principal antidote is knowledge of the true nature of the I as empty of inherent existence.

Ignorance can also refer to obscuration with respect to the coarse relationships of actions and their effects, as in the case of ignorantly making sacrifices in order to gain liberation, but as the first of the twelve members of dependent-arising, it is necessarily a conception of a self of persons that gives rise to the later members.

In a particular round of dependent-arising, the first member applies only to the period of obscuration or misconception which in a previous life served as the motivator of one particular action. This single complete action, the second member of the twelve, is called a path of action because it serves as a path to rebirth in a bad migration (hell-being, hungry ghost, or animal) or a happy migration (human, demi-god, or god). For an action to be a complete path of action it must have its necessary members: an intention (such as the wish to kill someone), thought which identifies the object properly, preparation for the accomplishment of the action, successful conclusion, and non-reversal of intention before the action is completed. This complete action establishes a potency on the 'cause consciousness' or the consciousness at the time of the action, the first half of the third member.
Action as the second member usually refers only to one meritorious or non-meritorious contaminated action in a former life, either in the life immediately preceding this life or in any other former life. Based on ignorance with respect to the nature of the person, a path of action leading to a happy migration is accumulated. Based also on ignorance with respect to actions and their effects, a path of action leading to a bad migration is accumulated. The former is a meritorious action projecting or impelling rebirth as a human or god of the Desire Realm, and the latter is a non-meritorious action projecting rebirth in a bad migration as an animal, hungry ghost, or hell-being. Based on ignorance with respect to the nature of the person, an action of meditative stabilization projects, or provides the power for, a happy migration in a Form or Formless Realm; it is a meritorious action which is called 'unmoving' because its effect can reach fruition only in the type of life and level for which it was projected, this corresponding to the type of meditative stabilization. An example of an unmoving action is a deed of meditative absorption in the first concentration that projects an effect included within the first level of the Form Realm and which will only ripen in the first level of the Form Realm. An example of a moving action is a deed such as murder that projects an effect included within a bad migration but which might not actually ripen in a bad migration, reaching fruition in a human life as a form of human suffering. Thus, meritorious and non-meritorious actions are 'moving' actions because their projected effects and actualized effects are not necessarily of the same type of life and level even though they may be the same.

Dependent on the motivational ignorance that precedes and gives rise to them, virtuous actions and actions of meditative absorption lead to rebirth in cyclic existence, albeit in a favorable situation. Pa-bong-ka's commentary on Dzong-ka-ba's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* says, 'The second member, action, is the performance of an activity, motivated by ignorance, which produces the mental and physical aggregates of a rebirth. It is like doing work.' The first half of the third member, 'cause consciousness', refers only to the moment when the
potency of the action 'stains' the consciousness which exists at the time the action is completed.

The first two and a half members, ignorance, action, and cause consciousness, are causes projecting a future birth (see Chart 35); they are, therefore, called a 'future dependent-arising'. What they project are the next four and a half members, effect consciousness, name and form, sources, contact, and feeling. The first of these, 'effect consciousness', refers only to the moment of the mental consciousness just after bridging the gap from the previous life to the new life, which in womb-birth is the first moment in the womb. Then, with the next moment, name and form apply. 'Name' refers to the four non-form aggregates—feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses—and 'form' refers to the aggregate of forms.

A being in the intermediate state between lives has all six consciousnesses as well as at least the five omnipresent mental factors, including feeling and discrimination. Together with the mind are potencies, established by countless actions, in a dormant state; these are instances of compositional factors, and thus all four non-form aggregates are present during the intermediate state. Also, a being in the intermediate state has a subtle physical body which is called an 'unobstructed body' because it can pass through walls, mountains, and so forth; thus, the form aggregate is also present during transmigration.

Name and form, as the fourth member of dependent-arising, refer to the five aggregates of the new life immediately after conception. At that point there are mental and body consciousnesses. 'Form' refers to the roundish shape (embryo), oblong shape (the lengthening embryo), and so forth. (In the Formless Realm 'form' refers only to the dormant seeds of form, which are neither form nor consciousness.)

The six sources are the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental sense powers. Through the development of the form aggregate which at that time is the embryo (the semen of the father and the blood of the mother penetrated by the consciousness) and the four 'name' aggregates (feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses) the remaining four of
Chart 35: Buddha’s Explicit Teaching in the ‘Rice Seedling Sutra’ of One Round of a Twelve-Membered Dependent-Arising

Life A -
1. ignorance  
2. action  
3. consciousness  
   a. cause consciousness

   b. effect consciousness
4. name and form  
5. sources  
6. contact  
7. feeling  
8. attachment  
9. grasping  
10. existence

Life B -
11. birth  
12. aging and death

Life C -

- projecting causes
- projected effects
- actualizing causes
- actualized effects

Life A precedes life B at any time, and life B precedes life C with no interval.

The six sources—eye, ear, nose, and tongue sense powers—come into being. (The body and mental sense powers exist from the first moment of the embryo.) If the birth is spontaneous as in a hell or heaven, the sense powers all come into being with the inception of the new life, unlike the serial development as in birth from a womb, from an egg, or from heat and moisture.

The term ‘sources’ as the fifth member of dependent-arising refers to a specific five moments in the development of a life in cyclic existence; the first is the achievement of the sense powers of mind and body, and the second through fifth occur at the production of the other four sense powers which depend on the gradual development of name and form. Therefore, ‘sources’ are identified as only the six sense powers, excluding the six objects (see p.274). The six objects or external sources are ever present and need not be produced in dependence on name and form.
because the embryo has color and shape, sound (for example, if hit), odor, taste, softness and so forth as tangible objects, and impermanence.

The sixth member, contact, arises from the aggregation of object, sense power, and consciousness and has the function of distinguishing objects as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. 'Aggregation' refers not to a simultaneous collection, but to the production of a consciousness by a sense power and an object.

The seventh member, feeling, is comprised of feelings of pleasure, pain, or neutrality in accordance with the discrimination by contact. Since feeling is divided into six types from the viewpoint of the six types of contact produced by the six sources, it involves a serial production in accordance with the production of each source. However, 'feeling' refers not just to the first moment of each of the six types of feeling but also to moments of feeling throughout the life that serve as the objects of the next member, attachment.

In sum, effect consciousness, name and form, sources, contact, and feeling are effects projected by ignorance, action, and cause consciousness in the sense that the latter make them suitable for actualization. An action that depends on ignorance projects these through staining a potency on the cause consciousness. This potency of a particular type of life is similar to the outline of a picture, the details of which are provided by other deeds, called completing actions.

The potency is actualized by attachment, grasping, and existence. The eighth member, attachment, is desire not to separate from a feeling of pleasure, to separate from a feeling of pain, and for a non-diminishment of neutral feeling. The ninth member, grasping, an increase of attachment, is of four types:

1 desirous grasping—desire involving strong attachment to the Desire Realm attributes of pleasant forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects
2 grasping for views—desire involving aspiration to bad views, not including the view of the transitory collection of mind and body as real I and mine
3 grasping for ethics and modes of conduct—desire involving
strong attachment to bad ethics and bad modes of conduct which are associated with bad views

4 grasping for a self—desire involving strong attachment to the pride of selfhood and the view of the mental and physical aggregates which have the nature of transitoriness and of an aggregation as real I and mine.

Attachment and grasping nourish or actualize the particular potency that is the projecting cause of the next life and thus can occur at any time during the life. However, since such moments of attachment and grasping are most efficacious near the time of death, attachment and grasping here for the most part refer to instances near the time of death.

The tenth member, existence, is a case of giving the name of the effect to the cause. For it is the potency established by the second member, action, when it has been thoroughly nourished by attachment and grasping and has become empowered to develop into the next life. Since 'existence' occurs at the moment just preceding the new existence or life which is its effect, calling the tenth member 'existence' is a designation of it with the name of its effect.

Attachment, grasping, and existence are causes that actualize the potency projected by ignorance, action, and cause consciousness. The actualizer is grasping, which is caused by attachment, and birth and aging and death are what are actualized. Through grasping, the potency previously established in the consciousness by an action is fully empowered, this state being called 'existence'.

Among the twelve members, ignorance, action, and cause consciousness take place in a former life. Effect consciousness, name and form, sources, contact, feeling, attachment, grasping, and existence occur in the present life. Birth and aging and death occur in the future life. For the production of this life only ignorance, action and cause consciousness are explicitly presented; for the production of the future life only attachment, grasping, and existence are explicitly presented. However, each birth has both the three projecting causes and the three actualizing causes. Particular causes are emphasized for each of the two births
Meditation on Emptiness

for the sake of pointing out the existence of all of them for all births.

The actualized effects are birth, that is, the five mental and physical aggregates just after transmigrating to the new life, and aging and death. Aging refers to the process of change beginning from the second moment of the new life and applying through to death. Death is the cessation of the continuum of a similar type of mental and physical aggregates. Aging and death are put as one member because there are cases of death immediately after rebirth, without aging.

In this way one round of the twelve members of dependent-arising is completed in three lifetimes. The effect consciousness, name and form, sources, contact, feeling, attachment, grasping, and existence of this lifetime are not in the same round of dependent-arising as the birth and aging and death of this lifetime. The birth and aging and death of this lifetime are the result of the actualizing members of the last lifetime. In this way, two rounds of dependent-arising are occurring simultaneously. Similarly, actions motivated by ignorance in this lifetime are each beginning other new rounds of dependent-arising. (For other presentations, see Appendix 2.)

A benefit of contemplating dependent-arising is the creation of a sense of distress. Through understanding that a life is created by nourishment—through attachment and grasping—of a potency established by an action that is motivated by ignorance, one can thereby infer the existence of past and future lives. Through this, one sees that innumerable potencies have been established in the mind and are ready for actualization. The impermanence and precariousness of this life is obvious, and the conditions for empowering another potency to create a new life that might be very miserable are ever-present. Similar to a person who knows that calamity is about to befall him, one will, upon understanding one's position, seek with great effort to extricate oneself from such a situation. The afflictions that give rise to the rounds of dependent-arising will be identified as enemies, and one will seek the means of overcoming them.

After a practitioner identifies the misery in his own continuum,
he knows through inferential extension that other sentient beings are suffering the same miseries. Just as he wishes to free himself from misery, so he develops the wish to free all sentient beings due to their closeness over the continuum of lives. In this way compassion is generated, and with it as a motivation, one will seek with great vigor to vanquish ignorance, attachment, and grasping which are now identified as the enemies of all sentient beings. The benefit of the study and realization of dependent-arising is eventually the attainment of Buddhahood.
3 The Four Noble Truths

Sources
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings
Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may's Presentation of the Four Truths
Pan-chen-So-nam-drak-ba's General Meaning of (Maitreya's)
'Ornament for Clear Realization'
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way

Like the two truths, the four noble truths—true sufferings, origins of suffering, cessations, and paths—are objects and not concepts of truth, beauty, and so forth. Unlike the two truths, however, the four noble truths do not include all objects; absent are permanent phenomena, such as spaces and non-analytical cessations, as well as impermanent phenomena such as a Buddha's Enjoyment and Form Bodies or an ordinary being's body in a pure land.

The first truth is true sufferings, which are the mental and physical aggregates produced by contaminated actions and afflictions. They include all instances of mind and body of ordinary beings except those generated by pure wishes, meditation, and
so forth. Even the environments shared by beings in the various cyclic existences are true sufferings because they are created from potencies established by contaminated actions and afflictions. However, the body of an ordinary being born in a pure land is not a true suffering because it is not created by contaminated actions and afflictions but by pure wishes for rebirth in a pure land. A common being's consciousness inferentially realizing impermanence or emptiness is also not a true suffering because it arises from cultivation of the path and is born from meditation, not from the afflictions. Still, a common being's inferential cognizer of emptiness is said to be 'contaminated' (sasrava, zag bcas) because it is polluted with dualistic perception in the sense that its object, emptiness, appears to be inherently existent though it is not being conceived as inherently existent.

Of the two types of true sufferings, internal and external, internal true sufferings are 'cyclic existences' (samsara, 'khor ba) and are included within the three types of suffering. The first is the suffering of misery, or all feelings of physical and mental pain. The second is the suffering of change, or all feelings of pleasure which are contaminated with the misconception of inherent existence. For example, just as the warmth of the sun is pleasant on a cool day but is a source of pain if one stays too long in it, all the pleasures of cyclic existence, if over-extended, become sources of suffering. Furthermore, even if one enjoys the pleasures of cyclic existence in measure, these still are sufferings of change because they are suitable to create suffering if overused. If such were inherently pleasurable, long-term usage would increase the pleasure; however, suffering is eventually induced. Thus, the need for moderation is a sign of their not naturally being pleasurable.

Discouragement with the suffering of misery and of change is not sufficient to induce a fully qualified aspiration for liberation. The third type of suffering, that of composition, is the root and pervader of the other two, and discouragement with it must be sought with particular emphasis. The suffering of composition means simply to be under the outside influence of contaminated
actions and afflictions such that one is ready to suffer pain upon the aggregation of minor causes. The main conditions are always present—when one is in cyclic existence—to undergo considerable suffering upon the sudden aggregation of the remaining causes, such as a change in the environment. Thus, even though one might not have manifest feelings of pain, one is still subject to suffering upon meeting with minor causes. This type of suffering is called 'pervasive' because no matter how one searches among the ordinary body and mind, every instance of it is miserable, either manifestly painful or capable of inducing suffering. It is called 'compositional' because it induces suffering in the future. As Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may says:

Though a prisoner certain to be executed is not punished physically, there is no opportunity for pleasure in his inner mind which realizes the daily approach of death. Similarly, a person carrying a burden, even when resting, does not take much pleasure until reaching the destination.

In this way, a yogi develops discrimination of the phenomena of cyclic existence as unfavorable, like executioners raising swords, and the wish to leave cyclic existence arises. Thereupon, by inferring the plight of others based on one's own, compassion wishing to protect others arises without difficulty. This is the special purpose of Buddha’s setting forth true sufferings first.

The second of the four truths is true origins, the sources of suffering—the afflictions and actions contaminated with the afflictions. Here 'afflictions' specifically are the first member of dependent-arising—ignorance—and the other afflictions that are produced based on ignorance, the remaining five root afflictions and the twenty secondary afflictions (see p.255-66). Actions, as the other source of suffering, refer to the second member of dependent-arising—the meritorious, non-meritorious, and non-moving actions motivated by ignorance that impel rebirth respectively in happy migrations as humans or gods, in bad migrations as hell-beings, hungry ghosts, or animals, or in the Form
and Formless Realms. Afflictions and actions are the causes of suffering even though in general they themselves are true sufferings because they are what give rise to true sufferings. Like illnesses, true sufferings are to be identified, and like the causes of illness, true origins are to be abandoned.

The third of the four truths is true cessations, the extinguishment of true sufferings and origins. These are the individually enumerated cessations that are states of having abandoned obstructions and correspond to the uninterrupted paths causing their attainment. By stages one attains complete deliverance from the various levels of afflictions such that they will never return, culminating in the attainment of nirvana, the emptiness of the mind in the continuum of one who has abandoned all afflictions whatsoever.

The chief affliction is ignorance, and its chieftype is the conception of inherent existence. Therefore, anyone who has attained nirvana, even if he has not attained Buddhahood, has completely destroyed the conception of inherent existence. Foe Destroyers (Arhan, dGra bcompa) are those who have destroyed (han, bcom) their enemy (ari, dgra), the afflictions. All Foe Destroyers—whether Hearers, Solitary Realizers, or Buddhas—have attained a nirvana that is an utter cessation of the afflictions.

Even though true cessations, the ultimate of which are nirvanas, are attained in dependence on a path that eradicates the afflictions, they are said to be permanent phenomena in the sense that since they do not change moment by moment, they are non-disintegrating. However, the true cessations in the continuum of a yogi come into being upon his attainment of the various levels of the paths; thus, there are debates about whether or not true cessations and nirvanas are impermanent phenomena. The answer given is that a true cessation is not an act of cessation but an emptiness of the mind in the continuum of one who has utterly and forever removed at least some portion of the afflictions. All true cessations are emptinesses and thus permanent, but all emptinesses are not true cessations as is the case with the emptiness of inherent existence of the body. Emptinesses, except for
those of the mind in the continuum of persons who have overcome afflictions, are not any of the four noble truths.

The fourth noble truth is true paths, which are the means of attaining true cessations. Just as a state of health is to be attained by the sick and the medicines to attain that state are to be relied upon, so true cessations are to be realized and true paths are to be relied upon. Except for vows which are non-revelatory forms, all true paths are consciousnesses, called paths because they are factors which, through being generated in the mental continuum, take one to liberation from cyclic existence. Here, there are eight paths:179

1 correct view—the opposite of the view of the transitory collection of mind and body as real I and mine, the opposite of the permanent and annihilistic views of the self and the aggregates, the opposite of perverse views such as asserting the absence of cause and effect, the opposite of views conceiving bad ethics and bad disciplines to be superior, and so forth. Thus, a correct view is not necessarily just a consciousness cognizing emptiness though such is included in the term.

2 correct realization—especially the consciousnesses which subtly analyze emptiness

3 correct speech—the vows and so forth which are the contraries of wrong livelihood and so forth

4 correct aims of actions—the actions of body and speech in dependence on vows

5 correct livelihood—the abandonment of wrong modes of livelihood, such as butchering animals

6 correct effort—the mental factor of effort that causes gradual progress on the path

7 correct mindfulness—constant attentiveness to objects of awareness and to modes of perception of those objects necessary for ascending the paths

8 correct meditative stabilization—the meditative ability to remain one-pointedly on the objects of the paths.

The four noble truths are called 'noble' (arya) because they are
taught by Nobles or Superiors (*Aryan, ’Phags pa*) or because they are ennobling.\(^{180}\) They are called truths (*satya, bden pa*) because through meditation on them one unmistakably enters into the paths of liberation and omniscience. Because the teachings that sufferings and their origins are to be abandoned and that cessations and the paths that actualize them are to be adopted are true and thus do not deceive disciples into cultivating false paths, they are truths. However, unlike ultimate truths they do not necessarily exist the way they appear, because except for true cessations, they are falsities in the sense that true sufferings, for instance, appear in direct perception to exist inherently but do not. Therefore, the four noble truths are not just truths for Nobles or Superiors because, if they were, they would have to be truths for the special cognizers of Superiors—their direct perceivers of suchness—whereas when emptiness is directly perceived, conventional truths such as true sufferings do not in any way appear to the mind. Thus, the Prasangikas say that the four noble truths are truths for conventional valid cognizers. For the Vaibhashikas, however, they are truths just for Nobles (Superiors) because they are perceived directly by a Superior’s wisdom of meditative equipoise.

Buddha set forth the four noble truths—true sufferings, origins, cessations, and paths—in the order not of their causation but of their realization. In causal order, true origins—afflictions and actions contaminated with the afflictions—give rise to true sufferings—the phenomena included within the scope of the contaminated mental and physical aggregates—while true paths, such as the realization of emptiness, cause the attainment of true cessations—the state of being freed forever from a certain portion of the afflictions and their consequent sufferings. However, in his presentation of the four noble truths Buddha put the effects before the causes to indicate their application in practical realization.

When one recognizes sufferings as like an illness, one understands that one must become free from them. Then, seeing that abandoning sufferings depends on overcoming their origins, one
generates a wish to abandon these. Having identified the origins of suffering as the afflictions, the chief of which is the ignorance conceiving inherent existence, one realizes that since the conception of inherent existence is baseless, the causes of suffering can be abandoned whereby a wish to actualize cessation is generated. Having seen that sufferings and their origins must and can be abandoned, one engages in the means for abandoning them, true paths. This is said to be the general procedure of intelligent persons and an unparalleled quintessential instruction not just for initial realization but also for initially training the mind. As Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may says:

When we analyze our own mental continuum carefully, we see that beyond a mere verbal image of it, it is extremely difficult to develop an aspiration to liberation from the depths of the heart; rather, we are naturally involved in the causes of suffering—contaminated actions and afflictions. This is because beginninglessly we have mistaken a mind which is under the influence of the afflictions, and thus actually a suffering, to be happiness. For example, when certain types of hidden heat disorders are mistaken to be cold disorders, the antidotes to heat disorders are not taken and one intentionally seeks the diet, behavior, and so forth increasing the heat disorder. Just as to overcome the heat disorder, it is absolutely essential to identify it, so if one does not recognize that which has a nature of suffering as suffering and turn away from it from the depths, there is no way to be led upward through annihilating the root of suffering. In this condition, though one pretended to seek liberation, one would proceed only to error, conceiving some low contaminated state to be it; thus, an actual wish for liberation would not occur. As Aryadeva’s Four Hundred says:

How could one who is not discouraged About this aspire to its pacification?
The four noble truths are objects of extensive meditation, with each truth having four attributes, making a total of sixteen attributes.

1 True sufferings
   i Impermanence. The meditation centers on the thought:

   The contaminated mental and physical aggregates are impermanent because of being produced occasionally (not existing forever).

   The impermanence of true sufferings is their momentary disintegration, which is a fault arising from the afflictions and actions contaminated with the afflictions. However, the impermanence of a Buddha's omniscient consciousness is an advantage of this consciousness and arises from the force of the completion of the accumulations of wisdom and merit. Unlike a Buddha's omniscient consciousness which, though impermanent, continuously remains of the same type, true sufferings change in the process of disintegration, gradually leading one to lower rebirths. Meditation on the impermanence of true sufferings overcomes viewing them as permanent.

   ii Misery. The meditation centers on the thought:

   The contaminated mental and physical aggregates are miserable because of being under the outside influence of contaminated actions and afflictions.

   True sufferings are miserable because they are not independent phenomena but under the outside influence of former afflictions and actions contaminated with the afflictions. The experience of ordinary beings confirms the misery of birth, aging, sickness, and death whereas realization of the suffering of being under an outside influence requires long analysis. Meditation on the misery of true sufferings counters viewing them as pure and pleasurable.

   iii Emptiness. The meditation centers on the thought:
The Four Noble Truths

The contaminated mental and physical aggregates are empty because of being devoid of a supervisory self that is a different entity from them.

True sufferings are empty of being a permanent, single, independent self. The permanent is the non-disintegrating; the single is the partless; and the independent is what does not depend on others for its existence. That true sufferings are empty of being a permanent, single, independent self or of being objects of use of such a self is their emptiness. Meditation on the emptiness of true sufferings overcomes viewing them as a self.

iv Selflessness. The meditation centers on the thought:

The contaminated mental and physical aggregates are selfless because of not existing as an independent self, but being under the influence of many other impermanent factors.

True sufferings are empty of being a self-sufficient person. A self-sufficient person would be a controller of the mental and physical aggregates, like a master over his servants. That true sufferings are empty of being such a self-sufficient person or objects of its use is their selflessness. Meditation on this counters the view of true sufferings as a self-sufficient person or as the objects of use of such a person.

2 True origins

i Cause. The meditation centers on the thought:

Contaminated actions and attachment are causes because of being the roots of suffering.

Meditation on these as causes counters the notion that suffering is causeless, as is asserted by the Hedonists (Charvaka, Tshu rol mdzes pa).

ii Origin. The meditation centers on the thought:

Contaminated actions and attachment are origins because they again and again produce suffering in all its forms.
Meditation on these as origins counters the notion that suffering is caused by just one cause, such as permanent time as is asserted by the Dipakas.

iii *Strong production*. The meditation centers on the thought:

Contaminated actions and attachment are strong producers because they produce suffering with great force.

Meditation on true origins as strong producers counters the notion that the nature of things is permanent but their states changeable, as is asserted by the Vaidakas and the Samkhyas.

iv *Condition*. The meditation centers on the thought:

Contaminated actions and attachment are conditions because attachment to cyclic existence acts as a cooperative condition for suffering.

Meditation on true origins as conditions counters the notion that suffering is created under the supervision of a deity, as is asserted by the Naiyayikas and Vaisheshikas.

3 *True cessations*

i *Cessation*. The meditation centers on the thought:

A separation which is a total extinguishment of a suffering by its antidote is a cessation because of being a state of having abandoned that suffering.

Meditation on true cessations as cessations counters the view that there is no liberation from cyclic existence, as is asserted by the Hedonists.

ii *Pacification*. The meditation centers on the thought:

A separation which is a total extinguishment of a suffering by its antidote is a pacification because of being a state of having abandoned an affliction.

Meditation on true cessations as pacifications of contaminations counters notions conceiving contaminated states to be liberation
as is the case with the Jaina assertion of a place of liberation on top of the worlds that is like an upside-down white umbrella.

iii Auspicious highness. The meditation centers on the thought:

A separation which is a total extinguishment of a suffering by its antidote is auspiciously high because of being a liberation other than which there is no superior source of help and happiness.

Meditation on true cessations as auspiciously high counters the notion that there is a liberation superior to the cessation of suffering, as is the case with the Samkhya assertion of the liberated self as high liberation.

iv Definite emergence. The meditation centers on the thought:

A separation which is a total extinguishment of a suffering by its antidote is a definite emergence because of being a liberation from that suffering such that it will never return.

Meditation on true cessations as definite emergences from suffering counters the notion that liberation, once attained, is reversible.

4 True paths

i Path. The meditation centers on the thought:

The wisdom directly cognizing selflessness is a path because it causes one to proceed to liberation.

Meditation on this as a path counters the notion that there are no paths of liberation from cyclic existence.

ii Suitability. The meditation centers on the thought:

The wisdom directly cognizing selflessness is suitable because of being the antidote to ignorance.

Meditation on the wisdom realizing selflessness as suitable counters the notion that it is not a path of liberation.
iii Achievement. The meditation centers on the thought:

The wisdom directly cognizing selflessness is an achiever because it realizes the nature of the mind unmistakenly.

Meditation on this wisdom as an achiever counters the notion that such paths as worldly concentrations, receiving initiation in a mandala of Ishvara, or undergoing the asceticism of the five fires (one each on the four sides and the sun above as in Jainism) are paths of liberation.

iv Deliverance. The meditation centers on the thought:

The wisdom directly cognizing selflessness is a deliverer because it unquestionably causes one to pass to a state of irreversible liberation, extinguishing sufferings and afflictions completely.

Meditation on wisdom as a deliverer counters the notion that there is no total eradicator of suffering.

COARSE AND SUBTLE SELFLESSNESS

The Vaibhashika sub-schools, except for the five schools advocating a self, say that through direct cognition of the four noble truths and their sixteen attributes Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas reach their respective paths of seeing. Through continuously meditating on them during the path of meditation, they also reach their goals, the states of Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Buddha Foe Destroyers. Dharmakīrti says that the purpose of the first two attributes of true sufferings is to help in the realization of the last two attributes, emptiness and selflessness. Thus, the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning say that paths of seeing and the state of Foe Destroyer are attained through direct cognition of the mental and physical aggregates that lack being a self-sufficient person or lack being the objects of use of self-sufficient persons.

Among the Mahayana schools, the Chittamatrins and Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas say that Hearers and Solitary Realizers take the emptiness that is a person's lack of being...
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self-sufficient as their main object of meditation (see Chart 36).183 The Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas say that only Hearers take the emptiness of a self-sufficient person as their main object of meditation; Solitary Realizers take the emptiness that is the non-existence of subject and object as different entities as their main object of meditation.

The non-Prasangika schools agree that the conception of the person as a self-sufficient entity and the poisons that arise from it are the afflictive obstructions. They are the afflictions obstructing one from liberation from cyclic existence (kleshavarana, nyon sgrīb). All these schools agree that through eradication of the afflictive obstructions, Hearers attain the state of Foe Destroyer. Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Sautrantika-Svatantrika add that Solitary Realizers have the same principal object of meditation, with Vaibhashika and Sautrantika also saying that it is the same for Bodhisattvas.

The Chittamatrins say that Bodhisattvas principally meditate on a non-difference in entity of subject and object, whereas the Svatantrikas say that Bodhisattvas principally meditate on an absence of true existence. These two schools thereby propound that Bodhisattvas rid themselves of subtler obstructions than do Hearers and Solitary Realizers. They remove the obstructions to simultaneous cognition of all phenomena (jneyavarana, shes bya’i sgrīb pa). For Chittamatrins and Svatantrikas, though Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not meditate on the final nature of things, their meditation, despite its coarseness, is still capable of destroying the bonds to cyclic existence.

The Prasangikas disagree; they say that the conception of a self-sufficient person is only a coarse afflictive obstruction and that no one can attain liberation from cyclic existence through eradicating it. However, meditation on the emptiness of a self-sufficient person is indeed helpful for eventual abandonment of the subtle afflictive obstruction, the conception that phenomena truly exist (see Charts 37, 38, and 39). The Prasangikas do not separate out one type from among the coarse and subtle emptinesses as the main object of meditation for Hearers and Solitary Realizers and another for Bodhisattvas. For Prasangika, beings
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on all three types of paths realize the same emptiness, the lack of inherent existence of all phenomena. The conception that phenomena inherently exist obstructs beings from liberation from cyclic existence; without realizing that all phenomena—both persons and other phenomena—do not inherently, truly, or objectively exist, conquest of cyclic existence is impossible.

The destruction of the afflictive obstructions is simultaneous with the attainment of the state of Foe Destroyer for both Hearers and Solitary Realizers and is simultaneous with the attainment of the eighth ground for Bodhisattvas. On the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds Bodhisattvas proceed to destroy the obstructions that prevent simultaneous cognition of all phenomena. Being eighth-grounders or above, they have destroyed the conception that phenomena inherently exist, but due to previous conditioning phenomena still appear as if inherently existent; nevertheless, they know that these appearances are false just as a magician knows that his creations are false, no matter how vividly the illusion may appear. Finally, through the eradication of the appearance of inherent existence, an omniscient consciousness of Buddhahood is attained, and one is able for the first time to perceive objects through the senses with no trace of false appearance. One is then able to cognize simultaneously and directly the emptiness of all phenomena and all phenomena themselves.

A selflessness is an emptiness, to be viewed as a predicate or quality of existent persons and phenomena. These predicates vary from the coarse—or easier to realize—to the subtle—or more difficult to realize. It is said that the non-existence of a permanent, single, independent person is easy to realize through such reasons as the impossibility of a permanent being’s taking rebirth since the permanent can never change.

In the Prasangika system the emptiness of a self-sufficient person is not the final mode of existence of the person, and thus one cannot be liberated from cyclic existence through realization of and meditation on it. Cognition of the person as empty of such a self will not even cause one to ascend to the path of preparation of a Hearer. For, Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas all attain special insight into the emptiness of inherent existence
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simultaneously with their attainment of the path of preparation. Still, the realization of the emptiness of a self-sufficient person is a stepping-stone to realization of the emptiness of inherent existence. If one is incapable of understanding the coarse emptiness, one will certainly not be capable of cognizing the subtle; therefore, it is important that the coarse selflessness be identified as well.

A 'self-sufficient' (Tib. rang rkyab ha) person is a 'substantially existent' (dravyasat, rdzasyod) person. In general, both terms refer to an object that can appear to the mind without depending on the appearance of other objects; thus, the opposite of 'substantially existent' is 'imputedly existent' (prajnaptisat, btags yod). Here in the coarse selflessness, 'imputedly existent' is identified as eliminating the possibility that the person is an entity independent of the aggregates of mind and body. All Buddhist schools, except Prasangika and the Vaibhashika sub-schools that advocate a self, say that a person is 'imputedly existent' in the sense of not being a separate entity from the mental and physical aggregates. However, these schools propound that the person is either the composite of these aggregates, or one of them, or their continuum, or the continuum of one of them. For Prasangika, however, this is incorrect; a person is neither separate from the mental and physical aggregates, nor the mental and physical aggregates themselves; rather, a person is merely imputed in dependence upon the aggregates. The imputedly existent person of the other schools is considered by the Prasangikas to be substantially existent because the latter say that the meaning of 'substantially existent' is to be findable separate from or among the bases of imputation of the object.

Here in the four noble truths in the realization that a person is not self-sufficient, the meaning of 'only imputed' is not so subtle; the term merely indicates that a person depends on his mental and physical aggregates. Opposite to this, many mistaken systems teach that a person has a character separate from that of his aggregates; they view a person as like a herder or a lord and the mental and physical aggregates as his herd or subjects. For the non-Prasangika schools of Buddhist tenets, this view of a
self-sufficient person exists innately in ordinary beings, but for Prasajgikas it is only a product of false teachings. The Prasajgikas say that the innate sense of a self-sufficient person is the person's appearing to be like a head salesman and his aggregates appearing to be like salesmen. The head salesman, unlike the relationship between a shepherd and his flock, is not separate from the category 'salesman', but he is the boss of the other salesmen. Similarly, though a person is of the nature of the aggregates, he appears to be the controller of them; the aggregates, like salesmen, appear to depend on the person who, like a head salesman, appears not to depend on the aggregates. In fact, the person depends on the aggregates; however, when one thinks, 'My body', it seems that first there must be an I and then a body which is owned or controlled. This is the way that a self-sufficient person appears.

When the dependent nature of the person is reflected upon in meditation and when it is seen that the person is nothing separate from the aggregates, one can withdraw from desires and so forth that are entered into for the sake of such a person. One can then reflect on phenomena other than persons, such as mind and body or external possessions, as not being objects of use and enjoyment by a self-sufficient person. Such meditation is powerful and serves to advance one to the point of being a fit vessel for the doctrine that persons and other phenomena do not inherently exist. Through being taught non-self-sufficiency, a meditator is led into seeing the dependent nature of the person and is thereby drawn into probing the significance of dependence, the very sign of non-inherent existence.
Part Four
Systems
1 Self

Source

Nga-wang-bel-den’s Annotations

THE ASSERTION OF SELF

The non-Buddhist systems assert the existence of a substantially existent self based on scripture and counterfeit reasoning. The scriptures are those transmitted from one to another, setting forth the existence of a personal self. The reasonings are:

A self exists because without prior consideration, when phenomena such as the shape of a face are seen, the thought of the presence of a person is generated, not just the thought of the presence of a shape.

A self exists because without prior consideration, when enjoyment preponderantly of pleasurable feelings is perceived, the thought of the presence of a high person is generated, not just of feeling. When enjoyment preponderantly of painful feelings is perceived, the thought of the presence of a low person is generated, not just of feeling.
When the name 'Devadatta' is designated, one thinks of a person, not just of a discrimination of the name.

When engagement in afflictions—such as desire—or virtues—such as faith—are perceived, the thought of the presence of a childish person or a wise person is generated, not just of engagement.

When the mind understands its objects through the eyes and so forth, one does not just think that the mind sees but that 'I see.' This shows that there is a sentient being, or I separate from the mind.

If there were no self separate from the mental and physical aggregates, one would not think, 'I have seen a form,' or 'I will see a form,' but would only think of the aggregates as engaging in activities. However, this is not the case; one must definitely think of the self prior to engagement in activities.

**BUDDHIST REFUTATION OF SELF**

Since those seeking liberation must completely refute the referent object of the view of the transitory collection as a real I and must assert a mere I or mere person, they must become skilled in the ways of refutation and proof through reasoning. Otherwise, falling to the extreme either of asserting no I at all or of affirming a substantially existent I, all their efforts will be senseless. Since the mere person is not to be refuted, a person as qualified by a certain attribute is. This is called a true (*satyaka, bden pa), ultimate (*paramartha, don dam), or substantially existent (dravyasat, rdzas yod) person.

In short, the person is conceived to exist substantially whereas it only exists imputedly (*prajnaptisat, btags yod). Here, an imputedly existent object is a phenomenon, such as a forest or army, which when it appears as an object of the mind must depend on the appearance of some other basis which has a character different from it, such as trees or soldiers. However, the
substantially existent appears under its own power without depending on such—for instance, a tree or soldier. This explanation of 'substantial existence' comes from the lower systems because in the Prasangika system nothing substantially exists since the appearance of any phenomenon must depend on the appearance of its basis of imputation, which is not itself.

1 Refuting the reasoning that the person substantially exists because it is observed that when phenomena such as the shape of a face are seen, the thought of the presence of a person is generated without prior consideration

Are phenomena, such as the shape of a face and so forth, perceived and the thought of a sentient being generated with respect to them, or is something else perceived and the thought of a sentient being generated with respect to it? If the former, then that thought is erroneous because it conceives such to be a sentient being whereas a sentient being is other than the shape of a face and so forth. If the latter, one has let fall the position that the thought of a sentient being is generated only from perceiving such phenomena.

Does that base which, when perceived, generates the thought of a sentient being have the nature of a sentient being or not? If the former, then that thought is erroneous because the sentient being appears to be self-sufficient in the sense of having a character different from that of the mind and body. If the latter, then one would have to assert that even a pot could serve as a cause generating the thought of woolen cloth.

Do you accept that the thought of a sentient being can be generated with respect to what is not a sentient being or not? If not, it is manifestly contradicted by the experience of generating the thought of a human to a pile of stones seen in the distance. If, however, the thought of a sentient being can be generated with respect to what is not a sentient being, then the basic assertion that the thought of a sentient being understands its object just as it is is indefinite.

Do you accept that the thought of non-sentient being can be generated with respect to a sentient being? Do you accept that
the thought of a certain sentient being can be generated with respect to another sentient being?

When the aggregates are perceived, is the base that generates the thought of a sentient being manifest or hidden? If manifest, then the aggregates would be the sentient being because another phenomenon not included among them is not manifestly perceived. If hidden or obscure, then a small untrained child would not generate a thought of a sentient being.

2  Refuting that the person substantially exists just because it is observed that one engages in activities having first thought, 'I will murder,' or 'I will forsake murder'

Do these activities arise from mental causes or from the cause of the self? If the former, then one has let fall the position that these are activities of a substantially existent person. If the latter, then it contradicts the position that these activities are preceded by thought.

Is the cause of the activities permanent or impermanent? If permanent, then it could not act. If impermanent, then these could not be the activities of a permanent self.

Does the sentient being who is the agent have a nature of exertion or non-exertion? If the former, then the self could not be permanent. If the latter, it would be contradictory to say that the non-exerting exerts.

Do the activities of a sentient being have causes or not? If not, then the activities would always be performed. If caused, then since they would be preceded by other causes, they would not be the independent activities of a self.

Are activities performed under one's own power or under the influence of the other? If the former, then the sufferings of birth, aging, sickness, death, and so forth would never be experienced because what one experienced would be in one's own power. If the latter, then it would not be suitable for these to be the activities of the self because the self is asserted to be under its own power.

3  Imputation of the self to the aggregates

If the person is imputed to the mental and physical aggregates,
then it could not be a self-sufficient entity different from the aggregates.

If the person abides in the aggregates like a pile of grain in a mandala, is the person permanent or impermanent? If permanent, then it could not be helped or harmed by pleasure and pain; hence, it would not accumulate virtuous and non-virtuous actions (karma las) and thus would not assume a body, in which case there would be no sense in asserting it as a person. If impermanent, then something that is other than the aggregates and is produced and disintegrates would have to be observed, but it is not.

If the person is other than the aggregates (which include all products) like sticks set side by side, then since the person would be a non-product, it would be senseless to assert it.

If the aggregates do not exist at all, then since there could be no relation with fetters, one would be liberated effortlessly.

4  **Positing the character of the person**

If a person separate from the aggregates exists, does it have the nature of being the viewer of forms and so forth or not? If it does, is it imputed to the eye consciousness and so forth or is it another object altogether? If the former, then it could not be substantially existent.

If the self is the viewer of forms and so forth but is other than the eye consciousness, then it would be either the object or the instrument of viewing. If it is the object, then it would be the basis of the activity of viewing. This could be in the sense of, like a seed, newly producing its own similar type in the next moment, but then the viewer would be impermanent, not permanent as is asserted. Or, this could be in the sense of transformation, like a potter or a human with magical powers, but then it would be impermanent and conventional. If just as a magician emanates illusions under his own power, so the self is under its own power, then the viewer would not undergo any suffering. The self might be conceived as the basis of the activity of viewing in the same way as the earth serves as the basis of and destroys the moving (sentient beings) and non-moving (the environment),
but this is not observed in the self. Or, the self could be the basis of activity, like space, in the sense that one can stretch out and contract one's limbs in space which is non-obstructive, but this also is not observed in the self. Furthermore, if just as space is posited to a mere elimination of obstructive contact, so the viewer is posited to a mere elimination of its object of negation, then the self could not appear to the mind under its own power because it would be a mere absence.

If the viewer is the instrument of viewing, then like a sickle, its engaging in activity would definitely depend on an agent in which case it would be dual-natured, being both that which engages the object (as the instrument) and that which is engaged in the object (as the object upon which the agent acts). If, like a fire, it sometimes engages its objects under its own power without an agent (as in spontaneous combustion), then it would be senseless to assert the existence of the person in fear of the lack of an agent.

If the person does not have the nature of being the viewer of forms and so forth, then it is senseless to assert a person that does not have any valid cognition.

5 Positing the self as afflicted and purified
Does the self have the character of being afflicted and purified, or is it other than these? If it does, then it would be unreasonable to assert a person separate from the aggregates because food, clothing, and so forth help the self, imbalance of the elements and so forth harm it, and afflictions are perceived only in the aggregates, not in anything else. If the self does not have the character of the afflicted and the purified, then it could not be afflicted and purified.

6 Positing the self as engaging and disengaging
Does a person who has the character of engagement and disengagement engage and disengage or does a person who does not have the character of engagement and disengagement do such? If the former, then a person separate from the aggregates could not exist because the activity of engagement is observed only in the
phenomena of the aggregates. There is (1) engagement by way of having causes, like the body from its causes of semen, blood, and so forth, (2) engagement by way of having a nature of production, like a sprout, (3) engagement by way of having a nature of disintegration, like the gradual descent of a waterfall, (4) engagement from the one to the other like the connection of a flame to its next moment of similar type, and (5) engagement of transformation—having done one activity, engaging in another—like mounting a mount and thereby changing one's situation. All of these are observed only in the aggregates.

If a person who does not have the character of engagement and disengagement engages and disengages, then the self would not become engaged, because of not having the character of engagement. Since disengagement depends on a previous engagement, it is impossible when engagement is impossible.

7  Positing the self as the expericer, agent, and liberator
Is something that is affected by pleasure and pain which are generated by objects asserted as the experiencer or is one who is not? One who is not affected by pleasure and pain could not be the experiencer since something that is helped or harmed from enjoying objects of experience is the meaning of an experiencer. If something that is affected by pleasure and pain generated by objects is the experiencer, then it is senseless to say that the self substantially exists because the state of being affected is perceived only in impermanent products.

Is something that is affected by the mind asserted as the agent, or is something that is not? As above, being affected is perceived only in impermanent products. Something that is not affected by the mind is not an agent because 'agent' means something that is affected by the mind.

Is something that is affected by the root and secondary afflictions asserted as the self that is liberated or is something that is not? As above, being affected is observed only in impermanent products. Something that is not affected by the afflictions could not be liberated because of not having been formerly bound.
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8 Positing the self as the instrument
Is agentship posited only to the self or can it also be posited to others? If only the self, then it would not be suitable to say 'The light of burning fire illuminates the area,' indicating an agent other than the self. If others can be posited as agents, then it would be allowable to designate the self as the agent in seeing, hearing, and so forth, but there would be no point in asserting a substantially existent self.

9 Positing the self as what is expressed by 'person'
Is the verbal convention 'person' used only for the self or also for others? If only the self, then it would be wrong for one, having observed only the body of a being, to use the verbal convention of his name with respect to it. If 'person' can be used for other things than the self, it could also be used for the viewer of forms and so forth. Though such would be allowable, it would be pointless to assert a further self.

10 Positing the view of self
It is not feasible for the view of self to be virtuous because it is especially produced in the obscured, is generated without application of effort, generates fear with respect to liberation, and is seen to nourish faults such as desire. Being non-virtuous, the view of a self is erroneous and mistaken with respect to its referent object, in which case one cannot prove the existence of self through citing the existence of the view of self. Furthermore, it is not feasible for the view of selflessness to be non-virtuous because the Omniscient Buddha spoke highly of it and because it must be achieved with great effort, does not generate fear with respect to liberation, causes the speedy attainment of auspicious fruits, and acts as the antidote of faults.

Is it that a substantially existent self abides as an objective reality and thus through its power the view of self is generated, or is it that whereas the person lacks substantial existence, the existence of a substantially existent self is superimposed through the power of conditioning to improper thought? If the former, then it would follow that Buddhists could not generate ascertainment of
selflessness because this view of self, which would be produced by the power of the thing itself, would prevent it. If the latter, then it cannot be proved that a substantially existent self exists by way of citing the existence of the view of self.

In brief, a person which is not imputed in dependence upon the collection, continuum, and so forth of the mental and physical aggregates does not inherently exist because of not being established as one nature with or a different nature from the aggregates. However, the opposite, the substantial existence of the self, is believed due to the assumption that the self exists validly as it appears to the innate false view of the transitory collection as a real I. To such an innate false view the self only appears to be a different object from the aggregates, for one seeks to leave these aggregates and gain others that are better than these but does not wish to leave the self.

When the substantial existence of the person is refuted, one understands implicitly that the person only imputedly exists. A mere person must be asserted on the positive side, and mere imputation is to be realized through the implicit force of refuting substantial existence. Thus, although self (atman, bdag) and person (pudgala, gang zag) are in general synonyms, they are not synonyms in the expression 'selflessness of the person'; in this context, the term 'self refers to substantial existence (dravyasat, rdzas yod), whereas the term 'person' refers to the nominally existent sentient being imputed to the mental and physical aggregates. Though some Buddhist Vaibhashika systems (exemplified by some modern-day Theravadins) assert that there is no agent, only action, Dzong-ka-ba says\textsuperscript{187} that they are mistakenly opposing worldly conventionalities. The fact that a substantially existent agent cannot be found does not mean that person or agent do not exist at all; they exist imputedly and effectively.
2 Non-Buddhist Systems

Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets

The Buddhist tenet systems are differentiated from the non-Buddhist in that their teacher—Buddha—has extinguished all faults, attained all auspicious attributes, and taught from his own insight the profound doctrine of dependent-arising. Their teaching harms neither themselves nor others, and their view is the assertion of the non-existence of a permanent, single, independent self.

Non-Buddhist teachers, teachings, and views are just the opposite; their teachers have not extinguished all faults, their teachings harm some sentient beings, and their view is of a permanent, single, independent self. This is not to say that their teachers do not have some auspicious attributes, or that all of their teachings harm, or that all of their views are wrong. Rather, their teachers do not have the perfection of a Buddha; within their teachings there is at least one that harms a sentient being, and they have a wrong view on the status of the self. Even the
Jainas, who cultivate not harming others, harm themselves in extreme asceticism and thereby also harm the organisms that live in their bodies. Also, even the Nihilists claim that the self is permanent or unchanging during its existence, however short.

It is necessary to take into account the meaning and not just terminology in dividing the Indian systems into Buddhist and non-Buddhist, for Buddhists are not the only ones to use the terms 'emptiness' and 'selflessness'. The Vaishnavas and Aishvaras assert an emptiness which for them is merely the vacuity resulting from destruction at the end of a great eon. Also, the native Tibetan Bön religion asserts a selflessness which for them is a permanent truly existent essence.

Non-Buddhist Indian systems of tenets are almost innumerable; however, twenty-five are mentioned by Avalokitavrata, Dzong-ka-ba, and Dzong-ka-ba's disciple Kay-drup as having split off from Samkhya. Jam-yang-shay-ba selects twelve for his discussion of non-Buddhist systems due to their being explained clearly in texts surviving in Tibet. From the Buddhist point of view, eleven of these are assertions of an extreme of permanence, that is, they assert as existent what is non-existent. The remaining one is an assertion of an extreme of annihilation, that is, they assert as non-existent what is existent.

The eleven schools adhering to a view of permanence are:

1. Samkhya and Kapilas (Enumerators and Followers of Kapila)
2. Brahmanas (Followers of Brahma)
3. Vyakaranas (Grammarians)
4. Vedantins (Adherents to the Finality of the Vedas)
5. Guhyakas (Secretists)
6. Vaishnavas (Followers of Vishnu)
7. Mīmamsakas (Performers, or Analyzers)
8. Shaivas (Followers of Shiva)
9. Vaisheshikas (Differentiators)
10. Naiyayikas (Logicians)
11. Nirgranthas or Jainas (The Naked or Followers of the Jinas).
The school adhering to a view of annihilation is that of the Charvakas (Hedonists). Unlike the Buddhist schools of tenets which are all included in four types (with tantrists included among the Chittamatrins and Madhyamikas), all the non-Buddhist schools cannot be included in these twelve, or even in the twenty-five alluded to above.

The way to determine whether a system is inner—Buddhist—or outer—non-Buddhist—is to investigate whether or not the teacher has extinguished all faults and has attained all auspicious attributes, whether or not the teaching abandons harming sentient beings, and whether the view is of selflessness or self. Or in another way, the Buddhist teaching can also be established through four means: view, meditation, behavior, and fruit. The view, avoiding the extremes of asserting that a person is a separate substantial entity from the mental and physical aggregates or that a person designated in dependence upon these does not exist, is that of the four seals (see p.336). The meditation, avoiding the extremes of being too tight or too loose, eradicates all transmigration, including the Peak of Cyclic Existence which is the highest Formless Realm. The behavior avoids the extremes of both sensuous indulgence and fatiguing asceticism with regard to clothing, food, abode, and medicine. The fruit is the non-return of obstructions that have been abandoned through individual analytical cessation.

The non-Buddhist view is of a permanent, partless, independent self. Their meditation leads only to rebirth in higher realms within cyclic existence. Their behavior has fallen to extremes of severe asceticism or indulgence. Their fruit is the return of obstructions which only seem to have been abandoned.

To distinguish an insider from an outsider without identifying him or her as a proponent of specific tenets is merely to examine where refuge is taken. One who takes refuge in Buddha, his Doctrine, and the Supreme Community from the depths of his heart is a Buddhist. Therefore, it is said to be mistaken to assert that the teacher of non-Buddhists and of Buddhists is the same, for Buddha is the only perfect teacher, and his teaching is unique.
Proponents of outer tenets affirm that the self apprehended by a consciousness viewing a permanent, partless, independent self is real. Proponents of inner tenets refute such. Those outsiders who accept only objects of direct perception, refusing to accept inference as valid, are proponents of annihilation (uchchhedavadin, chad smra). Outsiders who also accept hidden objects which are revealed by inference and/or scripture are proponents of permanence (shashvatavadin, rtag smra).

According to Prajnavarman’s Commentary on (Udbhata-siddhasvamin’s) ‘Exalted Praise’ (Visheshastavatika) and according to Chandrakirti’s Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle Way’, all non-Buddhist systems are traced to the founder of the Samkhya system, Kapila. The Brahmin Kapila appeared in the world during the first of the twenty intermediate eons of abiding of this world system, when a life-span was immeasurable, and in retreat attained a solitary liberation through asceticism. In order to teach his path to others, he composed the Samkhya texts that mainly set forth the twenty-five categories of realities. The many and various systems of Forders (Tirthika, Mustelegs pa) split off from the root Samkhya as a result of disagreement over minute differences of opinion concerning the self as it was explained by Kapila.

However, some scholars, in accordance with the thought of Bhavaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvala), say that all the Forder systems arose individually, having their own fundamental teachers and different books, without relying on the Samkhya treatises.

According to the Jainas, however, the fundamental teacher of all Forders is the sage Arhat, who gave all the many and various systems of tenets to his companions. Afterwards, when Brahma came, Arhat said, ‘Great Brahma, you have come leisurely; you have come very late. Because I have given away all the treatises, use these Vedas.’

Jam-yang-shay-ba says that these various accounts show how very difficult it is to come to any conclusion about the origins of the Forders. Jang-gya, who in his presentation of tenets relied heavily on Jam-yang-shay-ba, says that the story of the
twenty-five Forder schools splitting off from the Samkhyas is meant to refer to their basic similarity of view of a permanent, partless, independent self, and not to an actual historical origin.

Bhavaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning reports that the pure offerings set forth in the Vedas initially spread widely. However, at a time when the morality of beings had diminished, sages debated about the Vedic injunction, ‘Various things are good [for offering].’ Some said that the offering of animals was not suitable, whereas some said it was. Those who wished to eat meat performed impure offerings and even altered the Vedas. Thus, the two types of offerings arose in stages, the initial pure offerings without animal sacrifice and later impure offerings that include blood sacrifice.

In general, non-Buddhists are called ‘other sectarians’ because they are followers of sects other than those of the Buddhists. They are called ‘outsiders’ because they are outside of the correct view of emptiness. Their treatises teaching paths to high status within cyclic existence and to liberation from cyclic existence are called ‘Fords to the End’. The authors of such treatises are called ‘Makers of the Ford to the End’ (Tirthakara, Mu stegs byed).

SAMKHYAS

According to Bodhibhadra, Samkhyas (Enumerators) are so called because they advocate a definite enumeration of the causes that produce existents. Or, according to Bhavaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning, they are called Samkhyas because they assert that one is liberated through understanding the enumeration of the twenty-five categories of realities. They propound that all products are produced from their own nature and thus are called Proponents of the Nature as Cause. Because they follow the sage Kapila, they are called Kapilas. Because they accept that the non-manifest principal (pradhana, gtso bo) is the cause of all products, they are called Proponents of the Principal.
Meditation on Emptiness

The school is divided into the non-theistic and the theistic. The non-theistic Samkhya are followers only of Kapila and do not take the lord Shvara to be the motivating cause of the manifestation of the world. They assert that all products exist at the time of their causes and are made manifest by conditions. The theistic Samkhya, following Patanjali, take the lord Ishvara to be their teacher and assert that the transformations or manifestations of phenomena depend on his supervision. They say that though all causes and effects are the same in nature, they differ as transformations.

The twenty-five categories of realities that both Samkhyā schools accept

1. person (purusha, skyes bu) [or self, consciousness, conscious self, mind, sentience, knower of the field]
2. fundamental nature (prakrti, rang zhin) [or nature, principal, universality, general principal]
3. intellect (buddhi, bio), or great one (mahat, chen po)
4. I-principle (ahamkara, nga rgyal)
   a. I-principle dominated by motility (rajas, rdul)
   b. I-principle dominated by darkness (tamas, mun pa)
   c. I-principle dominated by lightness (sattva, snying stobs)

Five subtle objects or potencies of objects which evolve from the I-principle dominated by darkness:

5. visible forms (rupa, gzugs)
6. sounds (shabda, sgra)
7. odors (gandha, dri)
8. tastes (rasa, ro)
9. tangible objects (sprashtavya, reg bya)

Eleven faculties which evolve from the I-principle dominated by lightness:

Five mental faculties:

10. eye (chakshus, mig)
11. ear (shrota, ma ba)
12. nose (ghrana, sna)
tongue (*rasana, Ice*)

body or skin (*sparshana, pags pa*)

Five physical faculties or action faculties:

speech (*vach, ngag*)

arms (*pantlag pa*)

legs (*pada, rkang pa*)

anus (*payu, rkub*)

genitalia (*upastha, 'doms*)

Intellectual faculty (*manas, yid*) the nature of which is both mental and physical

Five elements:

earth (*prthivl, sa*) which evolves from the odor potency

water (*dp, chu*) which evolves from the taste potency

fire (*tejas, me*) which evolves from the visible form potency

wind (*vayu, rlung*) which evolves from the tangible object potency

space (*akasha, nam mkha’*) which evolves from the sound potency.

The person lacks the qualities of motility, darkness, and lightness. Inactive because of pervading all migrators, it is neither an agent of virtue or non-virtue nor the creator of manifest phenomena. The person is a permanent existent because of not changing and is consciousness because of not being an aggregate of particles. It is the experiencer because of experiencing pleasure and pain. The person ‘dwells beside’ the nature until liberation in the sense that the manifestations which evolve from the nature are confused with the person until yogic discrimination separates the two and all manifestations disappear.

The other twenty-four categories—the nature and so forth—are aggregates of particles and, therefore, are matter. The nature is a permanent and partless entity that pervades all its transformations and is the agent of virtue and non-virtue, etc. The nature and its transformations are the objects enjoyed by the person, but it itself is always non-manifest; even the sage Kapila did not
directly see it. The nature is the three qualities of motility, darkness, and lightness in equilibrium. These three qualities (guna, yon tan) are:

1. lightness (both in light/heavy and light/dark), desire, and pleasure: sattva, snying stobs
2. motility, hatred, and pain: rajas, rdul
3. darkness, obscuration, and gloom: tamas, munpa.

The nature is also called the final mode of existence of phenomena and the ultimate. However, the person also is an ultimate, and the intellect, I-principle, and the five subtle elements are also natures in that they are sources of transformations. The nature is the original source of all the transformations.

From the nature the great one or intellect is produced. It is like a two-sided mirror, in which the images of objects from the outside and of the person from the inside meet or mix. The intellect 'empowers' the senses and apprehends the objects that the senses apprehend which in turn are then known by the person. This is the way that the person knows objects.

From the intellect three I-principles are produced. From the dark I-principle the subtle elements of odors, tastes, visible forms, tangible objects, and sounds are produced. These five respectively produce the five elements: earth, water, fire, wind, and space. From the lightness I-principle the eleven faculties are produced. The motile I-principle is the motivator of the former two. This is how Avalokitavrata presents the functions of the three I-principles; however, Dzong-ka-ba, in his commentary on Chandrakirti’s Supplement, and Gyel-tsap, in his commentary on DharmaHrtri’s Ascertainment of Valid Cognition (Pramana-vinishchaya), say that the dark I-principle is the motivator and the motile I-principle is the source of the five subtle elements.

The twenty-five categories are divided into four types: natures (causes), transformations (effects), both natures and transformations, and neither natures nor transformations. The nature is only a nature since it is the cause of all the transformations and is not itself caused. The intellect, I-principle, and the five subtle
elements are both natures and transformations in that they both cause transformations and are themselves caused by something else. The eleven faculties and the five elements are only transformations because, though they are caused, they do not produce anything else. The person is neither a nature nor a transformation because it neither creates nor is created.

The nature and the person are truly existent phenomena because they are non-manifest. The other twenty-three are manifest and are, therefore, only conventionally existent; they are falsities.

The Samkhya system explains production as the manifestation through minor causes of what is already existent. Disintegration is an effect's dissolution into its own nature. The theistic Samkhya school adds that the varieties of environments and animate beings are not produced from just the nature because it is mindless. That which is mindless is not capable of being a supervisor, and without a supervisor the creation of effects is not possible. The person is not suitable to be the supervisor because when the person is alone, before the appearance of the transformations, there is no knowledge; the intellect has not yet been produced, and without ascertainment by the intellect there is no realization of objects. Therefore, the varieties of effects are produced through the mutual dependence of the great lord Ishvara and the nature. An increase in strength of motility—among the three qualities that abide in the entity of the nature—causes Ishvara to issue forth all beings. An increase of lightness causes duration. An increase of darkness causes disintegration.

Though Ishvara and the nature, which are the causes producing all environments and animate beings, always exist, the serial production, duration, and disintegration of effects is said to be admissible. For, the three qualities—motility, darkness, and lightness—increase and diminish serially.

When the person wishes to enjoy objects, the nature realizes its desires, unites with the person, and creates the varieties of transformations. Eventually, through a lessening of desire, the person comes to view objects as faulty and parts from desire. By
Meditation on Emptiness

Cultivating the concentrations and formless absorptions the divine eye is obtained. When this eye looks at the nature, the latter is ashamed just as a mistress is when she is discovered by a wife. Having been discovered, the nature parts from the person, and, opposite to the stages of production, all the transformations dissolve into the nature. When these have become non-manifest and the person remains alone, liberation is attained.

Since discrimination is the means to liberation, a yogi meditates in general on the twenty-five categories and in particular on the person as empty of the nature and on the nature as empty of the person. This type of emptiness is called 'emptiness of the other'—the person is empty of being the nature, and the nature is empty of being the person. When the two are no longer confused, the root of cyclic existence is cut, and liberation is attained.

Buddhist Refutation of Samkhya

If, as the Samkhyas claim, that which existed at the time of its causes were nevertheless produced again, it would be a senseless production, and there would be no end to the re-production. For, the already existent would require production.

If their causes are permanent and thus do not diminish, the disappearance of the twenty-three effects is contradictory.

Because the intellect is matter, it cannot experience pleasure and pain.

Because the nature and the person pervade all, it is contradictory for them to be partless. Does all or only a part of the principal pervade every individual thing? If the former, the principal would be separate from itself just as a bull and a pot, which the principal and the person pervade, are separate entities. If only a part of the principal pervades individual manifestations, then it is admitted to have parts.

Is Ishvara a person? If he were, he would not be suitable to be the supervisor because persons are not agents in the Samkhya system and persons alone, without the nature, have no knowledge. If Ishvara is not a person, then there is a twenty-sixth
category. Also, if nothing appears to a liberated person due to the parting of the principal and all its transformations, is Ishvara, the supervisor of all appearances, non-liberated?

If the person is a partless entity, it cannot be consciousness. If the person is permanent, how could it be bound and freed?

It follows that one cannot be freed from cyclic existence merely through cognizing that the person and happiness, pain, and so forth are different. For, even untrained children realize a separation of themselves from their faculties and from happiness, pain, and so forth. Conceiving themselves as the seeker, they seek happiness and faculties which are superior to those of the present. Furthermore, they conceive of themselves in former and later moments as one but realize that happiness and pain arise and cease.

It is not possible to be liberated from cyclic existence through meditating on one's faculties as suffering and through seeking to become separate from them. For, such a mind of disgust for suffering is accompanied by hatred. Also, at that time one still has desire, even if suppressed. To achieve liberation from cyclic existence it is necessary to destroy the misconception of objective existence that gives rise to desire, hatred, and suffering.

CHARVAKAS

The Charvakas (Hedonists) are so called because they advocate satisfaction with only what is pleasant (charu, mdzespa) here in this life. They are called Proponents of Annihilation because they propound that at death, or after a number of lives, the continuum of the self ceases. They are called Nihilists because they propound that rebirth does not exist and that moral cause and effect do not exist. They are called Barhaspatyas because they follow the god Brhaspati. They are called the Gone-Afar (Ayata, rgyang phanpa) because they have gone apart from the right view. They are called Daivagurus after their teacher Devaguru; that is, Brhaspati, and Juk-dop-jen-bas (Juk-stobs-can-pa) after their teacher Juk-dop, a student of the renowned sage Lokachakshu
and a contemporary of the logician Dharmakīrti. They are called Proponents of Inherence and Proponents of Nature because they consider that many things, such as the sharpness of thorns and the descent of a waterfall, appear naturally, without depending on causes.

They are nihilists not because of believing in nothing or that life is totally worthless, but because they believe only in what they can perceive directly, discarding inference as a means of valid knowledge. Seeing that charity does not necessarily bring wealth as the clergy claim, they propound that this life and its attributes of life-span, wealth, and so forth are not results of merits and demerits in former lives. They are moral nihilists. Since they rely on direct perception as their sole source of knowledge, they deny causation where it cannot be seen, such as even in the coloring of flowers and the roundness of peas. However, they affirm causation that can be seen, such as the molding of a vase from clay.

The Nihilists are divided into Meditators and Dialecticians. The Meditators attain clairvoyance through which they perceive former and future births for thirty, sixty, or ninety eons according to their mental level. Unlike Buddhists, they assume that the cycle of rebirth has a beginning because their clairvoyance is limited and they do not perceive a beginningless cycle of births. With their clairvoyance they follow themselves and others from lifetime to lifetime noticing no immediate relationship of cause and effect with respect to the experience of pleasure and pain.

The Dialecticians see the same lack of causal relationship in the stages of a single human’s life and thus deny moral law along with rebirth. Wishing to save the world from uselessly wasting its riches on clergy and uselessly participating in efforts aimed at improving a future life, they advocate no cause and effect in the moral sense. It is also said that the sage Lokachakshu desired to lie with his daughter and so explained to her the absence of moral law.

For a Nihilist, consciousness is a fermentation of the elements, much like inebriation produced from alcohol. Mind is not
considered to be a phenomenon of a different nature from matter. Matter in all systems is composed of particles, but mind in most systems is not. The Buddhists, based on a view of an essential difference between mind and matter, expound a theory that mind and body have their own separate substantial causes—the mind's main cause being a former mind. Thereby, a beginningless cycle of existence is established because a mind must always have a mind preceding it as its substantial cause. The Nihilists reject this notion saying that mind has a physical nature just as the capacity to cause inebriation is of the same nature as beer. The mind is an effect of the body just as light is an effect of a lamp. The mind is a quality of the body just as a mural is a quality of a wall.

Nihilists say that the scope of the person is limited to the scope of the senses. This counters the Buddhist notion of a subtle type of impermanent self that transmigrates and the non-Buddhist notion of a permanent self beyond sense perception. Nirvana is then the annihilation of mind and body with the return of the body to the four elements and the dispersion of the senses into space. 'Live happily until death. After death you have no location or place. When the body has become ashes, how can it live again? Therefore, former and later [lives] do not exist.'

A Dialectician Nihilist asserts that a mind on the point of death has no conjunction with a later mind just because it is a mind on the point of death. Even though he does not believe that there are Foe Destroyers, he cites the example of the final moment of the mind of a Foe Destroyer which, according to the Buddhist Vaibhashikas, ceases upon death. For a Vaibhashika, the continuum of mind and body of a Foe Destroyer ceases when he dies whereas the Mahayana schools say that this is impossible, declaring that in this respect the Vaibhashikas are like Nihilists.

Nihilists assert that because the mind is produced from the elements, there are no Foe Destroyers who have eradicated the afflictions of desire, hatred, and ignorance. Therefore, they do not accept an omniscient Buddha or Supreme Community.
Similarly, there is no excellent Doctrine because there is no abandonment of afflictions and no path that abandons them.

The Dialecticians add that there are no Foe Destroyers because beings are permanent, stable, perpetual, and unchanging as long as they exist and thus do not become good or bad through the power of causes. The Meditators, when they attain any of the equipoises of the four concentrations or of the four formless absorptions, think that they are Foe Destroyers. Near the time of their death, they fall from their meditative stabilization, see their rebirth in a lower condition, and conclude, 'There is no Foe Destroyer, and there is no path of a Foe Destroyer.'

BUDDHIST REFUTATION OF NIHILISM

The mind right after conception has a preceding mind just because it is a mind. For, cause and effect must be of a harmonious nature. Even one whose mental powers are not clear and whose senses are torpid immediately after birth searches to eat food and searches to drink the milk of the breast without being taught. This is by the force of previous conditioning in other lives.

Consciousness is not produced from inanimate causes because the substantial causes of the inanimate and of consciousness are definitely separate. The natures of the two are different; the one is an aggregation of particles and the other is not.

Nihilists say that the mind is produced from the mindless elements because the mind is a product, just as inebriation is produced from beer and fire is produced from a magnifying glass and those two are products. However, because inebriation is an attribute of a mind and not a mind, the example is not proper. Because causes must accord in type with their effects, the reason cited is in fact contradictory; it proves that the mind is not produced from the mindless elements.

The Nihilists say that a mind at the point of death has no conjunction to another life because it is a mind at the point of death, like the final mind of a Foe Destroyer. The reason is
inconclusive because there are cases of memory of former lives and because babies have different styles of behavior. Furthermore, that the Vaibhashikas claim that the mind of a Foe Destroyer ceases at death does not make it so. The continuum of the mind never ceases, and the Vaibhashikas merely fall to the depth of the Nihilists in claiming so, as do some wrong interpreters of Prasangika who say that in meditative equipoise on emptiness there is no mind (confusing the fusion of subject and object at the time of direct cognition of emptiness with disappearance of the mind).

Body is not the main cause of mind because if it were, a dead body would absurdly be conscious. Also, the mind does not depend on the body in the sense of being its substantial effect because the increase and diminishment of wisdom and so forth do not depend on the increase and diminishment of the body. This is not to deny that mind and body affect each other; rather, all states and changes of mind do not depend on the body. Also, mind does not depend on body in the sense of its having a physical nature because if it did, a person’s mental qualities would be perceived by a sense consciousness that perceives the body. Because the Nihilists say that the body is permanent as long as it lasts, the mind also would always have to have the same disposition.

The Nihilists are wrong in claiming that there is no omniscient consciousness. The development of clear and direct perception by a conditioned mind is the proof through which omniscience is established. Much as an object of desire repeatedly taken to mind can appear vividly before a lustful person, emptiness can be seen directly and not just through the medium of images or concepts. Once this is shown, then the gradations of the path and final omniscience are easily established.

The limitless development of love and wisdom is established by proving the existence of former and future lives. For, since love and wisdom are qualities of mind, they develop naturally together with a consciousness that becomes conditioned to the ways of love and wisdom. A feature of consciousness is that the
same effort required to begin a continuum of love or wisdom is not required for each of the successive moments, much like the natural continuance of fire once it has been started. Since there are future lives, there is sufficient time for the full development of wisdom and love.

Because thorns and so forth are produced from their own seeds and because the sharpness of thorns and so forth are produced from those same seeds, the sharpness of thorns is not a suitable example of the causeless production of suffering. The ascertaining that thorns arise sometimes in some places proves that they are produced in dependence on their own objects of dependence, and these objects of dependence are accepted as their causes. A cause is that which aids its own effect; that which does not aid is not an object depended upon for production. If things were causelessly produced without depending on others, things would either always exist, or never exist, or everything would be produced from everything.

The Nihilists say that there are no former and later births, no omniscience, and no effects of charity, etc., because they have not seen them directly. Does this mean that all persons have not seen them directly or that just the Nihilists have not seen them directly? Also, do they directly see them to be non-existent or do they realize them to be non-existent through inference? That all persons have not seen them is doubtful; how, without omniscience, can anyone know what all have and have not seen? If only the Nihilists have not seen them, it is answered that it is mistaken that the non-existent is co-extensive with what the Nihilists have not seen.

If the Nihilists say that a direct perceiver sees former and later births, omniscience, and so forth as non-existent, the answer is that non-existence of other lives and so forth could not be an object of direct perception because, according to the Nihilists, other lives are non-existent entities. How can the non-existent be seen directly? If their non-existence is established by way of inference, then by accepting such an inference the fault is entailed of first denying the validity of inference and then of using inference to establish a point. For, the proponents of Nihilism say that only
direct perception is valid. The non-existence of former and later births and so forth not only cannot be established by valid inference, but also an attempt to do such would demolish their own position that inference is not valid.
3  **Hi nayana**

**Sources**
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jang-gya's *Presentation of Tenets*
Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets*
Nga-wang-bel-den's *Annotations*
Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's *Precious Garland of Tenets*

A Buddhist is one who accepts the Three Jewels—Buddha, his Doctrine, and the Supreme Community—as the final refuge, whereas a non-Buddhist is one who does not.\(^\text{201}\) Buddha is the teacher of refuge; the Doctrine—especially the true cessation of obstructions—is the actual refuge, and the Supreme Community are the friends helping persons toward refuge.

Refuge may be taken with any of three motivations:

1  Some persons have concern and fear for the sufferings of bad migrations as animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-beings. (Lives within cyclic existence are called 'migrations' (*gati*, *gro ba*) because beings move from one to another within the round.) Due to their belief that the Three Jewels have the power of protecting from bad migrations, they take refuge in them from the depths of their hearts.
2 Others, realizing the impermanence and changeability of even happy migrations, have concern and fear for the sufferings of all cyclic existences including those of happy migrations as humans, demi-gods, and gods. Due to their belief that the Three Jewels have the power of protecting from all these sufferings, they take refuge in them from the depths of their hearts.

3 Still others, having realized their own miserable condition, infer that all are suffering and generate fear for all sentient beings’ cyclic existence. They fear that even if beings turn toward a religion, they will seek one that leads only to a solitary peace, thereby neither perfecting themselves nor devoting themselves to the welfare of others. They also have concern and fear for others’ afflictions preventing liberation from cyclic existence, and their obstructions preventing omniscience. Due to their belief that the Three Jewels have the power of protecting all beings from these four faults, they take refuge in them from the depths of their hearts.

This last is the motivation of a Mahayanist, a being of greatest capacity.

Vibhashikas, Sautrantikas, Chittamatrinis, and Madhyamikas are Buddhists and also proponents of particular systems of tenets. ‘Tenet’ is a translation of siddhanta or siddhyanta (grub mtha’), which literally means ‘established conclusion’ or ‘that which is an establishment and a conclusion’. An established conclusion is so called because a meaning has been established for the holder’s mind through reasoning, scriptural citation, or both, and he will not pass beyond this conclusion. A Buddhist proponent of tenets is one who not only accepts the Three Jewels as the highest refuge but also propounds the tenets of the four seals which testify to the fact that a doctrine is Buddha’s.

Thus, all Buddhist systems—Vibhashika, Sautrakika, Chittamatra, and Madhyamika—propound the four seals:

1. all products are impermanent
2. all contaminated objects are miserable
3. all phenomena are selfless
4. nirvana is peace.
For the highest system, the Prasangika division of Madhyamika, products are conventionally but not inherently existent phenomena produced from the aggregation of causes and conditions. Products are impermanent even to the point that other than their own production they require no cause, major or minor, for their disintegration. Contaminated objects are mainly consciousnesses that conceive things to exist inherently but are also the environments and other phenomena that are created from the merit and demerit accumulated by sentient beings when they engage in actions motivated by the ignorant misconception of inherent existence. All phenomena are selfless in the sense that both persons and all other phenomena such as body, mind, house, and fence do not inherently exist. The passage beyond ignorance and its consequent miseries is nirvana, which is explained as meaning 'passed beyond sorrow'. 'Sorrow' is here identified as the afflictions, the principal of which is the conception that things inherently or naturally exist. Peace is not bestowed by a deity or obtained otherwise than through nirvana.

**VAIBHASHIKA**

'Vaibhashika' means a follower mainly of the *Great Detailed Exposition (Mahavibhasha)* which is a compendium on knowledge (abhidharma, chos mngon pa), a study of phenomena. This text distills the meaning of the Seven Treatises of Knowledge which only the Vaibhashikas accept as spoken by Buddha. 'Vaibhashika' (Bye brag smra ba) also means one who asserts that past, present, and future objects are all instances (vishesha, bye brag) of 'substantial entities' (dravya, rdzas). It is further said that Vaibhashikas are so called because, like the non-Buddhist Vaisheshikas, they propound many 'substantially established phenomena' (dravyasiddhaharma, rdzas grub kyi chos) such as uncaused space which the other Buddhist systems say are existent but only designated by thought.

Vaibhashikas assert partless particles that aggregate into gross objects. According to the Kashmiri sub-school, the particles do not touch each other but are held together by space. Others say
that the particles surround each other without interstice, while others say that they touch each other. In any case, gross objects are formed through the aggregation of partless particles, and thus external objects—objects which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness—are said to exist truly.

The Vaibhashikas also assert partless moments of consciousness. An aggregation of these is a continuum of consciousness that perceives its object 'nakedly', that is, without itself being generated in the image of its object.

For Vaibhashika, ultimate truths (*paramarthasatya, don dam bdenpa*) are objects that can bear analysis. This means that even when reduced, either physically or through the process of analysis, they still generate in a perceiver an apprehension of themselves. For instance, a clay pot, if broken with a hammer or analyzed into its parts, no longer generates a consciousness that perceives a pot or thinks 'pot.' Therefore, a pot is not an ultimate truth. However, the matter of the pot is still matter even down to the finest unbreakable particle. Therefore, objects such as partless particles, partless moments of consciousness, and permanent phenomena are ultimate truths—true for the ultimate analytical supramundane consciousness. They are also called ultimate truths because they definitely have ultimate existence.

All objects that require an aggregation of particles or of moments are conventional truths (*samvrtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa*)—conventional because they are designated in accordance with worldly conventions and truths because such designations are true.

Both ultimate and conventional truths are substantially established (*dravyasiddha, rdzas grub*), though only ultimate ones are substantially existent (*dravyasat, rdzas yod*). Vaibhashika is the only school to differentiate 'substantially established' and 'substantially existent', the intention being to provide a status of 'substantiality' for conventional truths. Though conventional truths are imputedly existent (*prajnaptisat, btags yod*) they are substantially established because in this system these imputations are true; when the objects designated are sought, an autonomous entity is found.
The non-Buddhist Vaisheshikas and Naiyayikas carry the doctrine of substantially existent entities to the point where whole and part are separate entities, as are quality and qualificand, doer and doing, and definition and definiendum. For the Naiyayikas, within the realm of the existent, whatever appear to the mind to be different are different substantial entities.

The Vaibhashikas are said to have been highly influenced by non-Buddhist thought even to the point where they are a mixture of Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Their name is, therefore, sometimes traced to the name 'Vaisheshika'.

Furthermore, like the Samkhya, the Vaibhashikas accept that a sprout, for instance, exists as a sprout at the time of its future, that is, when the sprout is yet to be produced. They say that if a product did not exist before its actualized state in present time, its production would be adventitious. If non-existents were produced, even non-existent things like the horns of a rabbit could be produced. For the other Buddhist schools, however, a sprout at the time of its future exists as the entity of its seed, but the sprout does not exist as a sprout and, therefore, does not exist.

The Vaibhashikas are also the only Buddhist school to accept simultaneous cause and effect as, for example, in the case of a consciousness and its accompanying mental factors, such as intention and feeling, which support each other like the poles of a tripod. No other Buddhist school accepts simultaneous cause and effect, citing as their reason that one thing cannot affect another that already exists; it can only affect later moments of the other.

'Vaibhashika' is a general name referring to eighteen sub-schools that, according to differing explanations, split off from one, two, three, or four basic orders after Buddha's death. According to an explanation by Bhavaviveka of a division from two basic orders, they are as shown in Chart 40. Bhavaviveka says that there are six Mahasamghika, seven Sarvastivadin, and four Vatsaputriya sects and that this is a list of eighteen; thus the eighteenth would have to be the Haimavatas. (For other renditions of the split into eighteen sub-schools, see Appendix 3.) Not all eighteen sub-schools actually accept the 'Vaibhashika'
Chart 40: Division of Vaibhāṣika into Eighteen Schools
(The dates are based on Buddha's death, After the Nirvana.)

Mahāsāṃghikas
137 A.N.

Mahāsāṃghikas

Ekavyāvahārikas
3rd cen. A.N.

Bahushrutīyas

Gokulikas

Prajñaptivādins

Sthavira-chaitikas

Mūlasthavirās

Mūlasthavirās

Vātsiputriyās

Mahāgirikas

Vātsiputriyās

Saṃmitīyas

(Mahāgirikas)

Mahāshāsakas

Dharmaguptakas

Tāmrashāṭiyas

Kāshyapīyas

Dharmottaras

Bhadrayāniyās

(Saṃpurīyas)

(Saṃpurīyas)
notion that past, present, and future objects are substantial entities. The Mahashasakas, for instance, say that past objects and future objects do not substantially exist; only present objects do. Furthermore, not all accept that there is no simultaneous cognition of all phenomena because the 'one expression' of the Ekavyavaharika (literally, those who have one expression) school is the assertion of a Buddha’s simultaneous cognition of all phenomena.

Some of the eighteen sub-schools arose from the simple fact that their teachers were different or that their monasteries were located in different areas. Difference of language also contributed to the divisions, but according to Kensur Lekden, the chief cause was the Hinayana notion that all Buddha’s sutras are literal. (The evidence does not show this to be the case as interpretation of scripture was important in many Hinayana schools.)

The five Sammitiya sub-schools (see Padmasambhava’s rendition in Appendix 3) assert the existence of a person that is neither the same as nor different from the mental and physical aggregates. However, they and the other thirteen Vaibhashika schools all assert the non-existence of a permanent, partless, independent self. The thirteen non-Sammitiya schools also assert the non-existence of a substantially existent or self-sufficient person. Their assertion of selflessness does not mean that there is utterly no self or person but refutes the existence of a certain type of self. For these thirteen Vaibhashika schools, a person is not independent of the mind and body but is a phenomenon within the mind-body complex. Some say that a person is the continuum of the five aggregates of forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses. Others say that a person is the mental consciousness; still others say that a person is all five aggregates.

For these thirteen Vaibhashika schools, the non-existence of a self-sufficient person is known as the subtle selflessness of persons. The coarse selflessness is a person’s non-existence as a permanent, partless, independent entity. Through cognizing and becoming accustomed to the subtle personal selflessness, the knot of cyclic existence is cut, and the state of Foe Destroyer is
attained. One has destroyed the foe which is the conception of the person as a substantial or self-sufficient entity.

Simultaneously with becoming a Foe Destroyer, one attains a nirvana with remainder—the state of having passed beyond the afflictions (the chief of which is the conception of a self-sufficient person) while still possessing a physical support that receives its impetus from former contaminated actions and afflictions. Then, at death the continuum of mind and body is severed in a nirvana without remainder. The attainer of the nirvana without remainder is thus said to be the Foe Destroyer who is about to die because once dead, his continuum of mind and body has utterly ceased, and there is then no one who could possess a nirvana without remainder.²¹²

For the Vaibhashikas, five of the six types of Foe Destroyers can fall from their attainment even as far back as the path of seeing. According to the other schools, however, such degeneration makes a mockery of the conception of the total abandonments of afflictions which are called true cessations, the third of the four noble truths.²¹³

The Vaibhashikas, despite being Hinayana in terms of their tenets, accept a Bodhisattva path that is trod by very rare beings—the one in our age being Shakyamuni Buddha.²¹⁴ That they accept such is clear from their literal acceptance of Buddha's Life Stories (Jataka) which recount his generation of the aspiration to enlightenment and his practice of the six perfections. They also accept as literal the Discipline (Vinaya) which recounts Buddha's performance of the twelve deeds of a fully enlightened being.

The Bodhisattva path requires an accumulation of the collections of merit and wisdom for three periods of countless eons whereas the path of a Solitary Realizer requires only one hundred eons. A Buddha completely removes both the afflictive and non-afflictive obstructions whereas the Hearers and Solitary Realizers, though they utterly abandon the afflictive obstructions, only 'abandon' the non-afflictive obstructions through non-attachment. In the Vaibhashika system the afflictive obstructions are the conception of a self-sufficient person and the poisons of desire, hatred, and ignorance that result from it.
The non-afflictive obstructions are ignorance of the distant in time, the distant in place, the profound and subtle qualities of a Buddha, and subtle objects such as the subtle details of cause and effect relationships. These are eradicated through a Bodhisattva's great accumulation of merit.

With respect to how practitioners ascend the paths, the Vaibhashikas say that a rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizer and a Bodhisattva pass in one meditative sitting from the beginning of the path of preparation through the paths of seeing, meditation, and no more learning. Thus, a Buddha's body is an ordinary human body of matter and is a true suffering even though it no longer can generate suffering for him. It is a true suffering because his body receives its impetus from former contaminated actions and afflictions. Therefore, the Buddha Jewel that is the object of refuge only refers to the phenomena of no more learning in his continuum.

Famous Vaibhashika masters are Vasumitra, Dharmapala, Buddhadeva, Samghabhadra and so forth.

SAUTRANTIKA

The other Hinayana school of tenets is Sautrantika. Jam-yang-shay-ba distinguishes it from the Sautrantika that is a sub-school of Vaibhashika, but the scholar Dak-tsang (b.1405) of the Saga (Sa-skya) order, whom Jam-yang-shay-ba frequently refutes in his Great Exposition of Tenets, disagrees. He says that there are eighteen Hinayana sub-schools, seventeen Vaibhashika and one Sautrantika.

Etymologically, the Sautrantikas are so called because they rely mainly on sutras in propounding tenets. However, since all Buddhist systems cite scripture and reasoning to support their tenets, the name Sautrantika is not a definition but an indication of emphasis. Etymologies are traditionally examined to discover whether they apply to a wider or narrower range than the precise meaning of the word, or whether the etymology can also serve as a definition. Here, the etymology of Sautrantika covers a wider set than those actually indicated by the term.
The Sautrantikas are of two types: Followers of Scripture—mainly of Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Knowledge*—and Followers of Reasoning—mainly of Dignaga’s *Compendium of Valid Cognition* (*Pramanasamucchaya*) and Dharmakirti’s Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition (see Bibliography). The latter are considered to be the higher of the two because of their resemblance to Mahayana counterparts, the Chittamattrs Following Reasoning, and because their assertions on the processes of reasoning are more developed. The Ge-luk-ba order of Tibetan Buddhism, of which Jam-yang-shay-ba is a member, is fond of Dharmakirti’s logic, especially as described by his Sautranti followers. They see the Sautrantika system of Dharmottara and so forth as a stepping-stone to an understanding of Mahayana tenets—their fondness refuting any suggestion that the Hinayana schools are despised in Tibet.

The Followers of Reasoning are more famous than the Followers of Scripture for their works on logic, but it cannot be said that the Followers of Scripture are not advocates of reasoning. Dignaga himself was a student of Vasubandhu, who was a Sautrantika Following Scripture before becoming a Chittamattr, though Dignaga is said to have surpassed his teacher in the field of logic.

The tenets of the Sautrantikas Following Scripture are similar to those of the Vaibhashikas; however, they, along with the Followers of Reasoning, do not accept that past and future objects are instances of substantial entities. They also do not accept that a Foe Destroyer can fall from his attainment. All Sautrantikas agree that the Seven Treatises of Higher Knowledge were not uttered by Buddha, and most add that they were not even uttered by Foe Destroyers because the latter would not set forth mistaken teachings, such as that of the substantial existence of space. Sautrantikas say that space, analytical cessations, and non-analytical cessations are mere negatives or absences of tangibility, afflictions, and so forth and thus are only imputedly existent, though permanent in the sense of being non-disintegrating. All Sautrantikas also assert that cause and effect cannot be simultaneous and that a consciousness does not perceive its object
nakedly but is generated in its image. On these points the Sautrantikas disagree with the Vaibhashikas and agree with the Mahayana schools of tenets.

The differentiation between Sautrantika and the Mahayana schools is the former's agreement with Vaibhashika that objects, which are entities external to the consciousness perceiving them, truly exist. The Hinayana schools also do not assert that phenomena other than persons are selfless except in the sense that they do not exist as objects of use of a self-sufficient person. They consequently do not assert that there are obstructions to omniscience—obstructions to simultaneous cognition of all phenomena (*jneyavarana, shes bya’i sgribpa*). As a result, they also do not accept the ten Bodhisattva grounds.

The HTnayana schools do not accept the existence of a Buddha's Enjoyment Body (*Sambhogakaya, Longs sku*) which immortally preaches doctrine to Bodhisattva Superiors. Therefore, it is very difficult for one who is a Hfnayanist by tenet to become a Mahayanist by path as defined by the Mahayana schools. In order to do so, he would have to generate an altruistic aspiration to enlightenment, as a Mahayanist by path does when he takes upon himself the burden of freeing all sentient beings from cyclic existence and establishing them in the happiness of Buddhahood. Without the possibility of omniscience and an immortal Enjoyment Body, the generation of such an unusual compassionate attitude would be next to impossible.

Many of the HTnayana schools do not even accept the Mahayana sutras as being Buddha's word, thinking that many Mahayana teachings contradict the four seals. For instance, the teaching that a Buddha's Enjoyment Body abides forever without disintegrating contradicts the first seal that all products are impermanent. (The Mahayanists answer that though an Enjoyment Body disintegrates moment by moment, its continuum remains of the same type, unlike an ordinary body which becomes sick, old, and so forth; thus, it is immortal but still impermanent.) The Hfnayanists say that the Mahayana teaching that a Bodhisattva proceeds from joy to joy contradicts the second seal that all contaminated objects are miserable. They say
that the Mahayana teaching that through cultivating the path one attains a superior self contradicts the third seal that all phenomena are selfless. Also, they say that the teaching that a Hearer or Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer, after attaining a nirvana without remainder, enters into cultivation of the Mahayana path contradicts the fourth seal that nirvana is peace.

With such an aversion to the special Mahayana teachings that make an aspiration to help all sentient beings realistic, it would be almost impossible for a practitioner’s sense of compassion to counter the influence of such tenets. However, it is said that a few Hinayanists by tenet have generated the full aspiration to altruistic enlightenment as described in the Mahayana scriptures. They thus become Mahayanists in terms of their path and not just in the way that the Bodhisattva path is described by the Hinayana schools. For the Hinayana schools of tenets, the Bodhisattva path merely entails a much longer period of the collection of merit; it does not involve such unusual aspirations.

The most marked difference between the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning and those Following Scripture lies in their assertions on the two truths. The Followers of Scripture agree with the Vaibhashikas that ultimate truths are objects such as partless particles and partless moments of consciousness which can withstand breakage and analysis, still generating a consciousness that apprehends them. For the Followers of Reasoning, however, ultimate truths are objects ultimately able to perform a function, especially the function of creating an effect. For them, all impermanent objects are ultimate truths—truths for an ultimate consciousness which is not mistaken with respect to its appearing object.

Valid sense consciousnesses that correctly perceive visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects and mental consciousnesses that directly perceive such objects as the four noble truths are non-mistaken. However, an inferring consciousness, though non-mistaken with respect to its referent object, is mistaken with respect to its appearing object. The reason is that it perceives an image of an object, and the image appears to be that object. For instance, when an inferential consciousness
realizes the impermanence of an ox based on the sign that an ox is born and the pervasion of whatever is born by impermanence, the impermanence of an ox is its referent object. Its appearing object is a generic image or concept of the impermanence of an ox that seems to be the real thing; thus, it is said that a correct inferential consciousness is mistaken in terms of its appearing object.

Images or concepts, not being objects of a totally non-mistaken consciousness, are not ultimate truths. They also are not impermanent but permanent, not in the Vaibhashika and non-Buddhist sense of the continual existence of a thing from one moment to the next, but in the sense of not undergoing momentary disintegration.

Each person's images or concepts do indeed come into existence in dependence on the person's having formed an image of such an object, but from the viewpoint of their representing the exclusion of everything which is not that object, they are said to be permanent. For the non-Buddhist Forder systems, a generality (samanya, spyi) is permanent and partless. Through identifying it in one object, a person thereafter notices it in its other instances and thereby knows its manifestations. Thus, for the non-Buddhist Forders, the naming and noticing of objects is positive; terms and thoughts are affixed to objects through the power of the objects themselves. In short, for the Forders, one initially learns of the presence of a universal in an instance, and through that process of naming, one is able to know all instances of the universal when they appear in one's ken.

For the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning and for the Mahayana schools of tenets, the process of naming and noticing is negative or exclusionary. Ox appears as an exclusion (apoha, gzhan sel) of non-ox to a consciousness that thinks, 'Ox.' In other words, the process of naming relies on the elimination of non-ox. Without the appearance to the mind of something as the negative of non-ox, thought cannot identify 'ox'. Non-non-ox does indeed mean ox, but it must appear to the mind through the negative route of eliminating non-ox.

Though non-non-ox means ox, it is a negative implying a
positive object whereas ox is just a positive phenomenon. It is not that ox does not exclude or negate non-ox, but ox is positive rather than negative because ox does not appear to thought through an explicit exclusion of non-ox. A further complexity is that though ox is impermanent, the isolate of ox, which means ox in isolation, is permanent because of appearing only to thought, for ox devoid of all of its instances is something that can appear only to thought. Thus, though ox is the isolate of ox, the isolate of ox is not ox.

Furthermore, an appearance as non-non-ox (which here means a conceptual appearance of ox to a mental consciousness) is permanent, that is, non-disintegrating. Some contemporary Tibetan scholars identify this appearance (or as it has been translated here, generic image or meaning-generality) as the thing that appears to the mind when we think about 'ox'. They agree that it seems to move and change, sometimes being one color, sometimes another, etc., but they still say it is permanent because it does not disintegrate moment by moment as do external objects such as stones. The appearance of change is due to the mind. Others say that the appearance of this white-haired thing that appears to the inner mind is not the meaning-generality (arthasamanya, don spyi) of ox, but they have no identification of appearance in this context. One scholar says that the meaning-generality of ox is impermanent, an internally created picture, and added that when he says this in the debating courtyards, the heads of the other scholars split wide open.

In any case, the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning, as well as the Mahayanists, present an essentially negative or exclusionary process of naming. One takes as one's basis the white-haired thing and takes as one's reason the presence of certain characteristics such as a dew-lap and a hump and then applies the name 'ox' to a generic image or meaning-generality that is actually an appearance as non-non-ox. A consciousness which has such a generic image as its appearing object is mistaken in that it understands its referent objects, such as the actual many and various oxen, through the medium of an image which is not manifold and various—thereby confusing place, time, and nature. Thus,
an inferring consciousness realizing the impermanence of an ox, though valid with respect to its main object, impermanence, is mistaken in terms of its appearing object, an image of the impermanence of an ox which appears to be actual impermanence. A definite preference for direct cognition is implied, with inferential realization valued as a means to it.

A generic image or meaning-generality appears to the mind through dependence on thought, not through its own entity; therefore, it is said to be permanent. Such phenomena are conventional or obscured truths (samvritisatya, kun rdzob bden pa) because they are truths, or existents, for thought. Thought—the intellect—is obscured because it cannot act directly on permanent objects; it must work through the medium of images and concepts. The intellect, as has been seen, is mistaken; however, the intellect, when correct, does not conceive or hold the internal appearance as non-non-ox to be non-non-ox, that is, ox; such only appears to it, much as a reflection of a face in a mirror appears to be a face but is not usually conceived to be so. Thus, a correct intellectual consciousness is mistaken with regard to its appearing object but not with regard to its referent object.

The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning hold that the explicit objects of direct perception are impermanent objects. The Mahayanists, on the other hand, assert that the permanent phenomenon, emptiness, can be directly perceived. The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning explain that a yogi, in direct perception, explicitly realizes the impermanent mental and physical aggregates and implicitly realizes the permanent phenomenon of emptiness which in their system is the non-existence of the person as a self-sufficient entity. An emptiness is thus not an ultimate truth but an obscured truth because it is a truth for thought, appearing to the mind through the route of the negation of a self-sufficient person. A selflessness, or an emptiness, is a non-affirming negative (prasajyapratishedha, med dgag), not implying anything in its place, and thus is permanent and cannot be seen directly.

The Sautrantika emphasis on impermanent things is obvious: impermanent objects are called ultimate truths, and yogis, in the
most exalted of cognitions, explicitly realize not emptiness but the impermanent aggregates. If an object can perform the function of creating an effect, it is determined as ultimately existing; a pot, which for Vaibhashikas and for Sautrantikas Following Scripture is a conventional truth, is an ultimate truth for the Sautrantikas following Dharmakirti.

On the subject of impermanence itself the Sautrantikas offer a presentation that differs significantly from Vaibhashika and agrees with Mahayana. The Vaibhashikas say that production, abiding, aging, and disintegration are not four activities but four agents: (1) that which causes production, (2) that which causes aging, (3) that which causes abiding, and (4) that which causes disintegration. These four characteristics of impermanent phenomena are substantial entities separate from the phenomena themselves. They are said to exist simultaneously as characteristics of one phenomenon, but to perform their functions serially. According to the Vaibhashikas, the momentariness of impermanent things actually refers to the period of these four instants.

Both types of Sautrantikas, however, hold that (1) production is the new arising of what did not exist before, (2) abiding is the remaining of a type similar to what preceded it, (3) aging is the non-similarity in entity of a later moment and a former moment, and (4) disintegration is a product's not remaining a second moment after its present. All four characteristics exist simultaneously because what is newly produced is just what does not remain for a second moment. What is newly produced is also just what abides as a type similar to its preceding cause and is just what is a different entity from its former cause. Therefore, all products last only the instant of their production; they require no further cause for their disintegration than their own production. Products have a nature of momentary disintegration; it is not something else that makes them so.

The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning also differ from the Vaibhashikas in that they assert self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is here not introspection or self-awareness, but a consciousness's cognizance of itself non-dualistically much as the sun illumines itself while it illumines others. In this context,
self-consciousness has little function in the spiritual path, and despite its somewhat impressive name does not occupy even a degree of importance that elicits a clear position from each school. Still, self-consciousness figures into the definitions of the proponents of Hihayana tenets. The definition of a Vaibhashika is:

a Hihayana proponent of tenets who does not assert self-consciousness and who asserts the true existence of external objects—with qualification.

(The qualification excludes the Sautrantikas Following Scripture who seem also not to accept self-consciousness, but this is a matter of controversy.) The definition of a Sautrantika is:

a Htayana proponent of tenets who asserts the true existence of self-consciousness and of external objects—with qualification.
Chandrakirti
4 History of the Mahayana

Sources
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets

This great eon is called the Fortunate Eon because during it one thousand Buddhas will appear in this world. A great eon is composed of eighty intermediate eons, divided into four periods of twenty each for formation, abiding, destruction, and vacuity of the world system. The last great eon ended in a destruction by fire, in which the whole of the Desire Realm and the first of the four areas of the Form Realm, called the First Concentration, were destroyed.

The Four Concentrations are situated, one on top of the other, above the Desire Realm, which is our habitation. After seven great eons end with destructions by fire, the next one ends with destruction by water, during which the Second Concentration is also destroyed. After seven cycles ending in destruction by water, the Third Concentration is also destroyed by wind. The Fourth Concentration is never destroyed by fire, water, or wind because it is free from the eight faults of inhalation, exhalation, investigation, analysis, pleasure, pain, mental pleasure, and
Meditation on Emptiness

mental displeasure. The individual environments of the Fourth cease with the death of the being on which their existence depends.

When the twenty intermediate eons of formation in this eon began, the area of the First Concentration was formed, and sentient beings were born there once again. Thereafter, the four abodes of the Desire Realm gods who inhabit the sky were formed. Our own world, in a system of one billion worlds, was formed when a great and powerful blue wind began blowing and circulating in the shape of a half moon. Great rains of seven types of precious substances fell and formed a vast white round ocean, supported by the dense winds. From the turbulence of the ocean were formed a yellow square of gold and then earth. From the dependent-arising of the combination of these three, a red triangle of fire formed, at which time the basis of the great Mount Meru and its surrounding mountains, four continents, and eight sub-continents was complete.

At first the land surface was a marvelous substance that someone, through previous conditioning, was led into eating. Until that time, their spontaneously produced bodies had no anus or genitals; for the sake of excretion these now appeared. Gradually, the marvelous radiance of the beings degenerated, and the earth became hard with a corn-like plant growing in abundance. Some, however, were not satisfied with merely taking their portion day by day and began hoarding. Some began stealing; some killed; houses were built to hide the sexual act. Gradually the sins were committed, and the causes of birth in the bad migrations were made. The twenty eons of formation were finished with the formation of the birth-places for animals, hungry ghosts and hell-beings.

The pattern was produced a billion times simultaneously, providing lands for gods, demi-gods, humans, animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-beings in accordance with their nature as determined by previous deeds. The life-span for humans, which at that time was extremely long, gradually began to shorten, and when it was forty thousand years, the first of the thousand Buddhas of this great eon, Krakuchchhandha, appeared. When
the average life-span was thirty thousand years, the second Buddha, Kanakamuni, appeared. At twenty thousand years, the third, Kashyapa (who is to be distinguished from the Hearer Kashyapa who was Shakyamuni Buddha's senior disciple) appeared. When the average life-span was only one hundred years, the very length of which reflects the poor state of the world, the heroic Shakyamuni, already a Buddha, appeared simultaneously in all one billion worlds of this world system to show the way to enlightenment. His teaching will remain for five thousand years. Eventually, the human life-span will degenerate to an average of ten years, accompanied by a destruction of the beings—but not the environment—by either weapons, sickness, or starvation, the current intermediate eon ending with a destruction by weapons. The remaining beings will experience renunciation whereupon emanations of Buddhas will appear to lead them on the path of virtue due to which the life-span will again begin to lengthen. During the period of lengthening, no Buddhas will appear as such, with the next openly declared Buddha—Maitreya—appearing four billion nine hundred million human years from now after the next decrease has begun.

The current era is that of Shakyamuni Buddha, whose lineage is traced back to a child born from an egg. The egg formed from semen that dripped onto a sugar cane leaf from a man wrongly accused as a killer. He was strung up for punishment, and having proved his innocence through causing his teacher's very black face to turn golden, his semen dripped down onto a sugar cane leaf. It formed an egg which his teacher nurtured, and a child hatched. Thus, the child, the lineage, and eventually Shakyamuni himself came to be known as Sugar-Cane-One (Ikshvaku, Bu ram shingpa).

His clan was called Shakya or 'the able' because of the clan-king's amazement at his banished sons' and daughters' ability to inter-breed in exile. They had been banished to satisfy a second wife's wish for her son to become king, and later when the king's attitude changed, his family was sought in exile with resultant amazement at their prolific inter-breeding.

Shakyamuni Buddha lived for eighty-one years, during which
the highest of his philosophical teachings were the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. They present the most profound of all views, the absence of inherent existence in all phenomena. Offering the essence of Buddha's thought, they contain not only the doctrine of emptiness but also in hidden form, the modes of the paths to supreme enlightenment.

Four hundred years after Buddha's death, Nagarjuna, the prophesied upholder of Buddha's deepest teaching, was born.\(^228\) He systematically explained the meaning of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras in his *Treatise on the Middle Way* which is called 'fundamental' (mula) because it is the basic text of the Madhyamika system he founded. Living for six hundred years, his teachings are divided into three proclamations of doctrine which he performed based on former prayer-aspirations made in the presence of the Tathagata Lu-rik-gyel-bo (kLu-rigs-rgyal-po). Nagarjuna's first proclamation of doctrine began with his becoming a monk under the abbot of Nalanda, Rahulabhadra, that is, Saraha,\(^229\) at which time he was called Shriman (dPal-idan). While prefect of Nalanda, Nagarjuna protected the monks from famine through alchemy, exhorted the indolent, and expelled the wayward.

His second proclamation commenced before one hundred years had passed in his lifetime. He went to Naga-land, taught doctrine to the Nagas, and brought back to this 'continent' the *One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*, etc., along with a great quantity of clay from which he made almost ten million reliquaries (*stupa*) and many images. He composed the Five Collections of Reasonings that establish emptiness as the mode of existence of all phenomena and thus founded the Madhyamika system which avoids all extremes. At that time he was called Nagarjuna. Nagas, or dragons, have their abode in the ocean, have treasures such as wish-granting jewels, and spew forth fire from their mouths, burning fuel and overcoming others. Just so, Nagarjuna possessed the profound understanding that eradicates the two extremes, possessed the treasure of profound good doctrine, and burned the fuel of bad views, thus clearing away mental darkness. Also, just as Arjuna protected
the kingdom and tamed his enemies, so Nagarjuna protected the kingdom of doctrine and conquered the foe, cyclic existence, itself. Therefore, he was called Naga-Arjuna, Nagarjuna.

His third proclamation of doctrine commenced with a visit to the northern continent three hundred years into his lifetime. On the way he met the king Shatavahana, then in his youth, and prophesied his ascension to the throne. From the northern continent, where he stayed for two hundred years in altruistic activity, he wrote the king a letter called the Precious Garland of Advice for the King. When the average life-span was eighty years—nine hundred years after the death of Buddha and five hundred years into his lifetime—Nagarjuna came for the third time to South India, the first time being his birth and the second his return from Naga-land. He brought with him the Great Drum Sutra (Mahabheriharakaparivarta), the Lion’s Roar of ShrimaladevTSutra (ShrTmaladevTsimhanada), the Tathagata Essence Sutra (Tathagatagarbha), and the Ornament of the Wisdom Engaging the Sphere of All Buddhas Sutra (Sarvabuddhavishayavataraajnanalamkara). These four sutras became the basis of extensive explanation in Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle (Uttaratantra) which clarifies the meaning of the Tathagata essence, or emptiness of the mind, that permits development into Buddhahood.

During the third proclamation, Nagarjuna wrote praises of the Tathagata essence and lectured on the Great Drum Sutra etc., living another one hundred years. Upon his death he himself went to the Blissful Pure Land (Sukhdvati, bDe ba can) and sent a manifestation to the Joyous Pure Land (Tushita, dGa'Idan) to question Maitreya about the Great Drum Sutra. In the future he is to become a Buddha. After the passage of the thousand Buddhas of this eon, there will be sixty-two eons without the appearance of any; then, after one hundred thousand ten million Solitary Realizers have appeared, seven Buddhas will appear. Nagarjuna will appear as the eighth, living for fifteen intermediate eons in extremely favorable conditions, with his teaching remaining for ten billion years.

Since he was away from South India for such long periods,
many have thought that there were two or three Nagarjunas, but it is clearly indicated in the Great Cloud Sutra (Mahamegha) and the Great Drum Sutra that there was only one. With respect to his level of attainment, Bhavaviveka's disciple Avalokitavrata wrote, in accordance with the way things seemed to the world, that Nagarjuna was a first ground Bodhisattva; however, he actually was a seventh grounder who attained the eighth in that lifetime. Thus, the prophesies of Nagarjuna in the Descent into Lanka Sutra and the Fundamental Tantra of Manjushri (Manjushrimulatantra) as a first ground Bodhisattva should be taken to mean that although he was a seventh ground Bodhisattva, he manifested the ways of a first grounder for the sake of leading sentient beings. Still, the tantra system—which is accepted as having the final say—views Nagarjuna as having attained Buddhahood during that lifetime.

He did not newly invent the teachings of the Madhyamika system; Hihayana and Mahayana arose simultaneously during Shakyamuni’s lifetime. After his death, the Mahayana sutras remained in the lands of humans for forty years, but then with tumultuous times they disappeared. This is why the Mahayana had to be brought back, making it necessary for many authors to prove that it was the word of the Buddha—Maitreya in his Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras (Mahayanasutralamkara), Shantideva in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharyavatara), Bhavaviveka in his Heart of the Middle Way (Madhyamakaharodaya), etc. Though one hundred and twenty years after Buddha’s death the great religious king Ashoka respected and spread the teaching, it is clear that the Mahayana was then practically non-existent among humans; however, it had spread widely in the lands of gods and dragons and even in other areas. On this ‘continent’ it was limited to Bodhisattvas abiding on the earth and to tantric yogis who were secretly practicing it themselves and teaching it to the fortunate.

Because of the wide dissemination of the Hihayana Hearer orders, the Mahayana scriptures were as if non-existent. Though the great Brahmin Saraha appeared and spread mainly the Mahayana tantric teaching, it was the prophesied Nagarjuna
who restored the teaching of the Mahayana to the world and, through the help of his students, spread it widely. The chief of his students was Aryadeva who also attained the eighth Bodhisattva ground during that life. Nagarjuna and Aryadeva are called the Model Madhyamikas because the founders of the two branches of Madhyamika—Svatantrika and Prasangika—quote them as equally reliable sources.

Nine hundred years after Buddha's death and five hundred years into Nagarjuna's six hundred year life, the teacher Asanga was born. He attained the third Bodhisattva ground during that life and, roughly during the time of Nagarjuna's third proclamation of doctrine, founded the Chittamatra (Mind-Only) system. The timing had to have been like that, for Nagarjuna refuted mind-only in his *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment (Bodhichittavivarana)*, and this shows that he was still alive when the Chittamatra system was formed. In accordance with the doctrine of mind-only, Asanga commented on the meaning of the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Samdhinirmochana)* in his Five Treatises on the Levels and Two Compendiums, etc. (see Bibliography). However, in his commentary on Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle*, Asanga explained the thought of the *Questions of King Dharanishvara Sutra (DharanTshvararaja-pariprchcha)* and the *Tathagata Essence Sutra* in accordance with Prasangika, which was actually his own final system.

He showed that the mind-basis-of-all (*alayavijnana, kun gzhi mam shes*) is taught in Hihayana scriptures just as Nagarjuna had showed that the Madhyamika selflessness is taught in them and that the HTrnayana teaching of complete forsaking of the mental and physical aggregates in the final nirvana refers to the mode of appearance in meditative equipoise on emptiness.

Living for one hundred and fifty years, Asanga was mainly intent on founding the Chittamatra system. It is said that he did so in order to convert to the Mahayana his brother Vasubandhu who first was a Vaibhashika, then a Sautrantika, and finally a Chittamatrin due to Asanga's persistent efforts.

Just after Asanga's founding of the Chittamatra system, Buddhapalita laid the foundation for the Prasangika system with
the writing of his commentary on Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*. Even though Chandrakirti, through his defense of Buddhapalita, opened the way for Prasangika, Jam-yang-shay-ba considers Buddhapalita to be the founder. For, Buddhapalita in his commentary on the *Treatise on the Middle Way* used many consequences (*prasahga*, *thai 'gyur*) rather than syllogisms to establish emptiness. The commentaries by Devasharma, Gunashrf, Gunamati, and Sthiramati were not translated into Tibetan,238 but those authors as well as Bhavaviveka and his commentator, Avalokitavrata, mainly used syllogisms (*prayoga*, *shyor ba*). The other commentaries on the *Treatise*, the *Akutobhaya*—accepted as being falsely attributed to Nagarjuna239—and Chandrakirti’s *Clear Words* do not mainly use syllogisms; however, Buddhapalita's commentary predates Chandrakirti's. Also, the authorship of the short *Akutobhaya* is doubtful, though it certainly is not by Nagarjuna because his chief disciples did not quote it whereas they did liberally quote Nagarjuna’s commentary on his *Refutation of Objections* (*VigrahavyavartanI*). Also, chapter twenty-seven of the *Akutobhaya* quotes Aryadeva, and Nagarjuna would not have quoted his own student.240 Thus, because Buddhapalita was the first main commentator on the *Treatise* to use consequences instead of syllogisms, Jam-yang-shay-ba considers him to be the founder of the Prasangika system. Still, not even Jam-yang-shay-ba says that Buddhapalita specifically rejected the usage of syllogisms as the best means of generating in an opponent the view that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence.241

Buddhapalita is said to have written many books, but only his commentary on Nagarjuna’s *Treatise* survives in Tibetan or any other language. He achieved a meeting with Manjushri and attained tantric realization.

The great teacher Bhavaviveka (or Bhavyakara, Bhavaviveka, Bhavya, Bhavyaka, Bhavyakara, Bhavyaviveka, Bhaivikta, Bhaviveka, or Bhagavadviveka)242 author of many books and source for much of what is known about Buddhist and non-Buddhist tenets, objected to Buddhapalita's consequences used in refuting the four extreme types of production—from self,
other, both, or neither. Bhavaviveka also heartily refuted the Chittamatra position of no external objects and its notion that imaginary phenomena (*parikalpitadharma*, *kun btagspa'i chos*), such as analytical cessations, do not inherently exist. He asserted that all phenomena do not exist ultimately but do conventionally exist inherently or naturally; he thereby founded the great system of Svatantrika-Madhyamika.

Bhavaviveka is considered to be the founder of Svatantrika even though his commentator, Avalokitavrata, says that Bhavaviveka was following Devasharma's commentary on Nagarjuna's *Treatise*, for he was the first to set forth extensively the incorrectness of Chittamatra (which he considered to be just Asanga's fabrication and not taught by Buddha at all) and the correctness of Madhyamika within the context of asserting that conventionally all phenomena exist inherently. Similarly, Nagarjuna was preceded in his views by the king Indrabhuti and the great Brahmin Saraha, but they are not assigned as the founders of Madhyamika because they did not set off Madhyamika in contradistinction to the other Buddhist systems.\(^{243}\)

Bhavaviveka founded the Svatantrika system when Asanga's Chittamatra system had been widely disseminated. He vowed to attain Buddhahood during his life, but attained it in the next as Vajraghantapada. Both he and Chandrakirti were students of Nagarjuna toward the end of his six hundred year life.

After Bhavaviveka's founding of the Svatantrika system, Chandrakirti rejected the usage of autonomous syllogisms (*svatantraprayoga*, *rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba*) and established the Prasangika system as different from Svatantrika and the other Buddhist schools of tenets. He refuted inherent existence (*svabhavesiddhij rang bzhin gyis grub pa*) both ultimately and conventionally, establishing that even conventionally phenomena are only designated by thought.

Manjushri told Dzong-ka-ba, founder of the Ge-luk-ba order in Tibet, that the tenth ground Bodhisattva Chandrakirti had descended from a realm very high in the world system to spread Nagarjuna's system and that his explanations were in all ways reliable. Though Chandrakirti openly refuted Bhavaviveka,
Vasubandhu, Dharmapala, Dignaga, and so forth, no one openly refuted him. To some this shows that Chandrakirti lived much later than them; however, Jam-yang-shay-ba is of the opinion that Chandrakirti was an actual student of Nagarjuna. Dzong-ka-ba's disciple Kay-drup says that this view is supported by the masters of the Guhyasamaja Tantra (Guhyasamaja), scriptural citation, and reasoning. Thus, through living for three hundred years, Chandrakirti was roughly contemporaneous with those scholars whom he refuted.

In order to overcome others' sense that things exist the way they appear, Chandrakirti once milked a picture of a cow. Living for three hundred years in the usual gross physical body, he is said still to be alive in a rainbow body. As evidence of this, he met with a Tibetan translator of his Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'; due to his speaking quickly some errors appeared in the translation.

Just after Chandrakirti's three hundred years, Shantarakshita founded the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika system. He is similar to a Yogacharin, or Chittamatrin, in that he shows that external objects do not exist either conventionally or ultimately and that objects conventionally are of the same entity as the perceiving consciousness. He is a Svatantrika because he holds that phenomena only conventionally exist inherently and a Madhyamika because he accepts that all phenomena do not exist ultimately. Similarly, Bhavaviveka's Svatantrika-Madhyamika system is called Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika because, like a Sautrantika, he asserts the existence of objects external to a perceiving consciousness—that is, gross objects which are aggregates of particles. (Prasangikas assert conventionally existent objects that are external to a perceiving consciousness but are not aggregates of particles, only imputed to them.)

Just as Nagarjuna and Bhavaviveka were anticipated in their teachings by other scholars who, however, did not open a broad path for the chariots of their systems to travel, so Shantarakshita was anticipated by others. Vimuktisena's view is clearly that of a Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika, and Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayalamkara), which was brought
to this world by Asanga on his return from the Joyous Pure Land, manifests the same view. Also, it is clear that the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika system was present during the time of Bhavaviveka who was a definite predecessor of Shantaraksita. For he refuted it, saying that to accept mind-only first and then to pass on to the view of no ultimate existence is like spreading mud on the body and then washing. Avalokitavrata interprets Bhavaviveka’s referent as Chittamatra, but the only system that passes through the gradation of realizing first mind-only and then no ultimate existence is Yogachara-Svatantrika. Also, Yogachara-Svatantrika was present later when Shantaraksita was examining to discover which type of Madhyamika was the best. He made this choice and through his extensive works founded the system that was the final major development in the Madhyamika system, the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika. Chandrakirti’s Prasangika-Madhyamika, however, held sway, ultimately becoming the dominant system throughout Tibet and Mongolia.  

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### Chart 41: Mahayana Chronology in India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Event/Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 A.N. (After the Nirvana)</td>
<td>Buddha died, having lived eighty-one years and two months.⁴⁹⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 A.N.-1000 A.N.</td>
<td>Nagarjuna, the founder of the Mahayana system in general and the Madhyamika system in particular.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900 A.N.-1050 A.N.</td>
<td>Asanga, the founder of the Chittamatra system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. 975 A.N.-1275 A.N.</td>
<td>Chandrakirti, the disseminator of Prasangika.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bhavaviveka, the founder of Svatantrika-Madhyamika in general and Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika in particular, preceded Chandrakirti by a little, and Buddhapalita, the founder of Prasangika-Madhyamika, preceded Bhavaviveka by a little. Shakyamitra, Nagabodhi, and Ashvaghosha were students of Nagarjuna near the end of his life.

Padmasambhava died in 864 A.D. after living one thousand seven hundred and seventy-three years, and Shantaraksita died in 845 A.D. after living nine hundred and ninety-nine years.⁵⁰⁰
5 Chittamatra

Sources
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Corresponding section of the translation pp.602-20

The Chittamatrins (Mind-Only-ists) are so called because they assert that all phenomena are of the nature or entity of the mind.²⁵¹ (They are also called Vijnanavadins and Vijnaptivadins for the same reason.) This is not the same as asserting that all phenomena are mind because minds are observers of objects, and if all phenomena were minds, stones and so forth would absurdly have objects of observation.²⁵² Rather, just as dream objects are not the mind that perceives them but also not separate entities from the mind, so the objects of the world are not the consciousnesses that perceive them but also not separate entities from those consciousnesses.

Another name for Chittamatrins is Yogacharins, (Practitioners of Yoga), because they arrange the practices of the path "from the viewpoint of yoga. This, however, is just an etymology and not
a definition because all Buddhist tenets are presented for the sake of yogic practice.\textsuperscript{253}

The Chittamatrins are divided, like the Sautrantikas, into Followers of Scripture and Reasoning. The former are followers mainly of Asanga's Five Treatises on the Levels, and the latter of Dignaga's \textit{Compendium of Valid Cognition} and Dharmak\textit{frt}i's Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition. Though, in general, the term 'Chittamatrin' refers to the Followers of Scripture, that is, of Asanga, the Followers of Reasoning are said to be the more advanced of the two groups.\textsuperscript{254} This is because Asanga teaches that there are three final vehicles, meaning that some sentient beings never achieve Buddhahood because their vehicle is completed at a lower stage on which they remain forever. According to him, some Hearers only realize that a person is not a self-sufficient entity and never realize that objects and subjects are empty of being separate entities. These Hearers aim only toward a solitary peace. The Chittamatrin followers of Dharmak\textit{frt}i, however, point to the impermanence of fetters and to the skill of the Buddha in teaching and thereby show that all eventually cognize both selflessnesses and attain the highest enlightenment. Thus for them there is only one final vehicle and all sentient beings eventually attain Buddhahood.

The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning interpret Dharmak\textit{frt}i's teachings otherwise and accept three final vehicles but with only one type of realization of selflessness. This selflessness is the emptiness, or absence, of a self-sufficient person. In both Chittamatra schools, however, there are different types of selflessness which vary in difficulty of realization, it being more difficult to realize that objects and subjects are empty of being separate entities than to realize that a person is not a self-sufficient entity. Thus, there are two types of selflessness: one of phenomena in general and one only of persons.

The Chittamatra Followers of Scripture are the only Buddhist school to accept eight consciousnesses: the five sense consciousnesses, a mental consciousness, a mind afflicted with egoism (\textit{k\textit{lishtamanus, nyon yid}) and a mind-basis-of-all (\textit{alayavijnana, kun gzhi rnam shes}). The Followers of Reasoning and all other
Buddhist schools assert only six consciousnesses with some of the functions of the seventh and eighth being performed by the mental consciousness. There are sub-schools of Chittamatra which assert one, two, seven, and nine consciousnesses, but they are considered to have strayed from the positions of the four Buddhist schools of tenets.

The definition of a Chittamatin is:

a person propounding Buddhist tenets who uses reasoning to refute external objects and who asserts that dependent phenomena, such as consciousnesses, truly exist.

MIND-ONLY

Mind-only is the very core of the Chittamatin teachings; for them it means that there are no objects which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness. They and the Yogachara-Svatantrikas, who assert mind-only conventionally, are the only Buddhist schools which assert that there are no external objects. All the other schools—Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Sautrantika-Svatantrika, and Prasangika—assert that an object of a sense consciousness is an entity external to the perceiving consciousness. For them, objects are a cause of a consciousness in that they cause it to be produced in their image. Causes must exist before their effects, not simultaneously or afterward because nothing can affect an already existent entity in that very moment. Thus, because of the cause and effect relationship of object and sense consciousness, and because causally related things must be different entities, the non-mind-only oriented schools assert that object and subject are different entities.

The Chittamatrins disagree, saying that Buddha taught that a sense consciousness perceives a present object, whereas if object and subject were cause and effect, then, since a cause has ceased when its effect exists, a sense consciousness would be perceiving a past object. The non-mind-only schools must accept that an object of a sense consciousness exists one instant prior to its
apprehender, but they say that the object is present in that there is no moment intervening between the object moment and the perceiver moment. The Chittamatrins, however, are able to uphold Buddha’s teaching on this point without any qualifications; for them, object and subject exist simultaneously. A seed (bija, sa bon) or predisposition (vasana, bag chags) is activated and simultaneously produces both an object and a cognizing subject, much as in a dream. (A Buddha has no seeds or latencies but perceives objects through the complete awakening or actualization of his collections of merit and wisdom.)

For the Chittamatrins, an object is of the same nature or entity as its perceiving subject, although an object is not a mind, not a cognizing agent, illuminating and realizing objects. If an object were a mind, it would have to be shown that it apprehends objects, and such cannot be shown. In this way, with object and subject the same entity and different isolates, not synonyms but mutually exclusive with one never the other, the Chittamatrins are able to uphold mind-only and still present the five aggregates, including forms. There are no forms that are separate entities from a perceiving consciousness, but there are forms that are the same entity as a perceiving consciousness. Again, as with the Prasangikas’ assertion of nominally existent objects, the view is extremely subtle, and it should not be thought that because the system says there are objects, it is referring to objects as one knows them. For, a sense consciousness of a sentient being perceives objects as if they were distant and cut off, whereas the objects declared to be existent in the Chittamatra system are not cut off from the subject.

According to the Chittamatrins, the final root of cyclic existence is the conception that object and subject are different entities; this is the subtlest and strongest of all misconceptions, and when it is destroyed, all misconceptions are destroyed. Thus, the subtle selflessness of all phenomena is a non-difference in entity between subject and object. Bodhisattvas mainly meditate on this and thereby overcome the obstructions to simultaneous and direct cognition of all phenomena.

Included in the obstructions to simultaneous and direct
cognition of all objects of knowledge, together with the conception of object and subject as different entities, is the conception that phenomena naturally exist as the grounds or bases of engagement of names. The non-existence of objects as natural bases of engagement of names is a selflessness of phenomena that is as subtle as the non-existence of subject and object as different entities, but is easier to realize. An understanding of it serves as a means of entering into an understanding of non-duality.

In refuting that phenomena naturally exist as grounds or bases of names, the Chittamatrins are not merely saying that the appearing objects of thought, meaning-generalities, do not naturally exist because of depending on thought. For the Sautrantikas propound such, and here a subtle selflessness of phenomena must be more subtle than anything found in the lower systems of tenets. Nor are they saying that forms and so forth do not naturally exist because for them forms naturally exist as unpredicable phenomena. Forms do naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist because if they did not, they would not exist at all. For the Chittamatrins, the Prasangika view that objects do not naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist is a denial of phenomena; if impermanent things did not naturally exist, they would be totally non-existent.

When the Chittamatrins speak of objects as not being naturally bases of names, they base this on the adventitious relationship between objects and names and between names and objects. For instance, when an ordinary being’s eye consciousness perceives a pot, the pot not only appears to be a bulbous thing able to hold fluid, but also the bulbous thing appears to be the basis of the designation ‘pot’. The bulbous thing seems to be the basis of the designation ‘pot’ by way of its own being and not just established so by verbal convention. After an eye consciousness perceives the object, thought imputes, ‘This is a pot,’ without the intervention of any other thought. The sense consciousness alone is able to draw thought into imputing, ‘This is a pot,’ without the aid of intervening reflection. Therefore, when another asks what the expression ‘pot’ means, people do not say ‘It is the "pot" that is only nominally imputed to a bulbous thing capable
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of holding water.' They say, 'It is a bulbous thing capable of holding water.'

Due to previous conditioning, objects falsely appear to sense consciousnesses as if naturally bases of names, and then thought, assenting to this appearance, falsely conceives them likewise. This is the Chittamatrin assertion. The Sautrantikas say that both the appearance of objects as naturally bases of names and the conception of them as so are correct because sense objects are truly existent external objects, and when they appear to a faultless sense consciousness, their very mode of being must appear just as it is. Still, they say that mental images which appear to internal thought do not naturally exist and are only a reification of what depends on thought for its existence.

In the Chittamatra system, forms and so forth are not external objects; they appear to be external objects through the force of predispositions accumulated through beginningless conditioning to the naming of objects. Forms are only of the nature of inner consciousness, but appear to be natural bases of names through the force of predispositions for expression. Therefore, the appearance of forms as naturally existent bases of names is not suitable to arise from the way things are, without dependence on establishment by names and thoughts. Otherwise, the fact that forms are the bases of names would not depend on a consciousness, in which case forms would be different entities from a perceiving consciousness, and this is refuted by many reasonings. The assertion that things are not by way of their own character grounds of the designation of names meets back to the assertion that subject and object are not different entities.

If the opposite were true—if things were naturally bases of names—then the establishment of a bulbous thing as the basis of the name 'pot' would not depend on thought because it would exist as the basis of the name 'pot' through its own mode of being. If this were accepted, then the generation of a consciousness that thinks, 'Pot,' would not depend on thought. If this were accepted, then it would follow that before one learned the name 'pot' a consciousness thinking, 'This is a pot,' would be generated through only looking at a bulbous thing.
Furthermore, since one being who has many names would inherently be the bases of these names, this one being would have to be that many beings. Just as the names appear to be different to thought, their objects would have to be different in reality because objects would naturally generate a naming consciousness.

Also, two beings who have the same name would be one being, similar to their one name which appears the same to thought. Therefore, phenomena do not naturally exist as bases of the affixing of names, and thought which apprehends them so is mistaken. It is undeniable that beings perceive objects as if they were of their own nature the bases of the affixing of names; this false perception must be destroyed.

One is exhorted to engage in the four investigations and the four cognitions:

1 investigation into whether names are merely adventitious, mere imputation, or whether they are designated through the force of the object's own mode of being
2 investigation into whether objects naturally or adventitiously exist as bases of names
3 investigation into whether in the designation of entities the relationship between the word and the object exists substantially
4 investigation into whether objects exist naturally as bases of the designation of qualities, such as their production, destruction, color, impermanence, and use.

1 realization that names do not exist inherently in the objects they denote
2 realization that objects do not exist inherently as the bases of the designation of names
3 realization that the designation of entities based on the relationship of names and objects does not exist inherently
4 realization that the designation of qualities does not exist inherently.

The latter four are realized conceptually on a Bodhisattva's paths
of accumulation and preparation and directly or non-conceptually on
the paths of seeing, meditation, and no more learning. They
act as a means of entering into a realization of mind-only.

Through establishing that a mental consciousness is mistaken
when it apprehends objects as naturally existent bases of names,
it is also established that such an appearance to a sense con-
sciousness is mistaken. It is thereby negated that objects are
external entities, unrelated to consciousness, and thus it is estab-
lished that objects are only appearances to the consciousness that
apprehends them. Thereby, it is refuted that a spot of blue, for
instance, is a different entity from its perceiving consciousness.

Asanga collected many examples from sutras to show that
cognition is possible without external objects. For instance, no
one considers it to be contradictory for a yogi who is meditating
on ugliness to have a consciousness of an image of foulness with-
out this foulness existing in reality. Just so, it is not contradictory
to have a consciousness of external objects due to the predisposi-
tions of ignorance even though there are no external objects.

Similarly, hell-beings see a bowl of fluid as molten bronze. Hungry
ghosts see it as pus and blood; animals such as fish, as an
abode; humans, as water for drinking; gods, as ambrosia. If these
existed as external objects, there would be the contradiction of
one thing having many contrary natures. Therefore, everything
is just consciousness, that is, of the nature of mind.

Furthermore, if there were external objects, the externality of
objects would be their mode of being, and thus the uncontamina-
ted wisdom that cognizes the mode of being would be concep-
tual. Ordinary beings would absurdly be directly perceiving the
mode of being and so would lack ignorance. There also would be
no liberation from ignorance and thus no means of developing
an omniscient consciousness. Therefore, external objects are
only fabrications of thought.

The example of a magician’s illusions is given to overcome
doubt that without external objects one could not apprehend
objects. The example of a mirage is given to overcome doubt
about how minds and mental factors could be produced without
external objects. The example of a dream is given to overcome
doubt about how one could find things attractive and unattrac-
tive without external objects. The example of a hallucination is
given to overcome doubt about how the varieties of conscious-
ness could be produced without external objects. The example
of an echo is given to overcome doubt about how the various
expressions could arise without external objects. The example
of a moon reflected in water is given to overcome doubt about how
an image that is an object of meditative stabilization could arise
without external objects. The example of magical manifestation
is given to overcome doubt about how Bodhisattvas are born in
accordance with the thoughts of beings.

From these examples of the production of a consciousness
without the presence of an external object one can realize that it
is possible for external objects to be non-existent.

The Chittamatrins refute the view that material objects are
constructed from the amassing of partless particles through
pointing out that if a partless particle is surrounded by other par-
ticles, the place where one of the surrounders touches the one in
the center would not be the place where the others do and thus
there would be touched and untouched parts. Or, if the sup-
posed six particles surrounding the center one all touch the same
place on the center particle, then nothing could be larger than
the one partless particle. Some respond saying that the sur-
rounding particles do not touch the center particles, but it is
answered that nevertheless one of the surrounders would be
closer to one side of the center particle than the others, and so the
center particle would have to have sides and thus parts.

Furthermore, a spot of blue and an eye consciousness that
apprehends it are not different entities because the observation
of one by a valid cognizer is co-extensive with the observation of
the other by a valid cognizer. In other words, whenever an eye
consciousness observes an object, a self-consciousness observes
the eye consciousness. (For Chittamatrins and some Sautranti-
kas every consciousness is self-conscious because later when an
object seen is remembered, one also remembers the subject.
This shows that the subject must have perceived itself at the
same time as it was perceiving its object; otherwise, the subjective
element would not be remembered.) Dharmakirti states the reasoning of necessary simultaneity of observation of the subject and the object to prove that a sense consciousness and its objects are not different entities. This is based on the concomitance of whatever are necessarily simultaneously observed with absence of difference of entity.

Jang-gya explains that the above reasoning does not just prove a non-affirming negative which is a non-difference of entity of subject and object; it also implicitly proves that a sense object and a sense consciousness which apprehends this object are one entity. For if two things that exist are not different entities, they must be one entity. Also, this reasoning is used as a means to realize mind-only; therefore, how could it merely be establishing a non-affirming negative—a non-difference of entity of subject and object? To cognize the thesis would imply a cognition of sameness of entity of subject and object. Thus, Jang-gya, unlike Jam-yang-shay-ba, finds it difficult to say that for Chittamatrins what is being proved here is just a non-affirming negative. However, on other occasions, he seems to agree with Jam-yang-shay-ba that a subtle selflessness of all phenomena is a non-affirming negative—a mere non-difference in entity between subject and object. This non-affirming negative is a quality of each and every phenomenon because an object is empty of, or lacks, a difference in entity from a subject, and a subject is empty of a difference in entity from its object. Each phenomenon from a form through to an omniscient consciousness possesses such a quality, which is an ultimate truth because of being a final object of observation of a path of purification. Blind to this excellent quality, sentient beings wander in cyclic existence, assenting habitually to the false appearance to their senses of a difference in entity between subject and object.

**PRASANGIKA CRITIQUE OF MIND-ONLY**

The Prasangikas say that Buddha set forth a non-literal teaching of mind-only in order to overcome certain trainees' attachment to forms; the basis in his own thought was the fact that the mind
is the principal creator of everything. The explicit teaching that objects are of the same entity as the mind is refuted by the reasoning that subject and (external) object are mutually existent; if one exists, the other must exist, and if one does not exist, the other must not exist. Therefore, mind-only in the sense of no external objects is not taken literally. Both object and subject are conventionally existent, and conventionally there are objects external to a perceiving consciousness.

According to Prasangika, the mind is the principal creator of everything because sentient beings accumulate predisposing potencies through their actions, and these actions are directed by mental motivation. These potencies are what create not only their own lives but also the physical world about them. All environments are formed by \textit{karma}, that is, actions and the potencies they establish. The wind, sun, earth, trees, what is enjoyed, used, and suffered—all are produced from actions. Potencies on the mind of each person in combination with those of similar beings create the very substance of their world system. The Prasangika assertion is not like the Chittamatrin one that a potency or seed simultaneously creates a cognizing subject and a cognized object. Rather, the physical world is constructed through the former actions of beings of similar type, and that world is conventionally an entity external to a consciousness which perceives it. For, the world of objects acts as a cause of consciousness, affecting it in various ways.

Still, the mind, the motivator of actions, is the principal creator. The Prasangika view, like that of Chittamatra, is of a world inextricably involved with the person. Mahayanists practice the Bodhisattva deeds of compassion with a view toward the creation of pure lands for temporary Emanations (\textit{Nirmanakaya}, \textit{sPrul sku}), who are surrounded by both common beings and Superiors, and a Highest Pure Land (\textit{Akanishta, \ 'Og min}) for their immortal Enjoyment Body (\textit{Sambhogakaya, Longs sku}) which is surrounded only by Bodhisattva Superiors. In these lands one provides the conditions for others to advance on the path, including the land on which they stand. Perhaps it could be said that development of the ability to produce pure lands is a
consciously sublimation of the uncontrolled process of the creation of less suitable worlds by contaminated actions.

Both Chittamatrins and Prasangikas accept roughly the same presentation of phenomena; they disagree on their nature. For instance, both schools accept that when different types of beings look at a bowl of fluid, the fluid actually becomes different things. For a human it is cool water; for a god, ambrosia; for a hungry ghost, pus and blood etc. To a Chittamatrin this in itself proves that there are no external objects; the very world of objects is under the influence of the mind, changing in entity due to the presence of different types of beings. To a Prasangika, however, such changes in the external world show that objects do not inherently exist and show how powerful the mind and the potencies of actions are. Such changes are a sign of the lack of inherent existence in that objects depend on their perceivers and are not existent just in and of themselves under their own power. Even when a human and a hungry ghost perceive a bowl full of fluid simultaneously, a Prasangika is ready to say that there are two parts to the fluid, one water and one pus and blood, existing simultaneously as external objects. It is even said that a hungry ghost, who possesses a coarse body, can stand in the same spot as a human, who also possesses a coarse body.

For a Prasangika, the examples of dreams and so forth show that objects can appear to be inherently existent but not be so; they can be unfindable among their bases of imputation and still be effective. That objects are not naturally bases of names proves, for a Prasangika, that phenomena do not inherently exist; the Chittamatrans misunderstand the import when they add that sense objects are inexpressible truly existent phenomena. From their examination of names and the naming process the Chittamatrans make the unwarranted conclusion that objects are of the nature of the mind. They mistakenly think that by knowing that a sense consciousness misperceives its objects as naturally bases of names one will somehow be caused to realize that the perception of objects as external entities is mistaken. For the Prasangikas the reasoning which proves that objects are not naturally bases of the designation of names proves that all phenomena do not inherently exist. All
phenomena depend on the mind which imputes them; this very
dependence is a sign of their non-inherent existence. Still, the
Chittamatin analysis of names and objects is a stepping-stone to
the Prasangikas' more subtle teaching.

According to Prasangika it is simply wrong to say that a spot of
blue and an eye consciousness that apprehends it are necessarily
simultaneously observed by valid cognizers and, therefore, are
not different entities. For there is no self-consciousness. If there
were self-consciousness, then agent and object would be one; a
knife could cut itself; a finger could touch itself, with toucher
and touched exactly identical. A lamp does not illumine both
itself and the other because a flame itself has no darkness to clear
away; it is bright by nature. If light illumined light, then dark-
ness would obscure darkness in which case darkness would not
be seen.

Here 'self-consciousness' (svasamvedana, rang rig) refers
specifically to a consciousness's cognition of itself simultaneous
with cognizing its object and does not refer to introspection or
watching oneself. All systems advocate reliance on introspection
and self-awareness which are essentials for effective meditation;
in these cases the mind is perceiving a previous moment of the
mind or a part of the mind is perceiving the general mind. Even
in systems that assert self-consciousness, it is not an aid to self-
awareness. 'Self' in 'self-consciousness' means the consciousness
itself and not the person. Self-consciousness is a consciousness's
perceiving itself in a non-dualistic manner; it does not involve
analysis such as whether the mind is wandering or remaining
with its object.\textsuperscript{262}

Without self-consciousness, it cannot be shown that an eye
consciousness apprehending a spot of blue is observed by a self-
consciousness at the same time that the spot of blue is observed
by the eye consciousness. Thus, another supposed proof of
the non-existence of external objects falls, the conclusion for
Prasangika being that a difference in entity between subject and
object exists conventionally though certainly not in the manner
in which common beings perceive it.

Still, for Chandrakirti not all teachings of mind-only even
literally mean that there are no external objects; sometimes this teaching literally and without interpretation indicates that the mind is the principal creator of all the varieties of objects. Thus, there are two types of mind-only doctrines: non-literal and literal. Both need finally to be interpreted to discover the final mode of existence of the mind and its objects as lacking inherent existence, but when the teaching of mind-only only indicates that the mind is the principal creator as in the Sutra on the Ten Grounds, it is validly established and literal. This is Chandrakirti’s Prasangika interpretation of the literal and non-literal teachings of mind-only.

The Sautrantika-Svatantrika Bhavaviveka is far more severe. He says that Buddha never taught a mind-only which means no external objects; even the teachings that Chandrakirti accepts as superficially teaching no external objects Bhavaviveka says do not. They are all literal, teaching that the mind is the principal creator. Bhavaviveka accuses Asanga of fabricating a teaching of no external objects and polluting Buddha’s teaching out of pride in his abilities as a scholar. Bhavaviveka takes the Yogachara-Svatantrika teaching that first one realizes mind-only and afterwards realizes the lack of true existence of the mind and compares it to first smearing mud on the body and then bathing. He questions why one should not from the beginning attempt the best teaching which is the lack of true existence of all objects. For him the Chittamatra emptiness is not a step on the ladder toward the Madhyamika emptiness whereas for the Ge-luk-bas it is.

Still, according to the Ge-luk-ba interpretation of Prasangika one cannot be liberated from cyclic existence through cognizing a lack of difference in entity between subject and object and cannot attain omniscience through the Chittamatra system. For the Prasangikas, to be a Superior (Aryan, ‘Phagspa)—one who has attained a direct cognition of emptiness either as a Hearer, Solitary Realizer, or Bodhisattva and thereby risen above common beings—means that one has cognized the absence of inherent existence of all phenomena. Unlike the other Mahayana schools, the Prasangikas assert that all Superiors, whether Hihayana or Mahayana, cognize the same emptiness; Mahayanists are
more intelligent and their mode of cognition is more forceful, but the emptiness cognized is the same for all. Without cogniz-
ing the lack of inherent existence of the person, one cannot be liberated from cyclic existence, and the very cognition of the absence of inherent existence in the person implies the ability to cognize its absence in other phenomena, such as mind, body, possessions, and so forth, because the mode of emptiness is simi-
or. It is only the base of the predicate emptiness that is different.

Despite the Prasangikas' view on the profound attainment of all Superiors, Hihayana and Mahayana, they do not accept that one can be liberated through cognizing emptiness as set forth by the other Buddhist tenet systems, Hihayana or Mahayana. One is thus to distinguish between HTnayana and Mahayana as modes of the practice of paths and as systems of tenets that describe the paths followed by HTnayanists and Mahayanists.

Consequently, there are Prasangikas who attempt to cognize the emptiness of inherent existence as HTnayanists, that is to say, with the motivation of liberating only themselves from cyclic existence. They are Mahayanists by tenet but Hlhayanists by path. A Prasangika can be a Mahayanist by path only through generating in his or her mental continuum the non-artificial determination to attain Buddhahood in order to liberate all sentient beings from misery and join all with happiness. He must generate an attitude of compassion which exceeds the usual by taking upon himself alone the burden of liberating all beings from suffering. Through much artificial practice he must bring this wish to the point of spontaneity. Finally, whether walking, eating, standing, or lying down he is able to generate a sense of dedication toward altruistic enlightenment through just turning his mind to the topic. When he is able to do this out of meditative session just as strongly as he can at the time of meditation, this is the sign that he has attained the spontaneous aspiration to enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings. Thereby, he becomes a Bodhisattva and attains the path of accumulation, which is this spontaneous wish itself as well as his other prac-
tices. He then becomes a Mahayanist by both path and tenet.

Buddha Superiors as well as Bodhisattva, Solitary Realizer,
and Hearer Superiors are all Prasangikas by tenet because they have cognized emptiness directly. The attainment of special insight into emptiness is simultaneous with the attainment of the path of preparation, and thus even persons on any of the three paths of preparation (Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva) must also be Prasangikas.265

Cognition of a non-difference in entity between object and subject is mistaken because it contradicts what exists, since a difference does exist conventionally. It must be remembered that for something to be conventionally or nominally existent the object cannot be found separate from or among the bases of its designation. Also, it must be remembered that the mode of direct cognition of emptiness is such that subject and object are undifferentiated like fresh water poured into fresh water and that a Buddha continually abides in this state even when he is perceiving conventional objects. Perhaps, the Chittamatrins are attempting to describe this aspect of the final state and extend its significance to every mental state.

The Prasangikas are describing another aspect, the continual perception of the unfindability of the imputed object in its bases of imputation, relegating the unusual mode of direct cognition of this unfindability to the analogy of water poured into water. Also, when Prasangikas practice the stage of generation in Highest Yoga Tantra, they visualize themselves as deities and their surroundings as the habitation of a deity, with the persons and objects forming their environment as the same entity as themselves. It is specifically said that one is not to view the surrounding sentient beings as having minds that are entities separate from one’s own mind. The sameness of entity of subject and object is brought into practice as an aid to realizing the more subtle presentation of emptiness as the lack of inherent existence.

The Prasangikas do not say that the Chittamatrin teachings are not appropriate for certain trainees; at issue is which teaching is the higher, which can liberate sentient beings from cyclic existence, and which can establish sentient beings in omniscience. Their exclusivity comes in declaring their own teaching
to be the only final teaching. For either school to declare that the other is its equal would be to deny their own emphasis on reasoning as a means of bridging the gap between misconception and insight.

BUDDHA NATURE

In the Tathagata Essence Sutra, the Nirvana Sutra, and so forth, Buddha speaks of a permanent, fully developed Buddha possessing the ten powers and existing in the continuum of each sentient being. The Prasangikas say that this teaching is an example of giving to the 'cause' the name of the effect, for the emptiness of the mind of each sentient being is what allows for change of that person's mind, and this emptiness is being called a fully developed Buddha. The emptiness of the mind, its lack of existence by way of its own being or its dependence on causes and conditions, is that most marvelous quality of the mind allowing it to be transformed into the wisdom of a Buddha. This emptiness is not a fully developed Buddha but is like a 'cause' of Buddhahood in that if the mind did not lack inherent existence, it would be utterly static, unable to be affected by practice of the paths.

Buddha praised this essential and marvelous 'cause' calling it a fully developed Buddha. In order to lead beings who were incapable of understanding emptiness correctly, he taught a Tathagata essence which is a fully developed Buddha obscured in the sheath of misconception. The basis in his thought was the existence of the Tathagata essence or Buddha nature which is the emptiness of the mind—not a fully developed Buddha, which could never be obscured, dulled, or hidden by anything. Buddhahood is not a temporary but an immortal state in which body and mind, though impermanent, are similarly and endlessly produced.

Buddha set forth the non-literal teaching of a Tathagata essence for Mahayana trainees who are not yet able to cognize the profound emptiness; he taught it in order to allay their fears of emptiness. The refutation of the explicit teaching is that all
sentient beings would be Buddhas, and practice of the path would be senseless.

The Buddha nature, that is, emptiness of the mind, of each sentient being is his natural lineage, that quality which naturally abides in the mental continuums of all sentient beings allowing them to attain Buddhahood and thus giving them the Buddha lineage (gotra, rigs) or Buddha constituent (dhatu, khams). It is called a 'cause' of development into Buddhahood even though, being permanent, it is not actually so. The emptiness of the mind is permanent, or non-disintegrating, because although it is a predicate of the mind, it is not produced and destroyed each moment as the mind is. Emptiness is the mere negative or absence of objective existence. 'Permanent' for all Buddhist schools except Vaibhashika means 'non-disintegrating', without necessarily indicating perpetual existence. However, the emptiness of the mind is both non-disintegrating and always existent because from beginningless cyclic existence each sentient being's mind has existed and will continue to exist uninterruptedly right through Buddhahood when it is the Wisdom Body (Jnanakaya, Ye shes kyi sku). The emptiness of the mind, because it is the precondition of change and transformation, is called a 'cause' of Buddhahood and according to a practitioner's position on the path is temporarily called a Hearer, Solitary Realizer, or Bodhisattva lineage. At Buddhahood, the Bodhisattva lineage becomes the Nature Body (Svabhavikakaya, Ngo bo nyid sku) of a Buddha. Though the emptiness of the mind is permanent and non-changing, it is said to improve when the mind of which it is a predicate improves. Finally, the mind itself reaches consummation as the Wisdom Body, and the emptiness of the mind becomes the Nature Body—these being the two aspects of a Buddha's Truth Body (Dharmakaya, Chos sku), so called because the Wisdom Body is the ultimate true path and the Nature Body is the ultimate true cessation.

For the Chittamatrins also, the teaching of a Tathagata essence as a fully developed Buddha in the continuums of all sentient beings is non-literal. For them, the basis in Buddha's thought was the mind-basis-of-all (alayavijnana, kun gzhi mam
shes), the impermanent basis of all attainments. A seed naturally abiding in the mind-basis-of-all is the natural lineage, an impermanent phenomenon which is the potential for spiritual attainment. Here, it is not emptiness that is called the Buddha nature but a potency predisposing the individual to certain paths and allowing the attainment of states that never existed before in the mental continuum. This seed, therefore, is not planted or established newly 'on' the mind-basis-of-all but abides there naturally, without beginning.

In sum, neither Chittamatrins nor Prasangikas accept as literal the teaching of a permanent body of Buddha obscured in the continuums of all sentient beings. According to the Ge-luk-bas an assertion of this teaching as literal is beyond the pale of the four schools of tenets of this Buddha's teachings. The Prasangikas, taking the Descent into Lanka Sutra as their source, show that the teaching of a permanent essence points to the lack of independent existence of the mind, that quality which when cognized can lead to Buddhahood. Emptiness in general is the element of (superior) qualities (dharmadhatu, chos dbyings) because meditation on it acts as a cause generating the qualities of Superiors. The emptiness of the mind is singled out as the Buddha nature because it specifically allows for mental improvement and the cognition of what previously was not cognized.

MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL

According to the Chittamatra system as explained by Asanga, each sentient being has a mind-basis-of-all. It is a repository of seeds or predispositions, including those that simultaneously produce an apprehending subject and an apprehended object. It is a non-defiled, neutral consciousness and thus capable of 'infused', or 'stained', or 'perfumed' with virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral potencies. It is a steady consciousness capable of existing through states which are otherwise mindless, such as deep sleep, the meditative equipoise of cessation, and fainting. It derives its potency from one complete action done in the past and lasts as long as the potency established by that action lasts.
It pervades the entire body, and when a person is about to die, his mind-basis-of-all withdraws from the limits of the body, slowly making those parts cold. Finally, it leaves the body and takes rebirth through the force of another of its seeds, carrying with it the seeds already accumulated but not yet activated. It is a continuum of seeds, similar to a stream, existing for Hearers and Solitary Realizers until they become Foe Destroyers and for Bodhisattvas until the eighth ground. Beyond these levels it is called a fruition consciousness (*vipakavijnana, rnam smin rnam shes*) until Buddhahood when it is transformed into a mirror-like wisdom.

The principal function of the mind-basis-of-all is contained in its seed aspect. However, the senses themselves and all the objects that appear to them also appear to the mind-basis-of-all, but it does not notice or identify them, nor is it capable of either remembering or inducing another consciousness to take notice of them. A sense consciousness directly perceives its objects and is capable of drawing the mental consciousness into noticing or identifying them; however, although objects appear to a mind-basis-of-all, it is incapable of drawing the mental consciousness into noticing those objects.

The Chittamatris who follow Asanga are the only school to assert the existence of a mind-basis-of-all. Along with it, an afflicted mind (*klishhtamanas, nyonyid*) is asserted, together with the other six consciousnesses that are commonly accepted: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses. A mental consciousness ascribes names to objects, perceives slightly hidden objects such as impermanence and emptiness, misconceives a difference of entity of subject and object, and so forth. A mind-basis-of-all does not cognize emptiness even though it has seeds with it that ripen and cause a mental consciousness to do so.

The afflicted mind, or the seventh from among the eight consciousnesses, mistakenly conceives the mind-basis-of-all to be a self-sufficient person. Even though the mind-basis-of-all, because it is the transmigrating entity, is indeed found to be the actual person when one searches to find it, it is not a self-sufficient person. Thus, the seventh mind is described as afflicted by four
mental factors: view of a self, obscuration with respect to a self, pride in a self, and attachment to a self. When these mental factors are overcome through their antidote—realization of selflessness—the untainted entity of the seventh mind remains. Then, when the conception of subject and object as different entities is destroyed totally and forever at Buddhahood, the seventh mind is transformed into the wisdom of sameness cognizing all phenomena as equally free from a difference in entity between subject and object.

All Buddhist schools refute a certain type of self and accept another. All deny that there is a permanent, single, independent self. All except the Pudgalavadins (Proponents of a Person) deny that there is a substantially existent or self-sufficient person; they present the person as something other than these two. The Pudgalavadins assert a self which is neither the same as nor different from the mental and physical aggregates. The Kashmiri Vaibhashikas and the Sautrantikas Following Scripture assert that the continuum of the mental and physical aggregates is the self. The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning, the Chittamatrins Following Reasoning, and the Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas assert that a subtle form of mental consciousness is the self. The Chittamatrins Following Scripture assert that the mind-basis-of-all is the self. The Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas assert that the continuum of the mental consciousness is the self. For Prasangika, none of these is the self, which is the I imputed in dependence upon the mental and physical aggregates.

Those who accept a consciousness as the actual self are specifically referring to the transmigrator, a neutral, subtle entity. They also accept that there is a self imputed to the aggregates, but in all systems except Prasangika 'only imputed' (prajnapati-matra, btags pa tsam) eliminates only that something separate from its bases of imputation is the self, not that the composite of the bases of imputation or any one of them is it. Therefore, Tugen (Thu’u-bkvan, 1737-1802) says that only in the Prasangika system does the word 'only imputed' have its full meaning. In all the other systems something must be the self; otherwise, for
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them there could be no transmigration, activity, and so forth. They identify the mental consciousness or the continuum of the aggregates as the self. Their meaning of 'only imputed' carries the sense of identification with one or more of the bases of imputation. In the Prasangika system 'only imputed' means that also not any of its bases of imputation is the self; nonetheless, the imputed self or person can function. The mere-I is the transmigrator and the carrier of the seeds or potencies from one life to another. It is the object that gives rise to the thought 'I' in lifetime after lifetime. It is the I that is imputed or designated in dependence upon the mental and physical aggregates in the Desire and Form Realms and upon only the mental aggregates in the Formless Realm. The Chittamatrans, however, assert that the mind-basis-of-all is the actual I since it is the transmigrator and carrier of seeds.

Thus, it should not be thought that because the Buddhist systems deny self, there is no transmigrator. The non-Buddhist systems could not posit transmigration without a permanent self; the Buddhists schools oftenets, on the other hand, posit many different modes of transmigration without a permanent self.

The Chittamatrans following Asanga feel that because Buddha said that the six consciousnesses of a person do not function in deep sleep and in the meditative equipoise of cessation, etc., there must be another very subtle consciousness, the continuity of which keeps the person alive. Also, since the six consciousnesses have periods of non-existence, the seeds or predispositions, if stored there, would be destroyed, and the continuity of lives would be severed. Therefore, they posit the existence of a mind-basis-of-all. The schools that accept the mental consciousness or its continuum as the self answer that Buddha was referring to the coarse states of the mental consciousness and that there is a subtle, neutral, stable mental consciousness that passes from one lifetime to another and exists through the equipoises of cessation, bearing the continuity of the seeds.

The Chittamatrans following Asanga accept that a mind-basis-of-all is accompanied by the five mental factors that accompany any consciousness—feeling, discrimination, intention, contact,
and mental engagement. The absorption of cessation is nevertheless without coarse feeling and discrimination even though the mind-basis-of-all and its five factors are present because the feeling and discrimination that accompany the mind-basis-of-all are subtle and non-manifest. This same reasoning allows the other schools to posit a subtle mental consciousness that is accompanied by such subtle, non-manifest factors and thus to say that there is no need to assert a separate mind-basis-of-all as an eighth consciousness.\footnote{275}

PRASANGIKA POSITION ON THE MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL

In the Prasangika system, external objects, and not seeds, are what provide sense objects although the overlay of false appearance is produced from seeds. A mental consciousness, and not an afflicted mind, misconceives the nature of the person. A subtle mental consciousness, and not a mind-basis-of-all, abides throughout the 'mindless' states. The mere-I, not a mind-basis-of-all, transmigrates. The six consciousnesses are temporary bases of seeds; the mere-I, not the mind-basis-of-all, is the constant basis of the seeds.

The basis in Buddha’s own thought when he taught a mind-basis-of-all was emptiness, the basis of all phenomena which is to be minded well (alayavijnana). Taking vijnana not as referring to the agent or action of knowing but as the object, the Prasangikas see the mind-basis-of-all as referring to the 'basis of all to be known well or in detail', emptiness. Emptiness is the basis of all in that it makes possible all the various types of beings, nirvana, cyclic existence, and so forth.

Buddha’s purpose in teaching a mind-basis-of-all was to provide a base for the transmission of cause and effect through a continuum of lives for those disciples who could not understand the mere-I as the bearer of predisposing tendencies. The refutation of the explicit teaching is that, although a mind-basis-of-all is said to be impermanent, it is like the Samkhya’s nature (prakrtirang bzhin) which contains all causes.\footnote{276} Because the
causes already exist, everything would necessarily be produced all of the time, or once and never again.

The Yogachara-Svatantrikas, who do not assert an external world, do not even conventionally assert a mind-basis-of-all; for them, a mental consciousness bears the seeds that create the appearance of an external world. Thus, it is said that no Madhyamika school asserts the existence of a mind-basis-of-all even though one Indian Madhyamika, Abhayakara, early in his life is said to have asserted a mind-basis-of-all.277 There are also a few passages in Nagarjuna’s writings that refer to a basis-of-all, but these are said to refer to the mental consciousness that takes rebirth.278

Although Nagarjuna does say once in his Precious Garland and once in his Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning that everything is included in the mind, the Ge-luk-bas point to his Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment for his position:279

A knower realizes an object known.
Without an object known, there is no knower.

Also, many yogic treatises make reference to a basis-of-all (alaya, kun gzhi), but there the term means the nature of phenomena (dharmata, chos nyid), or emptiness.280 Thus, not even conventionally do the Prasangikas accept a mind-basis-of-all; they say that this teaching points to emptiness, the basis of all change.

THREE NATURES

Buddha said that every phenomenon has three natures (trisvabhava, rang bzhingsum): imaginary or imputed (parikalpita, kun btags), other-powered (paratantra, gzhan dbang), and thoroughly established (parinishpanna, yongs grub).281 There are an endless number of non-existent imaginaries, such as the horns of a rabbit or the hairs of a turtle, but according to the Chittamatra system the most significant imaginary nature of every phenomenon is its being a different entity from an apprehending subject. Buddha called attention to an illusory element in ordinary perception, the bifurcation of object and subject into separate
entities, calling it 'imaginary' to show that it is utterly unfounded and should be eradicated.

Subject and object as different entities are non-existent imaginaries, as are objects that are established by way of their own character as bases of names and self-sufficient persons. Ordinary beings experience objects in an unfounded way, as if they were entities separate from themselves and as if they were naturally bases of the affixing of names, and conceive themselves to be the lord or controller of mind and body. Buddha called these elements imaginaries because they are mere reifications through names and thoughts and do not actually exist.

The objects that serve as the bases for misconceiving imaginaries are other-powered natures. These are impermanent phenomena produced not by their own power but in dependence on specific aggregations of causes and conditions which are other than themselves. These phenomena lack independence, unable to remain any longer than their own one moment. By calling impermanent products 'other-powered natures', Buddha draws attention to the dependent nature of products, countering the usual tendency to see objects as if they exist in themselves. These phenomena are falsities because they appear to be natural bases of names and to be entities separate from a perceiving subject but are not. They are said to deceive because they appear one way and exist another. However, products, though falsities, do not falsely exist; rather, they truly exist since they are produced from causes and conditions.

The non-existence of such an imaginary nature in a dependent nature is a thoroughly established nature. This is immutable and the final object of observation by a path of purification. An object which is a different entity from a subject does not exist; a subject which is a different entity from its object does not exist; these non-exsistences are emptinesses in the Chittamatra system. The emptiness of subject and object as different entities is named 'thoroughly established' in direct contrast to 'imaginary' in order to show that this is the highest quality of an object and should be sought. The thoroughly established nature includes the emptiness not only of subject and object as different entities
but also of objects which are naturally existent as bases of names and of a self-sufficient person. 'Emptiness' in the Chittamatra system refers to these three.

All phenomena, from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses, have the three natures—even permanent phenomena such as space and emptiness, though for these the term 'dependent nature' does not mean 'that which is dependent on causes and conditions for its production' but just identifies the entity of permanent phenomena as a base of an imaginary nature and a thoroughly established nature. Or, according to another interpretation, the dependent nature of a permanent phenomenon refers to a consciousness which cognizes it and is an impermanent phenomenon dependent on causes and conditions.282

Products, or impermanent phenomena, themselves are dependent natures, and thus it should not be thought that a product is one thing and its dependent nature another. Among permanent phenomena, emptinesses are thoroughly established natures, and space, analytical cessations, and non-analytical cessations are a special category of existent imaginaries, being imaginary in the sense that they appear to exist by way of their own character but do not, since they are posited in dependence on terms and thoughts. Space, for instance, is the mere absence of obstructive contact and is cognized by non-Buddhas only through inference—appearing to the mind through the elimination of obstructive contact.

A phenomenon's thoroughly established nature (ultimate truth) is not a different entity from its dependent nature (conventional truth). The relationship of the two is a sameness of entity within a difference of isolates. An emptiness is a dependent nature's own non-difference in entity between subject and object.

Emptinesses—that is, thoroughly established natures—truly, ultimately and naturally exist as do dependent natures, because the Chittamatrins consider that for an emptiness or a product to exist at all, it must ultimately exist.
PRASANGIKA VIEW ON THE THREE NATURES

The Prasangikas say that Buddha taught that thoroughly established and dependent natures truly exist in order to overcome the fright of those who could not understand how an emptiness or an impermanent phenomenon could not truly exist but still exist. According to the Prasangikas, the basis in Buddha's thought was the conventional existence of all phenomena, since objects are imputed by terms and thoughts, unfindable among their bases of imputation, but conventionally existent.

The Prasangikas also substitute inherent existence as the chief non-existent imaginary in place of non-difference in entity between subject and object. In their interpretation the non-existence of dependent phenomena as this imaginary is a thoroughly established nature because no phenomenon ultimately exists and all phenomena exist only conventionally. Beings are called to identify a mistaken aspect in all ordinary perceptions, the appearance of objects as if they exist right there in their bases of imputation; such objects are called 'imaginaries' in order to show their unfounded character and the necessity of ridding oneself of the misperceptions and misconceptions of inherent existence. In the Prasangika system, the absence of inherent existence as a predicate of dependent phenomena is their thoroughly established nature, appearing in direct perception to exist the way it actually does. Emptiness is not a realm separate from the world of objects but their highest quality. Buddha implicitly exhorts yogis to discover and cognize it through giving it the name 'thoroughly established nature'.

An emptiness no more truly exists than any other phenomenon, but just as products can be cognized directly despite their lack of true existence, so an emptiness can be cognized directly despite its lack of true existence. Through accustoming oneself to its import, the cyclic existence which is generated through the conception of imaginaries can be stopped, and dependent natures can be seen as they are.

Since in Prasangika emptiness—the absence of inherent existence (svabhavasiddhi rang bzhingyis grub pa)—is the nature
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\( \text{svabhava, rang bzhin} \) of all phenomena, it should not be thought that svabhava is refuted in all its meanings. Svabhava meaning svabhavasiddhi or 'inherent existence' is refuted, but svabhava as 'final nature' or just 'character' (such as heat and burning as the character of fire) is not refuted.

The final nature that ordinary beings imagine in dependent phenomena is an imaginary, but for a Buddha the actual final nature is a thoroughly established nature. However, this does not mean that there are two ways of looking at dependent phenomena, one in which a dependent phenomenon itself becomes an imaginary and another in which it becomes a thoroughly established nature. Rather, the 'final nature' in reference to an untutored being is an imaginary because he or she conceives the inherent existence of dependent phenomena to be real, and the final nature in reference to a Buddha is a thoroughly established nature because a Buddha continually perceives the absence of inherent existence as the reality of objects. The attempt here is to avoid making products into emptinesses, to preserve thoroughly established natures as the nature of phenomena and not make them the phenomena themselves even in the eyes of a Buddha. Still, Buddhas simultaneously and directly cognize all phenomena and their emptiness with the same consciousness.

THREE FINAL VEHICLES

All Buddhist systems of tenets, Hinayana and Mahayana, accept three vehicles: Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Great Vehicles. These are three different modes of practice for three different types of individuals. The Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, and Chittamatrins who follow Asanga accept that there are three final vehicles or, in other words, that there are some beings who never attain the highest achievement because, after completing their lower vehicle, they do not pass on to the higher. Specifically, it means that there are some sentient beings who never attain Buddhahood.

For the Vaibhashikas, Shakyamuni Buddha is the only being of this period to attain Buddhahood; a Buddha is a being who
accumulated the collections of wisdom and merit for three countless eons whereas the most that any other being is capable of achieving is in the neighborhood of one hundred eons, as in the case of a rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizer. Also, Buddha eradicated both obscurations, the afflictions of desire, hatred, and ignorance and the non-afflictive ignorance. The first prevents the attainment of liberation from cyclic existence, and the second prevents the attainment of an all-knowingness which in their system is not the simultaneous cognition of all phenomena but the knowledge of everything one by one. Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers have eradicated the afflictions, but they have merely abandoned the non-afflictive ignorance through non-attachment. Thus, for the Vaibhashikas, Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers are inferior to a Buddha and never attain Buddhahood; they finish their paths, and upon death the continuum of mind and body ceases in a remainderless nirvana. 'Remainderless' means that there no longer is any mind-body complex that derives its impetus from contaminated actions and afflictions; a remainderless nirvana is a substantiality (<&travya, rdzas) and a functioning thing (bhava, dngos po) which is the cessation of the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence, its function being the prevention of obstructions. Since Vaibhashikas do not accept that a Foe Destroyer after death forms a new physical support through pure wishes and meditative powers, the attainer of a remainderless nirvana is said to be a person about to pass into extinction but not one who has passed into extinction, for there is no mind, body, or person after a remainderless nirvana.

The Sautrantikas’ assertion of three final vehicles is roughly similar; however, they assert that a remainderless nirvana is a phenomenon (dharma, chos), not a functioning thing (bhava, dngos po) but rather a non-affirming negative which is a nothingness. For the Hihayana schools, manifestation after the death of an enlightened being is impossible, whereas the Mahayanists disagree, comparing Hihayanaists to Nihilists on this point.

The Chittamatris who follow Asanga also propound three final vehicles, saying that because sentient beings have different
types of minds and different styles of behavior, their vehicles must also be different. Some beings want only their own happiness; some want others to suffer; some want happiness for themselves and desist from harming others; some want only the happiness of cyclic existence; some want only to liberate themselves from cyclic existence; and some want only to free others from cyclic existence. These differences of attitude and style of behavior arise from differences in faith and interest which in turn are due to the presence of different lineages. Since it is thus unquestionable that the various lineages are different in the causal state, in the effect state they would not all pass into only one vehicle.

These Chittamatrins, therefore, assert three final vehicles as well as five lineages. The five are:

1. those who from the point of attaining the path of accumulation right through to attaining the path of no more learning are Hearers, not changing or abandoning paths in mid-stream
2. those who from beginning to end are Solitary Realizers
3. those who from beginning to end are Bodhisattvas
4. those who are indefinite, first in one vehicle and then another, either advancing upward as from a Hearer path to a Bodhisattva one, or falling downward as from a Bodhisattva path to a Hearer one
5. those who have no lineage for liberation from cyclic existence, will never free themselves from misery, and will never attain omniscience.

Hearers are so called because they hear the doctrine from others and when they attain the fruit of practice, cause others to hear that they have attained the goal, 'I have done what was to be done; other than this I will not know another existence.' Or in another etymology, Hearers are so called because they hear about the superior fruit of Buddhahood or its path from a Buddha and, without practicing it, proclaim it to others. According to the Chittamatrins following Asanga, the Hearers 'who travel only to peace', upon attaining the state of Foe Destroyer, do not pass on to the Mahayana but at death enter into a remainderless nirvana.
However, those Hearers do not become extinct but possess a wisdom of perpetual meditative absorption in the sphere of peace. They have eradicated the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence and through their meditation do not possess the obstructions to omniscience, but the latter have not been abandoned through their antidote, and, therefore, they are not Buddhas. Thus, Chittamatra, unlike the Hihayana schools of tenets, does not propound that the continuum of mind and body ceases in a remainderless nirvana because a Hearer Foe Destroyer is reborn in a pure land in meditative absorption inside a great lotus. A distinctive feature of the Mahayana teaching is the assertion that pure wishes and meditative powers can cause one to be reborn in a pure land, whereas for the Hinayanists it is as if cleansing the process of rebirth involves destroying the ability to manifest. For the Mahayanists, the process of purification reveals increasing control over mind and matter to the point where Buddhas and Bodhisattvas even after their 'deaths' can appear simultaneously in many places in order to aid beings. That each Buddha has an immortal Enjoyment Body abiding in his Highest Pure Land is a Mahayana tenet not shared with HTnayana.

The Chittamatrins following Asanga say that there are other Hearers who complete their vehicle, attain the state of Foe Destroyer, and through the urgings of a Buddha, pass on to the Mahayana, eventually attaining Buddhahood. They enter the Mahayana after attaining a nirvana with remainder. They have been liberated from cyclic existence but still possess a body—remainder—that derives its impetus from contaminated actions and afflictions. However, they have attained nirvana because they have passed beyond sorrow, which is identified as the afflictive obstructions, the chief of which in the Chittamatra system is the conception that a person is a self-sufficient entity separate from the mental and physical aggregates. They enter the Mahayana and are empowered by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas so that although they appear to pass into a remainderless nirvana, they do not, remaining alive in a magical manifestation which not even the gods can see. They complete the collections of wisdom
and merit, meditating on the non-difference in entity between subject and object, thereby destroying the obstructions to simultaneous cognition of all phenomena. Becoming Buddhas, they complete the Mahayana path.

The Chittamatsins following Asanga say that Buddha sometimes taught one vehicle rather than three in order to draw those of indefinite lineage into the Mahayana and to keep those Bodhisattvas who might fall to a lower path within the Mahayana. However, the Chittamatsins Following Reasoning—the Mahayana followers of Dharmakirti—answer that there is only one final vehicle, for contaminations are caused and, therefore, impermanent. Also, it is not that there is no means of eradicating the afflictions because through cultivating the antidotes to their causes all contaminations are eradicated. Also, it is not that there is a means but no one knows it because one who knows the nature of the causes knows their antidotes. Also, it is not that there are none who seek it because the compassionate seek to overcome suffering. Also, it is not that there is no teacher of the means because a protector Buddha teaches a path he manifestly sees, knowing the effects of his teaching and thereby not erring.

ONE FINAL VEHICLE IN PRASANGIKA

The Prasangikas agree that there is only one final vehicle, saying that when Buddha taught three final vehicles the basis in his own thought was that temporarily there are three different vehicles. His purpose in teaching three final vehicles was to overcome the fright of those who could not imagine completing the immeasurable collections of merit and wisdom of the Mahayana. The explicit teaching of three final vehicles is contradicted by the presence of a Buddha nature in every sentient being.

Just as the proponents of mind-only assert that a basis-of-all acts as the basis of the phenomena of cyclic existence and of nirvana, so the Madhyamikas assert that a natural lineage, or the mind’s lack of inherent existence, acts as the base and support of all phenomena of cyclic existence and of nirvana. Emptiness should not, however, be confused with a physically pervasive
entity that produces all phenomena. Emptiness is the base of all phenomena because due to the lack of inherent existence all the actions and agents of cyclic existence and of nirvana are possible. For if phenomena existed inherently, they would be independent and thus incapable of change through being acted upon by causes. Emptiness does pervade all phenomena in the sense that wherever there is a phenomenon there is an emptiness, but it is not a material substance that produces phenomena. Still, without it change would be impossible, and in this light emptiness can be viewed even as the ‘substance’ of phenomena.

Emptiness is not only the object of the highest wisdom and of the path of deliverance; it is the very justification of change, allowing beings of different types to reach the same high achievement. The mind's character of dependence on causes—its non-inherent existence—is the Buddha nature that makes Buddhahood possible for all.
6 Madhyamika

BACKGROUND

Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning

In the Ge-luk-ba monasteries of Tibet the Madhyamika system was studied through textbooks written as commentaries on Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakavatara). Madhyamaka, in the title, refers to Nagarjuna's Madhyamakashastra and not to his other works because when Chandrakirti quotes the Madhyamakashastra, he merely says, 'From Madhyamaka,' whereas when he quotes Nagarjuna's other works, he refers to them by their own names.

The word madhyamaka itself is formed from the stem madhya meaning 'middle', with the suffix ma yielding a derivative noun that has the same meaning as its base. Madhyama means 'the very middle' or 'the middlemost'. Bhavaviveka derives the suffix ka from the verbal root for 'proclaiming', kai, thus taking madhyamaka as meaning 'that which proclaims the middle', that is, either a person, a system of tenets, or treatise that propounds the middle. In the case of Nagarjuna's title, it refers to a treatise
setting forth the middle, or middle way not in the sense of the middle path but the middle way things are; therefore, the word Madhyamaka when used in this sense is translated as Treatise on the Middle Way even when it is not accompanied by the explicit word for 'treatise', shastra.

Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way extensively teaches both the profound emptiness and the extensive varieties of spiritual paths, etc. His text delineates reasonings that establish an emptiness of inherent existence as the final mode of existence of all phenomena, not with one or a few but many examples and through many approaches in twenty-seven chapters. The four noble truths, the two truths, nirvana, production, perception, etc. are analyzed with respect to activity, agent, and object, appropriator and appropriated, substance and attribute, and so forth. In his treatise, Nagarjuna treats the two truths even more extensively than Chandrakirti does in his Supplement. The Treatise teaches:

1. the nature of the two truths
2. that if one does not know the two truths, one does not know the essence of Buddha’s scriptures
3. the purpose of teaching the two truths
4. the faults of misconceiving the two truths
5. that because the two truths are difficult to realize, Buddha did not teach them in the beginning.

Nagarjuna says:

1. (XXIV. 8)
   Doctrines taught by the Buddhas
   Rely wholly on the two truths,
   Worldly conventional truths
   And ultimate truths.

Truly are objects that exist the way they appear. Thus, conventional objects are truths only in the sense that they seem to exist the way they appear for an ignorant consciousness, a concealer (samvriti) of suchness through conceiving phenomena to exist inherently. Hence, all objects except emptinesses are
conventional truths or truths-for-a-concealer. An emptiness, however, is a truth because it exists the way it appears to direct perception, this is, as empty of inherent existence. It is an ultimate truth, because among phenomena it is supreme since through meditating on it obstructions are removed and since it is the object of the highest wisdom.

2 (XXIV. 9)
Those who do not comprehend
The difference between these two truths
Do not know the nature
Of the profound doctrine of Buddha.

Those who do not know the difference between conventional and ultimate truths do not know the essence of Buddha's teaching, the principle of the profound dependent-arising. Therefore, one who wants to know the actuality of the Conqueror's teaching should comprehend the suitability of all actions, objects, and agents in dependently produced and dependently designated conventionalities that appear like a moon in water. Also, one must comprehend by that very reason the mode of the ultimate that abandons the two extremes of inherent existence and total non-existence.

3 (XXIV. 10)
Without relying on conventions
The ultimate cannot be taught.
Without realizing the ultimate
Nirvana is not attained.

Someone says, 'If the ultimate is a nature free of [dualistic] elaborations, then it needs to be taught, but what is the point of teaching conventionalities such as the aggregates, constituents, and sources? If the unreal is to be abandoned, there is no point in teaching what is to be abandoned.'

Answer: Although it is true that the erroneous—conventionalities that appear to be real but are not—are to be abandoned, the ultimate cannot be taught without depending on worldly ultimates such as object of expression, expresser, knowing, object
known, and so forth—the conventions related with Superiors that are asserted to be conventional truths. Also, without teaching the ultimate, it cannot be realized, and without that, nirvana cannot be attained. Therefore, because of being the means of attaining liberation, just as one who wants water has need of a vessel, so initially one definitely should assert conventionalities just as they are.

4 (XXIV. 11)
If emptiness is viewed wrongly,
Those of small intellect are hurt,
Like wrongly holding a snake
Or wrongly using a spell.

A yogi who realizes that conventional truths produced merely through ignorance do not inherently exist and realizes their ultimate emptiness will not fall to the two extremes. For he does not conceive that an objectively existent nature, which formerly existed, now does not exist. Also, because he has not damaged (or refuted) worldly conventionalities that are like reflections, he has not damaged actions and their fruits (and thus does not fall to an extreme of nihilism). Such a yogi also does not falsely superimpose ultimate existence on phenomena because he has seen that actions and their fruits can occur in only non-inherently existent things; he knows that things do not inherently exist, and that all actions, their fruits, and so forth would not be possible if they inherently existed. Those, however, who see that phenomena do not inherently exist without perceiving such a difference between the two truths either think that things do not exist or impute true existence to emptiness and thereby think that things inherently exist as bases of emptiness. These are both wrong ways of viewing emptiness, and in this way those with little intellect are hurt.

When they see that things do not inherently exist, it seems to them that there is no way of positing actions, agents, and objects, whereby they conclude that all does not exist—falling to a view of deprecation. Or, if they do not deprecate everything, they question how these things, while they are being apprehended,
could be empty of inherent existence—concluding that the meaning of non-inherent existence is not the meaning of emptiness and thereby abandoning emptiness. Through this they accumulate an action (karma, las) resulting in being bereft of the doctrine and are born in a bad migration.

5 (XXIV. 12)
Therefore, realizing that the dull-witted
Would have trouble understanding this doctrine,
The mind of the Subduer
Turned away from teaching doctrine.

Since one who views emptiness wrongly is harmed and since those of little intelligence cannot apprehend the meaning of suchness correctly, after enlightenment Shakyamuni—when he saw the dispositions of sentient beings and the great profundity of the doctrine—knew that those of little intellect could not realize the depths of the profound doctrine of dependent-arising. Therefore, his mind turned away from teaching. (This, however, is accepted as being his first teaching, for his pretended retreat from teaching indicated the profundity of his doctrine and thereby generated interest.)297

Chandrakīrti did not treat all these topics in his Supplement, which is, therefore, less extensive than the Treatise though of greater length. A work is extensive not because of a great number of words, but because of covering many topics; for instance, Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization is short but its meanings are indeed vast. Therefore, Nagarjuna's Treatise is more extensive than Chandrakirti's longer Supplement.

Furthermore, the Treatise is not limited to an extensive explanation of emptiness; it also extensively sets forth the suitability of conventional phenomena within an emptiness of inherent existence as well as the four truths, actions and their effects, the Three Jewels, the eight levels of approaching and abiding in the fruits of Stream Enterer, Once Returner, Never Returner, and Foe Destroyer, and so forth. Jam-yang-shay-ba398 says that if, as some scholars say, Nagarjuna's Treatise does not set forth the varieties of phenomena, paths, and so forth, then to do so, it would be
necessary to give a tally of the bugs in the world. Still, Jam-yang-shay-ba agrees that these varieties are not the principal object of discourse in the *Treatise*; the profound emptiness is. When Nagarjuna identifies particular phenomena which are the bases of their own emptiness, he explicitly but secondarily indicates the paths, grounds, fruits, and so forth. As Nagarjuna says (XXIV. 14ab):

For whom emptiness is possible  
For him all is possible.

The establishment of the phenomena of cyclic existence and nirvana is possible when emptiness is possible. If things inherently or naturally existed, they would be independent and could not be affected by causes and conditions. Emptiness, or the lack of inherent existence, makes possible production, abiding, and disintegration.

Chandrakīrti's *Supplement* reveals emptiness through far less forms than the *Treatise*; it is a supplement in that it fills certain holes in the *Treatise* that became apparent with the founding of the Chittamatra and Svatantrya systems. Nagarjuna wrote the *Treatise* during his second proclamation of doctrine which preceded the founding of those two systems. Therefore, the *Treatise* required clarification to show that it was not suitable to interpret its meaning according to those systems.

Chandrakīrti also provides an extensive discussion of the three types of compassion (compassion observing sentient beings, observing sentient beings as qualified by momentary impermanence, and observing sentient beings as qualified by non-inherent existence), the ten Bodhisattva grounds, Buddhahood, and the cultivation of calm abiding on the fifth ground and special insight on the sixth. Jam-yang-shay-ba explains that Chandrakīrti was not filling holes in the *Treatise* in the sense of providing what was incomplete or making extensive what was not already extensive, but rather in the sense of making the extensive more so and of taking secondary subjects as principal. He explains that Chandrakīrti makes clear that students of the *Treatise* should practice the Bodhisattva paths and ascend the grounds. 299

Chandrakīrti wrote a commentary to his own *Supplement*; the
founder of the Ge-luk-ba order, Dzong-ka-ba (1357-1419) wrote a commentary called *Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakirti’s) 'Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s) "Treatise on the Middle Way"*, and the major Ge-luk-ba monastic colleges have their own commentaries on both Chandrakirti’s and Dzong-ka-ba’s works, usually in the form of general explanations accompanied by debates. These works are the basis for the study of Madhyamika and more particularly of Prasangika, centering on the topic of the two truths.

**TWO TRUTHS**

**Sources**
- Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets*
- Nga-wang-bel-den's *Annotations*
- Kensur Lekden’s oral teachings

The two truths are objects, not vague concepts of truth, beauty, and so forth. They are phenomena (dharma, chos), objects (vishaya, yul), existents (sat, yodpa), and objects of knowledge (jneya, shes bya).

Truths are those things that exist the way they appear, and thus only ultimate truths (paramarthasatya, don dam bdenpa) or emptinesses qualify as truths. The other various and sundry objects do not exist the way they appear, except to Buddhas. These objects are truths only for a concealer of suchness, an ignorant consciousness; therefore, they are called truths-for-a-concealer (samvritisatya, kun rdzob bden pa).

Truths-for-a-concealer are falsities, appearing one way and existing another. Thus, since only an ultimate truth can actually sustain the meaning of truth, it is not truths that are divided into the two truths. Objects of knowledge, or phenomena, are the basis of division of the two truths. The *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra (Pitaputrasamagama)* says, ‘Objects of knowledge are exhausted in the two truths.’

Since those which are divided into the two truths are phenomena (and the synonyms of ‘phenomena’), each member of either division is a phenomenon, an object, an existent, and an
object of knowledge. This means that an emptiness is a phenomenon, object, existent, and object of knowledge as are all other various and sundry objects.

Among six positions on the topic of what is divided into the two truths which are refuted by Jam-yang-shay-ba is that of the translator Ngok, (Ngog-lo-tstsha-ba bLo-dan-shes-rab) and his followers, who do not accept that an emptiness is an object of knowledge because the mere non-finding of an object under analysis is just called an emptiness, and, thus, there is no phenomenon 'emptiness' existent there. Ngok's idea is that if an analytical consciousness cognized an emptiness, then that emptiness would necessarily inherently exist. For, an analytical consciousness is searching to find whether an object inherently exists or not, and if it 'finds' or cognizes an emptiness of inherent existence of that object, then it would seem that the emptiness must inherently exist since, according to him, it would be able to bear ultimate analysis. Therefore, according to him mere appearances are the basis of the division into the two truths and not objects of knowledge because an ultimate truth, that is, an emptiness, is not an object of knowledge.

The Ge-luk-ba answer to this is: An analytical consciousness investigating whether a table, for instance, is separate from its basis of designation, or is the composite of its bases of designation, or is some one of its bases of designation does not find a table. This very non-finding is an emptiness, and this non-finding is 'found' or cognized by an analytical consciousness. However, because an analytical consciousness is not investigating whether the emptiness of the table can be found, its 'finding' or cognizing the emptiness of the table, i.e., its lack of inherent existence, does not necessitate that the emptiness be inherently existent. This is because the analytical consciousness was not searching for the emptiness of the table but for the table. When, in turn, an analytical consciousness searches for the emptiness of the table, it also cannot be found; an emptiness of the emptiness of the table is 'found'. This type of finding does not mean that the object can bear ultimate analysis; nothing can bear ultimate analysis; even an emptiness cannot.
Every emptiness is, in turn, qualified by an emptiness, necessitating an infinite regress, but this does not entail a fallacy just as there is no fallacy in the fact that there are an infinite number of causes that eventually lead to the production of a sprout. Infinite regresses are damaging only when they necessitate an impossibility; since the causal sequence that leads to the production of a sprout can stretch back through measureless time, there is no fallacy such as the impossibility of millions of causes having to occur in a tiniest moment.

Still, the situation with an infinite number of emptinesses is different from that of an infinite chain of causes over time. Since each emptiness of the emptiness of the emptiness of the emptiness, etc., of a table is a phenomenon, they must all be cognized by a Buddha if he is to be omniscient. Also, if first one emptiness is understood and then the mind turns to the next, and the next, and the next, there would be no time in which all the emptinesses related with just one object could be known. However, this is true only for the mode of cognition of emptiness by inference. An inferring consciousness first realizes the emptiness of a thing through the medium of a concept; then, through merely turning the mind to another object, its emptiness is immediately known. However, when emptiness is directly cognized—that is to say, without the medium of concepts and images—all emptinesses throughout all world systems are simultaneously known. The mind and its objects—all emptinesses—are totally undifferentiated like fresh water poured into fresh water; a transformation has been effected that allows simultaneous cognition of the emptiness of everything.

Direct cognition of all emptinesses does not mean that all phenomena are directly known; rather, the mode of existence of all phenomena is realized. When a yogi has become familiar with direct cognition of emptiness on the Bodhisattva’s path of meditation and has completed the necessary stock of merit, he becomes a Buddha, able to know directly and simultaneously both the emptinesses of all phenomena and the phenomena themselves. An analytical consciousness does not create an emptiness; it discovers the nature of a phenomenon; thus, an
emptiness of an emptiness does not come into being when the first emptiness is understood. An emptiness, like any other phenomenon, is itself empty of inherent existence, just as hotness is the nature of red pepper even when it is not being tasted.\textsuperscript{302}

The emptiness of one thing, though no different in color, shape, and so forth from another emptiness, is not the emptiness of another thing. However, because of their similarity of type, meditation on the emptiness of one thing functions as meditation on the emptiness of all things. For, having inferentially realized the emptiness of one thing, merely turning the mind to another subject yields cognition of its emptiness without having to rely again on the process of reasoning.

If the emptiness of one thing were the emptiness of another, one would be forced to accept that the lack of inherent existence of a pot is the lack of inherent existence of a person and that the apprehension of the inherent existence of a pot is the apprehension of the inherent existence of a person, but this is clearly not the case. One must understand that emptinesses are divided by way of their bases, that is, the things that are empty. Therefore, ultimate truth is not partless; otherwise, it would contradict the various scriptures that speak of two, four, sixteen, eighteen, etc., divisions of emptinesses. The \textit{King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra} says, 'Just as you have understood the discrimination of a self, so apply [this understanding of the lack of inherent existence] to all.'\textsuperscript{303} Having learned about the emptiness of the person, a yogi is to apply this understanding to all phenomena; therefore, knowing one emptiness inferentially does not mean that all emptinesses are already known. Otherwise, why, after knowing the emptiness of the person, would one have to apply it to other phenomena?

The presentation of emptinesses as different emphasizes the stage of the path concerned with developing an inferential understanding of emptiness. However, there is the powerful experience of utter undifferentiability of subject and object in a direct cognition of emptiness in which it seems that subject and object become more 'one' than the word 'one' could ever convey. For 'one' is always a composite of different things; there is no
'one' that can appear to thought which is not a composite. The Ge-luk-bas must resort to the realm of exceptions and analogies at the time of presenting the mode of direct cognition of emptiness; all emptinesses in all world systems are realized, subject and object are like water in water, but for an outside 'observer' subject and object are different and each emptiness is different from every other emptiness. Sometimes, it seems as if the Ge-luk-bas deliberately disregard the more fantastic, relegating it to the realm of exceptions rather than attempting to blend the outlooks of higher experiences with their presentation. It seems as if they occasionally lose sight of the goal during their highly intricate philosophical maneuverings whereas other interpreters seem more content to keep the goal in mind and risk some apparent difficulties in presenting conventional objects.

This indeed is the way the difference between the Ge-luk-bas and the non-Ge-luk-bas often appears, if only because the Ge-luk-bas, having accepted the task of laying out all phenomena under the umbrella of valid establishment, must spend so much time in formulating conventionalities. However, there is a deeper point; in his tantra teaching Dzong-ka-ba objects to those who do not thoroughly practice the stage of generation—roughly speaking, imagination of oneself as a deity and one's surroundings as the environment of a deity. He objects to those who immediately, without ripening their mental continuum, rush to clear away all forms and abide in some sort of vacuity, which is not the vacuity that is a negative of inherent existence but nothingness. Similarly, Jam-yang-shay-ba says that in Tibet few have wished to meditate on emptiness and have called meditation on a vacuity of nothingness meditation on emptiness. For him and for Dzong-ka-ba, analytical meditation on emptiness involves reflection on the reasons why things do not inherently exist. The meditator should state to himself a subject, such as '1', a predicate, such as 'do not inherently exist', and a reason, such as 'because of not being the same as or different from the mental and physical aggregates, mind and body'. Then, he should continue to prove the reason, reflecting on the meaning until conviction and the resultant intuition are generated. This
type of meditation acts as an *antidote* to the misconception of inherent existence whereas mere withdrawal of the mind from the object I, though often felicitous, will not counteract the misconception of an inherently existent I.

In Ge-luk-ba teachings, analysis is stressed, and emptiness is presented as the highest predicate, quality, or nature of each object—its lack of inherent existence. Non-perception of it is like not perceiving the best quality of everything one sees—their thoroughly established nature. The attempt to keep emptinesses individual is in order to emphasize that each and every one of these various and sundry objects lacks inherent existence; emptiness is not a vague negative, but a specific negative of inherent existence in each and every object. The content of wisdom is the incontrovertible cognition of this.

Other than saying that the experience of a direct cognition of emptiness is like fresh water poured in fresh water, of what benefit are words like 'one' in leading a yogi to the experience? The experience is entered through analysis, through gaining an inferential intuition into emptiness and directly attacking the very cause of cyclic existence, not through superimposing a vague concept on experience. Though most Tibetan orders, after the defeat of the Chinese Ho-shang Mahayana, accept analysis, its use is often more limited for non-Ge-luk-bas than for Ge-luk-bas.

For Dzong-ka-ba an emptiness is an imputedly existent phenomenon like any other object, but for Ngok it is only a designation pointing to this non-finding of objects by an analytical consciousness. Jam-yang-shay-ba says that in that case an emptiness would not exist, and there would be no ultimate truths. These differing systems serve to highlight the fact that nothing can bear analysis. That the Ge-luk-bas are able to view this non-finding as an object, an ultimate object, and as validly established allows them to take literally passages in sutras that others find require interpretation, such as the presentation of suchness as a phenomenon in the *Meeting of the Father and Son Sutra* above when it presents objects of knowledge—existents—as the basis of the division into the two truths. Still, suchness is a mere non-affirming negative of inherent existence, not a positive
phenomenon, and when it is realized, one is not thinking, 'This is emptiness.'

The next position that Jam-yang-shay-ba refutes is that of Tang-sak-ba (Thang-sags-pa) who says that the entities of all phenomena beginning with forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses and extending through to and including omniscient consciousnesses are the bases of division into the two truths. The problem with this position is that since, for instance, a form would be a basis of division into a truth-for-a-concealer and an ultimate truth, the ultimate truth which is a division of the form would have to be a form in which case it would be composed of material particles. This, of course, is not Tang-sak-ba's intention; he means that every phenomenon, from a form through to an omniscient consciousness, has two entities, one a truth-for-a-concealer and the other an ultimate truth. However, Jam-yang-shay-ba would perhaps say that when searching for proper terminology, even unintended absurdities must be considered.

Some say that non-reified objects are the basis of the division into the two truths. Just objects which exist, not those falsely reified into existence, are divided into the two truths. To this Jam-yang-shay-ba makes the trifling objection that then reified systems, such as Samkhya which falsely reifies many objects, would not be truths-for-a-concealer whereas they are. Wrong systems, even if they involve reifications, do exist as systems.

Dak-tsang, in turn, is criticized for his assertion that non-investigated and non-analyzed objects of knowledge are the basis of the division into two truths. Dak-tsang's reason is that under investigation and analysis nothing is found; thus, the two truths are only non-analytical. Jam-yang-shay-ba rejects this view because the two truths themselves are objects of intensive analysis. One would have to contradict ChandrakTrti's statement that Madhyamikas are skilled in presenting what conventionally exists. Also, since an emptiness is found by an analytical consciousness, how can it be said that ultimate truths are non-analyzed objects of knowledge? Jam-yang-shay-ba thereby also
rejects Duk-tsang’s view that objects of knowledge are established as existing by an ignorant consciousness, refusing a role for valid establishment in a presentation of what exists.

A fifth position that truths are the basis of division is refuted by the fact that then truths-for-a-concealer would exist the way they appear, since they would be truths. The sixth is actually not a position but a lack of interest in what is divided into the two truths despite extensive discussion on the two divisions; Jam-yang-shay-ba refutes this by saying that then the truths would be attributes without a substratum.

Thus, the basis of division into the two truths is only objects of knowledge, and since all existents are divided without residue into the two truths, there is no third or fourth truth. The four noble truths are included in the two truths, with true sufferings, origins, and paths being truths-for-a-concealer and true cessations being ultimate truths, that is, emptinesses within the continuum of those who have abandoned totally and forever any portion of the obstructions.

Also, the two truths are mutually exclusive and a dichotomy; in other words, if something exists, it must be either a truth-for-a-concealer, or an ultimate truth. Thus, if something is a truth-for-a-concealer, it is not an ultimate truth, and if something is an ultimate truth, it is not a truth-for-a-concealer. Jam-yang-shay-ba quotes the Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra to prove through scriptural citation that there is no third truth:

Without depending on others the Knower
Of the World taught these two truths,
Conventional and likewise ultimate—
A third truth does not exist.

He quotes Kamalashila’s Illumination of the Middle Way to show that the two truths are mutually exclusive contradictories: ‘With respect to phenomena that have the character of mutual abandonment [i.e., a dichotomy], when having refuted [that something under consideration] is the one, if it is [also] not established as the other, then it does not exist. Therefore, a position that is neither is not feasible.’
The two truths are not different entities but one entity within nominal difference. If conventional and ultimate truths were different entities, the lack of inherent existence of a form would not be the final mode of existence of the form because it would be completely separate from the form. Just so, realization of the non-inherent existence of a form would not overcome the conception of the form as inherently existent. Also, a yogi’s cultivation of high paths would be senseless because understanding emptiness would not be related with destroying misconception of the objects themselves. Similarly, a Buddha would not have forsaken the apprehension of inherent existence because he would have only a powerless apprehension of an emptiness which was entirely separate from objects.

On the other hand, if the two truths were utterly the same, everything true of the one would be true of the other. In that case, for every truth-for-a-concealer such as desire and hatred which was overcome on the path, an ultimate truth also would be overcome. Just as truths-for-a-concealer have many dissimilar and different aspects such as color, shape, odor, and taste, so ultimate truths would be dissimilar and different. Just as many truths-for-a-concealer are affictions, so many ultimate truths would also be affictions. Just as common individuals directly cognize truths-for-a-concealer such as forms, sounds, odors, and tastes, so they would absurdly directly cognize the emptiness of forms and so forth.

Therefore, the two truths are not different entities; they are the same entity. This is what the Heart of Wisdom (the Heart Sutra) means when it says that emptiness is form and form is emptiness. The two truths are not one, but are nominally different, for they appear differently to thought. The relationship is called a oneness of entity but a difference of isolates or opposites of the negatives. The negative of truth-for-a-concealer is non-truth-for-a-concealer, and its opposite is non-non-truth-for-a-concealer, which indeed is truth-for-a-concealer but as known through a negative route. Similarly, the negative of ultimate truth is non-ultimate truth, and its opposite is non-non-ultimate truth. Because non-truth-for-a-concealer is different from non-ultimate truth, the opposites of the negatives are also said to be different.
The meaning can be more easily seen with an example. Take table and product. If the mind turns to deciding whether the two are different, it determines whether there are any non-tables which are products and any non-products which are tables. When it is said, pointing at the basis of the imputation 'table', 'This is a table,' and 'This is a product,' it is not obvious just from the statement whether only tables are products. It then must be seen that there are non-tables, such as cups, which are products and that there are no non-products which are tables because non-products are either permanent phenomena or non-existent. From this approach, non-table and non-product are different, and thus it is said that the opposites of those negatives, non-non-table and non-non-product, are different. However, table and product are the same entity just because a table is a product. Though there are products which are not tables, product is the same entity as table because there is no generality product which is a separate entity from its specific instances, such as tables, houses, fences, mountains, and so forth.

A truth-for-a-concealer and an ultimate truth are a case of two phenomena which are the same entity and different opposites of the negatives with the two terms being mutually exclusive; nothing can be both. Product and table are the same entity and different opposites of the negatives within the relationship of a generality and its particular instance. Impermanent thing and product are the same entity and different opposites of the negatives wherein the two terms are not mutually exclusive but synonymous because all instances of either are instances of the other. They are nevertheless one entity but different opposites of the negatives and not utterly one because the mention of the one does not necessarily entail the appearance to the mind of the other. Still, product and impermanent thing are synonyms, the first being a thing from the viewpoint of its being made by causes and conditions and the second from the viewpoint of its disintegrating moment by moment. In the same way, khyi (which means 'dog' in Tibetan) and dog are the same entity and different opposites of the negatives because when 'khyi' is said, 'dog' does not necessarily appear to the mind. Only khyi and khyi...
are the same entity and the same opposite of the negative, or more strictly, the same isolate.

These distinctions yield a sense of the impact for this writer when, after a discussion of the fresh water poured into fresh water metaphor for the direct cognition of emptiness, the late Ge-luk-ba scholar and tantric abbot, Kensur Lekden, leaned toward me and said that it almost seems as if the cognizer and cognitum are one opposite of the negative.

Nagarjuna says in his *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* that the two truths are like product and impermanent thing; however, his example is said not to show that the two are synonyms but that they are the same entity, with the existence of one being impossible without the existence of the other. That the two truths are not synonyms is determined through the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought,* which nevertheless does not explicitly state that they are the same entity and different opposites of the negatives. In a similar vein, Dzong-ka-ba reports that some have said that the two truths, though not different entities, have a difference which is a mere negation of their being one.

The Jo-nang-bas hold that the two truths are different entities. Theirs is a view of 'emptiness of other'—an ultimate truth is empty of being a truth-for-a-concealer and a truth-for-a-concealer is empty of being an ultimate truth. This is said to be similar to the Samkhya teaching that the root of cyclic existence is the confusion of the person and the nature and that liberation is gained by realizing that the person is not the manifesting nature and that the manifesting nature is not the person. Through differentiating the two, a yogi is released from cyclic existence.

For a Ge-luk-ba, it is true that an ultimate truth is not a truth-for-a-concealer and vice versa, but this distinction does not constitute emptiness. An emptiness is a phenomenon's own lack of inherent existence; thus, this doctrine is called 'emptiness of self' which does not mean that a table is empty of being a table but that a table is empty of its own inherent existence. Otherwise, if a table were empty of itself, there would be no tables and, by extension, no phenomena; an emptiness would also be impossible because an emptiness would be empty of being an emptiness.
The Jo-nang-ba assertion of a difference of entity between the two truths contradicts the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, but it does reflect the Ge-luk-ba acceptance that at the time of direct cognition of emptiness (by anyone except a Buddha) none of the conventional phenomena which are the bases of the quality emptiness appear to the mind. A direct cognition of emptiness is non-dual in four ways: (1) all appearances of inherent existence have ceased, (2) all appearances of conventionalities have ceased, (3) all appearances of subject and object have ceased, and (4) all appearances of generic images (or conceptual meaning-generalities) have ceased.

The disappearance of conventional phenomena is said to be due to the mind’s concentration solely on emptiness and due to the cessation of the five sense consciousnesses. Until Buddhahood a direct cognition of suchness precludes cognition of other phenomena just as cognition of other phenomena precludes direct cognition of emptiness; the stains of the mind are such that the one blocks the other. When anyone except a Buddha directly realizes emptiness, merely the quality emptiness appears without the appearance of the qualificands—the phenomena which are empty.

Thus, though the two truths are inextricably related, it is possible to perceive one and not the other; common beings perceive truths-for-a-concealer without perceiving ultimate truths, and sentient beings in meditative equipoise on emptiness perceive ultimate truths without perceiving truths-for-a-concealer. However, if it is wrongly viewed that an ultimate truth is a different entity from a truth-for-a-concealer, an emptiness could not be the final mode of existence of phenomena and meditation on it would not serve to dissolve misconceptions about the nature of objects.

An ultimate truth, or more literally, a highest object truth (paramarthasatya, don dam bden pa) is so called because an emptiness is the most exalted of all phenomena and is the object of the wisdom that realizes suchness. It is a truth because it exists the way it appears in direct cognition. Truths-for-a-concealer (samvrtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa) are so called because
all other objects are assumed by ignorance to exist the way they appear. An ignorant consciousness is not just a consciousness which does not know suchness but a concealer of suchness through actively assenting to the false appearance of objective existence. Even in direct sense perception, forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects appear to exist inherently, as if they existed in their own right. All phenomena except emptinesses appear to the cognizers that certify them as existing as if they exist inherently. Since the ignorance that assents to this appearance is the root of cyclic existence, its role in everyday perceptions is emphasized through naming all phenomena except emptinesses 'truths-for-a-concealer', truths for ignorance.

Even for Foe Destroyers and eighth ground Bodhisattvas, who have totally and forever overcome the conception that phenomena inherently exist, phenomena still appear to exist inherently, to be their bases of imputation, but these liberated beings know that they are not. Like magicians who see their own creations but, unlike the deceived audience, know them to be illusions, Foe Destroyers and eighth ground Bodhisattvas have destroyed ignorance and know that phenomena do not inherently exist. Therefore, it is only through their knowledge of how other beings conceive conventionalities that these conventionalities are still for them truths-for-a-concealer. Though they have destroyed the concealer of suchness in their own continuums, they realize how others misconceive phenomena.

To a Buddha, conventionalities appear the way they exist, for a Buddha has eradicated not only the afflictions, the chief of which is the ignorance that misconceives the nature of phenomena, but also the appearance of inherent existence caused by beginningless conditioning to ignorance. Therefore, the explanation that conventionalities do not exist the way they appear does not hold true for a Buddha. Still, even for a Buddha conventionalities—all phenomena except emptinesses—are truths-for-a-concealer because he knows how things are perceived and conceived by others.

Chandrakirti etymologizes the word samvrti of samvrtisatyatva as 'concealer' (samantadvaranan, sgrig byed), 'conventionality'.
All existents except emptinesses are conventional truths and interdependent existents. They are conventional in the sense that they are conventions as consciousnesses or expressions or as objects of consciousnesses or expressions. They are interdependent in the sense that doer depends on doing and doing depends on doer, etc. However, the latter is only an etymology and not a definition, for an emptiness is also interdependent in that it depends on the phenomenon of which it is the final mode of being. Just as the nature of a phenomenon depends on that phenomenon, so the phenomenon also depends on its nature. Furthermore, an emptiness depends on the meditative equipoise that certifies it, and it also depends on its basis of imputation, the non-inherent existence of an object. Thus, though all phenomena are interdependent, conventionalities are called interdependent existents in order to stress their false appearance as if they exist in and of themselves.

Since neither ultimate truths nor truths for a concealer inherently exist, the division of the two truths is not an ontological division. Both exist only conventionally (samvritisat, kun rdzob tu yodpa) with samvriti here referring to a valid dualistic cognizer; both truths exist for valid dualistic cognizers and not in ultimate analysis. The division of the two truths emphasizes two types of objects of consciousness, truths and falsities. Both, however, are falsely existent or falsely established because neither is independent; each depends on its imputing consciousness and on the other.

Whether understood by a particular being or not, emptiness is forever established as the nature of objects, which do not gain non-inherent existence through being cognized as lacking inherent existence. They never did, never do, and never will inherently exist. Emptiness is validated by a consciousness of meditative equipoise, and there has always been someone cognizing emptiness. Though each person needs to validate it for himself, this does mean that because it is not validated for someone, it is not validated in general. If this were the case, it would be difficult to establish the existence of anything.
For Prasangika nothing exists objectively, that is to say, as if of its own will right with its basis of imputation. Prasangika philosophy, though emphasizing the subjective element, is still not a turn to utter subjectivity in which what exists for the individual is what exists. There are standards and criteria for valid establishment, and in this sense both suchness and the phenomena qualified by it are objective. The division into two truths on epistemological grounds is a call to eradicate ignorance and to attain the highest wisdom. It is a call to recognition that a conventional cognizer, even if valid with respect to the existence or non-existence of objects, is not valid with respect to their suchness. It is a call to a new mode of perception, to a cognition of a reality that has been ever-present.

The two truths are not vague realms of misty truth as suggested by translations which use the singular, such as 'Absolute Truth' and 'Conventional Truth'. In Sanskrit and Tibetan the singular is used for a class name whereas in common English usage a general term is most often either in the plural, or in the singular with the indefinite article 'a'. It would be correct to refer to conventional truths as 'Conventional Truth' only if it were suitable to refer to tables as table, e.g., 'Table is object,' rather than 'Tables are objects.'

However, translating paramarthasatya in the singular as 'ultimate truth' even without an article can be considered a matter of choice depending on the context, because though there are many types of emptinesses, they are only enumerated as such in accordance with the various types of phenomena that are bases of the quality emptiness. Still, at least in the Ge-luk-ba interpretation the emptiness of one thing is not the emptiness of another in the sense of exact identity, and from this viewpoint the term has often been translated here either in the singular with the article 'an' as 'an ultimate truth' or in the plural as 'ultimate truths'. Despite this, when referring to a direct cognition in which all emptinesses are simultaneously realized, it seems cumbersome to say, 'A yogi directly cognizes ultimate truths', because it seems to imply that only some ultimate truths are being
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cognized. Rather, usage of the singular as in, 'A yogi directly
cognizes ultimate truth in a totally non-dualistic manner,' or 'A 
yogi directly cognizes emptiness after having become accus-
tomed to an inferential realization,' at least suggests that there is
no ultimate truth which at that point is not being cognized. The
meaning, nevertheless, is not amorphous, but specific; an empti-
ness is a phenomenon's lack of inherent existence. Thus, one
'reflects on an emptiness' or 'generates an inferential cognition
of an emptiness' because it is the emptiness of a specific phenom-
enon that is being reflected upon and realized.

Also, for paramartha, 'ultimate' is a better translation than
'Absolute' because 'Absolute' suggests something that exists in
and of itself, independently, whereas nothing is independent in
the Madhyamika system, even an emptiness.

As was said earlier, a truth-for-a-concealer is not established as
existing by a concealer—an ignorant consciousness. Its erron-
eous inherent existence is 'established' by ignorance. Since the
mere existence of truths-for-a-concealer is not refuted by empti-
ness, the division into the two truths is not of mental objects into
those of the stupid and those of the wise. The conventional exist-
ence of objects is certified by valid cognizers and never eradica-
ted by ultimate analysis, which refutes only the inherent exist-
ence of objects, both conventionally and ultimately. Once ulti-
mate analysis establishes that the inherent existence of an object
cannot be found, it cannot be found ultimately or convention-
ally; hence, the doctrine of the two truths is not a concession to
the ways of ignorance. Chandrakirti establishes that even
conventionally objects are not their bases of imputation; even
conventionally objects are merely interdependent.

This does not mean that when a truth-for-a-concealer, such as
a chair, is perceived, a common being perceives it as a truth-for-
a-concealer.\textsuperscript{32*} Though one must depend on truths-for-a-
concealer, such as words, definitions, examples, and so forth, in
order to realize an ultimate truth, one must gain an under-
standing of an ultimate truth—an emptiness—in order to realize
that a truth-for-a-concealer is just a truth-for-a-concealer. Beings
whose minds have not turned toward emptiness do not actually
know truths-for-a-concealer as such, though indeed they per-
ceive and use them every day. Thus, the name 'truth-for-a-
concealer', itself is a call toward an understanding of emptiness.
The same impact is present when samvrtisatya is taken as 'con-
ventional truth', for it implies that there is a non-conventional
analytical consciousness for which these objects do not exist the
way they appear. Also, samvrtisatya as 'interdependent existent'
calls for a recognition of the lack of independent or inherent
existence. However, the most forceful meaning of samvrtisatya
is 'truth-for-a-concealer' which is used so predominantly that
Jam-yang-shay-ba points out that it is not the only etymology
of the term.\footnote{325}

In the Prasangika system there is no division of truths-for-a-
concealer into the real and the unreal from the point of view of a
reasoning consciousness because all are unreal in the sense of
being falsities that do not exist the way they appear.\footnote{326} However,
based on the world's discrimination of what is true or untrue,
real or unreal, through determining whether, with respect to
impermanent objects, they can perform functions in accordance
with their appearance, the Prasangikas accept a division of
truths-for-a-concealer into the real and unreal. The unreal are
objects such as a mirror image which appears to be a face but
cannot perform the functions of a face. A mirror image exists,
however, and, therefore, can be classed among the two truths.
An example of a real conventional truth is a face.

Even though an ignorant consciousness accepts an inherently
existent person to be true, an inherently existent person is not a
truth-for-a-concealer, real or unreal, because such does not exist.
Therefore, the etymology of samvrtisatya as an object which the
concealer, ignorance, takes to exist the way it appears is wider than
the actual meaning of the term. Things that ignorance assumes to
be true but do not at all exist cannot be classed among the two
truths, which are only existents. Thus, the name 'truth-for-a-
concealer' is not a definition. Just as Buddha said that all products
are deceptive, so his choice of a name for conventional objects,
'truths-for-a-concealer', points to an error in the perception of
them: they seem to exist in and of themselves, but do not.
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INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE AND PHENOMENA

Sources
Geshe Gedün Lodrö’s oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp. 595-623

Sutras that mainly and explicitly teach ultimate truths are definitive (nit art ha, nges don) because the mode of existence of the phenomena discussed in such passages is definite as just what is said. No further interpretation is necessary to discover the way things are.

Though a direct cognition of ultimate truth cannot be described exactly as it is, the cognition and its object can be taught. For example, as Chandrakirti says, if one without cataracts tells another who has and sees hairs falling before him, 'There are no hairs here,' the person with cataracts will not realize the lack of hairs the way the person without the disease does; however, it cannot be said that he does not realize the non-existence of the hairs. In the same way, when someone who lacks the contaminations of the darkness of ignorance teaches about suchness, a listener cannot realize it the way the speaker does, but it is accepted that in general it is not that he does not realize suchness.

When Shantideva says that 'the ultimate is not an object of the mind', he means that it is not an object of direct perception by a dualistic mind. A non-dualistic wisdom consciousness, which in relation to its cognitum emptiness is like water poured into water, is needed in order to know an emptiness just as it is experienced by a Superior. Kensur Lekden said that after direct cognition a yogi intensely wishes to tell others how it is, but no words succeed.

Sutras that mainly and explicitly teach truths-for-a-concealer require interpretation (neyartha, drang don). Because the mode of being of the phenomena discussed in such passages is not explicitly presented, it is necessary to search out a mode of being other than what is explicitly said. In other words, sutras that do not explicitly teach emptiness must be interpreted in order to understand it. Their subjects may be validly established, but the final mode of being of these subjects is not explicitly mentioned.
Also, sutras that teach non-existent objects, such as a permanent self, must be interpreted to discover Buddha's intention in preaching such a doctrine to a particular type of trainee. The teaching of a permanent self has as its basis Buddha's thought that there is continuous rebirth. The purpose is to influence listeners, who for the time being cannot posit an impermanent self without becoming morally nihilistic, to accept cause and effect and thereby generate devotion to virtue which yields rebirths of high status. The teaching of a permanent self is refuted by the reasoning that a permanent self cannot be reborn since what is permanent cannot change.

Other sutras must be interpreted just to discover what is being said. For instance, a passage that says, 'Father and mother are to be killed,' does not even say that father and mother are to be killed. Rather, it says that 'existence'—the fully potentialized latency that in the next moment will become a new life—and 'attachment', which nourishes this latency (see pp.280-1), must be destroyed. Such passages must be interpreted first to determine what is being said and then to determine the mode of existence—emptiness—of the phenomena discussed.

In definitive sutras the mode of being is definite right there in the texts, but this does not mean that literal passages requiring interpretation are indefinite in the sense of not being validly established. 'Definitive' here connotes not only validity but also ultimacy.

'Sutras' are passages spoken by Buddha and not necessarily whole texts; even a few words or a phrase can be a sutra. Thus, because all actual Perfection of Wisdom Sutras are definitive, some phrases in books called Perfection of Wisdom Sutras which set forth conventionalities, such as the location of the discourse, are not actual Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. For they require interpretation to determine the final mode of being of the phenomena discussed, such as the location's emptiness of objectively established existence. Also, because actual Perfection of Wisdom Sutras are literal, though the phrase, 'There are no forms', is accepted as spoken by Buddha, Buddha did not speak a phrase teaching that there are no forms. He taught that forms are not inherently existent as is clearly specified in various Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, such as the Heart of Wisdom; this
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qualification is extended to all similar instances in the text. Buddha never taught that there are no forms because teaching or not teaching a doctrine is determined on the basis of whether there is or is not a student for it. There must be a special or specific type of trainee for a teaching, and there are no special students for a teaching that there are no forms. Buddha taught that forms do not inherently exist, that forms are impermanent, that forms are not different entities from perceiving consciousnesses, and so forth.

The Chittamatrins, unlike the Prasangikas, do not make a division of definitive and requiring interpretation on the basis of whether ultimate or conventional truths are taught but on the basis of whether the teaching in the sutra is literally acceptable. This means that for the Chittamatrins all sutras of which the teaching is validly established, such as of the five aggregates, are definitive; those which are not validly established, such as of a self-sufficient person, require interpretation.

For the Chittamatrins, the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras are nevertheless the supreme of all Buddha's sutras, but their speaking of an absence of natural existence is not said to be literal. For them, Perfection of Wisdom Sutras are not definitive and require interpretation, not because their subject matter is secondary but merely because they are not literal. The special students of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras must be of sharper faculties than those of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, a definitive sutra, because from the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras themselves they must be able to determine the Chittamatin presentation of the three natures and so forth without relying on a text, such as the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, which clearly differentiates what does and does not truly exist.

The Svatantrikas agree with the Prasangikas that definitive sutras mainly and explicitly teach emptiness. However, the Svatantrikas hold that a definitive sutra must be literal. For instance, the Heart of Wisdom Sutra where it says that phenomena do not inherently exist is non-literal because it requires qualification to indicate that ultimately (paramarthatas, don dam par) phenomena do not exist inherently, since for Svatantrikas phenomena inherently exist conventionally. In the Svatantrika school, to be literal a sutra that teaches ultimate truths must specify
ultimately' in its refutation of inherent existence, though it need
not be specified explicitly in every instance.

That scriptural passages are to be divided into definitive and
requiring interpretation is taught in sutra itself through the four
reliances: (1) rely on doctrine, not on persons; (2) rely on mean-
ing, not on words; (3) rely on definitive sutras, not on those requir-
ing interpretation; and (4) rely on wisdom, not on knowledge.

Initially, at the time of hearing the teaching, one should not rely
on the person of the teacher, looking to his fame, wealth, and so
forth. Rather, one should listen to anyone's teaching that explains
the path out of suffering. One should not take the words as most
important but mainly pay attention to the meaning. Again, when
thinking about the teaching, one should take definitive sutras as
most important and should recognize that those requiring inter-
pretation are a means of realizing the definitive—emptiness. When
practicing, one should not feel satisfied with just the knowledge
arising from hearing and thinking but should devote oneself to
generating the non-conceptual wisdom arising from meditation.

The two types of scriptures are also differentiated in sutras
teaching that all products are falsities, thus establishing that
passages propounding the non-true existence of products are
definitive. (Sutras often take products as their examples of falsi-
ties, but this does not mean that non-products, such as space, are
not falsities. Rather, products are the chief of objects encoun-
tered by 'common beings and, therefore, are singled out as falsi-
ties, appearing one way and existing another.)

Nagarjuna's refutation of production, establishing that pro-
duction does not inherently exist, indicates through reasoning
that sutras which speak of inherently existent production or do
not mention the actual empty status of production require inter-
pretation. Consequently, sutras that specify production as
lacking inherent existence are definitive.

Nagarjuna himself did not explicitly state in any of his works on
which sutra he was relying for his differentiation of sutras into two
types. However, one can infer from his mode of procedure that
he was relying on the Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra which is
quoted as a source for the differentiation by Chandrakirti in his
Clear Words, by Avalokitavrata in his commentary on Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom' (Prajnapradipa), and by Kamalashila in his Illumination of the Middle Way.

It is said that the Prasangika system presents Buddha's own final differentiation of the two types of scriptures even though it contradicts the thought of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, which the Chittamatrins use as their basis for the division. However, it does not contradict Buddha's thought when he taught the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, in that the latter merely accords with the mentality of certain Mahayana disciples who were incapable of comprehending the final teaching. It is similar to the non-contradiction in terms of Buddha's own thought when he taught Hinayanists that killing was totally forbidden but taught Mahayanists that killing is permitted in certain circumstances. (Bodhisattvas—some say eighth grounders and above and some say first grounders and above—may, in order to help others, commit seven of the ten non-virtues: killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, speaking harshly, speaking divisively, and chattering senselessly. However, they are never allowed to commit the three mental non-virtues—covetousness, harmfulness, and wrong views. In general, these seven non-virtues are permitted when they are the only possible way to stop someone from bringing great harm on himself or others; thus, they are performed altruistically, not with an intent to harm.)

The Sutra Unravelling the Thought sets forth three turnings of the wheel of doctrine by Buddha. The division into three is made according to subject matter, specifically the manner in which selflessness is presented. The first turning is comprised of sutras that set forth the selflessness of persons but do not refute that phenomena are established by way of their own character as bases of names and conceptions. The second is comprised of those that on the literal level set forth the non-true existence of all phenomena, without distinguishing that some do and others do not truly exist. The third is comprised of those that clearly discriminate the true existence of emptinesses and impermanent phenomena and the non-true existence of imaginary phenomena. Since the Chittamatrins follow the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, they
assert that all sutras of the first and second wheels require interpretation whereas all those of the third wheel are definitive. The Prasangikas, on the other hand, assert that the first and third wheels as explained in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought require interpretation and that the middle wheel is definitive.

The three wheels of doctrine can also be arranged in a different manner. In this system the first wheel is comprised of sutras mainly spoken for Hfnayana disciples, teaching the four noble truths and concordant topics. 'Hfnayana disciples' are Hearers and Solitary Realizers, who do not have separate wheels of the teaching because Solitary Realizers can attain their paths in reliance on the Hearers' division of the teaching. The second wheel is comprised of sutras mainly spoken for Mahayanists, those of the wheel of signlessness, such as the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras and so forth, as well as those teaching concordant topics. The third wheel is comprised of sutras mainly spoken for Mahayanists, those of the wheel of good discrimination, such as the Sutra Unravelling the Thought and so forth as well as those teaching concordant topics.

According to the Prasangikas, a sutra of the first wheel, which is meant for Hfnayanaists, is not necessarily a first wheel sutra as set forth in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, for according to the Prasangika system, Hfnayanaists cognize the same selflessness as Mahayanists, and therefore, many first wheel passages do not require interpretation. Without realizing the emptiness of inherent existence through understanding that analytically findable existence does not occur, liberation is impossible. Thus, a central Prasangika tenet is that some Hfnayana scriptures also teach the final mode of being of objects.

Without understanding the mode of being of objects—without understanding that objects are not their own final mode of being—no one, Hfnayanaist or Mahayanist, can uproot the basis for the afflictions that bind beings in cyclic existence, the mistaken notion that objects exist from their own side right with their bases of designation. Thus, both Hfnayanaists and Mahayanists—those motivated primarily to get out of cyclic existence for themselves and those mainly seeking others' welfare—must cognize the
middle way between the extremes of over-concretized existence and no existence at all, seeing the compatibility between emptiness and dependent-arising.

To accomplish this, a practitioner must distinguish between what teachings are definitive in that they present the final mode of subsistence of objects and what teachings require interpretation to arrive at that final mode of being. This differentiation, moreover, is not limited to scriptures, but must be carried over to objects as well—emptinesses being definitive and all other objects requiring interpretation to arrive at their final mode of subsistence. The basis of this is a division of hermeneutics in Madhyamika into two categories—of the objects of expressions (brjod bya V drang nges) such as chairs, tables, bodies, and emptinesses; and of means of expression (rjod byed drang nges) such as sutras. A practitioner is called to interpret all ordinary objects of experience to discover their inner nature.
Part Five
Prasangika-Madhyamika
1 The Prasangika School

Sources
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.586-8

The works of both Nagarjuna and Aryadeva are considered by both Svatantrikas and Prasangikas to be reliable sources. From the Prasangika point of view Nagarjuna and Aryadeva are Prasangikas though neither specified themselves as such nor openly presented the special features of that system. They are called Model Madhyamikas.

Buddhapalita did not clearly specify that consequences are to be used in place of autonomous syllogisms; however, his extensive use of consequences qualifies him, according to Jamyang-shay-ba, to be the founder of the Prasangika school. It is with Bhavaviveka's refutation of Buddhapalita and insistence on autonomous syllogisms that the necessity for a clear statement of Prasangika method arose. At that point, Chandrakirti defined the system in relation to the other schools, clearly explicating the incorrectness of using autonomous syllogisms and the correctness of consequences for generating in another the view of the
middle way, and it is for this reason that most Tibetan monastic colleges consider Chandrakirti to be the founder of Prasangika.

Thus, the Partisan Prasangikas are those who explicitly differentiate themselves as Prasangikas through extensive use of consequences and/or through specific challenges of the Svatantrika viewpoint from a Prasangika standpoint. Among them are Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti, Shantideva, and Atisha.

There are other Prasangikas who are neither Models because they were not used as valid sources by all Prasangikas and Svatantrikas nor Partisans because they did not explicitly reject the Svatantrika viewpoint. However, it can be seen from their works that their view accords with Prasangika; they are the Non-partisan Prasangikas: Shakyamitra, Nagabodhi, Rik-bay-ku-juk (Rigs-pa'i-khu-byug, a student of Chandrakirti), Shura (Ashvaghosha), etc.

SYNONYMS

Prasangikas are called Only Appearance Madhyamikas, for as Chandrakirti says (see p.586), they assert the existence of conventional phenomena—those phenomena which appear to the conventional mind—by way of their conditionality, not through asserting any of the four extremes: that phenomena inherently exist, utterly do not exist, both inherently exist and utterly do not exist, or are another inherently existent alternative.

'Conditionality' (*idampratyayata, rkyen nyid 'di pa tsam*), or 'having this particular condition, is a synonym for the dependent-arising of compounded phenomena. Not covered by the term 'conditionality' is the dependent-arising of uncompounded phenomena, such as space, analytical cessations, non-analytical cessations, and emptinesses. Non-products—or permanent phenomena—are dependent-arisings in two ways: (1) they arise, or exist, in dependence on their parts or bases of imputation, and (2) they arise, or exist, in dependence on a conceptual consciousness that imputes them. For example, the space of a room is imputed or designated to an absence of obstructive contact and to the space
of the various parts of the room; thus, it depends both on its bases of designation and on the mind that designates it.

Here, with regard to permanent phenomena, 'arising' in the term 'dependent-arising' does not mean 'being produced' but 'existing' (*sat, yodpa*ov 'established' (*siddha, grub pa*). Permanent phenomena are dependent-arisings in that they are 'dependency existent' or 'dependently established'.

The dependent-arising of impermanent phenomena is itself a sign that products are not produced from themselves, naturally existent others, both, or causelessly. The first alternative and the last two alternatives require no qualification; however, the second, production from other, does require the qualification 'naturally existent'. For products are indeed conventionally produced from causes that are conventionally existent others. There is no production, even conventionally, which can bear analysis, but there is conventionally existent self and other and conventionally existent production from what is other. Self and other are mutually dependent as are cause and effect. Because of being interdependent, they cannot be naturally existent, that is to say, established by way of their own character.

It is by way of this conditionality that a Prasangika accepts phenomena. The Sanskrit word translated by 'phenomena' is *dharma*. Because all *dharma* are objects of knowledge (*jneya, shes bya*), they can appear to the mind, and thus the word 'phenomena' from the Greek *phaindmenon* meaning 'appearance' is used as a translation equivalent. There are impermanent and permanent phenomena, and in this system of translation there is no noumenon which is not a phenomenon. For even emptiness is a phenomenon in that it appears to the mind and is an object (*vishaya, yul*); in the Prasangika system nothing exists independently, in and of itself, as 'noumenon' suggests. Even an emptiness is a dependent-arising because it is imputed to a lack of inherent existence which is its basis of imputation and, like all other phenomena, cannot be found when sought among its bases of imputation. Just as much as a chair is not its legs, arms, back, or seat, or even their composite, so the emptiness of a chair is not the lack of inherent existence of the legs, arms, back, or seat, or even their composite.
‘Conditionality’ refers to the dependent-arising of products, and indeed all Buddhist schools of tenets accept that products are dependent-arisings inasmuch as all effects depend on causes. However, the Prasangika sense of ‘conditionality’ is brought into focus when it is seen that they accept the dependence not only of effects on causes but also of causes on effects. For a seed is a cause only in relation to its effect, a sprout. (For convenience, a sprout can be considered to be a shoot of some height when the two bulbous halves of the seed are no longer present and a root system has developed.) Its ability to produce an effect, given the proper conditions, makes it a cause. Except in relation to the sprout, how can it be said that a seed is a cause? This is obvious and requires no special analysis, for in the Prasangika system, if anything could bear ultimate analysis, it would inherently exist whereas nothing inherently exists. That a cause is dependent on an effect is obvious to the ordinary non-analytical intellect.

However, no other Buddhist system of tenets—Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra, or even Svatantrika—accepts that causes are dependent on effects. They reason that causes do not rely on effects for their production whereas effects do rely on causes for their production. However, the Prasangikas' approach is from the viewpoint of the designation of the ultimately unfindable nominality 'cause' and not from the viewpoint of its production, for they agree that a cause does not depend on its effect for its production. The Prasangika assertion of the interdependence of cause and effect highlights their emphasis on the interrelated nature of names and the naming process, the dependence of all phenomena on thought.

All phenomena are interdependent though each and every phenomenon is not interdependent with each and every other phenomenon. A calf depends on its causes, cow and bull, etc., and the cow and bull as parents depend on their calf though they were not born from the calf. Still, a calf and a pony are not dependent on each other.

It is by way of this conditionality that the one hundred and eight afflicted and purified phenomena are asserted to exist, but the name 'Only Appearance Madhyamika' does not imply that
Prasangikas assert that phenomena merely appear to the mind whereas in fact they do not exist. Though analysis shows that phenomena ultimately do not exist, ultimate analysis does not deny that objects exist conventionally. Truly existent or inherently existent objects are rejected through Madhyamika analysis but not the mere objects themselves. However, it is to be remembered that the status of conventionalities is such that they are not separate from their parts; they are neither their parts individually nor the composite of their parts. They are not their bases of imputation even conventionally. A chair is only the 'chair' imputed in dependence on legs, arms, back, seat, and so forth arranged in a certain shape. The conventions of the world are exactly the opposite of the Prasangika view on this point; the world, through beginningless ignorance, confuses the object imputed with the basis of imputation. All of the conventions of the world are not, then, accepted in the Prasangika system. The Prasangikas mostly accept those phenomena which the world says exist, but not the way the world feels those phenomena exist. Phenomena appear to the world to exist naturally, and the world assents to this appearance; such appearances are false, and such assent is mistaken.

In the same vein, Bu-don (Bu-ston) says that Prasangikas are called 'Madhyamikas using what is renowned in the world' (Loka-prasiddha-varga-chari-madhyamika). The name is perhaps a deliberate contrast with the Hindu emphasis on scriptural wisdom over ignorant worldly conventions. However, even in the Prasangika system the world's ignorance is still the first link of the dependent-arising of the misery of cyclic existence. Therefore, the Prasangikas, though mostly accepting the world's opinion on what exists, do not enshrine every aspect of the worldly non-analytical intellect. For it is analysis itself that will break the knot of cyclic existence through rescuing beings from the tangles of misconception.

Prasangikas are also called Non-Abiding Madhyamikas, or Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas, because through refuting inherent existence they avoid the extreme of permanence and through asserting conventional existence they avoid
the extreme of annihilation. They do not abide in any way, coarse or subtle, in either, but in the middle or center which denotes neither a mixture of existence and non-existence nor a gray area of agnostic doubt. The middle way philosophically is the way things are—not mistaking what exists for what does not exist and not mistaking what does not exist for what exists.

All systems claim to occupy the center.\textsuperscript{343} For example, the Dialectician Nihilists say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through not asserting phenomena which are beyond sense perception and avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting those that are manifest to the senses. The Samkhyaśas say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through asserting the transformation of states and avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting the unchangeability of the nature. The Vaiśbhashikas, the lowest Buddhist school of tenets, say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through asserting that all products are impermanent and avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting that past and future objects are substantialities. The Sautrantikas say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through not asserting that permanent phenomena, such as space, are substantial entities and avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting that forms and so forth are naturally bases of names. The Chittamatrins say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through asserting that forms and so forth are not naturally bases of the affixing of names and avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting that products and emptinesses truly exist.

The Svantra-Madhyamikas say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through asserting that objects do not exist from the viewpoint of an objective mode of subsistence which is not established through the object's appearing to a non-defective consciousness. For all objects attain their inherent existence through appearing to a non-defective consciousness. The Svantrikas do not find it contradictory to assert that objects have no objective, inherent existence which is not established by the mind and to assert that objects do exist inherently.\textsuperscript{344} A beautiful woman created by a magician has no
mode of being that is not posited by the mistaken minds of the audience who have come under the spell of the magician. However, this does not mean that the beautiful woman has no mode of being; she has one posited by a mistaken consciousness. Just so, though phenomena seem to have their own mode of being or own mode of subsistence free from any positing consciousness, they do not; however, they do have their own mode of subsistence within the scope of its being posited to them through their appearing to consciousness. In the case of the illusory woman, the positing consciousness is mistaken whereas in the case of phenomena the positing consciousness is correct or non-defective—free from error due to spells, moving objects, disease, and so on. The Svatantrikas, therefore, say that they avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting that conventionally objects exist inherently or exist in their own right.

The Prasangikas find such to be contradictory, and thus they say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through asserting that objects do not exist inherently. For them, existing ultimately (paramarthasiddha, don dam par grub pa) and existing inherently (svabhavasiddha, rang bzhin gyis grub pa) are synonymous whereas for the Svatantrikas they are not. The Prasangikas say that they avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting that conventionally all phenomena are only nominal and exist only imputedly. They do not find it contradictory for phenomena to exist only designatedly and yet be able to perform functions. They do not find it contradictory for things to be unfindable among their bases of designation either singly or as a composite and yet exist. In fact, the only way that things can perform functions is to exist merely imputedly, for if objects did inherently exist, they could not be affected by causes nor could they affect anything. Existence would be impossible in a world of frozen substantialities; things would be static, for they would not depend on causes.

Objects are imputed in the way that a snake is imputed to a rope. Just as much as a snake cannot be found among the parts of the rope either individually or collectively, so phenomena, even when correctly imputed, cannot be found among their
bases of imputation, individually or collectively, and, of course, not separately. Nevertheless, there is a difference between a snake wrongly imputed to a rope and a snake rightly imputed to a proper basis of designation because the latter can perform the functions of a snake.

Therefore, when Prasangikas cite the example of a rope-snake, it illustrates only the mode of imputation; the purport of the example is not that the existence of phenomena is the same as the existence of a rope-snake. A rope-snake does not exist and cannot perform the functions of a snake whereas things do exist and create effects within the context of being ultimately unfindable nominalities.

The most difficult point in the Prasangika system is this: the utter unfindability of phenomena in their bases of designation and yet their ability to perform functions. Prasangikas do not deny the bhava (dngogs-po) which is defined as 'that which is able to perform a function', particularly the function of creating an effect. They deny the bhava which means inherent existence (svabhava, rangbzhin in the sense of rang bzhin gyis grub pa), the non-dependence of things on their parts, their bases of designation, or the consciousness that designates them. Thus, when an emptiness of inherent existence is rightly seen in an object, understanding of imputed existence is furthered. When imputed existence is rightly seen, understanding of the emptiness of inherent existence is furthered. As long as these two are seen to be contradictory, that is, as long as a refutation of inherent existence seems to refute the effective existence of phenomena, one has not passed beyond the views of non-Madhyamikas. Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (XXIV. 14ab) says:

For whom emptiness is possible
For him all is possible.

This eliminates the view that Madhyamikas themselves accept emptiness but accept conventional phenomena only in dependence on others' misconceptions. Nagarjuna said that 'for him', that is, for the Madhyamika who accepts emptiness, everything—all the objects, agents, and actions of cyclic existence and of
nirvana—is suitable. The key to the Prasangika assertion of conventional phenomena is that though they assert the existence of what the world says exists, they do not assert that phenomena exist the way that the world sees them.

Not only are the world's habitual conceptions wrong but also other philosophies, far from actually abiding in the middle way, have fallen to extremes. They tie even tighter the knot of cyclic existence. All of these extremes are forsaken by the Prasangikas who detail with exactitude the way that phenomena exist. When emptiness of inherent existence is seen to be harmonious with imputed existence, then the middle way in which the Prasangikas abide can be cognized.
2 Debate

Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of the Middle Way*
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings

Buddhapalita's refutation—in commentary on the first chapter of Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*—of the Samkhya position that an effect is produced from a cause which is of the same nature as itself drew heavy criticism from Bhavaviveka.\(^{346}\)

An examination of Buddhapalita's refutation, Bhavaviveka's criticism, and Chandrakīrti's defense of Buddhapalita reveals central differences between the two divisions of Madhyamika: Prasangika, founded by Buddhapalita/Chandrakīrti, and Svatantrika, founded by Bhavaviveka.

The Samkhya position is:

The cause of a barley shoot is a barley seed, and its minor causes are water, manure, and so forth. The nature of the cause and of the minor causes is partless, and thus the nature of the seed is the nature of the water and of the manure, and the nature of the water is the nature of the
seed and of the manure, and so on. For these causes have a common effect.

The barley shoot exists at the time of the barley seed because the barley shoot abides in the nature of its causes at the time when they are still causes and when the effect or manifestation has not yet been produced. For example, a pot exists in the nature of the clay. Therefore, the nature of the causes and the nature of the effect are one and thus are each other.

Though some Samkhya-s speak not of production but of manifestation, the relationship of oneness of the nature and the manifestation is the same as with producer and produced, or cause and effect.

Buddhapalita flings consequences at the Samkhya's assertion. First he sets his thesis:

Things are not produced from their own entities.

Then in answer to anyone's wondering what fallacies there are in asserting production of something from that which is of the same nature, he gives a brief refutation in the form of two consequences:

There are the fallacies that their re-production would be senseless and, not only that, would also be endless.

Buddhapalita's actual words are: 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless.'

The way he flings the consequence that re-production would be senseless is:

It follows with respect to the subject, a sprout, that its production again is senseless because of already existing in its own entity.\textsuperscript{347}

The Samkhya, however, holds that what is existent but unmanifest must be made manifest. Therefore, he might answer that it is not entailed by something's already existing in its own entity.
that its production again is senseless. In that case, the second consequence of the endlessness of its production is flung:

It follows with respect to the subject, a sprout, that its production is endless because, though it already exists in its own entity, there is sense in (or a need for) its re-production.

If the existent requires re-production, then even when the effect is manifest, it would still require re-production because it exists. Buddhapalita says, 'The production again of things already existent in their own entities is purposeless. If though existent they are produced, they would never not be produced.'

The Samkhya holds that what has already been manifested need not be produced; therefore, he might again answer that there is no entailment. However, his answer does not hit the mark, for by switching from the vocabulary of production to that of manifestation he cannot escape inquiry about whether the manifestation exists at the time of its unmanifest state. If he says that the manifestation does not exist at the time of its unmanifest state, he would fall from his view that all products, though formerly existent, are manifested by causes because the manifestation would not exist at the time of its unmanifest state. Therefore, he might accept that the manifestation existed from the time of its unmanifest state. He would be saying that it is not entailed by a manifestation's existing at the time of its unmanifest state that it would not be produced again. Then the consequence of endlessness is flung:

It follows about the subject, a manifestation, that its production is endless because, though it exists from the time of its unmanifest state, it has a need for production again.

CONSEQUENCES AND SYLLOGISMS

Consequences (prasahga) are used to generate in an opponent a consciousness that infers a thesis. Unwanted consequences
that contradict an opponent's position and arise from his position are frequently used. Employing a reason and a pervasion approved by the opponent, a consequence of his views which contradicts another of his views is presented to him.

For instance, if among the various tenets of a school there were the assertions that a sound is permanent, that a sound is a product, and that all products are impermanent, the following consequence would be stated:

It follows that the subject, a sound, is not a product because of being a permanent phenomenon.

The opponent himself has accepted the reason, that a sound is a permanent phenomenon. He has accepted the pervasion, that whatever is a permanent phenomenon is not a product. Thus, he is forced to accept the unwanted thesis that a sound is not a product, and this contradicts his own view that a sound is a product. The stater of the consequence would say, 'The three spheres have been accepted!' This means that the reason, the pervasion of the reason by the predicate of the consequence, and the opposite of the consequence have been accepted.\textsuperscript{349}

The sample consequence above also implies its opposite meaning:

The subject, a sound, is an impermanent phenomenon because of being a product.

The opposite of the original reason is put as the predicate of the implied thesis, that is, 'permanent phenomenon' becomes 'impermanent phenomenon'. The opposite of the predicate of the original thesis is put as the reason of the implied syllogism, that is, 'not a product' becomes 'a product'.

To repeat, the consequence,

It follows that the subject, a sound, is not a product because of being a permanent phenomenon,

implies the syllogism,

The subject, a sound, is an impermanent phenomenon because of being a product.
Through the statement of the consequence, a consciousness that infers the implied opposite meaning is generated in the opponent.

Non-Prasangikas also use consequences to break down the vibrance or pointedness of the opponent's adherence to his own view. However, they do not accept that a consequence alone can generate in the opponent a consciousness inferring the implied thesis. Prasangikas assert that the statement of a consequence alone is sufficient, provided the opponent is intelligent and ready. To such an opponent, a further explicit statement of a syllogism is purposeless.

The intent is to generate in the opponent an inferring consciousness, though not necessarily through the route of implying the opposite meaning as just explained. For instance, Buddha-palita's consequences above are intended to generate in the Samkhya a consciousness which infers that there is no production from self and not that there is production from other.

Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way™ lists five types of consequences.

1 Consequence generating an other-approved inference, i.e., generating an inference in another using a subject, reason, and pervasion approved in the opponent's system

Example: It follows that the subject [of this consequence], a sprout, is not a dependent-arising because of being objectively existent.

This type is also called 'a consequence implying its opposite meaning'. It both contradicts the opponent's assertion that a sprout is a dependent-arising and implicitly establishes that a sprout does not objectively exist. The other-approved syllogism which is implied by the consequence is:

The subject [of this syllogism], a sprout, is not objectively existent because of being a dependent-arising.

The above consequence would be flung at a Buddhist proponent of objectively existent things. Svatantrika and the other lower
Buddhist systems accept that all impermanent things are dependent-arisings at least in the sense that they arise dependent on an aggregation of causes and conditions, and they also accept that the very sign of their dependent-arising proves their objective existence. For them, if things did not objectively exist, they would not exist at all.

If, after the statement of the consequence, the opponent were still recalcitrant, his answer would be, 'The opposite is entailed', meaning that whatever is a dependent-arising is objectively existent. However, his answer would not hit the mark because the meaning of 'objectively existent' is 'independently existent', thereby contradicting dependent-arising. The opponent might require more consequences to reveal to him his self-contradiction. However, for one who is ready to realize his self-contradiction, the above consequence is sufficient to generate in him a consciousness inferring that a sprout does not objectively exist and, by extension, that all phenomena do not objectively exist.

2 Consequence through similarity of reason

Example: It follows that a sound apprehending ear consciousness sees colors and shapes because a color and shape apprehending eye consciousness ultimately sees colors and shapes.

If an eye consciousness ultimately saw colors and shapes, then it would be independent, that is, would not depend on the eye sense that endows it with the ability to perceive colors and shapes but not sounds. Since consciousnesses would apprehend their objects without dependence on their respective senses, an ear consciousness would also absurdly apprehend colors and shapes. The thesis being implied is that an eye consciousness and, in general, sense consciousnesses do not ultimately perceive their objects. The implied thesis here, however, is not, as in the previous example, the subject plus the opposite of the reason.

3 Contradictory consequence

Example: It follows that the subject, the ox-generality
which is a permanent thing, does not pervade its many particular instances because of being a partless unity.

This consequence merely demonstrates a contradiction in the opponent's view and neither implies the opposite meaning, like the first type of consequence, nor uses a similarity of reason, like the second. The opposite meaning would be:

The subject, the ox-generality which is a permanent thing, is not a partless unity because of its pervading its many instances.

It is true that the ox-generality is not a partless one because it has as many parts as the number of oxen it 'pervades' or encompasses. However, the ox-generality is impermanent because all instances of ox are impermanent. Thus, the subject of the thesis, the permanent ox-generality, does not exist and, therefore, could not be proved to possess the quality of the reason, that is, it could not be shown that the permanent ox-generality has as many parts as the number of oxen it pervades.

The implied thesis of this consequence is not its opposite meaning but that an ox-generality which is a permanent thing does not exist. Another implied is:

The ox-generality has parts because of pervading its many particular instances.

The opponent here is a non-Buddhist Vaisheshika.

The other types of consequences are contradictory, but this type is merely contradictory in that it does not share the special qualities of the other four types.

4 Consequence expressing contradiction and proving one's own assertion

Example: It follows that the subject, a sprout, is senselessly re-produced because of already having attained its own entity.

A Samkhya accepts that re-production is sensible in the sense that what has already attained existence in its non-manifest state
still requires production to become manifest. Therefore, the consequence of senseless re-production expresses an inner contradiction of this position. Furthermore, since the view being proved by this consequence is that there is no production from self, the Prasangika's own assertion is being proved. Again, the issue is not that only some consequences prove something, either positive or negative, for all correct consequences prove something. Rather, this type of consequence is distinguished by its particular force, as in the example where no production from self is proved but the opposite of the reason is not implied.

5 Consequence established through similarity of reason and thesis

If someone said that it followed that the form aggregate exists inherently because the feeling aggregate exists inherently, this consequence would be stated:

It follows that the reason 'the feeling aggregate inherently exists' cannot prove that the form aggregate inherently exists because the reason and thesis are equally difficult to prove.

Even if there were inherent existence, there is no difference in difficulty of realization in establishing that the feeling aggregate inherently exists and that the form aggregate inherently exists. To fulfill the purpose of generating the inference of a thesis in another, the establishment of the sign (reason) as present in the subject must be easier than the realization of the thesis. For instance, a sound is proven to be an impermanent thing through the sign of its being a product. Though 'impermanent thing' and 'product' are synonyms because all instances of the one are instances of the other, being a product can serve as a correct sign of being an impermanent thing, for being a product is easier to understand than being an impermanent thing. To be a product means to be made, and a mere snapping of the fingers can demonstrate that a sound is made or created by causes and conditions. That products are impermanent, i.e., that they necessarily disintegrate moment by moment, is harder to realize. Therefore,
when the reason is as hard to establish as the thesis, the reason is not suitable.

Much like a consequence, a syllogism (prayoga, sbyor ba) consists of a thesis and reason; however, in the logic school of Dignaga and Dharmakīrti the stater of a syllogism must himself accept the reason's presence in the subject, the pervasion of the reason by the predicate of the thesis, and the pervasion of the negative of the predicate by the negative of the reason. For instance:

The subject, a pot, is an impermanent thing because of being arisen from exertion—just as, for example, speech [is arisen from exertion and is impermanent].

The stater of the syllogism must accept the reason's presence in the subject—that a pot is arisen from exertion. He must accept the pervasion—that all things arisen from exertion are impermanent—and the counter-pervasion—that all permanent things are not arisen from exertion. However, in the case of a consequence neither subject, predicate, nor reason need be accepted by the stater. It is only necessary that the opponent accept, or be forced from his own position to accept, these three. Consequences are means of dealing with opponents on their own grounds, and Chandrakīrti declares that, if the opponent will not accept consequences stemming from his own views, there is no point in proceeding to state syllogisms to him.351

Thus, first of all, the difference between the Svatantrika Bhāvaviveka on the one side and the Prasangika Buddhāpalita on the other is Bhāvaviveka's insistence on the eventual statement of syllogisms. It is not that Prasangikas do not use syllogisms amongst themselves when there is agreement on the status of the subject, etc.; rather, the point at issue is what constitutes the necessary and best means of generating in an opponent the view that phenomena do not truly exist.

This controversy stems from different opinions on whether phenomena appear correctly to a non-defective sense consciousness. The Prasangika position is that not only do ordinary beings
misconceive the nature of phenomena but also phenomena appear to them in a mistaken aspect. In other words, an assenting to an incorrect appearance of phenomena as inherently existent is what constitutes the misconception that phenomena inherently exist. Even for eighth ground Bodhisattvas and Foe Destroyers (both of whom have totally overcome the conception that things inherently exist) phenomena still appear as if inherently existent. It is only for a Buddha that phenomena appear just as they are.

Thus the Prasangikas say that although a sense consciousness can be valid with respect to the existence of its object, it is never, except in the case of a Buddha, correct about the mode of existence of the object. For, due to the force of previous conditioning, objects appear to a sense consciousness as if existing objectively whereas they do not. They cannot be found among their bases of designation when sought, but appear as if existent in their own right.

However, Bhavaviveka's school, Sautrantika-Svatantrika, asserts that phenomena appear correctly in terms of their inherent existence to a non-defective sense consciousness. Bhavaviveka agrees that phenomena appear to sense consciousnesses to exist by way of their own character and asserts that they exist so. From this basis, he says that it is possible to state a syllogism in which subject and reason appear similarly to both parties in the debate. Bhavaviveka asserts that being arisen from exertion conventionally exists inherently in a pot, as do the natures of pervasion and counter-pervasion whereas a Prasangika sees the presence of the reason in the subject, the pervasion, and the counter-pervasion as existing imputedly or nominally, without inherent existence.

Both systems accept that an inferring consciousness is a valid cognizer (pramana, tshad ma). The statement of a valid reason that the subject possesses and which itself possesses the proper pervasion and counter-pervasion is not just verbal manipulation but a revelation of the nature of things which is hidden to the direct perception of ordinary beings. Prasangika, as well as Svatantrika, relies on inference to gain an understanding of emptiness. A meditator's statement to himself and intense
reflection on consequences and syllogisms in meditation are presented in both sutra and tantra systems as the means of gaining a familiarity with emptiness. Thus, in both sutra and tantra, cognition of emptiness through inference is a prerequisite for direct cognition.

According to Prasangika, once the view of emptiness is about to be entered, syllogisms about the final nature of phenomena are appropriate; however, when debating with those who are not yet about to generate the view in their continuum, consequences mainly are used. The case is the same in meditation; consequences are stated in order to break down one's own adherence to the wrong view; then, syllogisms may be stated, if necessary.

Without considering the difference between Prasangika and Svatantrika, the definition of a Madhyamika in general is:

A proponent of Buddhist tenets who totally refutes all extremes of permanence, i.e., that any phenomenon ultimately exists, and refutes all extremes of annihilation, i.e., that phenomena do not exist conventionally.

Therefore, all Madhyamikas—Prasangikas and Svatantrikas—avoid the extreme of permanence or existence through refuting that phenomena ultimately exist, truly exist, or exist as their own reality. They avoid the extreme of annihilation or non-existence through asserting that all phenomena exist conventionally, or nominally.

The word madhyama itself refers to the middle way that things are, the profound meaning of dependent-arising free from the two extremes, permanence and annihilation. The extremes here are misrepresentations of existence and non-existence. Because phenomena do not exist ultimately, the ultimate existence of phenomena is an extreme of existence. Because phenomena do exist conventionally, the non-existence of phenomena conventionally is an extreme of non-existence. Avoiding the extremes of existence and non-existence, however, does not mean that Madhyamikas refrain from making assertions about existence and non-existence because they do assert that
phenomena exist conventionally but not ultimately, even if these assertions exist only nominally.

A Svatantrika is a Madhyamika who asserts that a non-defective consciousness which perceives an object as existing inherently in its basis of imputation is valid and thus accepts that an object so cognized appears similarly to both parties in a debate. Based on the common appearance of a subject, the Svatantrika states a reason to prove a predicate about this subject. Thus, the definition of a Svatantrika-Madhyamika is:

A proponent of no true existence who asserts that conventionally all phenomena exist by way of their own character.

Truly existent phenomena are refuted by Svatrantrikas through relying on a logical mark, a reason, that has the inherently existent threefold aspects: presence in the subject, pervasion, and counter-pervasion. This usage of autonomous inferences (svatantra-anumana, rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag) to generate in an opponent a cognition of emptiness is the source of their name.

The definition of a Prasangika is:

A Madhyamika who does not assert that phenomena exist by way of their own character even conventionally.

Etymologically, a Prasangika is so called because of asserting that an inferential consciousness realizing a thesis of no inherent existence can be generated in the mental continuum of a disputant through only the demonstration of consequences (prasahga, thai ‘gyur). According to Prasangika all sense information is characterized by misinformation about the status of objects, for things undeniably appear to common beings to exist inherently in their bases of designation. Therefore, consequences that operate within the sphere of a non-Madhyamika's own views are relied upon to convince him that nothing can bear analysis, thereby causing him to realize the absence of objectively established existence.
Thus, Svatantrikas and Prasangikas are named on the basis of the means by which they generate in others the view that phenomena do not truly exist.
Dignāga
3 Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita

Sources
Bhavaviveka's *Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom'*
Avalokitavrata's *Commentary on (Bhavaviveka's) 'Lamp for (Nagarjuna's)' "Wisdom "*
Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of the Middle Way*
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings

The split between Svetantrika and Prasangika grew out of Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita's refutation of the Samkhya view that an effect is produced from a cause which is the same entity as the effect. Their commentaries on the first chapter of Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* reveal their differences. Buddhapalita said:

Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless. It is thus: the production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. If though existent they are produced, they would never not be produced.
Bhavaviveka took the first sentence not merely as a brief display of a thesis and consequences but as indicating an autonomous syllogism (svalantra-anumana, rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag). (Svatantra is usually translated as 'independent' rather than 'autonomous'; however, the very motto of Buddha's teaching is dependent-arising, and thus 'independent' for svatantra seems a too obvious self-contradiction. Also, here 'inference' does not refer to a consciousness, but to a syllogistic statement. Therefore, svatantra-anumana is translated often as 'autonomous syllogism'.)

According to Bhavaviveka, Buddhapalita's autonomous syllogism, if taken at face value, is:

The subjects, things, are not produced from their own entities because production is senseless and endless.

Bhavaviveka thought that the reason as stated would obviously not be Buddhapalita's intended reason, for Buddhapalita himself would not assert that production is senseless and endless. He thought that Buddhapalita's intended meaning would have to be:

The subjects, things, are not produced from their own entities because production is sensible and has an end.

According to Bhavaviveka, this autonomous syllogism sets forth a thesis of non-production from self but cannot prove it because it offers neither a reason nor an example which have the capacity of refuting production from self. This is Bhavaviveka's first objection to Buddhapalita's mode of reasoning.

Bhavaviveka states his own syllogism refuting production from self as an example of a correct autonomous syllogism:

The subjects, the inner sources (see p.273) such as an eye sense, are not ultimately produced from self because of existing—like, for example, existent consciousness [which exists and is not produced from itself].

For a Samkhya, the person or consciousness is eternal and thus not a product; therefore, just as a person or consciousness requires
no production, so an eye sense requires no production because it exists (even in its unmanifest state).

Bhavaviveka's second objection to Buddhapalita's supposedly intended syllogism is this: A Samkhya would question what 'production from self or 'production from their own entities' means. Does it mean production of effects from already manifest entities? If it does, Buddhapalita's syllogism is proving what is already established for Samkhya since Samkhya themselves accept that the manifest is produced from the non-manifest and, once manifest, requires no further manifestation. Because Samkhya do not accept that effects are produced from entities which are already manifest, Buddhapalita would be laboring to prove what they already accept.

Or, the Samkhya's question would be: Does the reference to production from self apply to production of an effect from the entity of the non-manifest nature (prakrti, rang bzhin)? If so, the syllogism would prove just the opposite of what Buddhapalita intended. It could not prove that there is no production from self because all products are produced from the nature. The Samkhya would say:

The subjects, things, are produced from themselves, that is, from the nature which is the same entity as themselves, because production is sensible and has an end.

Therefore, Bhavaviveka concludes that Buddhapalita's intended syllogism does not avoid the fallacies that a Samkhya, having analyzed the thesis, would be expected to adduce.

Also, as a third fault, because Buddhapalita stated something that is not established as his reason—that production would be senseless and endless—it must be reversed into: production is sensible and has an end. This being so, the predicate of the thesis also must be reversed; it must be changed from 'Things are not produced from themselves' to 'Things are produced from others'.

To restate this step, the reason as stated ('production is senseless and endless') is unacceptable because it must be a property of the subject ('things'), and it is not established that things have
senseless and endless production. Therefore, the reason must be changed to 'production is sensible and has an end' in consideration of Buddhapalita's 'actual' meaning, for it is established that things have sensible and finite production.

Furthermore, Bhavaviveka would claim that Buddhapalita could not have intended his reason to mean:

If produced from themselves, it would be senseless and endless.

For syllogistically this would be:

The subjects, things, are not produced from self because, if produced from self, their production would be senseless and endless.

The reason why Buddhapalita supposedly could not have meant this is that when the reason is established, the thesis would already be established. Contrary to this, it is always necessary to establish that the reason is a property of the subject, then establish that the predicate of the thesis follows from the reason, and then, for the first time, realize the predicate of the thesis as a quality of the subject. In other words, when it is established that if things are produced from self, their production is senseless and endless, it is already established that things are not produced from self. There would be no point in further establishing the concomitance of the predicate of the thesis, 'no production from self with the reason, 'if produced from self, their production would be senseless and endless'. Therefore, Bhavaviveka concludes that since it is 'clear' that Buddhapalita himself did not accept what he explicitly stated, he must have meant:

The subjects, things, are produced from others because production is sensible and has an end.

Bhavaviveka says that Buddhapalita thereby contradicts the Madhyamika tenet that the refutation of the four extreme types of production is a non-affirming negation (*prasajya-pratishedha, meddgag*). In other words, when production from self is refuted, production from other should not be implied in its place. Even
though Buddhapalita did not state as an explicit thesis that things are produced from others, Bhavaviveka decided that this was his implicit thesis, and, therefore, his explicit thesis becomes an affirming negation (paryudasā-pratisedha, ma yin dgag)—an explicit negation of production from self which implies an affirmation of production from other in its place. According to Bhavaviveka, Buddhapalita's explicit thesis actually is:

About the subjects, things, their production from themselves is not just eliminated.

In the Madhyamika system a thesis of any of the four extreme types of production is just to be eliminated; nothing is to be implied in its place, not even conventionally existent production, even though such is validly established as existing. If an affirming negation were set forth, it would contradict the intention of Nagarjuna's Treatise to eliminate all elaborations (prapancha, sprospa) of true existence for which only non-affirming negations are appropriate. If an affirming negation were used, one would then be seeking to affirm that things are conventionally produced, rather than merely eliminating that phenomena are produced from self, other, both, and neither and seeking to take this mere absence as one's object in meditative equipoise. Thus, if Bhavaviveka's description of Buddhapalita's intention is correct, the latter would indeed have erred.

Bhavaviveka would add that although it is not the case in general that when a reason is reversed the thesis also has to be reversed, Buddhapalita's intention was clearly not just to prove no true existence but also to prove that production exists nominally or conventionally. For in his introductory remarks to his commentary on the first chapter of the Treatise, Buddhapalita indicates that the first chapter is in answer to an objector who says, 'Show how this which is called production is only a convention.' Also, concluding a brief refutation of production from self, other, both, and neither, Buddhapalita says, 'Since the production of things is thus in all ways inadmissible, there is no production; therefore, this called production is only a convention.'
Let us cite the entire passage in question from Buddhapalita's commentary.\(^{359}\)

Here [an objector] says, 'Show how this which is called production is only a convention.'

Answer: That is shown first [in the first stanza of the first chapter of Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*].

There is never production
Anywhere, of any thing
From itself, from others,
From both, or without cause.

Concerning this, if some things are produced, consider whether the production of those things is from self, from other, from both self and other, or causelessly. Upon examination it is not feasible in all ways.

'From self is synonymous with 'from [its own] entity'. About that, respectively, things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless.\(^{360}\) It is thus: the production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. [Also] if though existent they are produced, they would never not be produced. Hence, that also is not asserted. Therefore, respectively, things are not produced from self.

They also are not produced from other. Why? For it would [absurdly] follow that everything would be produced from everything.

They also are not produced from both self and other because [such] would [absurdly] entail the fallacies of both [production from self and from other].

They also are not produced causelessly because it would [absurdly] follow that everything always would be produced from everything and because there would be the fallacy that all endeavor would be just senseless. Since the production of things is thus in all ways inadmissible,
there is no [inherently existent] production; therefore, this called production is only a convention.

According to Jam-yang-shay-ba, these statements led Bhavaviveka to believe that Buddhapalita was taking it that since production is delimited to either production from self or production from other, the refutation of the former implies the affirmation of the latter. Thus, the root of Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita is the latter's own introductory remarks to the refutation of production which seem to indicate that his intention is to show through the refutation that production exists conventionally. Because of this, Bhavaviveka viewed Buddhapalita's consequences as implying a proof of a positive phenomenon, that is, conventionally existent production from other.

In a brilliant display of intellectual ingenuity that exists to this day among the Ge-luk-ba colleges, Jam-yang-shay-ba traces Bhavaviveka's objection back to Buddhapalita's somewhat questionable introductory remarks. Bhavaviveka himself only says:

About this, one [that is, Buddhapalita] who is other [than Bhavaviveka himself] makes the explanation, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.'

That is not suitable (1) because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example; (2) because [the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Samkhya would be expected to adduce]; and (3) because [Buddhapalita's] words afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system. His explanation affords such an opportunity] because since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from what is explicitly stated, what emerges is the opposite of the thesis and the reason—that things are produced from other because production is fruitful and because production has an end—due to which [he] would contradict [Madhyamika] tenets.
Bhavaviveka's commentator, Avalokitavrata, elaborates on the criticism, clarifying points largely through making sure that the grammar is understood and the moves are properly identified. His commentary is painstakingly slow and repetitive but is worth citing because it clearly reveals the broad outlines of Bhavaviveka's argument:

[Bhavaviveka's *Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom'] says:

About this, one [that is, Buddhapalita] who is other [than Bhavaviveka himself] makes the explanation, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.'

This indicates that also on this occasion of proving that things are not produced from self the commentator, the master Buddhapalita, makes such and such an explanation. In that, 'About this' means 'on this occasion of proving that things are not produced from self. 'Other' refers to the Elder (*Sthavira, gNas rtan) Buddhapalita who is other than most of the many commentators on this *Treatise [on the Middle Way]—ranging from the honorable master [Nagarjuna] himself; the Elder Buddhapalita, Chandrakfrti, Devasharma, Gunashn, Gunamati, and Sthiramati through to the master Bhavaviveka.

The master Buddhapalita makes this explanation: 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.' In that, 'Things' (*bhavah, dngos po mams)* are the external and internal sources (*ayatana, skye mched*). 'From themselves' (*svata, bdag gi bdag nyid las*) [which is rendered into English above as 'from their own entities' following the Tibetan which is following this very gloss by Avalokitavrata] means 'from [their] entities' (*bdag nyid las*).
Bhavaviveka’s Criticism of Buddhapalita

[Buddhapalita is referring to production] from that. 'Are not produced' means '[are not produced] ultimately'.

Why are things not produced from their own entities? 'Because their production would be just senseless' [or, more literally, 'because of the senselessness of their production']. 'Their production' (*tadutpada, de dag gi skye ba*) means the production of those things. 'Senseless' (*vaiyarthya, don medpa*) means 'devoid of sense', 'purposeless', 'fruitless'. 'Ness' (*ya[?], nyid*) is the fact of their production being without sense, the senselessness of their production.

By saying 'because their production would be just senseless' [Buddhapalita] is indicating: If things are produced from an existent [state], their production would be just senseless because there would be nothing different from what had already been produced, nothing which had not arisen earlier.

Also, 'because their production would be endless' [indicates]: If, though existent, something were produced, then through being produced it would be produced in that aspect without cessation; therefore, [its repeated] production would just not finish. 'Makes the explanation' means that the Elder Buddhapalita makes that explanation on this occasion of proving that things are not produced from self.

[Bhavaviveka's *Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom'*] says:

That is not suitable (1) because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example; (2) because [the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Samkhya would be expected to adduce]; and (3) because [Buddhapalita's] words afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system. His explanation
affords such an opportunity] because since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from what is explicitly stated, what emerges is the opposite of the thesis and the reason—that things are produced from other because production is fruitful and because production has an end—due to which [he] contradicts Madhyamika tenets.

In this passage the commentator [Bhavaviveka] himself proves that the explanation by the Elder Buddhapalita is not suitable. In that, 'is not suitable' is [Bhavaviveka's] thesis that the explanation by the Elder Buddhapalita is not suitable. Why is it not suitable? 'Because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example.' This indicates that in his explanation he has only proclaimed a mere thesis, 'Things are not produced from self,' and has not expressed a reason why they are not produced from self such as [Bhavaviveka did in his syllogism when he gave as the reason] 'because of existing' and has not expressed an example of the non-production of the existent from self such as [Bhavaviveka did when he said] 'like, for example, an existent consciousness,' and therefore [his explanation] is not suitable.

Furthermore, [it is not suitable] 'because [the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Samkhya would be expected to adduce]. This indicates that] even if he had fully expressed and established a reason and an example, it would, without question, have the fallacies adduced by another who propounds [ultimately existent] production, but you [Buddhapalita] did not avoid them; therefore, because of not avoiding the fallacies adduced by another, [the explanation] is not suitable.

For what further reason is it not suitable? 'And because [Buddhapalita's] words afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own
system].' [This indicates that] the explanation by the Elder Buddhapalita is also unsuitable because of being a passage that affords an opportunity for censure by another party. 'And' (cha, yang) is to be taken as [indicating] that not only is [his explanation] unsuitable because of not expressing a reason and an example and because of not avoiding the fallacies adduced by another but also it is unsuitable because of affording an opportunity [for censure].

To indicate just that [third fault, Bhavaviveka] says, '... [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from what is explicitly stated'. What is explicitly stated? It is just Buddhapalita's explanation, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.' To be reversed from that is to be reversed from that which is explicitly stated. The opposite of 'Things are not produced from their own entities' is 'things are produced from other'; the opposite of 'because their production would be just senseless' is 'because their production is fruitful', and the opposite of 'because production would be endless' is 'because production is finite'. Hence, because of affording an opportunity [for censure] it is also unsuitable.

How [does Buddhapalita's explanation] come to be a passage affording an opportunity [for censure] through reversing what is explicitly stated? Therefore, [Bhavaviveka] says,'... what emerges is the opposite of the thesis and the reason [or, more literally, the property of that].' The 'thesis' (sadhya, bsgrub par by a ba) is the thesis, 'Things are not produced from their own entities.' 'What emerges is opposite of that' means that what emerges is the opposite of 'Things are not produced from their own entities,' i.e., things are produced from other.

The 'property of that' (taddharma, de'i chos) is the property of that thesis, that is to say, [the reason which
is] the property of the subject of that thesis: namely, 'because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.' 'What emerges is the opposite of those': what emerges is the opposite of 'because their production would be just senseless'—namely, because production is fruitful—and the opposite of 'because production would be endless'—namely, because production is finite.

How does [Buddhapalita's explanation] come to afford an opportunity [for censure] due to the emergence of the opposite of those? Therefore, [Bhavaviveka] says, 'things are produced from other because production is fruitful and because production has an end'. [This means that Buddhapalita gives someone an opportunity for censure through opening up] the opportunity of [someone's saying that he is holding] (1) that things are produced from other, which emerges as the opposite of the thesis 'Things are not produced from their own entities'; (2) production is fruitful, which emerges as the opposite of the property [proving the thesis] 'because their production would be just senseless'; and (3) production is finite, which emerges as the opposite of the property [proving the thesis] 'because production would be endless'.

What fault is there in such? As a possible response by his opponent, [it would show that Buddhapalita] 'contradicts [Madhyamika] tenets'. For it would contradict the tenets in the master [Nagarjuna's] scriptures that he does not assert that things are [ultimately] produced from other, that he does not assert that production is [ultimately] fruitful, and that he does not assert that production is [ultimately] finite.

Therefore, this explanation by the Elder Buddhapalita is not suitable since it contradicts reasoning and scripture.

Dzong-ka-ba, in commenting on these points in his Ocean of
Reasoning, disagrees with Avalokitavrata about what tenet is contradicted. He says that it is the tenet that the statement in Nagarjuna's Treatise 'there is no production from self is a mere elimination of production from self. As Jam-yang-shay-ba points out, the three points show that a tenet is contradicted—they are not the tenet that is contradicted.

There is no question that Bhavaviveka is indeed right in saying that the refutation of the four extreme types of production is just a non-affirming negation and that it would contradict Madhyamika tenets if Buddhapalita indulged in an affirming negation on this occasion of ultimate analysis. However, a defender of Buddhapalita would answer that his refutation of the four extreme types of production is indeed a non-affirming negation. For his emphasizing that production exists conventionally does not mean that he considers that the refutation of production establishes conventionally existent production. Buddhapalita is briefly setting out the general thrust of Nagarjuna's Treatise that nothing exists ultimately and that everything is feasible within the context of mere nominalism; he means:

Though non-production from the four extremes is here a non-affirming negation, production does exist nominally.

Furthermore, even if Buddhapalita's words do seem to suggest an affirming negation, since he did not wish to suggest such, he cannot be called to task for it. Even sutra says, 'That which is produced from causes is not produced,' and Bhavaviveka himself says, 'The subject, a form, does not exist ultimately because of existing—like, for example, a magician's illusion [which exists and does not exist ultimately].' No one asserts that these statements imply conventional production or conventional existence even though they might seem to.

Based on Buddhapalita's somewhat misleading words, Bhavaviveka took his consequences as implying a proof of conventionally existent production from other. Then, he proceeded to extract Buddhapalita's supposed actual meaning according to this notion. He then showed that this would contradict the
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Madhyamika tenet that the refutation of production is a non-affirming negation.

This does not mean, however, that non-affirming negations have no implications. A non-affirming negation cannot imply a positive phenomenon or even an affirming negation but can imply another non-affirming negation of the same type. For instance, the non-affirming negation (or negative phenomenon), the non-existence of a son of a barren woman, implies the non-affirming negation, the non-existence of the beauty or ugliness of the son of a barren woman. Also, meditation on emptiness, a non-affirming negation of inherent existence, with respect to one phenomenon functions as meditation on the emptiness of everything. In the same vein, it is said that until one has eradicated adherence to the inherent existence of the mental and physical aggregates, one has not cognized the absence of inherent existence of the person. Similarly, the thesis that things are not inherently produced from self, other, both, and neither implies that production does not exist inherently, thereby implying that things lack inherent existence. These are all non-affirming negations that imply other non-affirming negations.

Therefore, non-affirming negations (or negative phenomena) may have implications, but those implications are all other non-affirming negations of the same type. An affirming negation, on the other hand, implies something positive in its place. For instance, the fat Devadatta's not eating during the day implies his eating at night. (For a discussion of negatives see Appendix 4.)

In conclusion, Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita's consequences revolves around his interpretation of the latter's prefatory and concluding remarks to the refutation of production. He interpreted them as showing that Buddhapalita saw conventionally existent production as being proved by the refutation of true production, thereby contradicting the basic Madhyamika tenet that the object realized through a refutation by ultimate analysis is a mere negation or elimination of true existence.
4 Chandrakīrti’s Defense of Buddhapalita

Sources
Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words
Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen’s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences
Kensur Lekden’s oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp. 584-6

For Chandrakīrti, all of the fallacies that Bhavaviveka found in Buddhapalita’s refutation of production from self are inadmissible.\textsuperscript{374} Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words (14.1-15.3, 10.11-11.2)says:

The master Buddhapalita says, ’Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless. There is no need for production again (punarutpada, yang skye ba) of things which already exist in their own entities. If though existent they are produced, they would never not be produced.’

About this, some [namely, Bhavaviveka] express faults,
'That is not suitable (1) because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example; (2) because [the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Samkhya would be expected to adduce]; and (3) because [Buddhapalita's] words afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system. \(^{375}\) His explanation affords such an opportunity] because since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from what is explicitly stated, what emerges is the opposite of the thesis and the reason—that things are produced from other because production is fruitful and because production has an end—due to which [he] would contradict [Madhyamika] tenets.'

We [that is, Chandrakirti] view all of these fallacies as not being reasonable.

**CHANDRAKIRTI'S DEFENSE AGAINST THE FIRST FALLACY**

The first fallacy was that Buddhapalita could not refute production from self because he did not state a reason and an example of an autonomous syllogism. Chandrakirti's answer is that through disputation with contradictory consequences an opponent can indeed come to accept that there is no production from self. Buddhapalita demonstrated the inner contradictions in production from self with two consequences:

- It follows about the subject, a sprout, that its production again is senseless because of already existing in its own entity. \(^{376}\)

If it is answered that the consequence is not entailed by the reason, the second consequence is:

- It follows about the subject, a sprout, that its production is endless because though it already exists in its own entity, there is need for its re-production.
The opponent can perceive that these consequences contradict his tenets because a Samkhya asserts that production again (into a manifest state) is sensible (even though he does not assert that the production again of the already manifest is sensible) and does not assert that products are produced endlessly. Thereby, Buddhapalita shows that the proofs for the existence of production from self are unreasonable, for a Samkhya can find no example of re-production of that which has already been produced. Since senseless re-production and endless production of that which has already been produced contradict his own tenets about production, the Samkhya is caused to fall away from his assertion of production from self.

Furthermore, if one is able to show such inner contradictions and the opponent perceives them yet persists in his error, there is no point in further stating reasons and examples of autonomous syllogisms. Bhavaviveka's rushing to state autonomous syllogisms just shows his liking for logic.

Also, if one is a Madhyamika who refutes all extremes as in the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra, one should not use autonomous syllogisms, in which the reason has inherently existent presence in the subject, pervasion, and counter-pervasion. This is because a Madhyamika has no assertion of other positions among the four extremes and so forth, such as that things inherently exist, utterly do not exist, both inherently exist and inherently disintegrate, or that there is an inherently existent middle way that forsakes the two extremes of existence and non-existence. A Madhyamika has no thesis which contradicts the Madhyamika system.

Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections says:

If I had any [inherently existent] thesis,
Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis that there is no inherent existence].
Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis,
I am only faultless.

It is not being said that a Madhyamika has no theses; he merely has no theses that inherently exist. He has no theses upholding
the existence of phenomena which can be found under analysis. However, Madhyamikas do have both negative and positive theses. That they have negative theses is clear in the refutations of going and coming and of production, for instance. Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* says (II.8):

> Respectively, a goer is not going,
> A non-goer also is not going,
> Indeed what third other than
> A goer and a non-goer is going?

Also, (1.1):

> There is never production
> Anywhere of any phenomenon
> From itself, from others,
> From both, or causelessly.

Madhyamikas also have positive theses as in Nagarjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment*, 'I assert dependently arisen activities to be like dreams and magicians' illusions.' His *Refutation of Objections* says, 'We do not set forth a non-assertion of conventionalities.' His *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:

> Those who assert dependent phenomena
> As like moons in water,
> As not real and not unreal,
> Are not tricked by views.

His *Praise of the Supramundane (Lokatitastava)* says, 'You [Buddha] have taught agent and object as conventionalities. Your assertion is that they are established as mutually dependent.'

Also, Chandrakrfti says in his own commentary on his *Supplement*, 'The wise should think that this position is faultless and beneficial and should definitely assert it.' Also, 'Therefore, because dependent imputation is asserted in the same way as the assertion of dependent-arising as just conditional, it does not follow for our position that all conventionalities are annihilated; it is suitable also for the opponent to assert just this.' Throughout
his commentary to his own Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' and in his Clear Words Chandrakirti refers to theses stated in the basic text and the reasonings or consequences which prove these theses.\textsuperscript{380} Thus, Madhyamikas have both negative and positive theses.

Since Nagarjuna does seem to say in his Refutation of Objections that he does not have any theses, the background of that statement needs to be known.\textsuperscript{381} A Madhyamika has said, 'Phenomena do not inherently exist,' to which a proponent of inherently existent phenomena has answered, 'If the words of this thesis inherently exist, then it would not be correct that all phenomena do not inherently exist. If the words of this thesis do not inherently exist, they are nothing and cannot refute the inherent existence of phenomena.' The idea of the opponent is that if things exist, they must exist by way of their own being. If things do not, then they do not exist at all and, like the hairs of a turtle, cannot effect anything.

Thus, the debate in the Refutation of Objections is not about having or not having a thesis in general. It is about whether the words of the thesis, 'Phenomena do not exist inherently,' exist inherently. The meaning of Nagarjuna's answer is:

If I asserted that the words of such a thesis existed inherently, I would have the fault of contradicting my own thesis that all phenomena do not exist inherently. However, because I do not assert that the words of my thesis exist inherently, I do not have this fault.

Thus, this passage which is often quoted to show that Madhyamikas have no theses does not do so. Madhyamikas have nominally existent positive and negative theses; they do not have any theses which are analytically findable or any theses which affirm the existence of analytically findable phenomena.

It is not fitting for a Madhyamika to assert the existence of autonomous syllogisms because, even conventionally, nothing exists autonomously or inherently. However, Dzong-ka-ba adds that it does not necessarily follow that if one accepts autonomous syllogisms, one is not a Madhyamika, for Svatantrikas do so but
are still Madhyamikas. Since they are higher than Chittamatrins because they prove with limitless forms of reasoning that all phenomena do not truly exist, they are not suitable to be other than Madhyamikas. The non-contradiction of being a Madhyamika and yet accepting what is not fit for a Madhyamika is similar to the non-contradiction of being a monk and yet having minor infractions of the monk's code.

In defense of Buddhapalita against Bhavaviveka's attribution of the first 'fallacy', Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (15.3-16.10, 11.1-12.4) says:

I view all of these fallacies as not being reasonable. How? His saying 'because Buddhapalita did not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example' is not reasonable. Why? Buddhapalita is inquiring in the following way of an opponent who asserts production from self:

You [Samkhya] propound that 'from self [means] that the existence [of things that involve production acts] as a cause and that just it [i.e., the existent] is produced.' However, we do not see that there is purpose in the production again of the existent, and we also see that [such production] would be endless. However, you [Samkhya] do not assert that the already produced [that is, the already manifest] is produced again and also do not assert that [the production of a thing] is endless. Therefore, your debate [that is to say, your position of production from self] is devoid of correctness and contradicts your own assertion.

When Buddhapalita debates through just these consequences which have the effects [derived] from stating a reason and example, would the opponent not accept it? However, if the opponent is not overcome even through debate by way of contradicting his own assertions, then due to [his] shamelessness he also just would not be
overcome by [stating] reasons and examples. We [Prasangikas] do not debate with the crazily stubborn. Therefore, when the master [Bhavaviveka] sets out inferences at inappropriate times, he is manifesting just his own liking for inference.

Also, it is not suitable for one who is a Madhyamika to make autonomous inferences because of not asserting other positions [among the four extremes]. Moreover, Aryadeva [XVI.25] explains:

Even over a long period of time
Censure cannot be expressed
For one who has no position of [inherent] existence,
Non-existence, or existence and non-existence.

Also, [Nagarjuna's] *Refutation of Objections* [stanzas 29 and 30] says:

If I had any [inherently existent] thesis,
Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis that there is no inherent existence].
Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis,
I am only faultless.

If [in accordance with your thought] the factualities Of direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established objects of comprehension],
Then [it would be suitable] to prove those [in your own system] and refute [others], but since [valid cognizers observing] Such objects of comprehension do not exist [even conventionally], there is no [chance for you] to censure me.

**CHANDRAKIRTI'S DEFENSE AGAINST THE SECOND FALLACY**

Chandrakirti next declares inadmissible the second fallacy adduced by Bhavaviveka in what the latter considered to be
Buddhapalita's intended syllogism refuting the Samkhya position. Bhavaviveka's criticism was that Buddhapalita did not avoid the fallacies which a Samkhya would be expected to adduce upon analyzing his thesis and reason. Chandrakrfti's answer is that Buddhapalita did not state an autonomous syllogism like Bhavaviveka's:

The subjects, the inner sources such as an eye sense, are not produced from self because of existing—like, for example, an existent consciousness.

Chandrakrfti objects to Bhavaviveka's syllogism, saying that he has not avoided the fallacy of proving what is already established for Samkhyas if non-production from self refers to non-production from an entity of an effect. For, Samkhyas hold that manifestations are not produced from the manifest, that is, from effects, but from the non-manifest. On the other hand, if non-production from self refers to non-production from the entity of a cause, one would have the fallacy of the reason's proving exactly the opposite for a Samkhya.

Similarly, if the reason of Bhavaviveka's autonomous syllogism ('because of existing') is analyzed, the same faults need to be eradicated. If 'existing' means that an eye sense exists from the time of its causes, then the reason, for a Samkhya, only goes to prove that things are produced from self. If 'existing' means that an eye sense exists at the time of its manifestation, then one would be proving what is already established for the Samkhyas since they themselves assert that it has already been produced into its manifest or effect state and thus does not require production.

Chandrakrfti says that though Bhavaviveka himself incurs these fallacies, Buddhapalita did not state such a thesis or reason. Rather, the thesis of Buddhapalita's consequence is:

It follows about the subjects, things, that their production again is senseless.

The reason is:

Because of already existing in their own entities.
(It should be remembered that Buddhapalita only said, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless."

According to Jam-yang-shay-ba, Chandrakīrti saw in Buddhapalita's refutation the positing of a thesis:

Things are not produced from their own entities.

Then, he saw two consequences demonstrating damage to the view that things are produced from their own entities:

1. It follows about the subjects, things, that their production again is senseless because of already existing in their own entities.
2. It follows about the subjects, things, that their production is endless because, although already existent in their own entities, there is need for their production.

In other words, Chandrakīrti is saying that Bhavaviveka misread Buddhapalita's text, for aside from positing a general thesis that things are not produced from self (that is, from their own entities), Buddhapalita did not express a syllogism (see p.456) such as 'The subjects, things, are not produced from their own entities because production is senseless and endless' (or in its altered form 'because production is sensible and has an end').

The fallacies which Bhavaviveka imputed to Buddhapalita are flung back at him by Chandrakīrti. It is Bhavaviveka and not Buddhapalita who has the questionable autonomous syllogism with a vague predicate of the thesis ('are not produced from self or 'are not produced from their own entities') and a vague reason ('because of existing'). In this vein, Chandrakīrti's Clear Words (16.11-18.4, 12.4-12.18) says:

When in that way a Madhyamika just does not express autonomous inferences, how could Buddhapalita have an autonomous thesis [such as Bhavaviveka stated]—'The inner sources are not produced from self—which the Samkhyas would cause to be overturned as follows:
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What is the meaning of this thesis? Does 'from self' mean from the entity of the effect or from the entity of the cause? Which is it? If it is from the entity of the effect, then [you have the fault of] proving what is already established [for us]. If it is from the entity of the cause, then it has the sense of [proving] the opposite because [according to us Samkhya] all that have production are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] causes.

Also, how could we [Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti] have a reason [such as that stated by Bhavaviveka]—'because of existing'—which would be either [a case of] proving what is already established [for a Samkhya] or of having the opposite meaning [for a Samkhya] and with respect to which we would have to toil to get rid [of the fault that we would be] proving what is already established or [the fault of] having the opposite meaning!

Therefore, just due to not being susceptible to the consequence of those faults, answers to them did not [need] to be expressed by the master Buddhapalita.

An hypothetical extension of Bhavaviveka's argument

Chandrakirti goes on to say that hypothetically Bhavaviveka might accept that the reasons, etc., which prove non-true existence do not appear similarly to Madhyamikas and non-Madhyamikas, making an autonomous syllogism impossible, in which case Buddhapalita should have stated a correct other-approved inference (parasiddha-anumana, gzhan grags kyi rjes dpag). (Even though an actual anumana refers to an inferring consciousness, here in parasiddha-anumana, literally 'other-approved inference', it refers to the application of a reason approved by the other party in the debate, an 'other-approved syllogism'. Synonymous with parasiddha-anumana is parasiddha-lihga (gzhan grags kyi rtags), 'other-approved reason'. Svasiddha-anumana (ranggrags kyi rjes dpag), 'self-approved inference', and svasiddha-lihga (rang grags kyi rtags), 'self-approved reason', are also synonymous with parasiddha-anumana, 'other-approved
inference', because 'self and 'other' here both refer to the opponent from different points of view.) Thus, according to Chandrakīrti, Bhavaviveka may mean that Buddhapalita did not state a correct other-approved inference because the latter did not give a proper reason and example.

In answer to this, Chandrakīrti states that there is no need for an other-approved syllogism because the inner contradictions and unreasonableness of the opponent's view can be shown by consequences and by showing him that his proofs of production from self are unreasonable, and thus there is no further purpose in stating an other-approved syllogism. That the Samkhya's 'proofs' of production from self have no capacity to do so is the clearest sign of the eradication of the Samkhya's own view. For, if upon statement of contradictory consequences, he wants to hold to his position, he must proceed to prove that there is production from self, for it is the way of logicians to state reasons in order to generate in another an ascertainment of a thesis just as one oneself has ascertained it. The Samkhya's syllogism would, for instance, be:

The subject, a sprout unmanifest at the time of its causes, is produced from its own entity because the non-existent is not produced and because the causes of one thing are distinct from the causes of another.

The Samkhya's idea is that if the non-existent were produced or made manifest, then the horns of a rabbit could be produced. Also, things have their own distinct causes, and this indicates that they exist non-manifestly in their causes.

However, a Buddhist would not accept the reason as correct. For a Buddhist (that is to say, for a Sautrantika on up), even though what is non-existent at the time of its causes is produced, what is non-existent in general is not produced, and also the causes of one thing are indeed distinct from the causes of another thing, but these two facts do not entail that things are produced from their own entities. The reason, therefore, does nothing to advance why things are produced from their own entities; the syllogism is only a repetition of the basic thesis itself. Technically
speaking, there is no concordant example to be found which can serve as a basis for ascertaining the entailment.\textsuperscript{391} The Samkhya's proofs are no proofs at all in that they are just outflows of his own assertions, incapable of establishing them. In this vein, Chandrakrfti’s \textit{Clear Words} (18.5-19.7, 12.18-13.18) says:

\[\text{[Bhavaviveka] might think, 'I might allow that] since according to Madhyamikas the position [or thesis], reason, and example [of an \textit{autonomous} syllogism] are not established, autonomous inferences are not to be expressed, and, therefore, one would not prove the meaning of a thesis refuting production from self and would not clear away the other's thesis through an inference established for both [parties]. Still, one must express contradiction of the other's thesis through one's own [other-approved] inference. Hence, one must have a position [that is, a thesis] and so forth that are devoid of the faults of position, reason, and example. Thus, since [Buddhapalita] did not express such and did not avoid the fallacies of those [which a Samkhya would be expected to draw, Buddhapalita] just has those faults [of not stating a reason and example capable of proving no production from self and of not avoiding the fallacies which a Samkhya would cite upon examining what no production from self means].'}

\textit{Answer:} That is not so. Why? One [such as a Samkhya] who [upon being pressed by the consequences set forth by Buddhapalita] wishes to generate ascertainment of something which he holds as a thesis in others in just the way that he has ascertained it, should demonstrate to others [that is, Madhyamikas] just that logical proof through which that meaning is understood. Therefore, it is respectively the custom for just the other party [here, the Samkhya] to state a proof of the meaning of a thesis which he himself asserts [in response to the contradictions shown by Buddhapalita's consequences rather than for Buddhapalita to proceed to set forth an other-approved inference]. However, this [reasoning which a
Samkhya states to a Madhyamika to try to prove production from self] is not a [valid] reasoning for the other [party, the Madhyamika]. Because the reason and example [which a Samkhya cites] are not [valid], the proof of the meaning of his thesis is just a statement of outflows of [his own] assertions. Therefore, since he has asserted a position that is devoid of logical correctness, it deceives just himself, due to which it cannot generate ascertainment in another. In this way, just this inability of his attempt to prove the meaning of his thesis [due to being faulty] is the clearest eradication of his [position]. What need is there here to express damage [to his position] by way of inference! [For, the contradiction of his view that something exists and yet needs to be reproduced has been shown, and upon the Samkhya's presentation of his own view in syllogistic inference, the Madhyamika has given answers showing its illogicality.]

Buddhapalita's indication of an other-approved inference

Still, hypothetically, Bhavaviveka might insist on the statement of a self-approved or, as it is also called, an other-approved syllogism, because there are many other-approved syllogisms in Nagarjuna's writings and in many sutras. Chandrakirti answers that even if an other-approved syllogism needed to be stated, Buddhapalita did state one when he said, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless.' This indicates a correct other-approved syllogism:

With respect to the subjects, things such as a non-manifest pot and so forth abiding in the potential entities of their causes, their production again is senseless because of already existing in their own entities—like, for example, a manifest pot [which already exists in its own entity and the re-production of which would be senseless].

This other-approved syllogism is similar to the consequence which Jam-yang-shay-ba first interpreted in Buddhapalita's statement as:
It follows about the subject, a sprout, that its production again is senseless because of already existing in its own entity.

Except for slight differences in format, there is no substantial difference in this case between the consequence and other-approved syllogism. In general, however, consequences have greater usage than other-approved syllogisms because they must be stated in all instances of generating an inference in another in order, at least, to break the pointedness or the vibrance of the other party's adherence to a wrong view. An other-approved syllogism need not be stated for intelligent opponents, when a consequence alone is sufficient to generate a consciousness inferring the intended thesis.

The question between Chandrakrfti and Bhavaviveka is whether Buddhapalita's statement indicates such a correct other-approved syllogism. To quote Buddhapalita again:

Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless.

Chandrakrfti sees the word 'their' in the reason clause as indicating the subject and the example. His source is Buddhapalita's more extensive rendition:

The production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless.

This more extensive statement of 'their' as 'of things already existing in their own entities' implicitly contains within it an example—like a manifest pot—which possesses both the reason—already existing in its own entity—and the predicate—senseless production again. A valid example must possess both the reason and the predicate and be approved by the Samkhya, who agrees that a manifest pot already exists in its own entity and does not require further production. Since this more extensive statement is Buddhapalita's own commentary on the brief statement, it must be applied to the condensed version.

Similarly, the phrase, 'existing in their own entities', in the
longer statement bears the reason of the syllogism. The predicate of the thesis is indicated in the shorter version itself, 'production would be senseless', though the word 'again' (punar, yang) does need to be added from the longer statement, making 'production again would be senseless'.

Therefore, even if Buddhpalita's words are taken from the viewpoint of presenting an other-approved inference, the faults imputed by Bhavaviveka do not apply. This is because Buddhpalita's words contain a five-membered statement of proof:

1. Thesis: With regard to things such as a non-manifest pot and so forth, their production again is senseless.
2. Pervasion: That production again is senseless pervades, or applies to all cases of, things already existing in their own entities.
3. Example: Like an already manifest pot.
4. Exemplification: Just as an already manifest pot already exists in its own entity, so things such as a non-manifest pot already exist in their own entities.
5. Summary: Therefore, because things already exist in their own entities, the production again of things is senseless.\(^{393}\)

(See Appendix 5 for a discussion of other proof statements.) About this, Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (19.8-21.7, 13.18-15.4) says:

[Bhavaviveka] might say, 'Nevertheless, the fault of contradiction with one's own inference [that is to say, with an inference acceptable to a Samkhya] must, without question, be expressed.'

*Answer:* The master Buddhpalita also just expressed such. How? For he said, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless.' In that, the [word] 'their' (tad, de dag) [in the reason clause] holds [or indicates] 'those which already exist in their own entities'. Why? This is because [Buddhpalita's subsequent statement] 'The production again of things already existing in their own
entities is purposeless,' is [his] commentary on that abbreviated statement [and we must, therefore, carry it over to the shorter statement]. Also, this [longer] statement ['those which already exist in their own entities'] bears a concordant example ['a manifest pot'] renowned to the other [party, the Samkhya] which possesses the qualities of [the predicate of] the probandum ['senseless production again'] and the proof ['already existing in its own entity'].

In [Buddhapalita's longer statement], 'already existing in their own entities' bears the reason. [In the shorter statement itself] 'because production would be just senseless' holds the predicate of the probandum [once it is changed to 'production again (punarutpada, yang skye ba) is senseless' in accordance with the longer statement].

A sound is an impermanent thing because products are [necessarily] impermanent things. It is seen that products are impermanent things, as in the case, for example, of a pot. Likewise, a sound is also a product. Therefore, because of being a product, [a sound] is an impermanent thing.

product which is manifested [or used] due to its connection [with the predicate of the probandum] is the reason. Just so, here also [the syllogism is]:

Things [such as a non-manifest pot and so forth] are not produced from self because the production again of what already exist in their own entities is just senseless. Just as it is seen that pots and so forth which already abide in front [of oneself] and which already exist in their own manifest entities do not rely on being produced again, so if you think that there are pots and so forth which already exist in their own entities at the time of the lump of clay and so forth,
then production even at that time of what already exist in their own entities does not exist.

In that [syllogism], the reason—'already existing in their own entities'—which is manifested [or used] due to its connection [with the predicate of the probandum, 'senseless production again'] and which is unmistaken with respect to refuting re-production expresses contradiction through the Samkhya's own inference [that is, an inference acceptable to a Samkhya].

Therefore, how is it that [Bhavaviveka] says, 'That is not suitable because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason as well as an example'?

*The unassailability of Buddhapalita's other-approved inference* Chandrakīrti found in Buddhapalita's commentary a syllogism that is unassailable. For a Samkhya would have no qualms about the thesis since the subject is clearly stated as a non-manifest pot and so forth, and a non-manifest pot does not require production. Also, the thesis—that a non-manifest pot and so forth have no need of production again—is new to a Samkhya and cannot be said to be a case of trying to prove what is already established for him since he accepts that the first production of a thing is its attainment of an existent entity in its causes and that it requires further production into a manifest state. He would also have no qualms that the reason was proving exactly the opposite because the thesis is that the production again of a non-manifest pot is purposeless. About this, the *Clear Words* (21.8-.14, 15.4-. 15) says:

Not only is it just not that a reason and example were not expressed, but also it is not that the fallacies adduced by the other [party, the Samkhya] were not avoided. How? For, the Samkhyas do not assert that a pot dwelling in front [of oneself] which has a manifest form (*abhivyakta-rupa, mngon par gsal ba'i rang bzhin*) manifests again, and [thus] here it is an entity established as an example [of something which already exists in its own entity and is not produced again]. Since the probandum is:
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those which are potential entities and do not have a manifested nature, predicated with a negation of production,

how could [the Samkhya] have the qualm that [Buddhapalita's syllogism has] the fault of a position [thesis] that is proving what is already established [for them] or has the sense of a contradictory reason [proving for them not that things are not produced from self but that they are].

Therefore, even if [Buddhapalita] did express contradiction\(^{395}\) of the Samkhya view through self-renowned inference [that is, a syllogistic statement approved by the Samkhya], they would not set forth the fallacies which [Bhavaviveka] mentioned. Hence, it is just not that [Buddhapalita] did not avoid fallacies adduced by the other [party since they would not adduce them]. For these reasons, it should be known that these [two] objections [to Buddhapalita's remarks by Bhavaviveka] are just senseless.

Chandrakirtti says that, furthermore, Buddhapalita's syllogistic statement does not have the fault of not applying to all products, since by using 'a pot and so forth' as the subject all things that have production are included in the subject and not just some specific products, such as pots. Thus, a Samkhya would not have any qualms that the reasoning did not apply to all products. The Clear Words (22.1-.2, 15.15-.18) says:

Because the phrase 'and so forth' in 'a pot (ghata, bum pa) and so forth' was expressed with the intention of including all things asserted as being produced, [Buddhapalita's syllogistic statement] also does not become indefinite by way of [not including] cloth (pata, snam bu)-and so forth.\(^{396}\)

A second other-approved inference contained in Buddhapalita's commentary

In the above syllogism which Chandrakirtti found in Buddhapalita's commentary, the thesis is that things such as non-manifest
pots have no need of being produced again, not that they are not produced from self (or from their own entities), the latter being considered, in the context, to be vague and thus subject to questioning by a Samkhya. In this interpretation of Buddhapalita's remarks, his opening statement that things are not produced from their own entities is, according to Jam-yang-shay-ba, just a general thesis applying to the section, not the specific thesis of either the consequences or the other-approved syllogism just explained. Nevertheless, Chandrakirti finds a second other-approved syllogism in the same passage that has the absence of production from self as the predicate of the thesis:

The subjects, objects other than the person which are asserted by the Samkhya to be produced, are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities, as is the case, for example, with the person (*purusha, skyes bu*).

According to Jam-yang-shay-ba, Chandrakirti's point is that even if Buddhapalita is proving for a Samkhya that objects other than the person are not produced from self, there is no fault of the Samkhya's having qualms that Buddhapalita is trying to prove what is already established for them, or that it proves just the opposite, or that it is indefinite due to not being all-inclusive. In other words, the argument is so well framed that none of these faults can be adduced.

Jam-yang-shay-ba does not explain how this syllogism is faultless; he merely says that it is easy to realize that it is. Clearly, it is all-inclusive in that 'objects other than the person which are asserted by the Samkhya to be produced' includes all phenomena that are subject to production, since it excludes even the fundamental nature (*prakrti, rang bzhin*), which is other than the person but is not produced, and yet includes all evolutes of the fundamental nature. Also, it is clear that the example is established for the Samkhya, who holds that the person exists in its own entity and is not produced from self since it is not produced at all. Perhaps, the specification of the subject as all phenomena *that are subject to production* rules out any question
about the predicate of the thesis—'are not produced from self—such as whether it means that these are not produced from their manifest form since manifest objects are not subject to production, and thus 'are not produced from self must mean that 'not produced from their unmanifest causal form in which they pre-exist.' Chandrakīrti's Clear Words (22.3-.5, 15.18-16.1) only says:

Or, [the brief statement by Buddhapalita indicates] this other syllogism:

Objects other than the person which [the Samkhyaśas] propound as being produced from self are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities, as is the case, for example, with the person.

[In that] this example [of the person] is expressed. 398

Refuting production from self also refutes manifestation from self
Buddhapalita's refutation of production from self also applies to those Samkhyaśas who assert not production but manifestation. For production and manifestation are similar in the non-appearance first of what is later apparent. Thus, any objection by a Samkhya that Buddhapalita's refutation does not hit its mark would be unfounded. Chandrakīrti's Clear Words (22.6-.8, 16.1-.5)says:

Even if [a Samkhya objected that] a refutation of production does not harm a proponent of manifestation, manifestation is designated with the term 'production', and due to qualitative similarity [of production and manifestation] with respect to earlier non-apprehendability and later apprehendability, the term 'production' just expresses manifestation. Thereby, it is not that refuting it [i.e., production] does not damage [the assertion of the manifestation of what already exists in an unmanifest state].

But did Buddhapalita really say all that?
Chandrakīrti, who has been conducting this debate based on
what Bhavaviveka actually said and extending it into the hypothetical, now indicates that Bhavaviveka's only possible answer at this point would be that one cannot actually find these meanings in Buddhapalita's remarks. Chandrakirti's answer is that although Buddhapalita did not extensively state these exact words, his statements are laden with meaning and that he, Chandrakirti, has said nothing not indicated by Buddhapalita. The Clear Words (22.9-23.2, 16.5-.9) says:

[Bhavaviveka might object:] Without [Buddhapalita's] having anything that expresses the meanings which you have set out, how was such analysis, found?

Answer: These statements of meaning\textsuperscript{399} [by Buddhapalita], due to having great import, contain the above-mentioned meanings. Being explained, they issue forth this having the nature of the meanings given. Hence, there is nothing [in what I have said] that is not indicated in them.

In summary, the purpose of Chandrakirti's defense of Buddhapalita is to show:\textsuperscript{400} (1) that consequences are sufficient to generate in an opponent an inference of the desired thesis, (2) that autonomous syllogisms are utterly out of place in the Madhyamika system, and (3) that if it is insisted that other-approved syllogisms are required, Buddhapalita's more extensive statement together with the initial brief one contain a correct five-membered syllogism.

His defense is reminiscent of the style of Nagarjuna's Treatise in that he gives a complete presentation and then, taking another tack, sets forth a new one. In the same way, in the second chapter of the Treatise Nagarjuna refutes inherently existing going through analyzing the area gone over, then begins again and refutes it through analyzing the goer, then through analyzing the beginning of going, and finally through analyzing its opposite, rest. Each is sufficient to refute naturally existent going completely, and yet he resorts to other methods for the sake of attacking the diverse ways in which the misapprehension of one topic is supported. When many angles are analyzed, it is more likely
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that the proper inferring consciousness will be generated in the other party. Also, it is necessary to refute the different philosophical systems directly through their own approaches and tenets.

The root of Bhavaviveka's objection is that he did not think that Buddhapalita's brief demonstration meant what it is found to mean by the more sympathetic. As Jam-yang-shay-ba so clearly spells out, the reason behind Bhavaviveka's disagreement is found in Buddhapalita's prefatory remarks where he seems to indicate that something positive, the conventional existence of production, is being proved on this occasion of refuting the four extreme types of production. Jam-yang-shay-ba agrees with Bhavaviveka that Buddhapalita's remark is questionable, but says that Buddhapalita was summarizing not what is specifically proven by the refutation of the four extreme types of production but the general meaning of the chapter taken in the light of the whole text: inherently existent production is refuted but production does exist nominally.

CHANDRAKLRTI'S DEFENSE AGAINST THE THIRD FALLACY

This brings us to the third and final fallacy adduced by Bhavaviveka—that since it is necessary for Buddhapalita to assert the opposite of his thesis and reason, he contradicts the Madhyamika tenet that the refutation of the four extreme types of production is a non-affirming negation. According to Bhavaviveka, Buddhapalita's intended meaning is that production from self is not just eliminated but is replaced by production from other because production is purposeful and has an end.

To repeat, Buddhapalita said, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be senseless and because production would be endless.' Bhavaviveka saw the statement as indicating two consequences:

1. It follows that the subjects, things, are produced senselessly because of being produced from self.
It follows that the subjects, things, are produced endlessly because of being produced from self.

When a consequence implies its opposite meaning, the negative of the reason in the consequence is put as the predicate in a syllogism, and the negative of the predicate in the consequence is put as the reason in the syllogism. Bhavaviveka saw these consequences as implying their opposite meaning:

1 The subjects, things, are not produced from self because their production is not senseless.

2 The subjects, things, are not produced from self because their production is not endless.

Chandrakirti answers that Buddhapalita did not state such consequences at all, never mind intending to imply their opposite meaning. Instead, the two consequences should read:

1 It follows the subjects, things, are produced again senselessly because of being produced from self (or because of already existing in their own entities).

2 It follows that the subjects, things, are produced endlessly because of being produced from self (or because, although existing in their own entities, there is sense in their being produced again).

The idea is that for the Samkhya the first production of things is their attainment of existence in the nature or entity of their causes; then, they are produced again when made manifest. The reason why the first consequence should read 'produced again', rather than 'produced', is that although Buddhapalita's brief statement says only 'produced' (utpada, skye ba), the more extensive statement following it (see p.460) says 'produced again' (punarupada, yang skye ba).

Bhavaviveka thought that Buddhapalita was flinging the absurd consequence that, in general, production is senseless and endless, and thus he thought that the opposite—sensible and limited production—was being asserted. However, once it is
understood that the consequences are that things are produced *again* senselessly and endlessly, it can be seen that the opposite meaning—that things are produced again sensibly and not endlessly—is accepted only by a Samkhya. For, a Prasangika has no such thesis of the sensible and limited re-production of things.

Understanding what Buddhapalita's consequences actually are and that their opposite meaning is asserted only by a Samkhya is so central to the controversy between Buddhapalita and Bhavaviveka that the Ge-luk-ba colleges call this phase of their Middle Way studies 'The Opposite of the Consequences' (*thai bzlog*). Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (23.3-24.2, 16.10-.17) says:

> The opposite meaning of the consequences [—that things are produced again sensibly and not endlessly—] is related only with the other [party, the Samkhya], not with us because we do not have [such] a thesis. Therefore, how could we be contradicting [the Madhyamika tenet that the refutation of production is a non-affirming negation]? Through proving that the opposite of the consequences [is related with, or held by, the other party] we only wish to adduce as many fallacies as possible to the other party [so that he will give up his assertion of production from self]. Therefore, how could the master Buddhapalita—following the unerring system of the master Nagarjuna [in which production from other, as well as sensible and finite re-production are not asserted]—have said any words that would make him susceptible in the sense of affording an opportunity for another [to show contradiction with the Madhyamika system]!

Some Tibetans (and indeed many Western scholars) have explained that this passage indicates that Madhyamikas (or Prasangikas) do not have any theses in general. Jam-yang-shay-ba says that it is easy to realize that this is wrong. Since the referent of Chandrakirti's remark that Madhyamikas have no thesis is specific—meaning specifically that Madhyamikas do
not hold the thesis that production again is sensible and limited —the passage cannot serve as a source showing that Madhyamikas have no theses in general.

**Consequences do not have to imply their opposite meaning**

The mere fact that these statements are properly constructed unwanted consequences does not mean that Buddhapalita must assert their opposite. As Chandrakirti has just indicated, through showing a Samkhya that he is logically subject to consequences that are opposite to his own views he can see the internal contradictions of asserting production from self and thereby will drop it, provided he does not shamelessly persist in his error.

Thus, on this occasion when a proponent of no inherent existence, a Prasangika, is adducing for a proponent of inherent existence, a Samkhya, the consequences that re-production is senseless and endless, these are not consequences implying their opposite meaning from among the five types of consequences (see pp.445-9), but merely unwanted consequences stated for the sake of refuting the opponent's thesis of production from self. For, Buddhapalita did not state them intending to imply their opposite, and words accord with the intention of the speaker—they do not coerce the speaker powerlessly but accord with the speaker's motivation. For instance, when a Buddhist says 'consciousness' and a Samkhya says 'consciousness', the two have radically different meanings. In this vein Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (24.2-.6, 16.17-17.3) says:

> When a proponent of no inherent existence adduces a consequence for a proponent of inherent existence, how could it follow that he is subject to the opposite meaning of the consequence? Words do not make the speaker powerless like [an executioner] with a club or noose [forcing a victim to say all sorts of things]. Then, how [do words indicate what they express]? If they have the capacity [to indicate their respective meaning], they accord with the speaker's intention in speaking. Therefore, [Buddhapalita's] adducing consequences [here] has the
effect only of refuting the other party's thesis [that reproduction is sensible and finite]; hence he does not come to have the opposite meaning of the consequences.

As Jam-yang-shay-ba notes, Chandrakirti is saying that Buddhapalita's consequences here at the point of refuting production from self do not imply their opposite meaning; he is not saying that no consequences imply their opposite meaning.

This is frequently Nagarjuna's procedure

It is clearly Nagarjuna's method in the Treatise frequently to use consequences, rather than syllogisms, to refute others' positions. For example, in refuting through an absurd consequence that a definition inherently subsists in what is defined, he says (V. led):

If space existed before its definition,
It would follow that it was without definition [at that time, due to which it would not exist].

He states an unwanted consequence in order to refute another's position and to cause him to cognize that a definition does not inherently subsist in what is defined and, therefore, that the existence of a definition does not serve to show that the defined inherently exists. The consequence implies its opposite meaning: Space does not exist before its definition because of having a definition. However, it does not imply that space exists after its definition.

Also, in refuting through an absurd consequence that dependent establishment exists inherently in conventionalities, Nagarjuna says (IV.2abc):

If a form [such as a sense power] existed [inherently] Separate from the form's cause [the elements],
It would follow that a form is causeless [because depending on causes would be contradictory with its inherent existence].

Nagarjuna here is implying the opposite meaning, i.e., that a
form is not inherently separate from its causes because a form is caused. An unwanted consequence is being stated to refute a position, and the opposite is also being implied.

Similarly, in refuting that nirvana is a functioning thing (*bhava, dngos po*), Nagarjuna says (XXV.4ab):

Nirvana is not a [functioning] thing.  
[For] it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death.

Since the consequence is:

It absurdly follows that nirvana has the characteristics of aging (changeability) and death (disintegration) because of being a functioning thing,

the opposite is something that a Prasangika in the Ge-luk-ba school, which indeed asserts that nirvana is not a functioning things since it is unchanging, could assert:

Nirvana is not a functioning thing because of not having the characteristics of aging and disintegration.

Though consequences sometimes imply their opposite meaning as in these cases, Bhavaviveka cannot insist that Buddhapalita's consequences do so just because they are consequences, for there are many types, including those that do and do not imply their opposite. Dzong-ka-ba gives an illustration of one that implies its opposite: If it is asserted that a sprout exists by way of its own entity, then the consequence is flung:

It follows that a sprout would not arise in dependence upon a seed because of existing by way of its own entity.

This implies the opposite:

A sprout does not exist by way of its own entity because of arising in dependence upon a seed.

As Dzong-ka-ba says, there are a great many instances of consequences' proving a thesis which is the opposite of the reason in the consequence by way of a reason which is the opposite of the
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predicate of the consequence. However, even in these cases, all that is being established is a mere elimination of the inherent existence which is asserted by the other party. A positive phenomenon is not being implied, and thus the Madhyamika tenet that the reasonings proving emptiness establish only a non-affirming negation of inherent existence is not contravened even when the opposite is implied. Still, the question why Chandrakirti cites as his three examples consequences that do imply their opposite remains; one could only say that he is giving examples of Nagarjuna's procedure of using consequences, not of consequences that do not imply their opposite meaning.

Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (24.7-25.2, 17.3-.10) says:

In this way, the master [Nagarjuna] mostly eradicates others' positions by way of merely adducing consequences as through (V.1):

> Space does not at all exist
> Before its definition.
> If space existed before its definition,
> It would follow that it was without definition [at that time, due to which it would not exist].

And (IV.2):

> If a form [such as a sense power] existed [inherently] Separate from the form's cause [the elements],
> It would follow that a form is causeless [because depending on causes would be contradictory with its inherent existence].
> Nowhere is there any [functioning] object that is causeless.

Likewise (XXV.4):

> Nirvana is not a [functioning] thing (*bhava, dngospo*). [For] it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death.
> There are no [functioning] things
> Without aging and death.

Etc.
Chandrakīrti’s pointing out here that Nagarjuna's procedure frequently is to adduce consequences (prasahga, thai ‘gyur) appears to be a central reason why, in Tibet, Chandrakīrti's school came to be called Prasangika.

Why does Bhavaviveka not find Buddhapalita's words to be rich with syllogisms like Nagarjuna's?

Bhavaviveka would find syllogisms implied in Nagarjuna's consequences; so, Chandrakīrti asks him why he does not find them in Buddhapalita's statements. The hypothetical Bhavaviveka answers that it is the job of a commentator in the process of expanding on the meaning of a root text to present syllogisms with proper reasons and examples. To this, Chandrakīrti cites the devastating fact that Nagarjuna, in commenting on his own Refutation of Objections, did not extensively use syllogisms. The Clear Words (25.3-.7, 17.11-.16) says:413

If the master [Nagarjuna's] statements are considered to be causes of many syllogisms due to being meaningful statements and thus of great import, why are the master Buddhapalita's statements also not considered that way?

Objection [by the hypothetical Bhavaviveka]: It is the custom of commentators to set forth syllogisms at length.

[Answer:] That also is not so because when even the master [Nagarjuna] commented on [his] Refutation of Objections, he did not set out syllogistic statements.414

Thus, Madhyamika custom or tradition does not call for the usage of syllogisms. Bhavaviveka's insistence on syllogistic reasoning goes against Madhyamika procedure.

Chandrakīrti next probes more deeply into the reasons behind Bhavaviveka's insistence on syllogistic statements, concluding that it stems from a basic misconception about the nature of reasoning, which in turn stems from a misapprehension of emptiness. In this way, in the next and final phase of this controversy Chandrakīrti goes on the offensive—having defended Buddhapalita by (1) first showing that consequences are sufficient,
(2) inbetween showing that even if one insists on a syllogistic statement, it is there in Buddhapalita's remarks, and (3) finally showing again that consequences are sufficient. By rimming his argument with demonstration of the sufficiency of consequences, Chandrakīrti causes us to wonder what is behind Bhavaviveka's view. He is now ready to set out his view of emptiness, more profound than Bhavaviveka's. It is a dramatic moment.
5 Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka

Sources
Chandrakirti's Clear Words
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen's Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.696-7

THE GENERAL INDICTMENT

To start, Chandrakirti turns to analyzing Bhavaviveka's refutation of the Samkhya position of production from self.415 The general indictment of Bhavaviveka is that even though he asserts the Madhyamika view, he states many faulty autonomous syllogisms—despite a wish to show great skill in logic. For instance, he states the following syllogism to refute production from self:

Ultimately the internal sources (eye sense, ear sense, etc.) are not produced from self because of existing, like, for example, an existent consciousness. (Hereafter, 'eye sense' will be substituted for 'inner sources' for the sake of brevity.)
Many fallacies, such as the non-establishment of the presence of the reason ('existing') in the subject ('the inner sources'), are seen. Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (25.7-26.2, 17.16-18.2) says:

Furthermore, this logician [Bhavaviveka], while wishing merely to demonstrate that he has great skill in treatises of logic, expresses autonomous syllogisms which are realized to be the locus of collections of a great many fallacies, despite his asserting the Madhyamika view. How? Respectively, here he states this syllogism, 'Ultimately the internal sources are not produced from self because of existing, like existent consciousness.'

Since, in the Samkhya system the person, or consciousness, is permanent, it is not produced and thus obviously not produced from self; so, a Samkhya can easily agree with the suitability of the example, i.e., that consciousness is existent and not produced from self. In this type of reasoning, the reason is not a non-observation of a related object but an observation of something contradictory (existence) with the predicate of what is being negated (being produced from self). Bhavaviveka's penchant for this style of reasoning is said to be based on the easy availability of cogent examples approved by the other party.

According to Jam-yang-shay-ba, Bhavaviveka's intention in this syllogism is to convey that just as the non-apprehension of production and cessation mentioned by Nagarjuna in the expression of worship at the beginning of his *Treatise on the Middle Way* is taken in reference to a mind of meditative equipoise on emptiness, so the four extreme types of production should be explained as not existing in the face of meditative equipoise on emptiness. Considering 'ultimate' as referring to a mind of meditative equipoise on emptiness, Bhavaviveka is actually wishing to say, 'For an ultimate consciousness, an eye sense is not produced from self because of existing, like, for example, an existent consciousness.'

**DOES 'ULTIMATELY' GO WITH THE PREDICATE?**

Chandrakirti says that Bhavaviveka's syllogism is not correct
because—within its being unclear why the qualification 'ultimately' is affixed and to what it should be affixed—it is fallacious no matter how it is taken. He questions where 'ultimately' should be affixed in the syllogism. Does it go with the predicate? If so, it would mean:

An eye sense is not ultimately produced from self because of existing, as in the case of, for example, an existent consciousness.

Bhavaviveka might want to affix it to the predicate because to refute production conventionally would contradict the Madhyamika's own tenets; therefore, it should be refuted only ultimately.

However, Chandrakrirtti answers:

1 There is no need from the Madhyamika's point of view to affix 'ultimately' to the predicate because, though a Madhyamika asserts production conventionally, he does not assert production from self even conventionally. Therefore, production from self is to be refuted in general without affixing the qualification 'ultimately'. For this reason both Buddha in the Rice Seedling Sutra, etc., and Nagarjuna in his Treatise refute production from self in general and do not affix 'ultimately' to the refutation.

2 There is no need from a Samkhya's point of view to affix 'ultimately' to the predicate because there is value in refuting the Samkhya, who has fallen from both ultimate truths and conventional truths, both ultimately and conventionally. Not recognizing emptiness, he falls from ultimate truths; falsely ascribing existence to a permanent person and so forth, he falls from conventional truths.

3 There is no need from the ordinary worldly person's point of view to affix 'ultimately' to the predicate in order to preserve worldly production from self because the world also does not assert production from self. Without considering whether things are produced from any of the four alternatives—self, other, both, or neither—the world
just accepts that a sprout, an effect, arises from a seed, a cause. Buddha said that he accepts what the world accepts, and this also is the way that Nagarjuna accepts production conventionally—without analysis, such as investigating whether an effect is produced from itself, others, both, or causelessly.

About this, Chandrakirti’s *Clear Words* (26.2-27.6, 18.2-19.6) says:

Why is the qualification 'ultimately' put in this [syllogism]?

[Hypothetical answer by Bhavaviveka: It is affixed to the predicate] because production which is asserted in accordance with worldly conventions is not to be refuted and because if it were refuted [conventionally], it would follow that one would be damaged by [one's own] assertion [of conventionally existent production],

[Response:] This is not suitable because [a Madhyamika] does not assert production from self even conventionally. [The *Rice Seedling* Sutra]*419 says:

Also, when a sprout is produced, arising from its cause—a seed—it is not created by self, not created by [naturally existent others], not created by both, not produced causelessly, not created by Ishvara, and not metamorphosed by time. It does not arise from particles, does not arise from the nature (*prakriti, rang bzhin*), and does not arise from its own entity.

Similarly [the *Extensive Sport Sutra (Lalitavistara)*]420 says:

If a seed exists, the sprout does also.
The sprout is not what the seed is.
It is not [inherently established as] other than it or just it.
Hence the nature of phenomena (*dharmata, chos nyid*) is not permanent and not annihilatory.421

Also, this very [text, Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*, XVIII. 10] says:
Whatever arises dependently is respectively
Not just that [i.e., its causes] and is not
Also other than that. Hence [causes]
Are not annihilatory nor permanent.

[Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka:] The qualification is made relative to the other's [that is, the Samkhya's] system.

[Answer:] That also is not suitable because their presentations are not asserted [by Madhyamikas] even conventionally. It is to be realized that it is advantageous to refute in both ways [that is, conventionally and ultimately] the Forders (Tirthika, Mu stegs pa) who have fallen from non-erroneous perception of the two truths. Thus, to express the qualification relative to the other's system (mata, gzhung) is also not suitable.

Furthermore, the world—in relation to which the qualification would be meaningful [if it asserted production from self]—does not construe production from self. The world does not employ analysis such as 'from self or 'from other' and so forth. The world understands only this, 'An effect arises from a cause.' The master [Nagarjuna] presented [cause and effect] this way too.

Therefore, the qualification ['ultimately'] is ascertained as meaningless in all respects.

DOES 'ULTIMATELY' GO WITH THE SUBJECT?

Bhavaviveka might, however, say that 'ultimate' should be affixed to the subject because the production of an eye sense, which Samkhya accepts as ultimate, is refuted even conventionally:

An ultimate eye sense is not produced from self because of existing, as in the case, for example, of existent consciousness.

Chandrakīrti answers that since Bhavaviveka himself does not
accept an ultimate eye sense, the subject and thus the reason are not established for him. (In an autonomous syllogism the subject and reason must be mutually and similarly established for both parties in a debate; in addition, an ultimate eye sense is not a fit subject for any type of syllogism with a positive reason such as 'existing', since it simply is not established.) The *Clear Words* (27.7-.9, 19.6-.9) says:

[Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka:] This qualification was made wishing to refute the conventional production [of subjects which are asserted to exist ultimately],

*[Answer:]* Then, you would have a fallacious position [thesis] in which the base [subject] is not established (*asiddhadhara, gzhi ma grub pa*) and a fallacious reason in which the base [subject] is not established (*ashraya-siddha, gzhi ma grub pa*) since you do not assert sources-eyes and so forth—ultimately.4213

It might be said that there is no fault because Bhavaviveka accepts conventionally existent production, and a conventionally produced eye sense is taken as the subject of the syllogism. However, there then would be no place to which 'ultimately' could be affixed, for it would be affixed neither to the subject nor to the predicate.

Again, it might be said that 'a conventional eye sense' is the subject and 'is not ultimately produced' is the predicate. However, this also is incorrect because Bhavaviveka did not say it, and even if he had, the subject would not exist for a Samkhya. The Samkhyas do not accept that an eye sense exists conventionally the way Madhyamikas use 'conventionally'. In Madhyamika terms, the Samkhyas accept an eye sense as substantially existent (*dravyasat, rdzas yod*) and not as imputedly existent (*prajnaptisat, btags yod*) or conventional as the Madhyamikas do. Though the Samkhyas assert that the principal (*pradhana, gtso bo*) and person (*purusha, skyes bu*) are ultimate truths and that the rest of the twenty-five categories are conventional truths, since they ascribe a different meaning to 'conventional',
it would be necessary to explain which meaning of 'conventional' was being used. Using the Madhyamikas' meaning would be unacceptable to the Samkhyas; using the Samkhyas' meaning would make the subject non-existent for the Madhyamikas. Even on this level Bhavaviveka's argument is ill-framed. Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (27.9-28.3, 19.9-.17) says:

[Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka:] Since eyes and so forth exist conventionally, there is no fault.

[Answer:] Then what does 'ultimately' qualify?

['Bhavaviveka':] Since the ultimate production of conventionalities such as eyes is being refuted, 'ultimately' qualifies the refutation of production.

[Answer:] In that case, [you] should have said, 'Ultimately there is no production of conventionalities such as eyes,' but such was not said. Even if you had, because the other party [the Samkhya] asserts eyes and so forth just as substantially existent (*dravyasat, rdzas su yod pa*2) and does not assert them as imputedly existent (*prajnaptisat, btags par yod pa*), the position [thesis] would be fallacious in that the base [subject] would not be established. Hence, that is not suitable.

**COMMONLY APPEARING SUBJECTS**

Bhavaviveka might answer that one should not qualify either the subject or the predicate with 'ultimate' or 'conventional' but take as the subject just a general eye sense which is common to both disputants. He might assert that when various schools of tenets debate, it is necessary to take just general terms for the subject and the predicate, for if each school affixed its own particulars, there would be no such thing as inference. (I feel that with this final major move in the now entirely hypothetical argument Chandrakirti has gotten down to his basic point: Bhavaviveka's insistence on the statement of syllogisms indicates that for him the elements of a syllogistic argument—subject, predicate, reason, and example—appear commonly to both parties of a
debate, Madhyamika and non-Madhyamika, that is to say, are asserted as certified by valid consciousnesses in a similar way in their respective systems, whereas if Bhavaviveka knew Madhyamika well, he would know that such is impossible. The defense of Buddhpalita has prepared the ground by revealing the intensity of Bhavaviveka's insistence on syllogistic reasoning, and the examination of the qualification 'ultimately' has removed a possible objection—Chandrakirti is suggesting that Bhavaviveka really did not mean anything by it anyway. In other words, we are not dealing in the merely hypothetical but in what Chandrakirti feels is actually at the core of Bhavaviveka's thought.

Bhavaviveka might cite some examples. For instance, if, when a Buddhist proved to a Vaisheshika that a sound is an impermanent thing, he specified the subject as a sound which is derived from the great elements, the subject would not exist for the Vaisheshika. If, in accordance with Vaisheshika tenets, 'a sound which is a quality of space' were specified, it would not exist for the Buddhist. Similarly, if, when a Vaisheshika debated with a Jaina, he specified 'a sound which is a product' as the subject, it would not exist for the Jaina. If he specified in accordance with Jaina tenets 'a sound which existed formerly and is manifested by conditions', the subject would not exist for the Vaisheshika himself.

Similarly, Bhavaviveka might add that the predicate of a thesis also cannot possibly be qualified with the particular tenets of each school but must be only the general term. For instance, if when proving that a sound is an impermanent thing, a Buddhist specified the predicate as 'an impermanent thing the disintegration of which is [externally] caused', the predicate would not exist for the Buddhist himself because things require no further cause for their disintegration other than their own production. Still, if he took as the predicate 'an impermanent thing the disintegration of which is uncaused', the predicate would not exist for the Vaisheshika.

Bhavaviveka might add that the reason why even the predicate must be just the generality which appears similarly to both parties in the debate is that before proving a thesis, one must give
a concordant example which possesses both the predicate (impermanent thing) and the sign (product). Since the predicate is, therefore, a quality of the example, it is clear that the predicate must appear similarly to both parties and, if so, must be just a generality not qualified by any school's particular tenets. In this vein, Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (28.4-29.7, 19.17-20.8) says:423

[Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka: For example,] in [the proof] that sound is an impermanent thing just generalities are to be taken as the subject and the predicate, not specified [with the particular tenets of the debaters]. If specifics were used, the conventions of inference [that is, inferring consciousness] and object inferred would be non-existent. For, if [as the subject] one used 'sound which is derived from the elements', it would not be established for the other party [the Vaisheshika]. However, if one used 'sound which is a quality of space (akaśa, nam mkha') it would not be established for oneself, the Buddhist.

Similarly, even when a Vaisheshika posits the thesis that sound is an impermanent thing, if [as the subject] he used 'sound which is a product', it would not be established for the other [party, the Jaina]. However, if [the subject were specified as 'sound] manifested [by conditions]', it would not be established for himself.

Similarly, [with respect to the predicate] if [impermanence were specified as] that of which the disintegration is caused, it would not be established for the Buddhist himself. However, if [it were specified as] causeless, it would not be established for the other party [a Vaisheshika]. Therefore, just as here [in these examples] mere generalities are to be used as the subject and the predicate, so here also [in the refutation of production from self] a mere subject devoid of qualification is to be used.
There are no commonly appearing subjects

Chandrakirti's answer is that all of this is inadmissible. A valid cognizer must certify the subject of a syllogism as existing, and in systems such as Bhavaviveka's and a Samkhya's which assert (either explicitly or implicitly) that all objects exist by way of their own character this valid cognizer must be non-mistaken in terms of the object's establishment by way of its own character. Thus, in Bhavaviveka's system, a mistaken sense consciousness is not accepted as finding or certifying its object of comprehension; rather, the subject about which the two parties are debating whether it is ultimately produced or not must be certified as existing by such a non-mistaken consciousness. Because of this, Bhavaviveka cannot assert that eyes and so forth are falsities, appearing one way and yet existing another—that is to say, appearing to be established by way of their own character but not—since he asserts that the consciousness certifying the subject is non-mistaken. However, eyes and so forth which are found by a non-mistaken valid cognizer just plain do not exist. Thus, although Bhavaviveka and a Samkhya agree on the status of the subject with respect to its being established by way of its own character, such a subject simply does not exist. In this way, the meaning of there being no commonly appearing subjects is that the subject in a syllogism such as Bhavaviveka's simply does not exist. Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (29.7-30.3, 20.8-.12) says:

That is not so, because at just that time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production] ⁴ when it is the case that here a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of the probandum, this one [Bhavaviveka] himself just asserts the degeneration or non-establishment ⁴²⁵ of the entities of the subjects [eyes and so forth]—the basis of that [predicate, non-production from self]—which are found by a mere erroneous consciousness. Bhavaviveka instead holds that the subjects of his syllogism, eyes and so forth, are found by a non-erroneous or non-mistaken consciousness in which case they would not be falsities; however, they are falsities
since they appear to exist inherently but do not, and thus the subject is not established.] The erroneous and the non-erroneous are different [that is, a dichotomy].

To repeat, at this time when Bhavaviveka is attempting to prove that for an ultimate or reasoning consciousness an eye sense is not produced, he might not qualify the subject with tenets peculiar to any system, but the subject must still be validly cognized by both parties. However, in Bhavaviveka's system if a consciousness is mistaken with respect to the inherent existence of an object, it is not valid. For him, to be valid with respect to an object a consciousness must also be valid with respect to the object's being established by way of its own character. Thus, once a sense consciousness apprehending blue, for instance, is valid, it must be non-mistaken with respect to its appearing object (the blue), and once a conceptual consciousness, such as an inferential consciousness realizing the impermanence of the body, is valid, it must be non-mistaken with respect to its referent object (the impermanence of the body). Since the consciousnesses that realize these are non-mistaken, these objects cannot be falsities, appearing to exist one way but actually existing in another way; otherwise, the consciousnesses would be mistaken with respect to that seeming mode of being.

However, they are falsities, and falsities simply cannot be among objects found by a non-mistaken consciousness. The reason for this is that false objects and true objects—that is to say, erroneous objects found by a mistaken consciousness and non-erroneous objects found by a non-mistaken consciousness—are mutually exclusive, even a dichotomy; whatever exists must be either one or the other. In this context, a mistaken consciousness is one to which eyes and so forth, for instance, appear to be established by way of their own character because objects which are so established do not exist, just as the falling hairs which appear to someone with cataracts do not exist in the least. Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (30.3-.4, 20.12-.15) says:

Therefore, like the falling hairs [seen by] one with cataracts and so forth, when what does not exist [by way of
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its own character] is apprehended by [i.e., appears to] an erroneous [consciousness] as just existing [that way], how could even a portion of an object existent [by way of its own character] be observed?

Similarly, in this context a non-mistaken consciousness is one which directly perceives only the nature of phenomena, emptiness, since it does not involve the appearance of false objects that even in direct perception seem to exist one way but do not. A consciousness in meditative equipoise perceives only emptiness in a totally non-dualistic way, without the slightest appearance of conventional objects which appear to sentient beings as if they are established by way of their own character but do not. To a consciousness of meditative equipoise on emptiness, there is not the slightest appearance of something that does not exist the way it appears; this is like the fact that the consciousness of one without cataracts does not see falling hairs and so forth and thus it does not certify those falling hairs as existing. In this vein, Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (30.5-.8, 20.15-.20) says:

Like the falling hairs and so forth of one without cataracts, when a non-erroneous [consciousness of meditative equipoise on emptiness] does not superimpose the unreal [i.e., objects established by way of their own character], how could it observe the merest portion of a conventionality that does not exist [by way of its own character]? Therefore, the honorable master [Nagarjuna] says [in his *Refutation of Objections*:427

If [in accordance with your thought] the factualities Of direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established objects of comprehension], Then [it would be suitable] to prove those [in one's own system] and refute [others], but since [valid cognizers observing Such objects of comprehension] do not exist [even conventionally], there is no [chance for you] to censure me.
According to Chandrakirti, all consciousnesses of sentient beings except a direct cognizer of emptiness are mistaken, and thus there can be no valid cognizer of the subject in a syllogism which is not mistaken with regard to the mode of being of that subject. However, a non-deceived consciousness, which nevertheless is mistaken about the inherent existence of its object in the sense not that it conceives the object to exist inherently but that the object merely appears to exist that way, can establish the existence of objects that are falsities—objects which appear to exist by way of their own character or inherently but do not. A distinction is made between the appearing object (snang yul) of a consciousness and its object of engagement (’jug yul); a valid cognizer (pramana, tshad ma) can be mistaken with respect to its appearing object but not with respect to its object of engagement.

Thus, it is not that Prasangikas hold that the subject in a debate is not certified by the valid cognizers of both parties, for they hold that each party—whether they recognize it or not—has valid cognizers of mere objects, such as eyes, which are valid with respect to neither the inherent existence nor the non-inherent existence of the object. However, only a Prasangika recognizes valid cognizers to be such; a non-Prasangika holds that the very valid cognizer which certifies the existence of the subject of the syllogism certifies its being established by way of its own character. Thus, in one way it is said that there are no commonly appearing subjects in the sense that in the systems of the two, the Prasangika and the non-Prasangika, the establishment of the subject by valid cognition is not asserted similarly.

In another way, even though the two parties, such as Bhavaviveka and a Samkhya, might agree that the subject of a syllogism is certified by a consciousness that is non-mistaken with respect to its being established by way of its own character, the subject, when qualified this way, does not exist, and thus from this point of view it can be said that a commonly appearing subject does not exist.

Again, in another way, if in a debate in which one was seeking to prove non-ultimate production, the other party understood
the subject as being certified by a consciousness that is valid with respect to neither its inherent existence nor its non-inherent existence, that person would already have understood the Prasangika view of the emptiness of inherent existence. The person would have come to be able to differentiate between inherent existence and mere existence—making it possible to identify that there are consciousnesses which neither certify inherent existence nor realize non-inherent existence but only realize their object. Thus, there would be no need to establish non-ultimate production for such a person. In this case, there is also no commonly appearing subject—even though both parties recognize the 'subject' as being certified by a similar type of valid cognizer—simply because there is no subject which needs to be proven as lacking ultimately existent production.

Thus, when there is no non-erroneous consciousness to certify the existence of the subjects of syllogisms such as eyes (the subject of Bhavaviveka's syllogism proving that eyes are not produced from self) which for Bhavaviveka are qualified by being found by a non-erroneous consciousness, the subjects just plain do not exist. Since such a subject cannot be established, the two parties—even if they, like Bhavaviveka and a Samkhya, both hold the view that the consciousness certifying the subject certifies its inherent existence—do not have a common mode of establishing the subject with valid cognition. For a non-erroneous consciousness in this context just perceives emptiness, resulting in there being no valid cognizer non-erroneously knowing subjects such as eyes.

In this way, the subject is shown not to be established in common for the two proponents. This makes the thesis, the combination of subject and predicate, non-established simply because the subject is not established. For the same reason, the sign's being a property of the subject (pakshadharmata, phyogs chos) also is not established. Chandrakirti's Clear Words (30.9-.11, 20.20-21.5) says:  

Because in that way the erroneous and the non-erroneous are different, on an occasion when the non-erroneous [is realized by the wisdom of meditative equipoise] the
erroneous does not exist [in its perspective]. Hence, how could a conventionality [that is to say, falsity such as] an eye which is the subject [in this syllogism] be [in its perspective]? Therefore, due to the irreversibility of having a fallacious position [thesis] in which the base [subject] is not established (\textit{asiddhadhara, gzhi ma grub pa}) and a fallacious reason in which the base [subject] is not established (\textit{ashrayasiddha, gzhi ma grub pa}), this [attempt at an answer—that commonly appearing generalities are to be used—] is just not an answer [since there is no valid cognizer, mistaken or non-mistaken, to certify the existence of such subjects].

\textit{Are there ever commonly appearing subjects?}

Chandrakirti is saying that there is a difference between proving impermanence and proving emptiness with respect to whether or not there can be commonly appearing subjects. Thus, it might seem that we are to conclude that even in the Prasangika system there are occasions when commonly appearing subjects are possible.\textsuperscript{429} However, Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen\textsuperscript{430} specifies that the Buddhist here is of the lower schools, thereby suggesting that even when debating on impermanence there is no commonly appearing subject in the Prasangika system. This is cogent because the non-Prasangika would still hold that the valid cognizer which certifies the subject certifies its inherent existence, but no such subject exists.

However, if one held that even in the Prasangika system there are commonly appearing subjects on occasions such as in debating about impermanence, one could say that the question of inherent existence is here of no consequence and that this is why both Chandrakirti and Dzong-ka-ba center their discussion of no commonly appearing subjects around the proof of no ultimately existent production or no production from self, in which the question of inherent existence is intimately involved. In this way, some Tibetan scholars say that the Prasangika tenet that a subject does not appear similarly to both parties in a debate applies only to occasions when proving emptiness.\textsuperscript{431} Chandrakirti’s \textit{Clear Words} (30.12-.14, 21.5-.9) says:
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There also is no similarity with the example. Even if there [in the example] a generality of sound and a generality of impermanence which are not asserted as qualified [with particular tenets] do exist for both [the Buddhist and the Vaisheshika], nevertheless proponents of emptiness and proponents of non-emptiness do not [agree on] asserting a generality of eyes as conventionally [existent in the sense of not being established by way of its own character] or as ultimately [existent]. Hence, there also is no similarity with the example.

Bhavaviveka has to admit his own reason is not established

Chandrakīrti indicts Bhavaviveka further, saying that he must accept the consequence that his reason refuting production from self is not established. For when another Buddhist school stated the syllogism:

The subjects, the inner sources, are only caused because the Tathagata said so,

Bhavaviveka said that the reason was not established. His thought was that if it were said that the Tathagata meant ultimately existent causation, the reason would be non-existent for a Madhyamika whereas if the Tathagata meant only conventionally existent causation, the reason would be non-existent for a Proponent of True Existence. Since besides these two there is no third category, Bhavaviveka himself objected that the reason had the fallacy of not being established for both disputants.

Here in the case of Bhavaviveka’s attempt to refute production from self, there is also no third category other than (1) objects found by mistaken consciousnesses and (2) objects found by non-mistaken consciousnesses. If the subject, the sign, and so forth are claimed to be cognized by a non-mistaken consciousness, then they would not be established for Madhyamikas. For Madhyamikas (actually Prasangikas) say that except for the wisdom of meditative equipoise on emptiness any consciousness of a sentient being is mistaken. If it is claimed that the subject, the sign, and so forth are cognized by a mistaken consciousness, then they
would not be established for non-Madhyamikas. For the Pro-
ponents of True Existence assert that a valid consciousness is
non-mistaken with respect to the inherent nature of its object. It
is self-contradictory for Bhavaviveka to assert something parallel
to what he finds to be a fallacy in others.

This is a convincing argument, but the debate does stem from a
difference of tenet in the Prasangika and Svatantrika systems. Chandrakirti does not accept that consciousnesses of sentient
beings are non-mistaken valid cognizers with respect to the
inherent existence of their objects, whereas Bhavaviveka does.
The latter finds that it is not contradictory for a consciousness to
perceive things as inherently existent and to be non-mistaken
because things do conventionally exist inherently. Chandrakirti
finds the two to be contradictory because both true existence and
inherent existence are equally to be refuted, both ultimately and
conventionally.

This means that for Bhavaviveka when an object is sought
among its bases of imputation, it can be found. For instance, a
table is the composite of its parts, and the actual person is a
subtle form of the mental consciousness. For Chandrakirti, an
object cannot be found among its bases of imputation; a table is
not the composite of its parts, and a person is not a conscious-
ness. In the Prasangika system, even conventionally objects are
only imputedly existent; they are designations. Furthermore, it
is undeniable that sentient beings perceive objects just the oppo-
site way; the basis of imputation appears to be the thing itself.
Thus, a Prasangika asserts that all sentient beings’ sense and
mental consciousnesses, except direct cognizers of emptiness,
are mistaken. Hence, it is not that Bhavaviveka has a manifest
contradiction but that he does not assert something which a
Madhyamika, as interpreted by Chandrakirti, should—that
conventional objects are certified only by mistaken consciousnesses. If he did assert this, he would be subject to the same kind
of analysis that he makes with respect to the Hearer school’s syl-
logism. In other words, in proving to a Samkhya that eyes and so
forth are not produced from self, he would be holding that such
conventionalities are certified by mistaken consciousnesses,
whereas for the Samkhya the consciousness certifying the subject—eyes—would also certify its inherent existence; in that case the subject would not be established in common for the two of them.

The claim of self-contradiction is Chandrakirti’s way of highlighting the fact that Bhavaviveka, in asserting that a valid cognizer of a conventionality is unmistaken, is going against what should be a basic Madhyamika tenet—that except for a consciousness directly realizing emptiness all consciousnesses of sentient beings are mistaken in that their objects appear to exist inherently but do not.

Chandrakīrτi offers no explicit evidence that Bhavaviveka asserts that such consciousnesses of conventionalities are non-mistaken; there is merely his earlier statement (p.508) that Bhavaviveka himself accepts that objects found by a mistaken consciousness are not established:

... at this time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production] when it is just the case that a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of the probandum, this one [Bhavaviveka] himself just asserts the degeneration [or non-establishment] of the entity of subjects [eyes and so forth], the basis of that [predicate, non-production from self], which are found by a mere erroneous [consciousness].

If Bhavaviveka asserts that objects found by an erroneous or mistaken consciousness are not established, then since he obviously holds that the subjects of his syllogisms are established, he must hold that they are certified or realized by non-mistaken consciousnesses. From this, many Tibetan scholars have drawn the conclusion that for Bhavaviveka the object of negation in the view of emptiness does not appear to sense consciousnesses.

In Tibet, these points have been formalized into a Svatāntrika system by scholars using as their basis brilliant exploration of the implications of brief statements such as this. By presenting a system in structured form, what is gained is clarity and sharpness in differentiating positions, resulting in ease in applying such tenets.
in meditation. Still, in the debating courtyards of the monastic universities, the sources for these now seemingly hardened positions are examined in detail with the result that those who pursue the topics in depth realize the almost fluid nature of the sources while reconstructing and examining the patterns of Dzong-ka-ba's thought as he formalized these systems. The challenge is first to come to know Dzong-ka-ba's interpretation so well that one can read it into his sources and then to examine the sources to determine if the interpretation is justified—both of these phases being required in the debating courtyard. A basic requirement is to go beyond the texts to construct what Bhavaviveka, for instance, was getting at. Thus, dynamic ingenuity is not limited to the past; it is ever-presently required. Our examination of the texts here is, therefore, only the tip of the iceberg.

About Bhavaviveka's being forced to accept that his own reason is faulty, Chandrakirti's Clear Words (30.15-31.10, 21.9-2.6) says:

Just this mode of expressing the fallaciousness of the position [or thesis] which is that the basis [the subject] is not established is to be applied also in expressing the fault of non-establishment with respect to this reason—'because of existing.' For, this logician [Bhavaviveka] himself [comes to] assert the points explained above. How? Another stated this proof:

Causes and so forth producing the internal sources just exist because the Tathagata said so. Whatever the Tathagata said is that way, as, for example, is the case with [his] saying that nirvana is peace.

At that time [Bhavaviveka] expressed the following fault:

What are you asserting is the meaning of the reason? [Are you saying] 'because the Tathagata said such [in terms of] conventional [existence]' or 'because the Tathagata said such [in terms of] ultimate [existence]'? If conventionally, the meaning of the reason is not established for yourself, but if ultimately, [then as
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Nagarjuna, I.7ab, says,] 'When [one analyzes whether] the phenomena [of effects] exist, do not exist, or [both] exist and do not exist [at the time of their causes], they are [understood as] not established [by causes].' At that time, conditions [producing] effects which have a nature of existence, non-existence, or both [at the time of their causes] are refuted. Therefore (I.7cd) 'How could [an ultimately established definition, that is,] establisher (nirvartaka, sgrub byed) [or producer] be [the definition of] causal [condition (hetupratyaya, rgyu'i rkyen)]? In that case, it is not feasible [to say that because the definition of causal condition ultimately exists, causal conditions ultimately exist].' The meaning of [Nagarjuna's] statement is that those [ultimately existent things] are just not causes producing [effects]. Therefore, because [we Madhyamikas assert that] what is established [that is, effects] and establishers [that is, causes] do not exist ultimately, [for a Madhyamika] that reason is just non-established [if the referent is to ultimate existence]. Or it is just contradictory [if the referent is to ultimate existence due to being very contradictory with a predicate of the probandum which should be a conventionality].

Bhavaviveka's other autonomous reasons are not established

Chandrakirti adds that Bhavaviveka's other autonomous syllogisms similarly incur the fallacy of the non-establishment of the subject, reason, and example since in the latter's system these must be certified by a valid cognizer which is non-mistaken with respect to the mode of being of the object. For a Prasangika a valid cognizer can be mistaken with regard to the object's inherent existence but still be able to certify the existence of the object as a falsity; however, this does not mean that ignorance establishes the existence of objects. Ignorance wrongly imputes the inherent existence of objects; valid dualistic cognizers establish the existence of objects.
About these other autonomous syllogisms, Chandrakirti’s *Clear Words* (31.11-33.3, 22.6-3.12) says:

Because this one [Bhavaviveka] himself [comes] in this way to assert the non-establishment of reasons, in all inferences in which [he] states inherently existent phenomena (*vastudharma, dngos po'i chos*) as reasons, the reason and so forth are not established for him. Hence, all [his] proofs are destroyed. For, in:

Ultimately the internal sources are not produced from their conditions which are other [than them] because of being other, as, for example, is the case with a pot.\(^{440}\)

or:

The producers of the internal sources such as eyes, which others\(^{441}\) want to say [exist] ultimately, are not ascertained as conditions [producing the internal sources] because of being other, as, for example, is the case with threads and so forth, 'other' and so forth are not established for oneself [i.e., Bhavaviveka].

On an occasion when another expressed the following reason:

The internal sources are only produced because of making the special designations of those which possess their objects [that is to say, because of being the reasons why their respective consciousnesses are called 'eye consciousnesses' and so forth],\(^{442}\)

this one [Bhavaviveka], wanting to speak of the non-establishment of that reason, says that if production, going, and so forth were established as existing ultimately by the eye of\(^{443}\) wisdom of a yogi in meditative equipoise seeing the reality of things just as it is, then that reason—'because of making the special designations
of those which possess their objects’—would just have the sense of being established [but it is not established] because [ultimately existent] going is also refuted just through the refutation of [ultimately existent] production.

This [sort of reasoning that Bhavaviveka used against his opponent] likewise is to be applied also to a reason which he formulates:

Ultimately the not-yet-gone-over is not being gone over because of being a path, like the path already gone over.

In that, the reason—path—is not established for him [due to not being established by the meditative equipoise of a yogi seeing suchness, this being the only unmistaken consciousness that a non-Buddha has].

Also, in:

An eye that serves as a basis [of an eye consciousness], does not ultimately see forms because of being an eye sense power, as, for example, is the case with [an eye sense power] that is similar [to one that serves as the basis of an eye consciousness but does not actually serve as a basis of an eye consciousness such as during sleep],

and likewise:

An eye does not [ultimately] see forms because of having arisen from the elements, as, for example, is the case with form,

and:

Earth is not [ultimately] an entity of hardness because of being an element, as, for example, is the case with wind,

and so forth it is to be applied that the reasons and so forth are not established for yourself [Bhavaviveka].
Bhavaviveka’s reason is inconclusive

Furthermore, the reason of Bhavaviveka’s autonomous syllogism would be inconclusive for a Samkhya:

The subject, an eye sense, is not ultimately produced from self because of existing, as, for example, is the case with an existent consciousness.

A Samkhya might think that an eye sense, because it exists, is not produced from self as in the case of consciousness but is produced from self as in the case of a pot. For him, a consciousness or person is not a product and thus, of course, is not produced from self; therefore, an eye sense is not produced from self in the sense that a consciousness is not produced from self, but it is produced from self in the way that a pot is. Bhavaviveka might object that pots are equally proven not to be produced from self, but that is not what he said since his subject was limited to the internal sources unlike Buddhapalita’s broad subject that includes all things involving production. Chandrakirti’s Clear Words (33.4-.6, 23.12-18) says:

Also, this reason—‘because of existing’—is indefinite in that the other party [would wonder], ‘Is it that the internal sources because of existing are not produced from self in accordance with how consciousness exists or is it that, like pots and so forth, they are produced from self?’

[‘Bhavaviveka’ objects:] It is not indefinite because pots and so forth are equally proven [not to be produced from self because of existing],

[Answer:] That is not so because such was not expressed.

Our other-approved syllogisms do not incur those faults

Chandrakirti says that all of these fallacies accrue to Bhavaviveka because of his using autonomous syllogisms in which the subject and so forth must appear similarly to both parties in the sense that they must be established similarly in the systems of
both. It is not sufficient in an autonomous syllogism that the subject be just validly established by one party and just validly established by the other party. Rather, the subject must be established or certified similarly in the systems of both disputants. Just so, the presence of the sign in the subject, the pervasion, counter-pervasion, and example must be validly established in the systems of both parties in a similar manner. This is the meaning of there being no similarly appearing subject, etc.

These fallacies do not accrue when one uses other-approved syllogisms. For instance, Nagarjuna says (III.2cd):

How can that which does not
See itself see another?

This is an other-approved syllogism:

The subject, an eye, does not inherently see another,
a form, because of not seeing itself, like, for example,
a pot.

It is not necessary to establish the reason, the example, and the subject (even though they are established for a Madhyamika)\(^{448}\) because the opponent himself accepts them. In order to ascertain the pervasion, i.e., that non-inherently existent perception of others pervades that which does not perceive itself, first a general pervasion is to be ascertained. This is done through a general counter-pervasion:

If things have an inherently existent nature, first that nature is to be apprehended in a thing, and then this nature can be apprehended in another which possesses that thing. For instance, because water has moisture, moisture is apprehended in earth which possesses water. Also, because a pleasant odor is apprehended in a certain flower, the pleasant odor is apprehended in a cloth which possesses, or is infused with, the odor of this flower.

Then, a general pervasion is stated:
If there is non-apprehension of a nature in a thing, then it follows that there is non-possession of this nature in another phenomenon which possesses this thing. For example, since jasmine flowers do not possess a foul odor, a foul odor is not apprehended in clothing that possesses, or is infused with, them.

Having demonstrated the general pervasion, it is applied to the present context:

It is admissible that if an eye has perception of itself, then it inherently sees another form when together with it. However, since an eye does not see itself, it does not inherently see another form.

When the opponent ascertains such a refutation as a refutation through realizing that not seeing oneself and inherently seeing another are contradictory, he ascertains the Madhyamika view of no inherent existence. At this time, he forsakes the theses and tenets of a Proponent of True Existence and simultaneously realizes that though things do not have inherent existence, conventionally existent activity and agency are possible. He then comes to distinguish non-existence and non-inherent existence for the first time, understanding that non-inherent existence does not contradict functionality. Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (34.1-.12, 23.18-4.16) says:

[Hypothetical objection by Bhavaviveka:] Is it not that just those faults which you ascribe to another's [that is, my, Bhavaviveka's, own] syllogisms accrue to your inferences, due to which they would just have the fallacies of non-establishment of the subject, reason, and so forth? Therefore, do not object to one [of us] with the faults that are incurred by both. Therefore, all these faults are not suitable.

*Answer:* Proponents of autonomous inferences (svatantra-anumana, rang rgyud kyi rjes su dpagpa) come to have these faults but we do not use autonomous
inferences because our\textsuperscript{449} inferences have the fruit of only refuting others' theses.

It is as follows. [For example] another\textsuperscript{450} who thinks that the eye [inherently] sees is refuted by inference renowned to himself:

You assert that an eye [has] the attribute of not seeing its own entity and also\textsuperscript{451} assert that if it does not have the attribute of [inherently] seeing other [forms such as blue, then that an eye sees] just does not occur. Therefore, whatever [substratum] does not possess [the attribute of] seeing its own entity also does not possess [the attribute of] seeing others [such as blue and so forth], as, for example, is the case with a pot [which does not inherently see others because of not seeing its own entity]. Also, an eye does not possess [the attribute of]\textsuperscript{452} seeing its own entity; therefore, it also does not possess [the attribute of inherently] seeing others [such as forms]. Therefore, seeing others—blue and so forth—which is contradictory with not seeing its own entity is contradicted just by inference renowned to yourself.

Since only such is expressed by our\textsuperscript{453} inferences, how could our position be subject to those faults as mentioned and due to which\textsuperscript{454} fallacy would be equally incurred?

The syllogism is valid because the subject and so forth are validly established for the opponent. It is not necessary that the subject and so forth be validly established in the same manner for the stater of the refutation. However, this does not mean that they are not established for the Madhyamika; they are, and they must be. What is not required is that the subject and so forth be validly established in a similar manner in the systems of both disputants. Therefore, the term 'other-renowned syllogism' eliminates that the subject and so forth are established \textit{in a similar}
manner for the Madhyamika; it does not suggest either that these are not established for the Madhyamika or are a matter of doubt. Thus, something's being 'other-renowned' or 'other-approved' comes down to how it is renowned or established for the other party, not to whether it is accepted as validly existing. As Dzong-ka-ba says:455

Therefore, the subject, predicate, and reason of an other-renowned syllogism must exist conventionally; it is not sufficient that they merely be asserted as existing by him [the other party].

The conventions of the world alone are appropriate for logical treatises, and in the world disputes are settled either by a third party accepted by both disputants or by one's own word, but not by the opponent's word. Just so, people are convinced by reasons established for them and not merely by the fact that reasons are established for others. Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (34.13-35.4, 24.16-5.5) says:

[Hypothetical rejoinder by Bhavaviveka:] Is there damage by inference even from an inference established for either [of the parties]?

*Answer:* There is. It is just by a reason established for oneself, not by one established for the other [disputant], since such is seen in the world. In the world, sometimes [one party] prevails and [the other] is defeated by the word of a judge which both take to be valid, and sometimes, by just one's own word, but victory or defeat is not by the other's word. Just as it is in the world, so it is also in logic because only the conventions of the world are appropriate in treatises of logic.

Vasubandhu and Dignaga assert that in both affirmations and negations the subject and so forth must be established for both parties, but according to Chandrakirti they actually should accept the usage of other-approved or other-renowned syllogisms. For in a refutation by scriptural citation the scripture need not be accepted as a valid teaching by both in the debate,
just by the defending party. Also, in inferences for oneself (as in meditative reflection) it is sufficient that the subject and so forth be established for oneself and need not be established for both because in an inference for oneself there is no second party. Thus, it is senseless for them to insist on common establishment of the subject and to say that consequences alone cannot generate an inferring consciousness. Buddhas aid those worldly beings who do not know suchness with just what is renowned among them. Chandrakirti’s *Clear Words* (35.4-36.2, 25.5-. 16)-says:

Therefore, some say, ‘There is no harm by inference that is through the force of being renowned to the other [party] because [we] wish to refute mere renown to others.’ Also, there is someone who thinks, ‘That [reason]⁴⁵⁶ which expresses ascertainment [established] for both is [capable of] proof and refutation; that which is either established for just one or about which there is doubt [by either party as to whether it is established] is not capable of such.’ In dependence upon the world’s presentation of conventions they also should assert just this mode, as described above, with respect to inference. For, damage through scripture is not only by way of scripture established for both [parties]. Then how? It is [also] by way of [scripture] established for [the other party] himself. [Furthermore] in inference for oneself just what is established for oneself is weightier at all [times], not what is established for both.

Therefore, expression of the definitions of logic [as they are renowned in the systems of the Svatantrikas and below]⁴⁵⁷ is not needed because the Buddhas help beings who are trainees and who do not know suchness with reasoning as it is renowned to them. Enough extensive elaboration.

**REMARKS**

There is great emphasis in the Prasangika system on the conventions of the world, which provide a common ground and insure
that the Prasangika will not be trying to help the world with a language it does not understand. Yet, it should not be thought that a Prasangika seeks to defeat all logicians through contradictory consequences in order to return to the vulgar views of the world. The refutations of other doctrinal systems are to be applied to the eradication of one's own innate ways of misceiving the person and other phenomena. Though Prasangikas mostly assert the existence of the phenomena which the world says exist, they do not accept what the world conceives about how these phenomena exist. No phenomenon exists by way of its own character; all phenomena exist imputedly, including emptiness. No phenomenon is its basis of imputation; all phenomena lack inherent existence. It is undeniable that the opposite appears to worldly beings and that, in turn, the world adheres to this appearance.

The insistence on referring to what is renowned in the world is not anti-philosophical; it is a call to see what appears without philosophical fabrication to the ordinary mind. This ordinary mind is possessed by one and all, philosopher and non-philosopher. The innate intellect is of two kinds: one the referent objects of which are non-existent and the other the referent objects of which are existent. The first is the habitual untutored intellect which without analysis conceives phenomena to exist inherently. Because an inherently existent object is utterly non-existent, the referent object of a consciousness conceiving inherent existence is non-existent. However, the image or concept of inherent existence which it perceives does exist. This mind is to be extirpated through hearing, thinking, and meditating on the non-existence of that referent object.

The second type of habitual non-analytical intellect is just the usual mind of everyday affairs that enters into thoughts and activities without analyzing whether the object exists ultimately as it appears or not. The Prasangikas are emphasizing attention to this mind, for it is this in its conceptual and non-conceptual forms which certifies the existence of all phenomena, establishing even the existence of emptiness although it is a mind of
meditative equipoise that certifies emptiness itself. Through attending to this mind one can determine what exists, and through determining what exists one learns what the bases of emptiness are. Since emptiness is a quality of objects—their lack of inherent existence—one must first identify what exists and then, using these existents as bases, meditate on their lack of inherent existence. Prasangikas assert what the world asserts not only because these phenomena do indeed exist but also because just these same phenomena are to be seen as lacking inherent existence. The concern is with the mind and its objects, as they are, without the fabrications of mistaken philosophical systems.

It is clear from Chandrakirti’s lengthy defense of Buddhapalita and from his attack on Bhavaviveka that he was versed in both their systems. His refutations of Samkhya, Nihilism, and so forth indicate a thorough study of non-Buddhist and Buddhist schools of tenets, comparative logic, and so on. Chandrakirti’s reliance on the world’s renown or what is established in the world is not a turning away from philosophy, study, or analysis but a refined view of an analytical philosophy.

Though phenomena such as the ten Bodhisattva grounds which form the structural basis of Chandrakirti’s *Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle Way’* are also said to exist conventionally, it is undeniable that they are not well known to ordinary beings. However, Dzong-ka-ba says that when the ten grounds become objects of the mind through hearing and experience, they appear to a non-analytical ordinary awareness; therefore, they are said to exist conventionally. Through this maneuver he shows that there is no need to abandon the extraordinary features of the spiritual path for the sake of according with the world.

Similarly, Chandrakirti lays out in great detail and with abundant definitions the standard phenomena of the world and those fabricated by other philosophical systems. He thereby stresses a study of definitions and an identification of the bases of emptiness before entering into the reasoning that refutes inherent existence.

Also, Chandrakirti accepts what the world accepts for the most
that is, except in cases such as the world’s assumption that the body is clean (if it is washed), pleasant, unchanging, and under the control of a self. Furthermore, he refuses to allow that there can be a subject of a syllogism which is validly established in a similar manner for a Madhyamika and a non-Madhyamika; this is because all consciousnesses of a sentient being, except for a direct cognizer of emptiness, are mistaken with regard to the mode of existence of objects. Only a Buddha has both sense and mental consciousnesses which perceive objects exactly as they are, imputedly existent; only he does not, in sense perception, confuse the object imputed with its basis of imputation. (A Buddha is not a sentient being, sattva (sems can), because, though he is conscious and has mind—sense and mental consciousnesses—he does not have a consciousness which still has obstructions yet to be abandoned, and this is the definition of a sentient being. All beings except for Buddhas have obstructions yet to be abandoned—even the highest of Bodhisattvas as well as Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers.)

Since beginningless cyclic existence all sentient beings have been chained to the false conception that phenomena exist inherently in their bases of imputation such that even a sense consciousness, though free from thought construction, perceives its objects as if they inherently exist. This appearance of inherent existence is assented to, and cyclic existence continues its unbroken round. All beings, non-Buddhist and Buddhist, Hmayanist and Mahayanist, must overcome the conception of inherent existence to break the round of powerless birth, aging, sickness, and death. As a technique to do so, a Prasangika removes the very basis of usual syllogistic debate by denying the existence of unmistaken valid cognizers of conventional objects in all who are not Buddhas. He uses consequences that call for analysis of everyday objects to discover the nature of objects. Analysis, the very opposite of ordinary intellect, which is defined as unanalytical, is demanded. Even syllogistic statements about this final nature cannot be used until one is about to realize the view of non-inherent existence and of the conventional valid existence of nominalities.
Uneducated beings would have difficulty understanding the format of a consequence, never mind its import. Therefore, the Prasangika's reliance on consequences and on what is renowned in the world does not reflect a vulgarization of Buddhism for the masses. Rather, it is an acknowledgement that people are convinced on their own grounds—an emphasis on watching one's own mind to discover or reveal what exists for oneself so that these existents may serve as bases for meditation on emptiness. In paying such close attention to the ordinary workings of the mind, the other type of ordinary mind—the non-analytical consciousness which assents to the false appearance of things as truly existent—can be seen more easily.

Prasangikas and Svanatrikas were named in Tibet from the point of view of the way in which they seek to generate in others a consciousness that infers the non-true existence of things, but it does not follow that all Prasangikas and Svanatrikas are debaters. They are seeking to accustom themselves to the view of emptiness through the statement of consequences and syllogisms to themselves in meditation and do not necessarily go about debating. Even a follower of Prasangika tenets may temporarily follow the Hinayana path, taking for the motivation of meditation on emptiness the wish to liberate himself or herself from cyclic existence and leaving for later the full development of the wish to free all beings from cyclic existence. Even those with the motivation of a Mahayanist would not necessarily debate or even teach during that particular lifetime, for it is necessary first to educate oneself before educating others.

Still, even a person who is a Mahayanist by tenet and Hinayanaist by path or motivation reveres and will eventually generate the great compassion of the Mahayana which requires taking upon oneself the burden of liberating all sentient beings. Eventually he will teach to others the view of the middle way through consequences.
6 Prasangika in Tibet

Sources
Jang-gya’s Presentation of Tenets
Khetsun Sangpo’s oral teachings

Buddhism first came to Tibet when books rained from the sky on the palace of King Hla-to-to-ri-nyan-dzen (Lha-tho-tho-ri-gnyan-btsan, 374-494*) in 433 A.D. The King was sixty at the time, and through paying respect to the books he assumed the appearance of a twenty year old, living for sixty more years to the age of one hundred twenty. Five generations later, during the reign of King Song-dzen-gam-bo (Srong-btsan-sgam-po, 617-698*), Buddhism was established in the snowy land through the efforts of his minister Thu-mi-sam-bho-ta who travelled to India, learned Sanskrit, created a Tibetan alphabet, and translated many books including sutras brought from Naga-land by Nagarjuna.

The first of the two disseminations of Buddhism into Tibet extends to the time of the translator Rin-chen-sang-bo (Rin-chen-bsang-po, 954-1055) whose translations form the boundary line beginning the new translations of tantra. The thorough transmission of the explanation and achievement in practice of the
Buddha's complete system occurred in the first dissemination during the reign of Tri-song-day-dzen (Khri-srong-lde-btsan, 790-848*) beginning in 803. During that period many Indian panditas visited Tibet; the Prasangika master Padmasambhava (877 B.C.-A.D. 864*) who was the founder of the Nying-ma order, Dharmakirti (not the famous logician), Vimalamitra, and Buddhaguhya who are all included within the Nying-ma order, all came at this time. The Nying-ma-bas, or followers of the old translations, are so named because they use translations, especially of Highest Yoga Tantras, made prior to the time of Rinchen-sang-bo.

These panditas, along with the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika Shantarakshita (ca. 165 B.C.-A.D. 844*) bore the burden of explaining everything from the discipline (vinaya, 'dul ba) to Madhyamika philosophy as well as tantra. Padmasambhava tamed the spirits of Tibet and initiated the king, princes, and others into tantra. Together with Shantarakshita and the king, Padmasambhava established doctrinal colleges at Sam-yay (hSam-yas), Hla-sa, and Yar-lung-drang-druk (Yar-klung-grang-'brug) and established meditation centers at Sam-yay-chen-bo (hSam-yas-chen-po), Shel-drak (Shal-brag), Chu-wo-ri (Chu-bo-ri), and Drak-yer-ba (Brag-yer-pa). Students in turn founded many doctrinal colleges and meditation centers, and thus though Padmasambhava mainly taught tantra, he spread all forms of the teaching. Similarly, Dharmakirti performed the mandala initiations of the Yoga Tantras, and so forth, but his teaching was not confined to tantra. The rules of tantra at that time were very strict, and it was not until later when the Tibetans were more educated in Buddhism that these and other masters spread tantra widely.

The Svatantrika-Madhyamika master Shantarakshita bore the Hihayana Sarvastivada lineage of discipline which is traced back to Rahula, Buddha's own son. Thus, the Sarvastivada discipline was favored over the other lineages. Later the king decreed that all were to follow the Bodhisattva abbot Shantarakshita in behavior, with the result that the texts of the other lineages of discipline were not even translated into Tibetan.
Shantarakshita warned that though no non-Buddhist could harm the continuation and development of Buddhism in Tibet, a dangerous internal schism would arise. Leaving his advice in bronze in the king's treasury, he counselled the king to call his student Kamalashila when the prophecy came to pass. After Shantarakshita's departure from Tibet, the Chinese abbot Ho-shang Mahayana (Hva-shang) composed many texts primarily setting forth his view of non-application of the mind to anything. His system spread widely in Tibet, even being accepted by the queen. King Tri-song-day-dzen saw that this system, which deprecated the many techniques of skillful means, did not accord with Nagarjuna's teaching. Being reminded of Shantarakshita's words, he invited Kamalashila to come to Tibet to debate with Ho-shang Mahayana at Sam-yay (ca. A.D. 846). Through citation of scripture and reasoning Kamalashila defeated the Chinese abbot, spread again the complete teaching, and praised analytical wisdom in his three books on the Stages of Meditation (Bhavanakrama). The king decreed that all were to follow Nagarjuna's Madhyamika view, but unlike the translation into Tibetan of only the Sarvastivada discipline, this did not prevent the views of other schools of tenets from being translated—the reason being that the great Indian teachers considered a study of various views valuable in ascertaining the features of the final view. It is said that Kamalashila was killed by a Chinese spy shortly before the king's own death in A.D. 848.

Even though some Indian scholars who upheld Chittamatra did visit Tibet during the first dissemination, since Padmasambhava, DhammakTrti, and so forth were Prasangikas in view and Shantarakshita was a Svetantrika, there is no question that the view of Tibet at that time was Madhyamika. Jang-gya reports that Ye-shay-day (Ye-shes-sde), who was a student of both Padmasambhava and Shantarakshita, accorded with the latter's Yoga-chara-Svetantrika-Madhyamika, but some say that his view was mainly Prasangika in accordance with the view of Padmasambhava. Ye-shay-day was a great translator who used the name Vairochana for his tantra translations, Indrabodhi for his translations of medical treatises, Gen-jak-tang-da (Gan-jag-thang-ta)
for his Bon translations from Shang-shung (Zhang-zhung) language into Tibetan, and Ye-shay-day for his sutra translations. Ye-shay-day's breadth is typical of many scholars of the period.

During the second dissemination, a while after the persecution of Buddhism during the last six years of the reign of King Lang-dar-ma (gLang-dar-ma, 877-906*), the great translator Rin-cheng-sang-bo (954-1055) relied on many Indian teachers, learned a great deal of philosophy and tantra, and translated many texts. His view was said to be that of a Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamika, that is, Prasangika; overcoming many mistaken tantric practices, he spread the teaching widely throughout Tibet. Thus, when Buddhism returned to prominence in Tibet, it was still the Madhyamika view and especially Prasangika that dominated philosophy.

The principal agents of the second dissemination were Rinchen-sang-bo and his teacher Atlsha (982-1054*). Atisha re-established the study of all aspects of Buddhism—the various sutra and tantra systems in terms of the practice of one individual—and this method persists through to the present. His student Drom-don ('Brom-ston) was able to penetrate Chandrakirti's system, and Atisha declared with pleasure that only the Prasangika view was to be upheld in Tibet. Atisha wrote that one could cognize suchness through the precepts transmitted from Chandrakirti, and the Ga-dam-ba (bKa'-gdam-pa) lineage stemming from Atisha contains many texts that accord with the thought of Chandrakirti's Prasangika-Madhyamika.

Relying heavily on Atisha's works, the Ge-luk-ba order, originally a branch of Ga-dam-ba, took Prasangika as their own final system. The famous Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path by Dzong-ka-ba (1357-1419), the founder of Ge-luk-ba, is a commentary on Atisha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhipathapradipa); in it Dzong-ka-ba presents, among other things, the particular features of special insight (vipashyana, lhag mthong) in the Prasangika system. Not just the Ge-luk-bas, but also the Nying-ma-bas, Ga-gyu-bas (bKa'-brgyud-pa), and Sga-gya-bas pay great respect to Atisha and study his works thoroughly.
The great Ga-dam-ba Ngok-lo-dza-wa Lo-den-shay-rap (Ngog-lo-ttsi-sha-ba bLo-idan-shes-rab), a student of Atfsha, quotes Bhavaviveka and Chandrakirti as sources but, along with his students, appears to agree mainly with Shantirakshita's Yogachara-Svatantrika. Also, there were some Chittamatrin followers of the teacher Suvarnadvipa (gSer-gling-pa), who, though a Chittamatrin, was Atfsha's principal guru for the generation of the altruistic aspiration to enlightenment.

The view of the Jo-nang-ba or Jo-mo-nang-ba school, a division of the Sa-gya order, is said by some to be a fabrication that is beyond the pale of the Indian schools of tenets. Their interpretation of the Madhyamika emptiness is that the permanent, unchanging realm or constituent (dhatu, khams) of the Tathagata which exists in all sentient beings is empty of all impermanent phenomena. Emptiness here is an emptiness of the other: the Tathagata realm, or Buddha nature, is empty of being impermanent phenomena and impermanent phenomena are empty of being the Tathagata realm. The other orders say that though emptiness is not impermanent phenomena and vice versa, this does not constitute emptiness; emptiness is a negation of self in the sense that phenomena are empty of, or lack, their own inherent existence. The Jo-nang-bas were refuted by many, but despite being considered as similar to the Vedantins in view, their founder Yu-mo-ba is renowned among scholars of all orders for his literature on the Kalachakra Tantra.

The great Sa-gya-ba scholar, Bu-don (Bu-ston, 1290-1364), originally a Nying-ma-ba and later a scholar of literally all orders and systems of tenets, accords greatly with the Prasangika Ga-dam-bas in view. It is said that he held Chandrakirti's works to be the best of all.

The great Ga-dam-ba translator Ba-tsap-nyi-ma-drak-ba (Pa-tshab-nyi-ma-grags-pa) spent twenty-three years in Kashmir, invited the pandita Kanakavarman (gSer-gyi-go-cha) to Tibet, and translated and taught many Madhyamika treatises. His four famous students, as well as many of his other students, spread Chandrakirti's system even more widely than he did.

There are some Madhyamika followers in Tibet about whom
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it is difficult to say whether they are Svatantrika or Prasangika. Go-rin-bo-chay Kuk-ba-hlay-dzay (Gos-rin-po-che Khug-pa-lhas-bsas) travelled to India twelve times, met with seventy-two scholars, and made many explanations of tantras. He was most likely a member of both the Ga-dam and Sa-gya orders, and though he was a Madhyamika, it is not clear which branch he asserted as his final system. Similarly, the translators Ba-kay-gay (Ba-khe-gad, Khe-gad-khor-lo-grags), Ra (Rva, Rva rDo-rje-grags), Dro (Bro, Bro Shes-rab-grags), and Nyen (gNyan, gNyan Dar-ma-grags) and so forth either because of their teachers or because of their own assertions are seen to be Madhyamikas, but no clear delineation of Svatantrika or Prasangika can be made.

The Sa-gya order stems from Drok-mi Shakya-ye-shay (Bro-kmi Shakya-ye-shes, 933 to either 1047 or 1050*) who spent twelve years in India studying especially with tantric teachers, then returned to Tibet, and spread tantra. He became Mar-ba's first Sanskrit teacher when Mar-ba was still a child. Drok-mi practices the mother tantras under the Indian pandita Gaya-dhara whose coming to Tibet greatly furthered the Sa-gya order and who ultimately died there in order to be near his place of rebirth. Drok-mi is said to have been a Madhyamika; also, since he sought to explicate the thought of the great Indian yogi Virupa, his view is Prasangika. The final view of the Sa-gya order is that of the Great Madhyamika, that is, Prasangika, their identification of the view being mixed with tantric precepts and known as the union of manifestation and emptiness. The great Sa-gya pandita Jam-yang-gun-ga-gyel-tsen (Jam-dbyangs-kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan) was a Prasangika in view in both his tantra and sutra teachings. The later Sa-gya scholar Ren-da-wa (Red-mda'-ba), a teacher of Dzong-ka-ba, wrote a commentary on Chandrakīrti's Supplement as well as instruction manuals for meditation on the Prasangika view. A Prasangikahimself, his writings on the view agree greatly with Dzong-ka-ba's.

The founder of the Shi-jay (Zhi-byed) order was Pa-dam-ba-sang-gyay (Pha-dam-pa-sangs-rgyas), who many say was Bodhidharma, also known as Kamalashlla (but not Shantaraksita's...
student Kamalashila). He was a student of eighty gurus, including Nagarjuna, Maitripada, and Naropa, lived for over five hundred years, visited Tibet five times, spread Buddhism widely in both China and Tibet, and is said to have visited Mi-la-re-ba near the end of his life. Based on the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, he divided his teaching into three systems—sutra, tantra, and union of sutra and tantra—spreading a doctrine much like that of sudden enlightenment. It is said that he pretended to die a few times in China.  

The writings of the famous clairvoyant Ma-ji-lap-dron (Ma-cig-lab-sgron) who is the founder of the Jo (gCod) branch of the Shi-jay order accord significantly with the Prasangika system. After she defeated Indian yogis through debate and feats of yoga, her system of exorcism, or elimination of suffering (gCod), originally brought to Tibet by Bodhidharma who received it from Aryadeva, spread back to India where it remained for a short while.

The renowned founder of the Ga-gyu order, Mar-ba (Lho-brag Mar-pa-chos-kyi-blo-gros, 1012-1096) visited India three times and Nepal four, meeting with one hundred and eight gurus, including Naropa, Maitripada, Jnanagarbha (not the Svatantrika Jnanagarbha), Shantibhadra, and so forth. He practiced in detail the yoga of the Guhyasamaja Tantra and most of the father and mother tantras. Returning to Tibet, Mar-ba had many students who upheld his lineage, and because his tantric activities were vast, his lineage spread widely. It is obvious that he relied on many teachers of both Chittamatra and Madhyamika views, but in his own words he relied mainly on Naropa and Maitripada in all aspects—whether view, meditation, practice, or tantra. That both Naropa and Maitripada were Prasangikas can be seen from their own words; thus, it is clear that the instructions on the view in the Mar-ba lineage are the great Madhyamika-Prasangika. Still, it is not necessary that every instruction in his lineage be Prasangika, for it is a sign of a great master that he does not teach the same to everyone or immediately attempt to explain his own view. Thus, some precepts in his lineage accord with Chittamatra.
Many of the songs of Mar-ba's famous student Mi-la-re-ba (Mi-la-ras-pa, 1040-1123) accord with Prasangika. Even those that speak of the four yogas, which is also a topic of the Chittamatin Ratnakarashanti, can be explained as either Chittamatin or Madhyamika. Since his teachings are not general presentations of tenets but answers to questions put by disciples, they accord with the disposition of the questioner. Mi-la-re-ba's student Gam-bo-ba (sGam-po-pa, 1079-1153) made popular usage of the term 'mahamudra' as a name for Ga-gyu-ba instructions on suchness in both sutra and tantra teachings. Gam-bo-ba's student Pak-mo-drup-dor-jay-gyel-bo (Phag-mo-grub-rdo-rje-gyal-po) had many students who formed branches of the Ga-gyu order.

In sum, the eight principal Tibetan orders—Nying-ma, Saga, Ga-dam (which includes Ge-luk), Ga-gyu, Shang-ba Ga-gyu (Shang-pa bKa ’rgyud, which was founded earlier than Mar-ba's Ga-gyu), Shi-jay (which includes Jo-yul), Jor-druk (sByor-drug, a tantric order based on the Kalachakra Tantra), and Dor-jay-day-ba (rDo-rje-bzlas-pa, a tantric order based on the tantras of the deity Bhairava)—mostly base their study of Madhyamika on Chandrakirti's Supplement. Students would memorize and debate Chandrakirti's Supplement, and only some would memorize Nagarjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way.

In terms of the view of emptiness, all the major Tibetan orders are Madhyamika, and almost all who differentiate between Prasangika and Svatantrika are Prasangika. Prasangika was and still is seen as the acme of philosophical systems and the basis for the special techniques of deity yoga in tantra.
7 Validation of Phenomena

Sources
Den-dar-hla-ram-ba's Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings
Geshe Lhundup Sopa's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.632-6

Even from the Prasangika standpoint it is not sufficient merely to tear down other philosophies.\textsuperscript{471} Not only must external debate be used as a branch of the attempt to overcome one's own misconceptions but also one must in one's own system of conventional existence present with valid confirmation all the actions, objects, and agents of cyclic existence and nirvana.

This very assertion of the valid establishment of all phenomena is what the Sa-gya-ba scholar Dak-tsang and others find so objectionable in Dzong-ka-ba. Dak-tsang cites as the cause for Dzong-ka-ba's 'error' the latter's addiction to logic.\textsuperscript{472}

The cause for such a burden of contradictions [in Dzong-ka-ba's writings] is that, despite [Chandrakirti's
and others’) statements again and again [that phenomena exist] only for the world without analysis, [Dzong-ka-ba] applied reasoning and proved [their valid conventional existence] due to the force of his habituation to logic.

Dak-tsang found eighteen 'contradictions' in Dzong-ka-ba's writings, the foremost of which is his assertion that there is a valid establishment of all phenomena in the Prasangika system.473

Those [pretending] to follow Chandrakirti who assert through analysis with many reasons that impure mistaken appearances are validly established have a great burden of contradictions.

The basic problem is that in the Prasangika system when objects are sought among or separate from their bases of imputation, they cannot be found and, thus, how can it be said that phenomena are validly established? How can valid cognition, either direct perception or inference, affirm an unfindable phenomenon as existing?

According to Dzong-ka-ba, every phenomena has its establisher, that is, a consciousness that certifies it as existing.474 A correct sense consciousness which directly perceives its object—or in other words apprehends its object without the medium of images and concepts—certifies the existence of visual objects, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. The mere realization of their objects by those consciousnesses in turn certifies their own existence.475 There is no further certifier of the certifier, and this is the reason why a valid cognizer exists in dependence on its own realization and does not inherently exist.

Similarly, an inferring consciousness which realizes uncaused space—a mere negative of obstructive contact—is the certifier of space. Just so, the wisdom of meditative equipoise certifies emptiness, although before directly cognizing emptiness, its existence can be certified by a valid dualistic mental consciousness that arises in dependence on reasoning and scripture. Emptiness is more difficult to realize than its existence, just as
liberation from cyclic existence is more difficult to realize than the mere existence of liberation. However, sense consciousnesses certify both their objects and the existence of their objects because the one is no more difficult to realize than the other and because it is impossible to identify another consciousness which, after a sense consciousness has certified its object, certifies the existence of that object.

Since it is obvious that double moons, blue snow mountains, a permanent self, and so forth are seen but do not exist at all, it cannot be said that everything which is perceived by the six consciousnesses is certified as existing. Some distinction of error has to be made; otherwise, there would be no way to determine which conventional phenomena exist and which do not. How else could Chandrakirti say:

From fear, not realizing that the self is just nominal, not knowing dependent imputation as it is, fallen away even from conventional truths, fooled by sheer wrong imagination through counterfeit inferences, [the non-Buddhist Forders] imagine a self and propound its character due to ignorance. A refutation of them even conventionally was given [in chapter eight where] the mutual establishment of a self and its appropriation [the mental and physical aggregates] was set forth.

How could Chandrakirti say that the Forders fall away even from conventional truths if there were not a valid means to determine what does and does not exist conventionally? How could Chandrakirti assert that the self is just nominal, a dependent imputation? It could not be done merely through polling the populace because, though the populace might not say that the self is permanent, they certainly would not even get a hint of what dependent imputation means.

By what means is it that Shantideva determines what is and what is not the path in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds? By what means is it that Nagarjuna determines the modes of the ethics he advises for the king in his Precious Garland of Advice for the King? If it were said that these are determined by the valid
establishment which is just popular in the world, then Chandra-kirti's nominalism would also have to be an object of popular valid establishment.

Dzong-ka-ba's answer is that these correct direct and indirect cognizers are valid within their sphere, in the sense that they determine whether, with respect to impermanent phenomena, the object imputed can perform the functions of the object or not.\textsuperscript{477} For instance, there is no difference with respect to the non-findability of a man imputed to a conscious human body and a man imputed to a pile of stones. However, the common intellect can determine without any special analysis which of the two is imputedly existent and which is just an imputation. The one can perform the functions of a man whereas the other cannot. Approaching and taking a good look is sufficient as a valid check of the coordination of basis of imputation and object imputed. Though an object imputed is not its basis of imputation and cannot be found among the bases of imputation or separately, it can be determined through simple checks whether the imputation is correct or not. To exist does not mean just to exist for thought; coordination of basis of imputation and object imputed is required.\textsuperscript{478}

The difference between a picture of a cow and a cow is that the former cannot perform the functions of a cow but the latter can. However, Chandra-kirti is renowned for having milked a picture of a cow in order to overcome others' sense of inherent existence. Might it not be that the ability to perform a function is linked inextricably with thought and thus the great yogis can do anything with anything? The Ge-luk-bas answer that, of course, they too accept the special powers of yogis but add that the yogis' and the world's presentations of phenomena should not be mixed. For the yogis' presentation would utterly eradicate the world's conventions;\textsuperscript{479} some yogis' eye consciousness can cognize odors, and their ear consciousness can cognize colors and shapes. A Buddha's hair cognizes all phenomena simultaneously; moments are stretched to eons; eons are reduced to moments. A Buddha can fit the world into a hair pore without changing the size of the hair pore or of the world. Thus, the
sphere of valid establishment is the coarse conventions of the world; within that context what is validly established holds true, and even Buddhas and yogis need not contradict these truths just because their sphere is subtler.

Still, does this mean that we poor worldlings are to have our dull presentation of phenomena and the yogis their subtle presentation? Even if it is granted that it is not ignorance that validly certifies these phenomena, but correct cognizers within a certain sphere, are we to hallow the admitted dullness of our sphere? What is the purpose of adhering to the world's limited knowledge? Why consecrate it with 'valid establishment' (pramanasiddhi, tshad mas grub pa)?

The Ge-luk-bas answer that it is necessary first to realize the existence of phenomena before meditating on their emptiness. Otherwise, the Nihilists who cognize an absence of former and future lives and the Madhyamikas who cognize an absence of inherent existence of former and future lives would be the same (see p.632-3). Furthermore, the cause and effect of actions are very subtle, and beings are bound in cyclic existence by the laws of cause and effect until they cognize emptiness directly and then become familiar with it over a long time. If a practitioner does not correctly outline the laws of cause and effect, he will be caught by his mispractices, whereby his very opportunity to meditate on emptiness will be lost. Furthermore, Buddhahood is not a mere state of total non-duality; rather, it is the perfection of mind and body, and dualistic perception in the sense of subject, object, and so forth continue though without the dualism of misperceived or misconceived inherent existence. A Buddha's wisdom and body are continuing effects of profound and vast practice. The cognition of emptiness is not the eradication of phenomena but a thorough understanding of their mode of existence. One learns how to perceive phenomena without confusing the basis of imputation with the object imputed.

Because ordinary beings cannot distinguish between inherent existence and conventional existence, as soon as it is said that objects are validly established, they tend to believe that objects as they perceive them are affirmed. Therefore, some non-Ge-luk-ba
masters have taught that nothing except emptiness validly exists; they feel that since a student is unable to distinguish between inherent existence and conventional existence, he can destroy his conception of inherent existence through destroying his sense of existence and then afterwards determine what remains. Agreeing with them, the twentieth century renegade Ge-luk-ba monk Gen-dun-cho-pel (dGe-'dun-chos-'phel) says that no teacher need fear that his students would fall to a view of utter annihilation or nihilism because no one can escape the data of his senses.\(^{482}\) He agrees that there is something left over after the fabrications of inherent existence are destroyed, but in the meantime students do not require fortification from nihilism through a teaching of valid establishment.

Gen-dun-cho-pel is said to have led an exciting life, and this may be the cause for his conviction that students would not fall into nihilistic views. He wrote a commentary on the *Aphorisms on Desire* (*Kamasutra*) from his own experience; he visited India and was arrested upon his return to Tibet as a Russian spy. He is said to have been quite a drunk, but also it is reported that upon retiring from the street with a friend in a drunken stupor he explained Nagarjuna's teaching with a very clear head.\(^{483}\) The vibrance of his life may have prevented him from falling into nihilism despite his obvious devotion to the doctrine of the unfindability of objects. However, that sense data are enough to keep all students from nihilism does not stand in the face of some current 'Buddhist' literature; the shadow of nothingness is often dark; the lack of discrimination between non-inherent existence and non-existence is obvious.

Still, Gen-dun-cho-pel's point is significant; he often refers to scholars who pressed him with their debates, and it appears that his objections are not to a philosophical incorrectness in Dzong-ka-ba's teaching but to a pedagogical fault. Since even Dzong-ka-ba says that no beginner can discriminate between existence and inherent existence, an emphasis on the valid establishment of conventionalities might merely fortify the habitual sense that things exist the way they appear. Gen-dun-cho-pel essentially is accusing the Ge-luk-bas of being too subtle for their own good.
The highly respected Mongolian scholar and Ge-luk-ba geshay Den-dar-hla-ram-ba (bsTan-dar-lha-ram-pa) in his Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many says in the same vein:484

Except for refuting just these mountains, fences, houses, and so forth which so forcefully appear to exist concretely, we are very wrong if we search for some other horn-like thing to refute. [‘Horn-like’ means something sticking out above everything else, obvious or prominent, something separate from the object itself.] For Jang-gya-rol-way-dor-jay’s (ICang-skya-rol-ba’i-rdo-rje) Song on the Practice of the View says, ‘It seems that having fully accepted these concrete appearances as givens, they are searching for some horn-like thing to refute.’

Still, some say [in answer] to this, ‘This is wrong because the mountains, fences, houses, and so forth as they appear to common beings are the objects of direct apprehension by sense consciousnesses. Therefore, it is unsuitable to refute them in any way because [Dzong-ka-ba’s] “Great Exposition of Special Insight” [in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path] says, “None of the objects of non-conceptual sense consciousnesses are ever refuted through reasoning.”“

That indeed is true; however, an object which appears to a non-conceptual [sense] consciousness is the object which is conceived to exist inherently by a conceptual consciousness [in the sense that a conceptual consciousness assents to the object’s appearance of inherent existence]. Therefore, related with this object are the appearance of objective existence which is to be refuted and the mere appearance [of the object] which is not to be refuted. [However] before attaining the view [of non-inherent existence but conventional, valid, effective existence] these two appear confused as one. When the view is found, these two [the appearance of objective existence and the mere appearance] are discriminated, and it is well renowned in the words of the wise that
there is this essential that the mere appearance is not refuted. When mountains, fences, houses, and so forth appear to ordinary beings, they appear in all respects to exist objectively. Therefore, one should meditate until, destroying this mode of appearance, it is cancelled in all respects for one's mind, and the fear, 'Now there is nothing left over,' is generated.

The generation of such fear is extremely rare. Kay-drup's *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate* says, 'If even arrival at the point of actual generation of fear and fright of the profound emptiness is extremely rare, what need is there to say that arrival at an actual ascertainment, which is an understanding of an emptiness through experience, is almost non-existent.'

Therefore, greatly superior to the present-day philosophers to whom not even an image of the mode of objective existence has appeared are those in former times who overextended what is refuted [in the view of selflessness and held that the objects themselves are refuted].

There are reasons for not being frightened about emptiness. On the one hand, the stupid who do not know either the term or meaning of emptiness are not frightened because they do not know any of its disadvantages or advantages. For example, the stupid who do not know about how one can fall from a horse are brave to mount a wild horse. On the other hand, those who perceive emptiness directly do not fear it because they lack the cause of fear, that is, the conception of inherent existence which is abandoned through seeing [the truth], like a being who has learned well the ways of controlling a wild horse.

Then, who fears [emptiness]? It is suitable for fear to be generated in one who has understood emptiness a little and is investigating whether such and such a phenomenon exists or not. For suddenly the phenomenon appears to his mind to be totally non-existent. An
example is a person who has understood a little but not completely how to mount a wild horse.

Even though the 'mere appearance' of an object is not negated in the view of selflessness, one has to bring oneself in analysis to the point where the object is utterly unfindable and totally disappears. One can at that time come up with nothing that is the object; this is a time of fright. It is said that eventually one will be able to comprehend what the 'mere appearance' that is not refuted is.

The Ge-luk-ba view is indeed subtle. It attempts to describe what nominal existence is: the non-identification of the imputed object as its basis of imputation and yet the coordination of these two as determined by whether the object so designated can perform its functions. Ge-luk-bas do sometimes seem to proceed to disregard emptiness and enter into long discussions about this or that conventional phenomenon. However, it rests on the oral teaching to emphasize attention to what objective existence and nominal existence mean and not just to enumerate and justify what conventionally exists.

Gen-dun-cho-pel's revolt from Ge-luk-ba teachings suggests that in the eyes of one intelligent being, not too many scholars and yogis were able to follow such a difficult middle path.
Dharmakīrti
8 Meditative Reasoning

Sources
Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path
Nga-wang-bel-den's Explanation of the Conventional and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets

Many, both in the East and in the West, have interpreted Prasangika-Madhyamika to be a systemless system that, based on the realization that words are incapable of generating an experience of objects like that of direct perception, uses reasoning merely to refute other views while propounding a meditation that is solely a withdrawal from conceptuality. This view contrasts sharply with the Ge-luk-ba interpretation. That Prasangikas have no system is refuted by Dzong-ka-ba in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path.483

Nowadays some who wish to be Prasangika-Madhyamikas [say]: 'Our own system even conventionally does not have any assertions based on the ultimate or the
conventional. For, if we had such theses, then we would have to assert examples and reasons that prove them, in which case we would become Svetantrikas. Therefore, there is no such thing as an 'own system' for Prasangikas since [Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, and Chandrakirti] say that Madhyamikas have no position and no thesis. As Nagarjuna's *Refutation of Objections* says:

> If I had any thesis,  
> Then I would have that fault,  
> Because I have no thesis,  
> I am only faultless.'

*Answer:* If this which you propound is not the Madhyamika system, then it is contradictory to establish it through citing passages from the Superior [Nagarjuna] and his spiritual sons. Also, since [according to you] it cannot be posited as Chandrakirti's or any other Buddhist system, it would be outside this religion. [However] if you say that it is Madhyamika and, from within that, the system of Chandrakirti, then it would contradict [your assertion] that Madhyamikas [in general] and Chandrakirti [in particular] do not have their own system.

Likewise, it is not feasible to propound—in hopes of being freed from assertions—that all presentations are solely from others' point of view. For, in saying, 'The existence of forms and so forth should be asserted solely from the viewpoint of other,' though you do not assert the existence of forms and so forth, you certainly must assert a positing from others' viewpoint, in which case you are not freed from assertions. Since at that time you must assert the others from whose viewpoint [these presentations] are posited, as well as the positer, and so forth, to propound that assertions are made solely from the viewpoint of others not only does not help but harms your [position of] not having your own system.
Dzong-ka-ba rejects the interpretation that Prasangikas in particular or Madhyamikas in general have no system. Those who propound such have misunderstood the various passages in Madhyamika texts that seem to indicate this. (Dzong-ka-ba's interpretation of the passage from Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections is given on pp.471-3.)

Nor is it the uncommon Prasangika-Madhyamika view that words are inadequate to convey experience just as it is. For according to Nga-wang-bel-den, Jam-yang-shay-ba's annotator, this is the view of the Hinayana Sautrantikas. In his Explanation of the Conventional and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets he explains in detail that in the system of the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning—that is, those following Dignaga and Dharmakirti—impermanent phenomena such as pots, pillars, bodies, minds, and so forth are:

... specifically characterized phenomena (svalakshana, rang mtshan) because of being phenomena that must be realized by a mind that takes them as its appearing object through the appearance of their own uncommon characteristics [in direct perception]. Due to this, they are not objects of terms since their entities cannot fully appear to a terminologically arisen [conceptual] consciousness. Also, a mind realizing them is not generated through the mere existence of terminology, mental application, and so forth that are other than them.

Thus, to say that the uncommon Madhyamika view is that words cannot generate perception of an object as direct sense perception can is to say that there is no difference in view between Sautrantika and Madhyamika. It is not the latter but the former who explicitly point out that the appearing object of a thought or conceptual consciousness is a meaning-generality (arthasamanya, don spyi) which is necessarily simple, being merely an appearance as the opposite of everything that is not that particular object.

Rather than trying to prove that reasoning and words are
Meditation on Emptiness

inadequate, the Prasangika-Madhyamikas base themselves on the adequacy of these to show that the appearance of objects as if concretely or solidly existent is false. Far from deciding that reasoning is mistaken because it does not agree with appearance, reasoning is used to show that the appearance of objects is false—that their nature is other than what appears, that the sense consciousnesses of sentient beings are mistaken with respect to their appearing objects, that, as Kensur Lekden so often said, there is a conflict between what appears and what is. The point at issue is not whether words can generate an experience like that of direct perception. That they cannot is accepted and held in common with lower systems of tenets. Investigation into emptiness means examining whether phenomena actually have the concrete existence that even in non-conceptual direct sense perception they appear to have. It is from this point of view that Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo says,487 'All sense consciousnesses in the mental continuum of a sentient being [a non-Buddha] are necessarily mistaken.'

The process of reasoning itself, used by a competent yogi, is viewed as the means of gaining access to emptiness—a slightly hidden phenomenon that is not accessible to initial understanding through direct perception. Far from being counter-productive to realizing emptiness, reasonings such as dependent-arising, the lack of being one or many, and so forth reveal emptiness in an incontrovertible cognition of the nature of phenomena, albeit through the medium of an image. Inferential cognition is thus not a mulling over of concepts but a conclusion reached through perceiving a sign in a subject, realizing its concomitance with a predicate, and then realizing that the subject has that predicate. The conceptual or imagistic element of this realization is removed through repeated cultivation, resulting in direct cognition. Thus, conceptual and direct realization are in a harmonious relationship of cause and effect.489 To discard reason would be to forsake the sole access to this which is hidden to the direct perception of an ordinary being.

Hence, meditation on emptiness is not the same as withdrawing from conceptually. Jam-yang-shay-ba makes this point
Someone says: 'Since the mode of subsistence, emptiness, is not anything, the mind of its meditation should not apply itself to anything. [Such non-application] is how to meditate on emptiness—selflessness—and its achievement is the measure of having achieved special insight realizing selflessness.'

*Answer:* Then it would [absurdly] follow that the son of a barren woman and his mind would be meditating on emptiness—selflessness—because both do not apply the mind to anything. The three circles [of self-contradiction]!

[You have accepted the reason, the predicate's following from the reason, and the opposite of the consequence.] The reason is so because [both the son of a barren woman and his mind] do not exist.

Someone [refining the above position] says: 'Within the scope of minds and persons, any conception such as, "It is this or that," is a case of conceiving true existence. Therefore, not conceiving such and not applying the mind to anything [constitute meditation on emptiness].'

*Answer:* It [absurdly] follows that, within the scope of minds, if one remains without conceiving, 'It is this or that,' one is meditating on emptiness because [for you] that is the meaning of meditation on emptiness. If you accept this, then it [absurdly] follows that the five sense consciousnesses of an ordinary fool individually realize emptiness and meditate on it because they remain without conceiving, 'It is this or that.' You have accepted the entailment. The reason is so because [those five] are sense consciousnesses. You cannot accept [that the sense consciousnesses of such a person realize emptiness and meditate on it] because these are of an ordinary being. [The reason] entails such because it is explained that the sense consciousnesses of a sentient being [that is, anyone but a Buddha] are not valid with respect to suchness. For,
Chandraldrti’s *Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle Way’* says, ‘It is not feasible that the dumb be valid,’ and the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra* says, ‘Eye, ear, and nose are not valid’.

Even if [this position] is put in the framework of the mental consciousness, then it [absurdly] follows that every case of thick sleep would be a meditation on emptiness because even the stupid know that at that time the mind cannot be applied to anything. If you accept that such is meditation on emptiness, then it [absurdly] follows that even though one meditates on emptiness, it is not possible to be liberated because even though there has been limitless meditation on such emptiness since beginningless time, there are still a limitless number of animals and so forth who are not liberated. You accept the reason. If you accept [the consequence], then it [absurdly] follows that there does not at all exist a path that liberates from cyclic existence because through meditation on emptiness one cannot be liberated. You accept the reason. The three circles [of self-contradiction]!

Someone says: 'At that time [during thick sleep] one does indeed experience emptiness and the Truth Body, but since it is not with mindfulness, one is not liberated'.

*Answer:* Then, it follows from your assertion that there is something to be mindful about with respect to emptiness. If you accept this, then it follows that it is not correct that emptiness is not an object of any mind because it is an object of mindfulness. You have accepted the reason. The three circles [of self-contradiction]!

Furthermore, [one can through using this reasoning] examine fainting and so forth as well as the existence and non-existence of meditator and means of meditation and so forth and refute [wrong positions]. Such [positions] are opposed and extensively refuted in the *Kalachakra Tantra*. For an extensive [rendition] see Dzong-ka-ba’s *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*.

Also, it follows that the views of your system and of
[the Chinese Abbot] Ho-shang (Hva-shang) are similar because he asserted that not applying the mind to anything is meditation on emptiness and you also assert the same.

To this someone says: It follows that the views of Ho-Shang’s and our systems are not the same because Ho-shang refuted giving and so forth whereas we do not.

*Answer:* Then it follows that with respect to the view you two do not differ because you speak of a difference of deeds and implicitly accept that there is no difference in view.

Someone who follows such [a system] says: To refute the conception of self through analysis is to adjust conceptual elaborations like a dog chasing after a stone [that has been thrown at it. However] from the start to hold the mind without scattering to anything is like a dog's seizing the hand that threw the stone, and thus this alone is profound. When the view is settled through scripture and reasoning, one is sunk in verbal conventions.

*Answer:* It follows that this is not correct because without analyzing and refuting the referent object of the conception of self [that is, inherent existence] it cannot be abandoned. For, this is the thought of the Conqueror [Buddha] and the supreme ornaments of the world. Sutra says:

'How is it that a Bodhisattva conquers over strife?'
'Manjushn, [by] analyzing and abiding in the unapprehendable nature of phenomena.'

The *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra* says:

If the selflessness of phenomena is analyzed
And if this analysis is cultivated,
It causes the effect of attaining nirvana.
Through no other cause does one come to peace.

Aryadeva's *Four Hundred* says:
When selflessness is seen in objects,
The seeds of cyclic existence are destroyed.

Chandrakīrti's *Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'* says:

The wise say that the reversal of conceptions
Is the fruit of analysis.

Dharmakīrti says:

Without disbelieving the object of this
[V[misconception]
It is impossible to abandon [misconceiving it].

Furthermore, [one can through using this reasoning] examine whether the mind meditating [on emptiness] is [necessarily] conceptual or free from conceptually and refute [wrong positions that it is necessarily one or the other as it can be either].

Also, someone says: When one has not yet found the view of selflessness, mere setting [of the mind] without thinking of anything is not meditation on emptiness, but once the view has been found, all such setting without thought is meditation on emptiness.

*Answer:* It [absurdly] follows that once the view has been found, even [thick] sleep would be meditation on emptiness because all settings [of the mind] without thought once the view has been found are meditation on emptiness. You accept the reason. If you accept the consequence, then it [absurdly] follows that such sleep is cultivation of the wisdom realizing emptiness because it is cultivation of the view realizing emptiness. You accept the reason. [The reason] entails such because the view is necessarily of the substantial entity (*dravya, rdzas*) of wisdom. The reason is easy to establish. If you accept the consequence, then it [absurdly] follows that such sleep is cultivation of the discrimination of phenomena which is an investigation of emptiness.
Someone says: Although all setting [of the mind] in non-conceptuality once the view has been found is not meditation on emptiness, prior to each [session of] sustaining non-conceptuality one should analyze with the wisdom of individual investigation and then, after that, all setting in non-conceptuality is meditation on emptiness.

*Answer:* It [absurdly] follows that once the view has been found and analysis is done for each [session], falling into [thick] sleep is meditation on emptiness because it is a setting in non-conceptuality by one who has found the view and performed a stint of analysis. You have accepted that such follows. The reason is established because the subject is what it is. You cannot accept the consequence.

Someone says: When meditating on emptiness, ascertainment of it is induced [by reasoning]. Then within non-degeneration of the mode of apprehension of emptiness, setting [the mind] in non-conceptuality is the mode of sustaining the full form of the view or special insight into emptiness.

*Answer:* Then it [absurdly] follows that such meditation is the mode of cultivating wisdom and special insight realizing emptiness because [according to you] it is the mode of cultivating the view and special insight realizing emptiness. You have accepted the reason. You cannot accept the consequence because that is the mode of cultivating the calm abiding and meditative stabilization realizing emptiness. For, that is stabilizing meditation realizing emptiness. That the reason is so follows because stabilizing meditation realizing emptiness is the cultivation of meditative stabilization and calm abiding realizing emptiness, whereas analytical meditation realizing emptiness is the cultivation of wisdom and special insight realizing emptiness. This is so because individual modes of cultivating calm abiding and special insight realizing emptiness exist and because in general
analytical meditation is cultivation of special insight and stabilizing meditation is cultivation of calm abiding. [See Part One, chapters eight and nine for a discussion of calm abiding and special insight.]

Meditation on emptiness is not a matter of withdrawing from conceptuality but of creating through reasoned analysis a mind that is capable of acting as an antidote or counter-agent to the conception of inherent existence. In dependence on this investigation the view is found, whereupon it is possible to use emptiness as the object in the process of developing calm abiding. Once that is achieved, stabilizing and analytical meditation are alternated until analysis itself induces greater stabilization and special insight is attained. This special insight—with analysis and stabilization in union—is cultivated through continued reliance on reasoning to the point where it becomes direct perception, when emptiness is no longer known through the medium of a meaning-generality but nakedly in non-dual cognition.

Asjang-gya says:

In particular, the many forms of reasoning for ascertaining suchness that were set forth [by the Mahayanists] are only for the sake of clarifying the path of liberation for the fortunate, not for the sake of becoming intent on debate. Buddhapalita says, 'What is the purpose in teaching dependent-arising? The master [Nagarjuna] whose very nature is compassion saw that sentient beings are beset by various sufferings and assumed the task of teaching the reality of things just as it is so that they might be liberated. Therefore, he began teaching dependent-arising.' Also, Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' says, 'The analyses in the Treatise were not done for the sake of attachment to debate; suchness was taught for the sake of liberation.' Also, Dzong-ka-ba says, 'All the reasoned analyses set forth in the Treatise on the Middle Way are only so that sentient beings might attain liberation.'
Thus, the main purpose of the twenty-seven chapters of Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* with its many forms of reasoning is taken to be the refutation not of other systems but of one's own innate conception of inherent existence. Though beings do not innately conceive that products, for instance, are produced from themselves, others, both, or neither, refutation of these four refutes the innate conception of the inherent existence of products because if products did exist in accordance with their concrete mode of appearance, they would have to exist in one of these four ways. Also, since other systems variously hold these views, they are refuted secondarily in the process of developing a meditative consciousness that understands the impossibility of such concrete or inherent existence and becomes accustomed to that emptiness. The primary aim is to become a source of help and happiness through penetrating the empty nature of phenomena that serves as the foundation of transformation into Buddhahood.
Part Six
Translation
Emptiness in the Prasangika System

From the twelfth chapter of Jam-yang-shay-ba's
Explanation of 'Tenets',
Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra
Brilliantly Illuminating
All of Our Own and Others' Tenets
And the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness],
Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning
Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings
Introduction

Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets*, published in 1699, is one of only several books of its kind, two of the others being Jang-gya's *Presentation of Tenets* (*Grub mtha'i rnam bzhag*), which is based on Jam-yang-shay-ba's text, and Dak-tsang's *Understanding All Tenets* (*Grub mtha' kun shes*) which Jam-yang-shay-ba takes as his main object of refutation. There are many other short books which present the basic tenets of the various non-Buddhist and Buddhist systems; however, there is none of the length and breadth of the *Great Exposition of Tenets*. Replete with quotations from Indian sources, it presents the tenets of the philosophical culture of India in three hundred and ten folios (Dalama edition). A translation into English in the manner of the section done here, with all quotes restored to full length, would take 2500 pages.

According to Kensur Lekden, a master of the *Great Exposition of Tenets* would have the many sources for the work around his room and refer to them as quoted. Daily the students in Go-mang (*sGo-mang*, meaning 'many doors' because Buddha's teaching has many doors or approaches and because those who have realized emptiness can walk through walls), the college of Dre-bung (*'Bras-spung*) monastery that uses Jam-yang-shay-ba's
textbooks, would have to present back to the teacher from memory the teacher's previous commentary on the Great Exposition of Tenets. The students would take sides and debate the many points, becoming clever at upholding and demolishing various positions and developing their intelligence and memory. The basic text would be memorized; the master would teach the whole work twice, and at the conclusion the students would have a map of the whole field of Buddhist philosophical literature. They would then be able to differentiate the systems and avoid confusing the works of authors of conflicting systems. They would be ready for the specialized texts on the path structure, Prasangika-Madhyamika, logic and epistemology, phenomenology, and discipline.

Jam-yang-shay-ba also wrote a textbook just on Prasangika-Madhyamika, a commentary to Chandrakirti's Supplement, which is in some ways far more extensive than his chapter on Prasangika in the Great Exposition of Tenets, such as in the discussion of autonomous syllogisms. Still, in other respects, the Great Exposition of Tenets is more extensive than the former, as in presenting the Prasangika theory of interpretation and formation of the Sanskrit of 'dependent-arising', pratityasamutpada. Thus, each is studied for a fuller appreciation of the other. These two form the basis of the knowledge of Madhyamika in the Go-mang College of Dre-bung which, within the sphere of the dominant Ge-luk order, was also influential—along with other colleges—in the Am-do province of Tibet as well as in Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, the Buryat area of Siberia, and the Kalmuk areas of Russia.

Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets has thirteen chapters:

1 Discussion of tenets in general
2 Refutation of the extreme of nihilism: Charvaka
3 Refutation of an extreme of permanence: Samkhya and Kapila
4 Refutation of an extreme of permanence: Brahmana, Vyakarana, Vedanta, and Guhyaka
5 Refutation of an extreme of permanence: Vaishnava and Mfmamsaka
Jam-yang-shay-ba's root text, written in verse mainly with nine syllables per line, consists of sixteen folios; his commentary is three hundred and ten folios (Dalama edition). The basic text is called (see bibliography for Tibetan titles): *Presentation of Tenets, Roar of the Five-Faced [Lion] Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Good Path to Omniscience*. His commentary is called: *Explanation of 'Tenets', Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings*.

The word 'tenets' in the title of the commentary refers to the root text; his commentary on it is like the light of the land of Samantabhadra, which is not lit by a sun that rises and sets but shines continuously through the power of meditative stabilization. This book of tenets fulfils the hopes of all beings seeking the ability to gain the wanted and avoid the unwanted since it explains what the wanted and unwanted are and how to achieve and avoid them. Through delineating the profound meaning of emptiness, it shows the path to liberation from cyclic existence and the eventual attainment of omniscience.

The great Outer Mongolian scholar, Nga-wang-bel-den (Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, born 1779), known more commonly as Bel-den-cho-jay (dPal-ldan-chos-rje), wrote an extensive
commentary of annotations (four hundred and sixteen folios, Sarnath edition) on Jam-yang-shay-ba's autocommentary (three hundred and ten folios, Dalama edition). It is called: Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought. Nga-wang-bel-den's annotations do indeed untie the knots of many difficult points in Jam-yang-shay-ba's text especially by elaborating the meaning of quotations, and thus it has been used extensively in the translation for both interpretation and addition of bracketed material.

Jam-yang-shay-ba is famous for his lengthy works replete with citations of Indian sources. Whereas his followers often point to his frequent citation of sources as a great advantage, the followers of the textbook literature by Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba (1478-1554), used in the Lo-sel-ling College of Dre-bung and the Shar-dzay College of Gan-den, conversely point to their writer's ability to condense important topics into easily readable prose, highly accessible to beginners. In the middle is Jay-dzun Cho-gyi-gyel-tsen (1469-1546), whose textbooks, used by the Se-ra Jay and Gan-den Jang-dzay Colleges, tend to fall between those two in terms of length.

Here in the Great Exposition of the renewed Jam-yang-shay-ba's devotion to the source literature is particularly helpful as it makes his presentation of Prasangika an anthology of the basic literature in both sutra and the commentarial treatises. In order to reduce the bulk of the text, Jam-yang-shay-ba condensed many quotations. However, since, as Kensur Lekden reported, a master of the Great Exposition of Tenets would have the cited texts available and make use of them during instruction, this translator has sought out those texts and filled in the ellipses, with the result that thirty percent of the translation is comprised of these reconstructions. The full, edited Tibetan text, with the reconstructions clearly marked, is given at the end of this book; the page numbers in brackets throughout the translation refer to it.

About the author
According to Lokesh Chandra's account given in his Materials
Jam-yang-shay-ba Nga-wang-dzon-drii was born in the Am-do province of Tibet in 1648. Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became a novice monk. He went to Hla-sa at age twenty-one to pursue his studies at the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastic University; six years later he received full ordination and at age twenty-nine entered the Tantric College of Lower Hla-sa. He spent two years in meditative retreat in a cave near Dre-bung from age thirty-three. (Perhaps it was at this time that Manjushri, also called Manjughosha, appeared to him and smiled, due to which, according to Kensur Lekden, he came to be called 'One On Whom Manjughosha Smiled', Jam-yang-shay-ba.)

At age fifty-three he became abbot of Go-mang and at sixty-two returned to Am-do province where he founded a monastery at Dra-shi-kyil (bKra-shis-'khyil), this being 1710. Seven years later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventy-three or four in 1721/2.

Partly because of the close connection between Go-mang College and the Mongolian peoples stretching from the Caspian Sea through Siberia, who were predominantly Ge-luk-ba by this time, Jam-yang-shay-ba's influence on the Ge-luk-ba order has been considerable. Like the other textbook authors, he was seeking to explicate the thought of the founder of the Ge-luk-ba order, Dzong-ka-ba (1357-1419), and perhaps it was because he was the last of the great textbook authors and thus had the others' works before him and could speak from a fully developed tradition of such study that he could put such great emphasis on the Indian sources of Dzong-ka-ba's thought.

About the editions of the text used

Five editions of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets were gathered over several years. Four of them turned out to have the same basis:
1 the Dalama edition published in Mussoorie in 1962
2 photographs (of the part translated here) of the text in the
possession of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The photograph
was kindly done by Sherpa Tulku and Khamlung Tulku.
Unfortunately, the final pages were not included, and thus
publishing data is not available. The margin of every page
reads 'grub 'greV, as do the other three in this class.
3 a hand-written copy (of the part translated here) of the edition
held in the library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Kar
ataka State. This was graciously provided through the efforts
of Kensur Lekden, by way of the then abbot of Go-mang
Den-ba-den-dzin. Again, the pages with publication data
were not copied.
4 a hand-written copy (of the twelfth and thirteenth chapters) of
an edition, surreptitiously procured—from a library in a
country that shall remain unnamed—by Mr. Gyatso Tsering,
Director of the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in
Dharmasala. The colophon states that it was commissioned by
'gam bear mkhan po chos 'byor rgya mtsho'.

The first, third, and fourth contain variations due to scribes’ and
print-setters' inaccuracies, but they share basic inaccuracies with
the second; thus we can posit that they stem from a common edi-
tion. These basic inaccuracies do not appear in the other edition
obtained:

5 a photographic reprint of the Dra-shi-kyil edition published in
1972 in New Delhi by Ngawang Gelek Demo in Volume 14 of
the Collected Works of Jam-dbyangs-bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje.

The last is by far the best edition due to not having some major
errors, which all the other four have, and due to using the virama
extensively in the section on forming the Sanskrit term pratitya-
samutpada under renderings of Sanskrit groups of letters in
Tibetan. (A copy of this edition has recently been made by Go-
mang College; it contains no publication information above and
beyond what is in the Dra-shi-kyil edition.)

According to Kensur Lekden, Jam-yang-shay-ba's works
have suffered from poor printing from the start due to the fact that the author wrote quickly in his old age, with little attention to the details of publication. The annotator, Nga-wang-bel-den, frequently points out printing errors, which appear in the edition represented by one through four in the list above. It can be deduced from his commentary (dbu 67b.8 note ca, for instance) that he did not have the Dra-shi-kyil edition at his disposal since he challenges readings that are clearly not in the Dra-shi-kyil edition but are in the other.

Both editions are replete with error; nevertheless, due to Jamyang-shay-ba's proclivity for quotation, it was possible to compare a great portion of the text with the Peking edition as found in the *Tibetan Tripitaka* published under the auspices of the Tibetan Tripitaka Foundation (Tokyo-Kyoto, 1956). Thus, in counsel with the Go-mang scholars mentioned below, it was possible to edit the text; a list of a hundred and ninety-one emendations of the Go-mang hand-copy is given after the reconstructed text.

*Jam-yang-shay-ba's sources*

The portion of the *Great Exposition of Tenets* translated here has two hundred and nine quotations, counting a few quotes within quotes. The sources in order of frequency of quotation are:

1. Chandrakirti's *Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Madhyamakavatara)* and his own commentary, thirty-eight quotations
2. Chandrakirti's *Clear Words, a Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Madhyamakavrtti-prasannapada)*, twenty-eight quotations
3. Chandragomin's *[Sanskrit] Grammar (Chandravyakarana)*, eleven quotations
4. Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakasstra)*, eight quotations
5. Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra (Sutrasamuchchaya)*, seven quotations
5. Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland of Advice for the King (Ratnavali)*, seven quotations
Meditation on Emptiness

5 Buddhapañita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna 'śj 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Buddhapalitamulamadhyamakavṛtti), seven quotations
6 Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (Prajnaparamita, in twenty-five thousand or eighteen thousand stanzas), five quotations
6 Aryadeva's Four Hundred (Chatuhshataka), five quotations
6 Chandrakīrti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred' (Chatuhshatakakīrtika), five quotations
6 Jnanagarbha's Discrimination of the Two Truths (Satyadvayavibhāhga), five quotations
7 Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacaryavatara), four quotations
7 Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bshad snying po), four quotations
7 Dzong-ka-ba's Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (rTsa shes tik chen), four quotations
7 Kalapa's Aphorisms (Kalapasiitra), four quotations
8 Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Samdhinirmochana), three quotations
8 Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Dashabhīmika), three quotations
8 Rice Seedling Sutra (Shalistamba), three quotations
8 Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktishastikā), three quotations
8 Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom' (Prajnapradīpa), three quotations
9 Ashvaghosha's Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment (Paramarthabodhicittabhavanakramavaranamagraha), two quotations
9 Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra (Akshayamatinirdesha), two quotations
9 King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra (Samadhiraja), two quotations
9 Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness (Shunyatasaptati) and his own commentary, two quotations
9 Mahamati's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly Letter' (Suhrleklekhatīkka), two quotations
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9 Kamalashfla's *Illumination of the Middle Way* (Madhyamakaloka), two quotations
9 Bhavaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning* (Tarkajvala), two quotations
9 Fifth Dalai Lama's *Sacred Word of Manjushri*, two quotations
9 AtTsha's *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment* (Bodhipathapradipa), two quotations
9 Dzong-ka-ba's *Praise of Dependent-Arising*, two quotations
9 Kay-drup's *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate*, two quotations
10 one quotation each:
   Nagarjuna's *Refutation of Objections* (Vigrahavyavartani)
   Nagarjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* (Bodhicittavivarana)
   Nagarjuna's *Friendly Letter* (Suhrilekha)
   Chandrakirti's *Commentary on* (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning' (Yuktisastikavrtti)
   Avalokitavrata's *Commentary on* (Bhavaviveka's) 'Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) "Wisdom '" (Prajnapradipavrtti)
   Dharmakirti's *Commentary on* (Dignaga's) 'Compendium of Valid Cognition' (Pramanavarttika)
   Dzong-ka-ba's *Explanation of* (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement' Extensive Sport Sutra (Lalitavistara)
   Heart of Wisdom Sutra (Prajnavrdaya)
   White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine Sutra (Saddharmapundarika)
   Chapter of the True One Sutra (Satyakaparivarta)
   Questions of King Dharanishvara Sutra (Dharanishvara-rajapariprccha)
   Irreversible Wheel Sutra (Avaivartachakra)
   Lion's Roar of Shrimaladevi Sutra (Shrimaladevisimhanada)
   Sutra on the Heavily Adorned (Ghanavyuha)
   Questions of the King of Nagas, Sagara, Sutra (Sagaranagarajapariprcchha)
   Kashyapa Chapter Sutra (Kasyapaparivarta)
   Meeting of Father and Son Sutra (Pitdputrasamagamana)
Meditation on Emptiness

Compendium of Doctrine Sutra (Dharmasamgiti)
Six unidentified sutra quotations.

The authors in order of frequency of quotation are:

1. Chandrakirti, seventy-three quotations
2. Buddha (sutra), forty quotations
3. Nagarjuna, thirty quotations
4. Dzong-ka-ba, eleven quotations
4. Chandragomin, eleven quotations
5. Buddhpalita, seven quotations
6. Aryadeva, five quotations
6. Bhavaviveka, five quotations
6. Jnanagarbha, five quotations
7. Kalapa, four quotations
8. Ashvaghosha, Mahamati, Kamalashila, Atisha, Kay-drup, and the Fifth Dalai Lama, two quotations each
9. Avalokitavrata and Dharmakirti, one quotation each.

The above tally is just for the parts of Jam-yang-shay-ba's chapter on Prasangika translated here on the definition, synonyms, divisions, literature, and emptiness of the Prasangika system. It is obvious from the two lists that at least for Jam-yang-shay-ba Chandrakirti is by far the principal source for the Prasangika position on emptiness and its relation to the other schools. (The last part of Jam-yang-shay-ba's presentation of the Prasangika system deals with the attributes of a Buddha and relies heavily on Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle [Uttaratantra]. Thus, the tally should be taken as applying not to Jam-yang-shay-ba's entire presentation of the Prasangika system but mainly to his presentation of emptiness.)

When Madhyamika is studied in the Ge-luk-ba monastic colleges, it is Chandrakirti's Supplement that is memorized and that serves as the basis for the entire study of Madhyamika. Dzong-ka-ba's commentary and the individual monastic textbooks are used as aids for illuminating the meaning of Chandrakirti's text.

These books by Chandrakirti which are so often quoted are all explanations, directly or indirectly, of Nagarjuna's philosophy. Even the sutras quoted by Jam-yang-shay-ba are mostly those
which Nagarjuna quoted in his *Compendium of Sutra* or made reference to in his *Treatise* or Chandrakirti quoted in his books. It is, of course, not surprising, since Nagarjuna was the founder of Madhyamika, to find that almost all of the philosophical quotes for Madhyamika derive from him either directly or through his chief commentator, Chandrakirti. What is noteworthy is that Chandrakirti's works of clarification are heavily relied upon to determine Nagarjuna's meaning.

As Jam-yang-shay-ba says at the end of his section on Prasangika literature, the main source for the content of his presentation is Dzong-ka-ba. It seems that almost all of Jam-yang-shay-ba's quotes from Indian philosophical commentaries—Nagarjuna through Atfsha—are cited by Dzong-ka-ba; Jam-yang-shay-ba is not giving a new presentation but arranging Dzong-ka-ba's presentation in a more convenient form for comparative study.

That most of the forty sutra quotations are also to be found in Dzong-ka-ba is not coincidence; Jam-yang-shay-ba was seeking to clarify Dzong-ka-ba's teaching especially in contradistinction to Dak-tsang (born 1405), a scholar of the Sa-gya (Sa-skya) order who indicted Dzong-ka-ba for self-contradiction. Jam-yang-shay-ba defended the founder of his order and indicted Dak-tsang for self-contradiction in return. Jam-yang-shay-ba's genius and importance lies not in innovation in Madhyamika philosophy but in his defense of Dzong-ka-ba's interpretation and in his thorough presentation of the non-Buddhist and Buddhist philosophical systems. Jam-yang-shay-ba's work came almost three hundred years after both Dzong-ka-ba and Dak-tsang and at a time when Ge-luk-ba influence was on the rise under the leadership of the Fifth Dalai Lama; thus, he by no means saved Dzong-ka-ba's teaching. It is more that his particular style of vast and thorough presentation, coupled with what at times is partisan fire, was suitable for developing the kind of sharp intellect that the monastic colleges of Tibet value.

Nagarjuna was clarifying the thought of Buddha; Chandrakirti was clarifying the thought of Nagarjuna; Dzong-ka-ba was clarifying the thought of Chandrakirti; and Jam-yang-shay-ba was clarifying the thought of Dzong-ka-ba. A measure of how important each clarification was is how often the clarifier is
subsequently quoted as opposed to how often what is clarified is cited; still, though Chandrakīrti is quoted most frequently and though his works finally drew more study and attention in Tibet than Nagarjuna's, Chandrakīrti is definitely secondary to Nagarjuna. Nagarjuna was the master and Chandrakīrti the commentator; Chandrakīrti did not write a book like the Treatise on the Middle Way which set a whole new trend in Buddhist philosophy and practice. A study of Chandrakīrti is viewed as a study of Nagarjuna.

Though it could also be said that a study of Nagarjuna is a study of Buddha, the sutras are far too vast and varied to lend the sense that a study of Nagarjuna is a study of Buddha in general. Nagarjuna's Treatise is an epitome of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, and without the Treatise, as Chandrakīrti says (commenting on VI.3 of his Supplement), it would be extremely difficult to understand what these sutras mean. The difference between Nagarjuna's and Chandrakīrti's clarifications is that Nagarjuna's is far more basic. It sets an order where order seemed not to exist. Chandrakīrti shed additional light on the order revealed by Nagarjuna.

According to all the various Ge-luk-ba interpretations, Chandrakīrti showed that phenomena do not exist by way of their own character even conventionally whereas Bhavaviveka at least implies that phenomena conventionally exist by way of their own character. This means that for Chandrakīrti even conventionally phenomena are not the composite of their parts or their bases of imputation. In relation to the other commentaries this was his 'innovation'.

Dzong-ka-ba's 'innovation' was to present the conventional valid existence of all phenomena, detailing the acceptability of the certification of the conventional existence of all phenomena by valid cognizers. Dzong-ka-ba showed that Madhyamikas do have a system of their own and that it is supported by valid cognition despite the utter unfindability of phenomena among their bases of imputation. Dzong-ka-ba thus distinguished his teaching from most of the other Tibetan commentators, preserving in a very subtle way the validity of the classic Buddhist phenomenology through delimiting the scope of the Madhyamika reasoning.
According to Dzong-ka-ba, Nagarjuna's analysis refutes the inherent existence of conventionally existent phenomena; it does not refute their conventional existence which is validly established. Emptiness and dependent-arising are compatible within valid establishment.

Jam-yang-shay-ba had no such central 'innovation' for Prasangika philosophy. His commentary on Chandrakirti's *Supplement* provides a work in a different genre: scholastic debates which provide final conclusions about Prasangika. Despite Jam-yang-shay-ba's many differences with the other Ge-luk-ba monastic textbook lineages, no difference was nearly as important as Dzong-ka-ba's astoundingly different and cogent definition of emptiness, delimiting the scope of what is negated in the theory of selflessness to inherent existence and preserving valid, conventional, effective existence.

Thus, Jam-yang-shay-ba's 'innovation' was to give a presentation of Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems of tenets in far greater detail than any previous Tibetan scholar had given. He thereby furthered in Tibet and Mongolia the study of comparative philosophy. His principal sources are Bhavaviveka's presentation of the Indian systems in his *Heart of the Middle Way (Madhyamakahrdaya)* and commentary, the *Blaze of Reasoning*, Shantaraksita's *Compendium on Reality (Tattvasamgraha)*—though of course Bhavaviveka and Shantaraksita, being Svatantrikas, are not his source for the Prasangika system—and Chandrakirti's commentaries.

In the *Great Exposition of Tenets*, the Buddhist systems are presented in ascending order of importance, but the presentations are remarkably unbiased. The cause for this is probably the Tibetan insistence on debate as a teaching method. Since the aim of each debate is to defend one's position, whatever position one is assigned is defended at all costs in the sense that unfair presumptions by any opponent are unhesitatingly refuted. Each monastic college has its favored and peculiar assertions which are indeed often defended with partisan vigor; however, this very partisan vigor is also invested in their opponents' positions within the debating courtyards of each college when their own members take the opposite viewpoint.
The philosophical disagreements are many, and it is therefore quite often impossible to speak of a Tibetan position on a subject. Often it is impossible to speak of a particular sect position because of differences within the sect. Sometimes, also, it is impossible to speak of a monastery position because of differences between the colleges which are the basic divisions of the monastery. There are even different lineages of assertions within monastic colleges; according to Geshe Gediin Lodro, Go-mang, for instance, had four. However, the principal units are the monastic colleges, with far more happening between the various monastic colleges of the Ge-luk-ba order than between Ge-luk-ba and non-Ge-luk-ba.

Not to discriminate differences in tenet as a pretension of non-bias is considered to be a sign of great ignorance and of dislike of religion, and indeed the devotion to debate cultivates both an excellent memory and a quick sense of discrimination, necessary for penetrating reality. Bias and partisanship are rejected, but discrimination is hallowed, though, of course, this is not easily accomplished. Jam-yang-shay-ba openly attacks the Sa-gya-ba scholar Dak-tsang, often in an inflammatory way, in his *Great Exposition of Tenets* which was written for the dual purpose of refuting Dak-tsang and of establishing the 'correct' view of emptiness. Jam-yang-shay-ba cites scripture and reasoning in his unceasing indictment of Dak-tsang; he not only devotes forty folios solely to refuting Dak-tsang but also spices many sections with brief refutations and even name-calling. Dak-tsang is a 'spouter of disconnected discourse through possession by the madness causing one to mouth ignorance' (*GT*, ca 19a.5), 'one who wishes to do a dance having cut off the head of a crazy, dancing peacock and hung it on his behind' (see p.648), and so on endlessly.

The nasty comments provide occasional comic relief in this heavy book, but there is no denying that the insults are inflammatory and counter-productive. It often seems as if Jam-yang-shay-ba's head was about to be rent asunder in amazement at quite common positions. In the debating courtyards scholars sometimes resort to ridiculous laughter and absurd comparisons
in order to heap upon the opponent the full devastating force of embarrassment and thereby cause him to lose footing even if he has not lost it logically. Still, each scholar must in turn take Dak-tsang's side in debate and win using his tenets. The aim in the debating courtyard is not to heap more abuse on Dak-tsang; rather, it is an enactment of a hypothetical encounter between Dak-tsang (born 1405) and Jam-yang-shay-ba (1648-1721/2) for the sake of exploring the principles of interpretive systems.

Most scholars in the Go-mang College of Dre-bung College have won debates as a hypothetical Dak-tsang against a hypothetical Jam-yang-shay-ba. Indeed, even when teaching, they do not automatically leap into the stream of abuse but analyze to determine whether Dak-tsang's supposed contradictions are explicitly so or ones he would be 'forced' to accept from another viewpoint. The designations of insanity and so forth quickly lose their shock value due to over-use and the shared knowledge that it is a game, but the technique also sometimes engages fierce aspects of the personality and lays at one's intellectual disposal energy that would otherwise be cut off. There is also, no doubt, a fascination with the tremendous importance that the utterly fabricated situation of re-enacting debates from the past assumes as a participant watches his attempts at waylaying the opponent and then revels in ridicule when the opponent is trapped or undergoes the opposite when he himself is trapped. Debate, above all, is used for group stimulated learning, the members increasing each other's knowledge through bringing special knowledge gained from their own research to the courtyard and then creatively exploring issues. The process of forcing each participant to identify with what are supposedly ridiculous positions causes one to become self-scrutinizing through seeing that other positions have their own logic, thereby challenging one's uncritical acquiescence to abusive caricature. The group dynamic (at least at the School of Dialectics in Dharamsala) is such that the participants keep a check on each other to prevent the type of over-kill that occasionally leaps into Jam-yang-shay-ba's style.

Kensur Lekden reported that Jam-yang-shay-ba's own devotion to citing sources came from embarrassment in debate when
attempting to defend a Buddha’s more fantastic qualities, such as the cognition of all phenomena by his hair. The requirement of accommodation to scripture balances the strong emphasis on reasoning. In even the most reasonable of books on Buddhist tenets, the fantastic is by no means obscured.

Collaborators for the translation
As mentioned at the beginning of this work, I studied almost all of Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Tenets and Nga-wang-bel-den’s Annotations under the guidance of Kensur Lekden (1900-71), a Go-mang scholar and former abbot of the Tantric College of Lower Hla-sa while still in Tibet. Without his help—his openness, willingness, and skill in introducing and expanding on topics—the task would have been impossible. Also, the clarification of fine points gained from three months work with Professor Geshe Gediin Lodro (1924-79) at the University of Hamburg, a Go-mang scholar who was a student of Kensur Lekden, was essential. They were both excellent scholars with hearts of compassion ever eager to help.
Emptiness in the Prasangika System
by Jam-yang-shay-ba

Translated in collaboration
with Kensur Lekden
and Geshe Gediin Lodro

The text has been divided
into seven chapters
to facilitate understanding
Shāntarakṣhita
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1 Background

\textit{Namas Svarasvatyai cha gurumanjughoshaya cha.} Homage to both Svarasvatf and Guru Manjughosha.

With respect to this Prasangika system the foremost lama, the great Dzong-ka-ba, says [at the end of his \textit{Essence of the Good Explanations}]\textsuperscript{494}:

One respects from the heart all the good explanations
Of those like adornments among the wise of the world.
Still, the eye of intelligence, a garden of jasmine, is opened fully
By the white rays of good explanations come from the moon [Chandrakirti],
Overcoming all extreme conceptions through the reasoning that cyclic existence
And nirvana are inevitable dependent-arisings.
Having seen the path revealed by Buddhapalita,
Who would not take Nagarjuna's good system as chief?

Thus, the Prasangika-Madhyamika system is the very acme of the best among all systems and schools of tenets. It is the great path of perfection travelled, being travelled, and to be'travelled by all the Conquerors of the three times [past, present, and
future], the incomparable unparalleled mother that gives birth to the four types of Superiors, [2] and the sole, excellent path of passage. Without considering body, enjoyments, and so forth, all the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and Superiors made effort toward it, sought it, concentrated on it, and meditated on it. It is the unsurpassed ambrosia delighting others, the profound middle path clearing away all coarse and subtle extremes and extreme conceptions, the final thought of Nagarjuna which Buddha-palita established as the Prasangika system. For its chariot a great way was made by the honorable Chandrakirti.

The explanation of the Prasangika system has six parts:

1 the definition [of a Prasangika] along with an etymological explanation
2 synonyms
3 divisions
4 the texts on which they rely
5 scriptural passages of definitive meaning and those requiring interpretation
6 tenets.

DEFINITION AND ETYMOLOGY OF 'PRASANGIKA'

(See pp.441-530.) The root text says:

Because they do not accept autonomous inferences
But mainly state consequences
That contradict the assertions of their opponents,
They are called Prasahgikas.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words [3] says, 496 'It is not admissible for one who is a Madhyamika to use an autonomous inference because another position [among the four extremes] is not asserted.'

'Existing under its own power' (rang dbang du grub pa), 495 'existing inherently' (svabhavasiddha, rang bzhin gyis grub pa), and 'autonomous' (svatantra, rang rgyud) are synonyms. Thus, the application of a reason [that is, a syllogism] the three aspects
of which exist inherently is an autonomous inference (svatantra-anumana, rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag).

If such autonomous inferences are asserted, then [other phenomena such as] production would perforce [be asserted to exist inherently]. Thus, when analyzing, there would necessarily be a position which would be one of the four extremes [and which could withstand ultimate analysis]. In that case, a thesis which is a position of one of the four extremes would have to be asserted. However, the assertion of any of the four extremes is not suitable [for Madhyamikas] because they must uphold the meaning of the middle way which avoids those extremes. Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:

Even over a long period of time
Censure cannot be expressed
For one who has no position
Of [inherent] existence, non-existence,
Or existence and non-existence.

Nagarjuna’s Refutation of Objections says:

If I had any [inherently existent] thesis, [4]
Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis that there is no inherent existence].
Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis,
I am only faultless.

Therefore, [a Prasangika] does not assert autonomous [inferences or any other autonomous phenomena even] conventionally.

Even so, Prasangikas have a great many means of generating in opponents the view realizing that phenomena do not truly exist. For the definition of a Prasangika-Madhyamika is:

a Madhyamika who mainly states refutations of an opponent’s assertion of any of the four extremes through the expression of a correct contradictory consequence—a consequence which either implies or does not imply the opposite meaning, and so forth, as will be explained below.
This is also an etymological explanation of ‘Prasangika-Madhyamika’ (Middle Way Consequentialist).

In this Prasangika system, the statements of consequences and other-approved syllogisms have respectively greater and lesser usage, but they are not entirely mutually exclusive. For, the usage of an other-approved syllogism is mostly similar to that of a consequence. An example of an other-approved syllogism is:

There is no sense in the production again of a thing which already exists in its own entity, [5] as in the case of a manifest pot.

SYNONYMS OF 'PRASANGIKA'

(See pp.432-9.) The root text says:

They are known as Prasahgikas, Only-Appearance Madhyamikas, And Non-Abiding Madhyamikas.

They mainly use contradictory consequences to generate in others the view [that no phenomenon inherently exists]; therefore they are called Prasahgikas (Consequentialists).

Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says, ‘The establishment of conventional phenomena is asserted by way of mere conditionality (idam pratayatamatra, rkyen nyid ’dipa tsam), not by way of asserting [any of] the four positions...’ Also, ‘When mere conditionally is asserted, both cause and effect are mutually dependent; hence, their establishment does not inherently exist...’ Therefore, Prasahgikas are also called Only-Appearance Madhyamikas. They are Madhyamikas who assert the existence of just these appearances from the viewpoint of conditionality when there is no analysis and no investigation [to find an object designated].

Shura’s [Ashvagosha’s] Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment (Paramarthabodhicittabhavana) says:

[Buddha], proclaimed selflessness with the great roar of a lion.
Through synonyms such as emptiness, [suchness, final reality,] and so forth,
Limitless examples such as likeness with a magician's illusions, [dreams, mirages] and so forth [6]
And the skillful means of a variety of vehicles,
[Buddha] made known the meaning of the middle way
not abiding [in any gross or subtle extremes].

Thus, because [Prasangikas] do not abide in even any of the extremes of permanence or annihilation, they are called Non-Abiding Madhyamikas and Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas.

DIVISIONS OF PRASANGIKA

(See pp.431-2.) The root text says:

Their divisions are Models,
Partisans, and Non-Partisans.

With respect to the divisions of Prasangika, earlier Tibetans rightly called the 'father' Nagarjuna and his 'son' Aryadeva the Madhyamikas of the model texts. This is because all—the two founders of the chariot-ways of Prasangika and Svatantrika [Buddhapalita or Chandrakirti, and Bhavaviveka] etc.—without difference treated Nagarjuna and Aryadeva as totally reliable sources.505

The partisan Prasangikas are Buddhapalita, the honorable Chandrakirti, Shantideva [and so forth]. Those who are non-partisan but maintain the Prasangika view are Shakyamitra, Nagabodhi, Rik-bay-ku-juk (Rigs-pa'i-khu-byug)506 and so on, Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations says,507 'Also, there are many eminent scholars, the masters Shura [Ashvagho-sha], Nagabodhi, and so forth; however, [7] there are no translations of their treatises on Madhyamika [here in Tibet].’ The latter part of the second chapter of The Five Stages (Panchakrama) by Shakyamitra508 clearly manifests [the Prasangika view].

Also, upon consideration, Nagabodhi's Classification of the Ends
of Actions (Karmantavibhahga) and so forth [clearly manifest the view of a non-partisan Prasangika],

Though Ashvaghosha’s view is very clearly that [of a non-partisan Prasangika], Dak-tsang asserts that Ashvaghosha is a model [Madhyamika] and then that he explicitly refutes Svatantrika. However, Buddhapalita, Nagabodhi, and so forth are not seen to have quoted Ashvaghosha as a source [and they would have if he were a model]. Though the two, Bhavaviveka [and his chief student Jnanagarbha], as well as those coming after them quoted Ashvaghosha, this does not of itself make Ashvaghosha a model. Also, [Dak-tsang claims that] Shura’s statement [in his Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment], ‘Also, illusions are not just illusions’, refutes Svatantrika. If [Dak-tsang were right], then it is clear that Ashvaghosha would be a partisan Prasangika-Madhyamika [and not, as Dak-tsang claims, a model].

**Objection:** Dzong-ka-ba’s Essence of the Good Explanations says, ‘Also, there are many eminent scholars, the masters Shura [Ashvaghosha], Nagabodhi, and so forth; [8] however, there are no translations of their treatises on Madhyamika [here in Tibet].’ Thus, if this Prasangika text [Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment] is Ashvaghosha’s, then does it not contradict Dzong-ka-ba?

**Answer:** Ashvaghosha’s Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment is a meditation manual; therefore, even though it does teach Madhyamika, Dzong-ka-ba’s remark was made [with reference to treatises on the Madhyamika view and not its meditation], as in the case of the separate treatment of Nagarjuna’s Collections of Praises and his Collections of Reasonings.

**LITERATURE ON WHICH THE PRASAHGIKAS RELY**

The root text says:

*Their books are the profound sutras,*

*The Collections of Reasonings, the Four Hundred,*
Engaging in the Deeds, the Compendium of Sutra,
The Compendium of Learnings, the Lamp for the Path,
and so forth.

The sutras quoted by the Superior [Nagarjuna] and his spiritual son [Aryadeva] as sources for the definitive meaning [emptiness] are taken as sutras teaching the profound meaning. These are the following sutras from the turning of the wheel of the doctrine of signlessness:

1. the seventeen mother and son sutras of the Perfection of Wisdom class
2. Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra (Akshayamatinirdesha)
3. King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra (Samadhiraja)
4. Compendium of Doctrine Sutra (Dharmasamgiti)
5. Questions of the King of Nagas, Anavatapta, Sutra (Anavataptnagarajapariprchcha)
6. Questions of the King of Nagas, Sagara, Sutra (Sagaranagarajapariprchcha)
7. Jewel Mine Sutra (Ratnakara)
8. Sport of Manjushri Sutra (Manjushrivikridita)
9. The first chapter of the Heap of Jewels Sutra (Ratnakuta), called Chapter Showing the Three Vows Sutra (Trisambaranirdesharpurivarta)
10. And further from the Heap of Jewels Sutra:
    - Kashyapa Chapter Sutra (Kasyapaparivarta)
    - Bodhisattva Section Sutra (Bodhisattvapitaka) [9]
    - Sutra Showing the Inconceivable Secrets of the Tathagatas (Tathagatachintyaguhyanirdesha)

etc.

The following are sutras teaching both the profound [emptiness] and the extensive [deeds of compassion]:

1. Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Dashabhiimika)
2. Sutra Showing the Realm of the Inconceivable Qualities and Wisdom of the Tathagatas (Tathagatagunajnanachintyavishay avatar anirdesha)
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3 Questions of Sagaramati Sutra (Sagaramatipariprcheha)
4 The four sutras on the four meditative stabilizations
5 Buddhavatamsaka Sutra (Buddhavatamsakanamamahavaiypulya)
6 Questions of King Dharanishvara Sutra (DharanTshvararaja-pariprchehha)
7 Sutra on the Heavily Adorned (Ghanavyuha)
   Etc.

   Though the sutras of the last wheel require interpretation, [the Prasahgikas] rely on the six perfections and so forth in them. They are:

1 Great Drum Sutra (MahabherTharakaparivarta)
2 Tathagata Essence Sutra (Tathagatagarbha)
3 Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Samdhinirmochana).

   If one wonders on what commentarial treatises [the Prasahgikas] rely, the texts considered to be completely valid are those [Chandrakfrti mentions] in his Clear Words: Having seen the Compendium of Sutra, the Precious Garland of Advice [for the King], the Praises, and…’ Thus, again and again [these works of Nagarjuna] are quoted in the Clear Words:

1 Compendium of Sutra (Sutrasamuchchaya)
2 Precious Garland of Advice for the King (Rajaparikatharatanavali) [10]
3 And among Nagarjuna’s Praises of Reality directed toward the ultimate [emptiness]:

   Praise of the Element of Qualities (Dharmadhatustotra)
   Praise of the Supramundane (Lokatitastava).

Moreover, he speaks of:

   Praise of the Three Bodies (Kayatrayastotra)
   Peerless Praise (Nirupamastava)
   Praise of What Surpasses Praise (Stutyatitastava)
   Praise of the Inconceivable (Achintyastava)
   Praise of the Mind Vajra (Chittavajrastava)
   Etc.
Also, the Clear Words says,... with effort over a very long time the stanzas propounded in the Treatise, the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning, the Finely Woven, the Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness, and the Refutation of Objections,...’ Thus, there are Nagarjuna's Five Collections of Reasonings” [that establish emptiness]:

1 Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way Called 'Wisdom' (Prajnanamamulamadhyamakakarika)
2 Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktishashtikakarika)
3 Treatise Called 'The Finely Woven' (Vaidalyasutranama)
4 Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness (Shunyatasaptatikarika) [11]
5 Refutation of Objections (Vigrahayavartanikarika).

Furthermore, the Clear Words says, And having seen the [Four] Hundred and so forth [by Aryadeva, etc.] and likewise many profound sutras...’ Thus, there are Aryadeva's texts: the Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas (Chatuhshatakashastrakarika) as well as those included in 'and so forth', the Length of a Forearm (Hastavalaprakaranakarika) and the Establishment of the Reasoning and Logic Refuting Error (Skhalitapramathanayuk-tihetusiddhi). Also, the several texts about the accumulations for enlightenment, etc., and the profound sutras are those quoted as sources in Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra and by this master [Chandrakirti] mentioned earlier.

Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Buddhapalitamulamadhyamakavrtti) and above [that is, the texts of the early Prasangikas such as Nagarjuna and Aryadeva] are taken as completely reliable [by Chandrakirti and later Prasangikas].

Also, the Clear Words says...

…as well as the commentary done by Buddhapañita, I have gathered together the good explanations of Bhavaviveka [and those of these masters] which were transmitted from one to another [and the texts of Shura, Jnanagarbha, etc.] as well as what I received from [Nagarjuna's own] analysis [of the meaning of his words] and have
Meditation on Emptiness expounded this in order to please those of great intelligence. [12]

Thus, one must rely on the correct explanations by Bhavaviveka and so forth which were transmitted from one to another. One should not scar the teaching of the Conqueror with fabrications not in the sutras and commentaries. [For instance, Dak-tsang without foundation speaks] of the nine spheres of objects in the mental continuum of a Buddha Superior which are to be abandoned through meditation. The precious Elder [Atfsha] and the precious Teacher [Drom-don ('Brom-ston)] said, 'It is not suitable for a follower of the Elder to be brash [and not cite scripture and reason]; be wary of the effects of actions.' Considering that statement as well as how the Teacher [Buddha] earnestly transmitted the teaching to Ananda, please press your palms together [in respect] toward all, not allowing yourself and others to be ruined. The Clear Words also says:

Nagarjuna, with the honorable Rahulabhadra [Saraha], clearly taught the system of this [Treatise on the Middle Way] for a long time, [their] word being followed by [Arya]deva. His students, with decisive minds [gained] through analyzing the Treatise, defeated all the Forders and set forth the supreme Subduer's teaching for a long time. [13]

Thus, [Chandrakrfti] speaks of the master, the Superior [Nagarjuna's], long period of teaching, also his students' composition of many commentaries on the master's texts, and their eradication of the Forders. Therefore, it is clear that this master [Chandrakrfti] also relied on the oral transmission of their teachings, but [Chandrakrfti goes on to] explain that most of those texts had already disappeared. The master Chandrakrfti stated the names of Vasubandhu, Dignaga, and so forth [in commentary on his Supplement] and refuted them, but there is no one who stated Chandrakrfti's name and refuted him. The four great commentaries and so
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forth'of this master [Chandrakirti] who was renowned as a tenth ground Bodhisattva [are:

1 Clear Words, Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Mulamadhyamakavrttiprasannapada)
2 Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning' (Yuktishashtikavrtti)
3 Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness' (Shunyatasaptavrtti)
4 Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas' (Bodhisattvayogacharyachatush-shatakatika)
   And so forth], [14]

Also, in general, stabilizing and analytical meditation, the three vows of Bodhisattvas,\textsuperscript{526} the ways of meditating on the profound [emptiness], etc., as well as hearing and explaining, etc. —all beginning from reliance on a spiritual guide—are extensively set forth in the Bodhisattva Shantideva's texts:

1 Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharyavatara)
2 Compendium of Learnings (Shikshasamuchchhayakarika).

Therefore, these two [Chandrakirti and Shantideva] are completely reliable.

One can take as reliable Atfsha’s \textit{Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment} (Bodhipathapradipa) and those works of Atfsha included within the term ‘and so forth’ in the basic text, \textit{Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way} (Madhyamakopadesha) and \textit{Introduction to the Two Truths} (Satyadvayavatara), as well as Prajnamoksha’s Commentary on (Atfsha’s) ‘Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way’ (Madhyamakopadeshavrtti).

One should take the good parts of Atfsha’s\textsuperscript{527} \textit{Explanation of (Shantideva’s) ‘Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds’} (Bodhisattvacharyavatrarabhhashya) and Commentary on the Difficult Points of ‘Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment’ (Bodhimargapradipapanjika).

One can rely on Maitreya’s \textit{Treatise on the Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle} (Mahay anottaratrantarshastr).
Explanation of (Maitreya's) 'Treatise on the Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle' (Mahdydnottaratantrashastravydkhya).

One should take whatever is common to Prasangika and Svatantrika in Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayalanka) and in Aryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's discussions on the path, etc.

For an unconfused account with respect to what is uncommon [to Prasangika I, Jam-yang-shay-ba,] having taken as valid the good explanations of the three—the great being, the foremost [Dzong-ka-ba who is the] father and his two spiritual sons [Gyeltsap and Kay-drup], will explain the Prasangika system just according to them even though I might not cite them in quotation. For, free from error, they expounded clearly through millions of reasons.
2 Interpretation of Scripture

About definitive sutras and those requiring interpretation (see pp. 422-8, 365-97) the root text says: [15]

Sutras teaching the two truths
Are respectively those to be interpreted,
Because they must be interpreted otherwise,
And the definitive, because the mode
Of existence is definite there.
There are two ways of interpretation:
When even the literal meaning is not suitable
And when the literal meaning, though established,
Is not the final mode of existence.
The first and last wheels require interpretation.
The middle are definitive sutras.
Five sutra sections of the Descent into Lanka,
The Unravelling the Thought, and The Heavily Adorned,
Thinking that there is no other creator
And thinking of emptiness
Teach mind-only [meaning] no external objects,
A permanent essence, the existence of the basis-of-all,
The true existence of other-powered phenomena
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And of thoroughly established phenomena,
And three final vehicles. These five Teachings are proved to require interpretation.

There are many purposes for the master, the Superior [Nagarjuna's], composing the Treatise on the Middle Way and differentiating what requires interpretation and what is definitive. For, the Treatise was written for the sake of non-obscuration with regard to the two truths, for the sake of making known the purpose of the two truths, for the sake of eliminating doubt in those who wonder just what requires interpretation and what is definitive, [16] and for the sake of dispelling the wrong understanding that conceives what requires interpretation to be definitive, that is, to be the way things are. Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:

This Treatise on the Middle Way was composed by the master [Nagarjuna] for the sake of showing the difference between that requiring interpretation and the definitive. With respect to this, those scriptural passages speaking of production and so forth of dependent-arisings were not spoken from the viewpoint of the nature of objects [as known by] the non-contaminated wisdom of those free from the dimness of ignorance. Rather, they were spoken from the viewpoint of the objects of mind of those whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the dimness of ignorance.

From the viewpoint of perceiving suchness, the Supramundane Victor said, 'O monks, this which is nirvana, having the attribute of non-deceptiveness, is the ultimate truth. All conditioned things are false, having the attribute of deceptiveness [appearing to exist in their own right when in fact they do not].' Etc.

Similarly, 'There is here no suchness and no non-erroneous suchness. [17] These have the attribute of deception. These also have the attribute of destructive allurement. These also are falsities; these are illusions, delusions of children.'

Similarly:
Forms are like balls of foam.
Feelings are like bubbles.
Discriminations resemble mirages.
Compositional factors are like banana tree trunks.\textsuperscript{531}
Consciousnesses resemble magical illusions.
Thus the Sun Friend Buddha said.

Similarly, 'If a monk, mindful and attentive, exerting effort, analyzes phenomena day and night, he should realize peace, the auspicious abode of the extinction of conditioned things, the selflessness of phenomena.'\textsuperscript{632}
Etc.

Due to not understanding the thought of [Buddha's] teaching set forth in this way, some would have doubt: 'Here, what is the teaching having the meaning of suchness? [18] What indeed is that having [some other] thought [as its basis]?' Also, due to having a weak intellect some think teachings which in fact require interpretation are definitive. In order to dispel with reasoning and scripture the doubt and wrong understanding of these two types of beings, the master [Nagarjuna] composed this Treatise.

There are differentiators of scriptures requiring interpretation and those of definitive meaning, because they are done so (1) by the four reliances [the third being, 'Rely on sutras of definitive meaning, not on those requiring interpretation,'], (2) by reasoning as in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way:™

\textbf{Things are never produced}
At all anywhere
From themselves, other,
Both, or causelessly.

etc., and (3) also through many scriptural citations such as in Nagarjuna's Treatise:™

The Supramundane Victor said that fraudulent
Phenomena are falsities.
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All conditioned things have the attribute of deception,
[19]
Therefore, they are falsities.

When asked 'Is a former limit [of cyclic existence] discerned?'
The Great Subduer said, 'No.'
Cyclic existence is without beginning or end.
[Ultimately] it has no former and later parts [and thus
does not inherently exist].

In the 'Advice to Katyayana'
'Exists', 'does not exist', and 'both'
Are rejected by the Supramundane Victor, knower of
[The nature of] things and non-things.

The differentiation of what requires interpretation and what is
definitive is devised from the viewpoint of the subject matter [in
the passage], A sutra mainly teaching the ultimate [emptiness] is
said to be definitive whereas one mainly teaching conventional-
ities [phenomena other than emptinesses] is said to require inter-
pretation. The Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra says,
'What are definitive sutras? What require interpretation? Sutras setting
forth the establishment of conventionalities [20] are called
"requiring interpretation". Sutras setting forth the establish-
ment of the ultimate are called "definitive".

Question: How are conventionalities and the ultimate estab-
lished?

Answer: There are ways of establishing them. Respectively,
the setting forth of any of the varieties of actions and agents
through various words and letters is the way that conventional-
ities are established. The setting forth of the doctrine of [empti-
ness which] is unapprehendable [as inherently existent], is
beyond the [dual] intellect, difficult to view, and difficult to
realize is the way that the ultimate is established. The Teaching
of Akshayamati Sutra says:

Those sutras teaching [about various objects] by way of
various words and letters are said to require interpretation.
Those teaching the profound, difficult to view, and difficult to realize are called definitive. Those teaching those objects indicated by various words [such as] self, sentient being, living being, nourisher, being, person, progeny of Manu, child of Manu, agent, and experiencer in the manner of there being, for instance, [an inherently existent] owner when there is no [inherently existent] owner are said to require interpretation. [21] Those sutras teaching the doors of liberation, the emptiness of phenomena, no [inherently existent] signs, no [inherently existent] wishes, no [inherently existent] products, no [inherently existent] production, no [inherently existent] sentient being, no [inherently existent] living being, no [inherently existent] person, and no [inherently existent] controller are called the definitive. This is called reliance on definitive sutras and non-reliance on those requiring interpretation.

The teachings of conventional phenomena in the first wheel of the teaching and in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought require interpretation. For it is necessary to search out the mode of existence [of the phenomena mentioned in these texts] apart from what was explicitly taught there. The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra, the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra, and so forth are definitive because the mode of existence of the phenomena [discussed in those texts] is definite as just the meaning of their explicit teaching.

With respect to interpreting the mode of existence [of the conventional phenomena mentioned in the first and third wheels] there are examples [such as a magician's illusions that contradict them] but the interpretation is from the viewpoint of [there being a pedagogic] need [which gave rise to the teaching]. Most passages requiring interpretation should have [both examples contradicting them and pedagogic need]. With respect to interpretation of the subject matter, reasonings such as not being able [in analysis] to find [the object designated] damage [the teaching of conventionalities if one takes merely that to be the final mode
All conditioned things have the attribute of deception,
[19]
Therefore, they are falsities.

When asked 'Is a former limit [of cyclic existence] discerned?'
The Great Subduer said, 'No.'
Cyclic existence is without beginning or end.
[Ultimately] it has no former and later parts [and thus does not inherently exist].

In the 'Advice to Katyayana'
'Exists', 'does not exist', and 'both'
Are rejected by the Supramundane Victor, knower of
[The nature of] things and non-things.

The differentiation of what requires interpretation and what is definitive is devised from the viewpoint of the subject matter [in the passage]. A sutra mainly teaching the ultimate [emptiness] is said to be definitive whereas one mainly teaching conventionalities [phenomena other than emptinesses] is said to require interpretation. The Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra says, "What are definitive sutras? What require interpretation? Sutras setting forth the establishment of conventionalities [20] are called "requiring interpretation". Sutras setting forth the establishment of the ultimate are called "definitive"."

Question: How are conventionalities and the ultimate established?

Answer: There are ways of establishing them. Respectively, the setting forth of any of the varieties of actions and agents through various words and letters is the way that conventionalities are established. The setting forth of the doctrine of [emptiness which] is unapprehendable [as inherently existent], is beyond the [dual] intellect, difficult to view, and difficult to realize is the way that the ultimate is established. The Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra says:

Those sutras teaching [about various objects] by way of various words and letters are said to require interpretation.
Those teaching the profound, difficult to view, and difficult to realize are called definitive. Those teaching those objects indicated by various words [such as] self, sentient being, living being, nourisher, being, person, progeny of Manu, child of Manu, agent, and experiencer in the manner of there being, for instance, [an inherently existent] owner when there is no [inherently existent] owner are said to require interpretation. [21] Those sutras teaching the doors of liberation, the emptiness of phenomena, no [inherently existent] signs, no [inherently existent] wishes, no [inherently existent] products, no [inherently existent] production, no [inherently existent] sentient being, no [inherently existent] living being, no [inherently existent] person, and no [inherently existent] controller are called the definitive. This is called reliance on definitive sutras and non-reliance on those requiring interpretation.

The teachings of conventional phenomena in the first wheel of the teaching and in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought require interpretation. For it is necessary to search out the mode of existence [of the phenomena mentioned in these texts] apart from what was explicitly taught there. The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra, the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra, and so forth are definitive because the mode of existence of the phenomena [discussed in those texts] is definite as just the meaning of their explicit teaching.

With respect to interpreting the mode of existence [of the conventional phenomena mentioned in the first and third wheels] there are examples [such as a magician's illusions that contradict them] but the interpretation is from the viewpoint of [there being a pedagogic] need [which gave rise to the teaching]. Most passages requiring interpretation should have [both examples contradicting them and pedagogic need]. With respect to interpretation of the subject matter, reasonings such as not being able [in analysis] to find [the object designated] damage [the teaching of conventionalities if one takes merely that to be the final mode
of subsistence], [22] Also, scriptures saying in one voice that all products are false and so forth damage [such].

Also, [with respect to definitive sutras] many examples such as illusions, many reasons such as, 'If [the object designated] is sought, it is not found,' and many scriptures teaching the profound non-production determine that the final mode of existence is just this [that is set forth explicitly in the text].

Here [in the Prasangika system] the way that texts requiring interpretation are to be interpreted [or literally, 'led'] does not refer to leading trainees—as by the indirect teachings [of a real self for the sake of] introducing them [to virtuous endeavor] but to interpreting the subject being discussed. In brief, there are two ways of interpretation: one when the literal meaning of the passage is not even suitable to be what is expressed by the sutra as in, 'Father and mother are to be killed,' [which actually teaches that 'existence' and 'attachment' are to be abandoned and the other when the literal meaning of the passage is suitable to be what the sutra expresses but interpretation is required to determine the mode of existence of the phenomena discussed in the text]. For instance, though the teaching that pleasures are produced from wholesome actions and sufferings from unwholesome actions is literal, it would not be suitable to assert these facts as the mode of existence of the two. One must interpret their mode of existence otherwise, as lacking self [objective existence]. Thus, there are, in brief, two modes of interpretation: of that which is not literally acceptable in order to discover the subject matter and of the literally acceptable to discover the nature of the phenomena discussed. The *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra* [23] says:

One knows the features of definitive sutras
In accordance with the Sugata's teaching of emptiness.
All doctrines of a sentient being, a person, a being,
Are to be known as requiring interpretation.

Therefore, [the Prasangikas'] differentiation of the three wheels of the teaching [as to whether they require interpretation] does not accord with the system set forth in the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought*. The *Extensive Sport Sutra* says:
I have found a truth, profound, peaceful, lacking
The elaborations [of thought], radiant, non-conditioned,
the ambrosia.

Though I taught it, no one would understand.
I should stay without speaking in the forest.

[Hihayana passages] such as this and the Hfnayana scriptures quoted in Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* that explicitly teach the ultimate are sutras of the first wheel; yet, [the Prasahgikas] say that these do not require interpretation. Therefore, there is no necessity that the individual three wheels [as taught by the Prasahgikas] be the first, second, and third wheels as identified in the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* [which states that every scripture of the first wheel requires interpretation].

Of the three wheels [identified] in the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought*, the first wheel explains that the four truths and so forth exist by way of their own character (*svalakshanasat*, *rang gi mtshan nyid kyis yod pa*). The last wheel explains that imaginaries do not exist inherently and that other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena exist ultimately and inherently. [According to the Prasangika system] these two types of sutras require interpretation.

Also, the *Heart of Wisdom Sutra* of the middle [wheel of the teaching], for instance, says, '[Avalokiteshvara] was viewing [the five aggregates] as empty of inherent existence.' Therefore, such [sutras] are definitive.

This way [that the Prasahgikas divide scriptures into those requiring interpretation and the definitive] does not accord with the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* [which states that the first and second wheels require interpretation and that the third wheel is definitive. However, the Prasahgikas' disagreement with this sutra] does not mean that it contradicts the thought [of Buddha], for such [a system as is set forth in that sutra] is suitable for certain types of trainees, and [no matter how much it differs from the final system] it does not contradict Buddha's thought. For example, Hearers are never permitted to kill, but certain Mahayanists are, according to the purpose. Though these two
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are systems of one speaker, they are not contradictory [in that the
difference is explained through taking into account the level of
the listener],

[All non-literal passages requiring interpretation such as,'Father
and mother should be killed,' or,'A mind-basis-of-all
exists,' must have another basis in Buddha's thought, a purpose,
and refutations of their explicit meaning.]

*Question:* With respect to passages that are to be interpreted
[and are non-literal], what are here [in the Prasangika system] the
basis in Buddha's thought, the purpose, and the refutation of the
explicit meaning?

*Answer:* [In general, there are numerous types of passages
requiring interpretation. However, Chandrakirti cites the *Des-
cent into Lanka Sutra* as proof that four types of teachings
require interpretation.]

Some persons [cite Chandrakirti's *Supplement*].

These passages [in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* and so forth]
show that other such sutras require interpretation.[25]

These [interpreters wrongly] say that from among the Chitta-
matrin teachings just four passages require interpretation
[whereas they should say four types do]:

1 the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* where it teaches the three
natures of Chittamattra [the sixth and seventh chapters]

2 the two chapters of the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* teaching
a basis-of-all (*alaya, kun gzhi*)

3 [the eighth chapter of the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought*
called] 'Questions of Maitreya' where it teaches that there are
no objects external [to a perceiving consciousness]

4 [the seventh chapter of] the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought*
where it teaches three final vehicles.

The third and fourth are indicated by the term 'and so forth' in
Chandrakirti's own commentary to his *Supplement*.

[It is correct that these are four types of passages which Chan-
drakirti says require interpretation. However,] it is incorrect
[that there are only four passages from Chittamattra teachings
referred to here and requiring interpretation]. For Dzung-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement' says, 547 'This [Prasangika] system considers all of the aforementioned four categories to require interpretation.' This statement explains that by way of topical abridgement and unification under subjects there are mainly four.

There are the three explicitly mentioned in Chandrakirti's own commentary on his *Supplement* and the teaching of three final vehicles discussed in Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra*. However, if passages requiring interpretation are differentiated by way of various modes of expression and inner divisions, there are a great many. For example, there are the ways that three final vehicles are taught, such as in the *Sutra on the Myrabolan Fruit (Myrabola)* [which says that, if a person removed one by one myrabolan fruits from a pile as large as Mount Sumeru, he would finish quickly whereas, if he attempted to name individually all the types or lineages (*gotra, rigs*) of sentient beings, he would never finish]. 548 The *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* says: 549

Thinking that [the purification and the path of purification of the three vehicles are the same in the sense that all three deliver beings from cyclic existence and are the same in the sense that the path is the meditation of selflessness] I teach one vehicle. However, it is not that there are no varieties of sentient beings—[26] the naturally dull, middling, and sharp—among the types of sentient beings.

Also, [there is the teaching that there are three final vehicles because three] truly existing lineages are apprehended individually. 550 Furthermore, [there is the teaching that] Foe Destroyers are not reborn through transmigration as found, for instance, in the [*Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza* Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* which is taken by the Chittamatrins who follow Asanga as indicating that some sentient beings never reach Buddhahood]: 551

Those [Hearers] who have entered a state destined for the lightness [of nirvana] do not have the power to
generate the aspiration to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment. Why? Because they have severed the continuum of cyclic existence [through not being born by the power of either affictions or compassion].

Also, the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* says,\(^{552}\)

Though all the Buddhas exert themselves, those who have the lineage of a Hearer, proceeding solely to peacefulness, do not have the power to generate an intention toward the highest, complete, perfect enlightenment upon being set in the best of enlightenments.

Also, there is, for example, the explanation [in the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* ]\(^{553}\) that through fear [of the suffering of cyclic existence Foe Destroyers have forsaken helping others, and thus] their Buddha lineage has been severed. There are many passages and many ways of indicating that no matter how much Foe Destroyers meditate, [27] they cannot generate compassion and the unusual attitude [oftaking upon oneself the burden of helping all sentient beings].

The individual scriptures showing that each of these [ways of teaching three final vehicles] requires interpretation were quoted in Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra* and were just not quoted here [in Chandrakirti's commentary to his *Supplement* ]. Thus, [it is wrong to say that Chandrakirti is referring to just four passages requiring interpretation], Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra* quotes the explanations that all the Buddhas of the three times and all the present Buddhas of the ten directions teach one vehicle:\(^{554}\)

It is extremely difficult to find sentient beings who have faith in one vehicle [due to the difficulties of the required accumulations of merit and wisdom in the Mahayana], However, [all vehicles] are exhausted in one because such was taught in many sutras. The *White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine Sutra* says, 'Also, based on one vehicle, I teach doctrine to sentient beings in this way. Buddha's vehicles arrive at their conclusion in omniscience. There
is no ascription of two or three vehicles. This is the nature [of the teaching] even in all the transient worlds of the ten directions.

'Why? All those Tathagatas who appeared in the past in all the transient worlds of the ten directions [28] taught doctrine to sentient beings based on one vehicle. This is the vehicle to Buddhahood. Also, all those Tathagatas who will appear in the future will teach doctrine to sentient beings based on one vehicle. Also, all those Tathagatas who are presently appearing in all the transient worlds of the ten directions are teaching doctrine to sentient beings based on one vehicle.

'Through that format this is to be understood: If there is even no ascribing of two vehicles in any of the transient worlds of the ten directions, what need is there to mention three?'

In this sutra[Hearers such as] Shariputra [29] are prophesied to attain the unsurpassed enlightenment; [this implies that there is only one final vehicle since even Hearers finally attain the highest enlightenment].

Also, Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra quotes the explanation that, if different vehicles had been taught, Buddha would have had different discriminations [in the sense of desire for some students and hatred for others]. He would have had the fault of miserliness [because he would have withheld the best teaching from some. Thus, it is shown that all the vehicles] only flow into the Mahayana. The Compendium of Sutra says:

The Chapter of the True One Sutra says, 'Manjushri, because [trainees] emerge [from all obstructions] through one vehicle, the field of Buddha has the essence of the Mahayana. I do not ascribe vehicles of Hearers and Solitary Reaiizers. Why? Because the Tathagata does not have various discriminations. Manjushri, if the Tathagata taught the Mahayana to some, the vehicle of the Solitary Reaiizers to some, and the vehicle of the Hearers to some, the Tathagata's mind would be very
impure, would have the fault of attraction and also little compassion, and would be secretive with regard to the doctrine.

'Manjushrī, all the doctrines that I teach to sentient beings are for the sake of attaining omniscient wisdom. Flowing to enlightenment [30] and descending into the Mahayana, they are the means of achieving omniscience; they lead completely to one place [omniscience]. Therefore, I have no establishment of vehicles.

'Manjushrī, an establishment of vehicles is done to set persons in Tathagatahood. It is done to set them in a small collection [of merit and wisdom] and in a limitless collection. However, because the element of qualities (dharmadhatu) [emptiness] is not diverse, they do not have different vehicles. These teachings of conventionalities are uttered only as means of entering [the path to omniscience]. Ultimately there is one vehicle, not two.'

Also, [Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra quotes] a Perfection of Wisdom Sutra [translated here in accordance with the Prasangika interpretation]:

Those devaputras who have not generated the aspiration to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment [31] will generate that aspiration. Those [Hearers] who have entered a state destined for the lightness [of nirvana] do not have the power [that is, are far from having the power] to generate the aspiration to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment. Why? Because they have [temporarily] severed the continuum of cyclic existence [their Buddha lineage]. When they generate the aspiration to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment, even I will be pleased, and I will not upset their roots of virtue. They will take great cognizance of the doctrine that far exceeds even the superior.

This passage shows that if Foe Destroyers generate the attitude [of aspiration to enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings,
Buddha] will be pleased and will not upset [their roots of virtue, that is, will not propound to them a teaching of five lineages or three vehicles]. They will become cognizant of the very superior doctrine [that is, will generate the aspiration to enlightenment relying on extraordinary births].

Thus, it is explicitly taught that even Foe Destroyers generate the aspiration to perfect enlightenment for the sake of all beings. Therefore, the three scriptures [the Sutra on the Myrabolan Fruit, the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, and the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra mentioned above] are said to require interpretation.

Also, [Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra quotes] the Questions of King Dharamshvara Sutra:

The Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors, [32] do not appear for the sake of a variety of discourses [diverse vehicles]. They appear in order to cause sentient beings to be fully enlightened and realize the element of qualities, which is of one taste, without obstruction, the boon of all sentient beings. Thus, they turn the irreversible wheel [of doctrine causing continual progression toward Buddhahood].

O child of good lineage, a jeweler, for instance, takes an unpolished jewel from a jewel-mine. He washes it with a strong solution of soda and wipes it with a black haircloth. However, he does not cease his efforts with just this; he washes it with a strong solution of quicksilver and rubs it with wood and wool. However, he does not cease his efforts with just this; he washes it with the juice of a great herb and wipes it with a fine cloth. Having polished it, the jewel is free of the types of fetters and is called vaidurya (cat's-eye gem).

Just so, a Tathagata ascertains the impure [Buddha] nature of all sentient beings. [33] He causes sentient beings who greatly enjoy cyclic existence to be disquieted through disquieting discourse on impermanence, suffering, selflessness, and unpleasantness. He introduces them to the disciplinary practice of Superiors.
A Tathagata does not cease his efforts with just this; he causes them to understand the Tathagata's own mode of discourse through discourse on emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness. However, a Tathagata does not cease his efforts with just this; he leads those sentient beings to the Tathagata's land through discourse on the irreversible wheel [cultivation of the union of method and wisdom] and discourse on the complete purification of the three spheres [of agent, action, and object].

Those sentient beings of various lineages and natures—having become equal—realize the nature of Tathagata-hood, whereby they are called the highest [field of merit] worthy of giving. [34]

This passage explains through the example of the three stages of cleansing a gem that [a Buddha] cleans away the stains of even Foe Destroyers' obstructions and establishes them in Buddhadhoo. Therefore, the teachings that Foe Destroyers do not have the capacity for Buddhadhoo are explained as requiring interpretation.

Also, [Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra quotes] the Irreversible Wheel Sutra (Avaivartachakra):  

The youthful Manjushrī asked, 'What is the teaching of doctrine by the Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors, like?' Buddha said, 'The teaching of doctrine by the Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors, is like an irreversible wheel of doctrine.' Manjushrī asked, 'Supramundane Victor, how is it that the Supramundane Victor, based on three vehicles, teaches doctrine?'

Buddha said, 'Son of good lineage, those sentient beings [to whom I teach three vehicles] admire low [vehicles]; they do not understand the one vehicle. The skillful in means lead them thus. Son of good lineage, the Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors, possess great skill in means. [35] The Supramundane Victor has appeared at the time of the five ruinations; these are non-admirers of the one vehicle.'
This explains that the teaching of three vehicles is for the sake of leading those who do not understand the one vehicle.

Also, [Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra] quotes the Lion's Roar of ShrimaladevT Sutra:564

The so-called utter passing away (parinirvana, yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa) is a skillful means of the Tathagatas. All three vehicles are aspects of the one vehicle; he who understands the one vehicle understands the unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment.

The foregoing sutras were quoted together [in one section of Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra]. Also, here in the Lion's Roar of ShrimaladevT Sutra,65 as before, the non-birth of Foe Destroyers is shown to require interpretation. [The Compendium of Sutra quotes the Descent into Lanka Sutra:566

Their faults due to predispositions and their madness due to meditative stabilization having ceased, Hearers and Solitary Realizers [36] rise again from the uncontaminated realm. Through fulfilling the collections included within the worldly realm (the collection of merit) and the non-worldly uncontaminated realm (the superior collection of the wisdom of emptiness), they attain the capacity for the extraordinary body of wisdom and emptiness.]

The Descent into Lanka Sutra says:567

Even Hearers who have attained an abiding in the bliss of meditative stabilization will attain the body of bodies of the Conqueror.

And:

Having attained the body
Of meditative stabilization,
They do not rise for eons.
Just as drunken persons
Forsake beer and become sober,
So even they will attain
My body of wisdom and emptiness. [37]
Though there are many scriptural passages teaching the rebirth of Foe Destroyers and their attainment of the Mahayana path through the Buddhas' prodding, these were counted as one in Chandrakirti’s Supplement: the teaching of one final vehicle.

Not only that, but also the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra shows that [the teaching of] a true existence of individual lineages requires interpretation. It says:

The essence of the Tathagata exists in all migrators,
And thus there are no unfortunate sentient beings.

Also, there are the explanations in the Tathagata Essence Sutra and in Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle that the Buddha lineage exists in all sentient beings. Even these teachings are just included in [the one topic of] the teaching of one vehicle. Thus, Chandrakirti's Supplement says:

These passages [in the Descent into Lanka Sutra and so forth] show that other such sutras require interpretation.

His own commentary on this [38] says:

What are the 'other such passages [that require interpretation]? The teaching of] the non-existence of imaginaries and the [inherent] existence of other-powered phenomena that occurs in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought when explaining the three natures: imaginaries, other-powered phenomena, and thoroughly established phenomena. Similarly, [the Sutra Unravelling the Thought teaches]:

There is a deep and subtle consciousness, the taker [of rebirth],
Having all the seeds and flowing like the continuum of a river.
If it were understood as a self, it would not be proper,
Thus I do not teach it to children.

And so forth. [The Descent into Lanka Sutra] says:

Just as a doctor distributes
Medicines to the ill,
So Buddha teaches
Mind-only to sentient beings.

This passage [and others from the *Descent into Lanka*] show that these [types of passages] require interpretation.

Thus, it is said that just as a doctor distributes individual medicines in accordance with illnesses, so Buddha [39] teaches trainees mind-only and so forth.

Also, all passages taught merely in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings require interpretation. Since it is mistaken to take these teachings literally, like apprehending water in a mirage, it is said that one should not be enamoured of the words but seek the definitive meaning [emptiness]. The *Descent into Lanka* says: \(^{573}\)

Sutras teaching in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings have meaning that is mistaken; they are not discourse on suchness. Just as a deer is deceived by a waterless mirage into apprehending water, so doctrine which is taught [in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings] also pleases children but is not discourse causing the wisdom of Superiors. Therefore, you should follow the meaning and not be enamoured of the expression.

This indeed describes all [non-literal passages requiring] interpretation. However, if they are described individually, on this occasion five types of sutras are mentioned:

1 mind-only and no external objects
2 the teaching in the *Tathagata Essence Sutra* of a permanent, stable essence in the continuums of all sentient beings which has the [major and minor] marks of a Buddha [40]
3 the description of a basis-of-all
4 the description of the true existence of other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena
5 the teaching of three final vehicles.

[The first, third, fourth, and fifth are accepted by the Chittamatrins Following Scripture as definitive or literal; they assert the
second, the teaching of a permanent Tathagata essence, to be non-literal and actually to be referring to the impermanent mind-basis-of-all.]

In the _Descent into Lanka Sutra_ the teaching of mind-only is explained through the example of [the distribution of medicine to] the sick. This shows that the teaching of mind-only in the 'Questions of Maitreya' chapter of the _Sutra Unravelling the Thought_ requires interpretation.

[Still, according to Prasangika 'mind-only' is not always a non-literal teaching requiring interpretation, since it is often taught for the sake of emphasizing that the principal creator of pleasure, pain, activities, and so on is the mind and not a deity or anything else. Thus, when the teaching of mind-only does not reject external objects, it is a valid literal teaching even for Prasangika. It requires interpretation only to determine the final mode of existence of the phenomena discussed.] The statement in the _Sutra on the Ten Grounds_,⁵⁷⁴ 'These three realms are mind-only,' is said by Bhavaviveka to mean that the creator propounded by the Forders does not exist and that only the mind is the principal creator. Chandrakirti’s _Supplement_ [similarly] explains [the meaning of 'mind-only' based] on the _Sutra on the Ten Grounds_ itself:⁵⁷⁵

The Bodhisattva of the Manifest [sixth ground],
Who is nearing [the element of qualities]
And understands that the three realms are only mind
Realizes that the creator [of the world] is only mind,
Thus he knows there is no permanent self as the creator.

Not only that, but also the _Descent into Lanka Sutra_ says:⁵⁷⁶ [41]

I explain as mind-only
[What is said to be] the creator-
Person, continuum, aggregates, causes,
Particles, principal, and Ishvara.

Thus, there are those who, though they are Buddhists, advocate as the creator a substantially existent person or a continuum or aggregates which are asserted to be the person. Also, some Buddhists advocate substantially existent causes as the creator.
The Vaisheshikas advocate particles as the creator of the world; the Samkhya, the principal; and the Aishvaras, Ishvara. Refuting them, Buddha said that only the mind is the creator.

[Some say that this passage from the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* refutes forms which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness and that this is done through understanding that the three realms are only the truly existent mind. However, it would be inadmissible for Buddha to say in the same sutra that the mind exists inherently and that the mind is produced from causes. For inherent existence and dependent-arising are mutually exclusive.]"^7^ If [this passage from the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds* means that] there are no forms separate from a [truly existent] mind, [why did Buddha in the same sutra] say,^578^ 'The mind [is produced] by the cause of actions'? Also, he would not have spoken [of the production] of name and form [by consciousness if there were no form]. Thus, because [the *Sutra on the Ten Grounds*] explains that the mind creates the varieties of the world, one should understand [that here the word 'only' of mind-only] refutes a creator which is not mainly the mind [and thus in this context does not refute external objects].

*Question:* The *Descent into Lanka Sutra* says:^579^

[Objects] do not exist as external objects as perceived.

[42]
The mind appears as various [objects through the power of predispositions].

[Because the mind is generated] in the likeness of bodies [senses], enjoyments [objects of senses], and abodes [physical sense organs and environments],

I have explained [that all phenomena are] mind-only.

Is this to be explained [as referring to the mind as the main creator and not refuting external objects]?  

*Answer:* No. Here a doctrine of mind-only which refers to the non-existence of external objects is presented, and it is said that what is perceived as bodies, enjoyments, and abodes is the entity of the mind [perceiving them]. The teaching of such in the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* and so forth is for the sake of overcoming
trainees' attachment to forms and so forth. With respect to the basis of Buddha's thought [when he taught this non-literal teaching of mind-only meaning no external objects], it is clear that he was thinking that all phenomena are posited through their mental images as [is taught in] Nagarjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*. In this context he set forth mind-only.

The refutation of this type of mind-only by both Bhavaviveka and this master [Chandrakirti] is the thought of the Superior [Nagarjuna] himself. Nagarjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment* says:

> The Subduer's teaching  
> That all these are mind-only  
> Was so that children would forsake [43]  
> Their fears. It is not suchness.

Also, Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland* says:

> Just as a grammarian [first] has [his students] read a model of the alphabet, so Buddha taught his trainees the doctrines they were able to bear. To some he taught doctrines in order to turn them away from sins. This was so that some [beings of small capacity] would achieve [the fruits of] merit [in rebirths as gods and humans]. He taught some [beings of middling capacity] doctrines based on the dualism [of object and subject as different entities]. To some he taught doctrines not based on dualism [that object and subject are empty of being separate entities and that consciousness ultimately exists]. He taught some [beings of heightened faculties] doctrines profound and frightening to the fearful, having an essence of emptiness and compassion, the means of achieving [highest] enlightenment. [44]

Therefore, Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:

> These sutras teaching no external objects of perception,  
> Teaching that the mind appears as the varieties of objects,  
> Turn away from forms those extremely attracted to forms.  
> These also just require interpretation.
A teaching that requires interpretation according to both Chittamattra and Prasangika is that of a permanent, fully developed Tathagata essence. Similarly, the Descent into Lanka Sutra says:

Mahamati said, 'The Tathagata essence taught in the Supramundane Victor's sutras is said by the Supramundane Victor to be naturally radiant [lacking the elaborations of thought], pure [free of adventitious contaminations], and thus from the beginning just pure. The Tathagata essence is said to possess the thirty-two characteristics [of a fully developed Buddha] and to exist in the bodies of all sentient beings.

'The Supramundane Victor says that like a precious gem wrapped in a dirty cloth, the Tathagata essence is wrapped in the cloth of the aggregates, constituents, and sources, overwhelmed by the force of desire, hatred, and ignorance, dirtied with the defilements of thought, and is permanent, stable, and everlasting.

'If so, Supramundane Victor, how is this propounding of a Tathagata essence not like the Forders' propounding of a self? Supramundane Victor, the Forders teach and propound a self which is permanent, a non-agent, without the qualities [of form and pleasure, etc.], pervasive, and non-perishing.'

The Supramundane Victor said, 'Mahamati, this teaching of a Tathagata essence is not like the Forders' propounding of a self. O Mahamati, the completely perfect Buddhas, Tathagata Foe Destroyers, teach a Tathagata essence meaning emptiness, the final reality, nirvana, no [inherently existent] production, signlessness, wishlessness, and so forth. So that children might avoid the fear of selflessness, they teach through the means of a Tathagata essence the state of no thought, the object [of the wisdom] free from appearances.

'Mahamati, future and present Bodhisattvas—the great beings—should not adhere to this as a self.
Mahamati, for example, a potter makes a variety of vessels out of one mass of clay particles with his hands, manual skill, a rod, water, thread, and mental dexterity. Mahamati, the Tathagatas teach the selflessness of phenomena which overcomes all imagined signs. Through [their techniques] having wisdom and skill in means—whether they teach it as the Tathagata essence or as selflessness—they, like a potter, teach with various formats of words and letters.' [47]

Thus, there is the teaching in the Tathagata Essence Sutra of a permanent body adorned with the major and minor marks of a Buddha, possessing the powers and so forth, and existing in the continuums of all sentient beings. This is explained, as before [in the case of the teaching of mind-only that means no external objects] to require interpretation from the viewpoint of another basis in [Buddha's] thought, his purpose, and the fact that there are refutations of the explicit teaching. Both this [teaching of a permanent Buddha Body in all sentient beings] and the teaching of the existence of a basis-of-all have emptiness as the basis in his thought. The refutation of the explicit teaching is that if it were taken literally, such a teaching would be like that of the Forders [who absurdly ascribe change to the permanent]. Thus, the teaching of a permanent Buddha Body in all sentient beings is proved by reasoning to require interpretation. Chandrakirti’s Supplement says:585

The teachings that a basis-of-all exists, that the person [inherently] exists,
And that only the aggregates [inherently] exist
Should be taken as teachings for those who would not understand
The very profound meaning [of emptiness],

[For the Prasangikas, the teaching of an impermanent mind-basis-of-all actually is based on a permanent Tathagata essence—the emptiness of the mind.] The Sutra on the Heavily Adorned
[Just as] lands [are the basis of] the varieties [of all things grown],
So the basis-of-all [is the basis for cyclic existence and nirvana].
The virtuous Tathagata essence is also this [basis-of-all], [48]
Tathagatas teach the essence with the term 'basis-of-all'.
Though the essence is proclaimed as the basis-of-all,
Those of weak intellect do not understand.

Thus, a natural lineage which is the emptiness of true existence of the mind in each sentient being—the Sugata essence or Buddha lineage—is called a basis-of-all. For it abides as the nature of all the phenomena [which make full enlightenment possible, these terms all referring to the emptiness of the mind].

[The natural lineage or Buddha lineage—the emptiness of inherent existence of the mind—is called alayavijnana which here means 'basis-of-all which is to be known well'.] \textit{Vijnana} is so called because of being that which knows [that is, the knower] or because of being this which is to be known well or in detail [that is, the known]. Taking [the term \textit{vijnana} of alayavijnana] according to the latter etymology [as 'that which is to be minded or known in detail'], the Tathagata essence is proclaimed as \textit{vijnana}, that which is to be known in detail. Chandrakirti's \textit{Commentary on the 'Supplement'} says,\cite{587} 'It should be known that because it abides as the nature of all the phenomena [which make full enlightenment possible], only emptiness is indicated by the term "mind-basis-of-all" (alayavijnana, kungzhirnam shes).'

[The three natures as taught by Chittamatra also require interpretation.] Chandrakirti's \textit{Supplement} says:\cite{588} Thus, one has understood the arrangement of scriptures [of definitive meaning and requiring interpretation]. Any sutra setting forth non-suchness, [49] teaching that which requires interpretation, is to be interpreted. Through realizing [this, these provisional teachings become a cause of entering into the realization that phenomena do not exist inherently]. Also, know that [any
sutra] which bears the meaning of emptiness is definitive.

Through such passages it is explained that the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* requires interpretation where it shows the differentiation of the [true] existence and non [true] existence of the first two of the three natures of the Chittamatra system [other-powered phenomena and imaginaries. The explanation in the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought* that impermanent phenomena truly exist needs to be interpreted as having as its basis in Buddha's thought their conventional existence.] For the *Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra* and so forth explain that the teachings of truly existent phenomena require interpretation.

Also, [another reason why the explanation that other-powered and thoroughly established phenomena truly exist requires interpretation is that Prasangikas] distinguish the existence and non-existence of the three natures [in another way]. According to the 'Questions of Maitreya' [chapter] of the *Twenty-Five Thousand and Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*, all phenomena from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses do not ultimately exist but exist only in the terminology and conventions of the world. There it is said in answer to a question about the way that forms and so forth exist,589 'They exist according to the terminology and conventions of the world but not ultimately.' Thus, it is said that all phenomena from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses [only nominally exist].

Therefore, Chandrakirti's commentary on his *Supplement* says:590

I will say a little bit [about our own system's presentation of the three natures]. For instance, a snake is [only] imagined in a coiled rope which is a dependent-arising, [50] for there is no snake in the rope. However, a snake is thoroughly established in an actual snake because it is not imagined. Similarly, that the final nature of things is in other-powered phenomena which are products is imagined [because] the final nature is not a product, for [Nagarjuna] said:591
The nature is not fabricated
And is not dependent on another.

This final nature that is imagined in presently apprehended products which are dependent-arisings and like reflections [in that the way they appear and the way they exist do not agree] is the actual final nature as the object of a Buddha. For [as the object of a Buddha's cognition] it is not imagined. Not contacting [or being obstructed by] things that are products, [his wisdom knowing the mode of existence] actualizes only the final nature. Thus, since he understands suchness, he is called 'Buddha'.

One has thus understood the presentation of the three natures: imaginaries, other-powered phenomena, and the thoroughly established. [51] [In this way] the thought of the Sutra [Unravelling the Thought] is to be explained [as requiring interpretation and the thought of the 'Questions of Maitreya' (see p.620) on the three natures is to be understood],

[The Chittamatrins treat the imputation of a difference of entity of] the two, apprehending subjects and apprehended objects [imputed in dependence on other-powered phenomena] as an imaginary. This should be considered [or analyzed], because apprehending subjects and apprehended objects [are other-powered phenomena and] other-powered phenomena [which are not subjects or objects] do not exist as things.

Let us illumine a little the meaning of his words. The way of [wrong] imagination is that whereas the final mode of existence does not exist as perceived in an other-powered phenomenon, it is perceived there through superimposition. For, the perception [that other-powered phenomena exist in their own right] despite their not actually so existing is an imaginary superimposition, like the superimposition by a consciousness apprehending a rope as a snake despite the snake's not existing in the rope. For, other-powered phenomena do not fulfill the sense of a non-fabricated nature, etc.
Other-powered phenomena presently being seen or apprehended are like mirror reflections in that there is no agreement between the way they appear and the way they are. Their nature or mode of being is an actual thoroughly established phenomenon [an emptiness] according to the sight of a Buddha [52] because he perceives without superimposing [true] existence when there is no [true] existence. It is like a snake's not being superimposed on an actual snake, and thus the object apprehended is thoroughly established. This sets out the definition and etymology of 'thoroughly established' (parinishpanna, yongs grub) and also explains that other-powered phenomena are the bases of the superimposition of imaginaries as well as the bases of emptinesses—thoroughly established phenomena.

Question: [It has been shown that the 'Questions of Maitreya' chapter of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra teaches that all phenomena do not exist ultimately but exist only nominally; however, the same chapter seems to show just the opposite.] The 'Questions of Maitreya' says,592 'Maitreya, these imagined forms [the ultimate existence imagined of forms] should be viewed as not existing substantially. These imputed forms [forms themselves] should be viewed as existing substantially because thought substantially exists and not because [the forms] exist under their own power.' [Here it says that thought 'substantially exists'; 'substantially existent' (dravyasat, rdzasyod) means 'ultimately existent' (paramarthasat, don dam par yodpa) in the Prasangika system, and since the Prasangikas say nothing ultimately exists] how is [one to understand this quote]?

Answer: Here 'substantially existent' means just 'existent' (sat, yodpa) because one can understand from the context that [substantially existent] here does not refer to anything other than [just 'existent']. It does not refer to the 'substantiality' meaning 'inherently existent' or 'truly existent'. The Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra says:593 [53]

'In dependence on the name, discrimination, and convention of the term "form" to these and those things which have the character of compositional phenomena,
an intrinsic existence of forms is imagined. These are imagined forms.

'Maitreya, in dependence on the name, discrimination, designation, and convention of the terms "feelings", "discriminations", "compositional factors", "consciousnesses",—through to—"qualities of a Buddha" to these and those things which have the character of compositional phenomena, there is imagined an intrinsic existence of feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, consciousnesses—through to—the intrinsic existence of the qualities of a Buddha. These are imagined feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, consciousnesses—through to—imagined qualities of a Buddha. [54]

'[Then with respect to other-powered phenomena] there are the nominal, discriminated, imputed, and conventional "forms", "feelings", "discriminations", "compositional factors", "consciousnesses"—through to—"qualities of a Buddha" that are designated to these and those things which have the character of compositional phenomena, in dependence on thought abiding in just the nature of thought. These are imputed forms, imputed feelings, imputed discriminations, imputed compositional factors, imputed consciousnesses—through to—imputed qualities of a Buddha.

'Whether the Tathagatas appear or not, reality and the sphere of the actual status of phenomena just abide. Reality's forms are imputed forms' permanent, permanent, stable, stable non-intrinsic existence and non-self of phenomena as imagined forms—suchness, final reality. [55] These are reality's feelings, discriminations, consciousnesses—through to—reality's qualities of a Buddha.' Thus Buddha said.

The Bodhisattva Maitreya asked, 'From among these three types of forms [imagined forms, imputed forms, and reality's forms], which forms are to be viewed as not substantially existing? Which as substantially existing?
Which as neither not substantially existing nor substantially existing but as distinguished by being ultimate objects? From among the three types of feelings, the three types of compositional factors, the three types of consciousnesses—through to—the three types of qualities of a Buddha, which are to be viewed as not substantially existing? Which as substantially existing? Which as neither not substantially existing nor substantially existing but distinguished by being ultimate objects?' Thus [Maitreya] asked.

The Supramundane Victor said to the Bodhisattva Maitreya, 'O Maitreya, these imagined forms [the ultimate existence imagined in forms] should be viewed as not substantially existing [because of not existing at all]. These imputed forms [forms themselves] should be viewed as substantially existing [that is, conventionally existing] because thought substantially exists and not because forms exist under their own power. Reality's forms [emptinesses] should be viewed as neither not substantially existing [because of existing as the nature of phenomena] nor as substantially existing [because of not existing by way of their own character] but as distinguished by being ultimate objects.'

Dzong-ka-ba's *Essence of the Good Explanations* says:594

Therefore, the 'substantiality' of the 'substantially existing' and 'not substantially existing' mentioned in the 'Questions of Maitreya' is not the 'substantiality' set forth in other texts as the pair, 'substantiality and imputation' (*dravya* and *prajnapti, rdzas btags*). They also are not the 'establishment by way of [the object's] own character' (*svalakshana-siddhi, rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*) set forth by the Madhyamikas as 'substantiality' (*dravya, rdzas*).

[It has been shown that many teachings, accepted literally by the followers of Chittamatra, are interpreted otherwise by the
Prasahgikas. However] the Prasangika system does not assert that whatever the Chittamatrins accept as literal or as being definitive is necessarily actually non-literal [since both systems assert that the teachings of the six perfections and so forth are literal]. Also, the Prasahgikas do not assert that the opposite follows [either; they do not assert that whatever the Prasangika system says is literal the proponents of Chittamatra necessarily say is non-literal]. For the Sutra on the Ten Grounds says, [57] 'These three realms are mind-only,' and [the Mahayana Sutra of Knowledge (Mahayanabhidharma) says]:

The beginningless realm
Is the source of all phenomena.
Because it exists, all migrations
And even nirvanas are attained.

The Prasahgikas accept these passages literally, [the first as negating a main agent other than the mind and the second as setting forth a Tathagata essence which is the emptiness of the mind. The Chittamatrins also accept these passages literally but with a different interpretation of their literal meaning; for them the first refutes forms which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness, and the second sets forth the mind-basis-of-all.]
Padmasambhava
3 The Object of Negation

The explanation of Prasangika tenets has three parts: their presentation of (1) the base, (2) paths, and (3) fruits of these paths. [The first of these is translated here.]

The Prasangika presentation of the base has five parts: (1) the object of negation in the view of selflessness, (2) the reasonings refuting the object of negation, (3) the basic objects of the two truths, (4) the uncommon features [of the Prasangika system], and (5) the valid cognizers certifying the above as well as an elimination of error. [The first two are translated here.]

THE OBJECT OF NEGATION
IN THE VIEW OF SELFLESSNESS

This section has two parts: the measure of what is negated [58] and the correctness of this measure.

Measure of what is negated in the view of selflessness
(See pp.35-41.) The root text says:

All of cyclic existence and nirvana
Appearing and renowned [to the mind]—
The varieties [of phenomena] and their mode [emptiness]—
Are posited by the inborn non-analytical [awareness]
As existing according to the conventions of the world.
Therefore, 'existing objectively [without just being an
imputation] there by thought',
'Substantially existing', 'existing by way of its own
character',
'Existing from its own [the object's]side',
'Truly existing', 'existing in its own right', and so forth
Are synonymously what is negated.

Forms and so forth are the phenomena of cyclic existence—the
afflicted class—and [the phenomena of nirvana]—the pure class
(see pp.201-12). These phenomena are all included within 'the
varieties and their mode which appear to and are renowned to
the mind'. All these phenomena must be posited [as existing] for
the inborn worldly [mind] which does not analyze [to try to find]
the object designated and does not superimpose [falsity] through
the conception [of phenomena] as truly existent.

Therefore, all the varieties and their mode [their emptiness]
are only imputed [from the subject's side to] there [the object's
side] by terms and thoughts. This is because these phenomena,
except for being just nominally imputed [from the subject's side]
to there, are not their individual parts, nor the mere composite of
their parts, nor the continuum [of their moments], etc. [59] For
example, in darkness a coiled speckled rope is imputed by
thought to be a snake, and from a distance a cairn [a pile of
stones] is merely imagined to be a human. Nagarjuna's Precious
Garland says:

Because the phenomena of forms [which have the
obstructiveness of which space is the absence] are only
names, space also is just a name [and does not exist inher-
ently. If someone said that forms exist inherently, then]
when the elements do not exist [inherently], how could
forms exist [inherently]? Therefore, even name-only-
ess does not exist [inherently because that which
possesses a name does not exist inherently].
Aryadeva's *Four Hundred* says: 600

Without [imputation by] thought [like the imputation of a snake to a rope] there is no [finding of] the existence of desire and so forth. If so, who with intelligence would maintain that a real object is [produced dependent on] thought? [For, being imputed by thought and existing as its own reality are contradictory.]

Chandrakrfti's *Commentary on (Aryadeva's) Four Hundred* says: 601

Undoubtedly, those which exist only through the existence of thought and those which do not exist when there is no thought are to be ascertained as not existing by way of their own entities, like a snake imputed to a coiled rope. [60]

Also, the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra* says: 602

O Great King, a person, a being, has the six constituents, the six bases of contact, and the eighteen activities of mind.

Based on what is it said that the person has the six constituents? Great King, the six constituents are these: the constituent of earth, the constituent of water, the constituent of fire, the constituent of wind, the constituent of space, and the constituent of consciousness. Great King, these are the six constituents. My saying that a person has the six constituents is based on this.

Based on what is it said that a person has the six bases of contact? Great King, the six bases of contact are these: the base of contact which is the eye for seeing forms, the base of contact which is the ear for hearing sounds, [61] the base of contact which is the nose for smelling odors, the base of contact which is the tongue for sensing tastes, the base of contact which is the body for feeling the tangible, and the base of contact which is the mind for knowing phenomena. Great King, these are the six bases
of contact. My saying that the person has the six bases of contact is based on this.

Great King, based on what is it said that the person has the eighteen activities of mind? Great King, the eighteen activities of mind are these. When a human sees a form with his eyes, he experiences the form as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When he hears a sound with his ears, he experiences the sound as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When he smells an odor with his nose, he experiences the odor as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When he senses a taste with his tongue, he experiences the taste as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When he feels the tangible with his body, he experiences the tangible as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When he realizes a phenomenon with his mind, he experiences it as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. Great King, these six experiences of pleasure, these six experiences of displeasure, and these six experiences of neutrality are in brief the eighteen activities of mind. Great King, these eighteen are activities of mind. Great King, my saying that these activities are the eighteen activities of mind is based on this.

Great King, [63] the constituent of earth is of two types: internal and external. Great King, what is the internal constituent? It is, inside the body, any of the hard and solid aspects, the close, conjoined with consciousness. Also, what are they? The internal earth constituent is to be known as hair, mustache, nails, teeth, impurities, excrement, skin, flesh, veins, sinews, bones, marrow, heart, liver, lungs, kidneys, spleen, diaphragm, large intestine, small intestine, bladder, urinary canal, anal canal, anus, brain, veins of the brain—also, any type of hardness, solidity, and the close, conjoined with consciousness inside the body.

Great King, what is the external earth constituent? Any type of hardness, solidity, the non-close, [64] not conjoined with consciousness is to be known as the external earth constituent.
Great King, when the internal earth constituent arises, it does not come from anywhere. When it ceases, it does not go anywhere.

Great King, a woman thinks of the internal, 'I am a woman.' Having imputed, 'I am a woman,' internally, she thinks of the external with respect to a man, 'A man.' Having imputed 'man' to the man externally, she becomes desirous and wishes to join with the external man.

The man also thinks of the internal, 'I am a man.' Having imputed, 'I am a man,' internally, he thinks of the external with respect to a woman, 'A woman.' Having imputed 'woman' to the woman externally, he becomes desirous and wishes to join with the external woman. Through desiring to join, they join together. Through the cause of joining there is the state of the fluid embryo.

Great King, both the imputed and the imputer do not [inherently] exist. [65] There is no woman in the woman [that is, in the basis of the imputation 'woman']. There is no man in the man [that is, in the basis of the imputation 'man']. Though they are thus non-existent, wrong thought is generated, but even this thought does not exist inherently.

Even the joining and the fluid embryo do not exist inherently as is imagined. How can that which does not exist inherently become hard?

Great King, having understood thought thus, you should understand hardness. It is to be understood that whenever hardness is produced, it does not come from anywhere. Great King, this body has a time in the end of going to the cemetery. When its hardness disintegrates and ceases, it does not go east, south, west, north, up, down, or to the intermediate directions. Great King, view thus the internal earth constituent.

Great King, there are occasions when the world abides in the sky as a heavenly mansion of Brahma, [66]
consisting of the seven types of precious substances. O King, when its hardness arises, it does not come from anywhere. Though it abides as the massive [mountains], hard and firm, established through the cause of the diamonds of the Chakravada and Mahachakravada mountains, when its hardness arises, it does not come from anywhere. Though it abides as Meru—the King of Mountains—Yugamdhara, Nimimdhara, Ishadhara, Vajradhara, Khadiraka, Vinataka, Ashvakarna, Sudarshan, Mahasudarshana, Bare [Mountains], Gandhamadana, or the Kitadri which are other than those, or though it abide as the billion world systems including everything, or though it abide as an earth eighty thousand yojanas in height and sixty thousand yojanas in width, O King, when its hardness arises, it does not come from anywhere.

Great King, when this world is destroyed, there is a time when this great earth is burnt by fire, or destroyed by water, or wrecked by wind. When it is burned by fire, there will be no smoke, and there will be no remains of ashes. For instance, when the flame of a butter or oil lamp burns space, there is no smoke and no remains of ashes. Just so, when this world system of one billion worlds is burned by fire, there will be no smoke, and there will be no remains of ashes.

Also, when it is destroyed by water, there is no remainder. For instance, when salt dissolves in water, there is no remainder. Just so, when this world system of one billion worlds is destroyed by water, there will be no remains.

When it is wrecked by wind, there will be no remainder. For instance, when a scattering wind drives about, no little birds are seen remaining. Just so, when this world system of one billion worlds is wrecked by wind, there will not be even a little remainder.

Great King, the arising of the earth constituent is thus empty. The destruction and arising of the earth
The Object of Negation

constituent are also empty of inherent existence. Great King, the earth constituent, except for only being a designation, should not be viewed as an earth constituent. That which has the designation [the basis of the designations 'woman' or 'man'] is not the woman and is not the man. Thus, O King, with wisdom realize these as they are in reality. [69]

The meaning of this sutra is that [the constituents and so forth] do not exist, except as only nominal imputations. This is indicated by the quote from the beginning through to 'The earth constituent, except for only being a designation should not be viewed as an earth constituent.' Then the passage, 'That which has the designation is not the woman and is not the man,' explains that the basis of the imputation—that which has the name—is not the phenomenon which is imputed, a woman or a man.

Nagarjuna's Precious Garland, condensing the meaning of that, says: 605

If a person is not earth, not water,
Not fire, not wind, not space,
Not consciousness, and not all of them,
What person is there other than these?

The passage 'a person is not earth, not water, not fire, not wind, not space, not consciousness' explains that a person is not each of the bases of the imputation 'person'. The statement 'not all' explains that a person is not even the composite of the bases of imputation 'person' [that is, not even the composite of the six constituents]. The statement 'What person is there other than these?' explains that there is no person which does not depend on [the six constituents that are] the bases of the imputation 'person'.

Thus, [70] the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras say that even [the highest of phenomena,] nirvanas and emptinesses, are only established [from the subject's side to] there [the object's side] through names and thoughts. Similarly, [the Prasangika system,] unlike Svatantrika and so forth, asserts that the members of the
following list, except for being different names, are [hypothetical] synonyms. [The Prasangika system] treats these terms as [hypothetical] synonyms in that they are what is negated by the reasonings [proving emptiness. The terms that mean 'self in the view of selflessness are:]

1 existing 'on' [that is, as a natural predicate of] the object [which gets] the imputation
2 substantially existing
3 existing able to establish itself—[this term and the preceding term] are opposites of dependent-arising [as are all the others in the list]
4 existing by way of its own character
5 existing from [the object's] own side [rather than being imputed from the subject's side]
6 existing through its own power
7 truly existing
8 existing inherently.

Aryadeva's *Four Hundred* says:607

All these [phenomena] are not self-powered;
Thus, there is no self [inherent existence],

Chandrakirti's commentary says,608 'Here, that which has its own intrinsic existence, has inherent existence, has its own power, or has no dependence on another would exist by itself; therefore, it would not be a dependent-arising.'

*Correctness of the measure of what is negated*

(See pp.539-47.) The root text says: [71]

*The Madhyamikas, those free from the extremes,*
*Posit all actions and agents*
*In this [system] of no 'existence from [the object's] own side'*
*And of 'imputation by name and thought there [to the object]'*
*Anything coarser or finer than this*
*Is an extreme of permanence or annihilation.*
Thus, that which is to be refuted [by reasoning] must be identified from its subtlest level. For, if it is not, one cannot ascertain the actual non-existent which is the negative [of self]. For, Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:

> Without contacting the superimposed existent
> One cannot apprehend its non-existence.

Also, one cannot ascertain the emptiness of former and later births, for example, without ascertaining that aspect which is their non-existence by way of their own being. Thus, the emptiness of births is not ascertained through only perceiving an utter vacuity that is merely the non-perception of former and later births. Buddhapalita, the honorable Chandrakirti, and many others assert this; Buddhapalita says [in his commentary on Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*]:

> [The Nihilists say,] 'This world [or life] does not exist [as an effect of past lives]. A future world does not exist. [Also] spontaneously born sentient beings [such as hell-beings] do not exist,' and so forth. [72] What is the difference between their view and the [Madhyamikas'] view that all things are not produced and do not cease?

> [Answer:] There is a great difference between these two. Not knowing the meaning of emptiness, you think that these two are similar. Acting with equanimity [that is, indifference] when one has not analyzed [to find that all sentient beings should be valued equally] and acting with equanimity when one has so analyzed are similar only in that both can be characterized as acting with equanimity. However, acting with equanimity but without analysis is involved in the entwinements of ignorance. Acting with equanimity when one has analyzed [is the result of knowledge and] is used by the Supramundane Victors.

Just as these two differ very greatly, so here also the perceptions [found in the texts of the Nihilists] such as, 'This world does not exist,' [meaning that this life is not
the effect of other lives] are thoughts beclouded with ignorance. However, the other one [the Madhyamika] who sees that all phenomena are not [inherently] produced and do not [inherently] cease because they are empty of existing by way of their own being has preceded his conclusion with the mind of analysis. [73] Therefore, these two [Nihilist and Madhyamika] are very different.

Also, [Chandrakirti's] Clear Words says:

Here some say, 'The Madhyamikas are indistinguishable from Nihilists because they propound that virtuous and non-virtuous actions, agents, fruits, and all worlds [lives] are empty of inherent existence. Also, the Nihilists say that these are non-existent. Therefore, Madhyamikas are indistinguishable from Nihilists.'

It is not so.

How?

Madhyamikas are proponents of dependent-arising; they say that due to arising dependent on, or reliant on, causes and conditions all—this world, the next, and so forth—lack inherent existence. The Nihilists do not ascertain that future worlds [future lives] and so forth do not truly exist (abhava, dngos po med pa) because of being empty of inherent existence due to being dependent-arisings.

Therefore, [the Prasangikas] refute the subtle object of negation—that is, refute that even particles exist from their own side—[74] but know how to posit all actions and agents of cyclic existence and nirvana within [asserting] that all phenomena are only nominalities and only imputations by thought. [A person who maintains such a system] is a Madhyamika—one who does not abide in the extreme of existence or permanence [such as asserting that phenomena] exist inherently, etc., and who, [through propounding] the suitability of the existence of all phenomena conventionally as only nominalities, does not abide in the extreme
of non-existence or annihilation. As [Buddha] says in the Kashyapa Chapter: 613

[Inherent] existence is the one extreme. No [conventional] existence is the second extreme. That which is the center between these two is unanalyzable [because it cannot be analyzed just as it is by thinking about it], is undemonstrable [because it cannot be explained to another just as it is], is not a support [because it is not an object of the senses], is unperceivable [because from the viewpoint of the mind directly realizing it duality has disappeared], is unknowable [because it cannot be ascertained just as it is by a dualistic mind], and is placeless [because it is not a place or source of the afflictions]. Kashyapa, this is called the middle path, individual analysis of phenomena.

Also, such is said in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way: 614

'[Inherent] existence' is a holding to permanence.
'No [conventional] existence' is a view of nihilism.
Therefore, the wise do not abide in either
[Inherent] existence or no [conventional] existence.

Also, through affixing 'inherent existence' (svabhava, rang bzhin) [to the refutation of existence] the extreme of non-existence is avoided. [75] [This is because that which is negated as a predicate of phenomena is only inherent existence and not existence in general; a negation of existence in general would be an extreme of non-existence because phenomena do exist conventionally.] The extreme of [inherent] existence is avoided by [affirming that phenomena are] only imputations [and thus not inherently existent]. Therefore, the Svatantrikas' estimation of what is to be negated [merely true existence and not inherent existence] is coarser than that [of the Prasahgikas who refute that phenomena inherently exist even conventionally].

Also, with respect to this assertion of phenomena as only imputations, some Tibetans [wrongly] do not accept even worldly trueness and falseness. [It is true that there is no difference
between] an illusory horse created by a magician and an actual horse with respect to their existing or not in accordance with how they appear. [Both an illusory horse and an actual horse appear as if they inherently exist, but in fact do not; therefore, they equally do not exist even conventionally in accordance with how they appear.] However, if one does not accept a [worldly]\(^{615}\) trueness and falseness with respect to whether something does or does not exist, then one contradicts Chandrakirti:\(^{616}\)

If the world does not harm you, based on the world itself
Refute these [conventionalities].
You and the world debate about these,
And afterwards I will rely on the stronger.

And, 'Do not lose the conventionalities renowned in the world.'
And, 'Perceivers of falsities are asserted as two types [those perceiving the real and unreal relative to a worldly consciousness].'

One should understand that [not accepting any worldly trueness and falseness] does not pass beyond adhering to extremes. [Asserting a coarser object of negation] also does not pass beyond adhering to extremes. Thus, one should cast aside [such assertions].

REASONINGS REFUTING INHERENT EXISTENCE

This section has two parts [76]: brief indication and extensive explanation.

Brief indication of the reasonings refuting inherent existence
(See pp. 127-9.)

Question: [The two selflessnesses, i.e., the lack of inherent existence in persons and in other phenomena] are realized by way of separate reasonings. Is this similar to the opinion of Sva\danta\(\text{t}\)rikas and below [i.e., Chittamatrins] and some Tibetan 'Prasangikas' that the objects negated in the two selflessnesses differ in that the selflessness of persons is coarser and the selflessness of other phenomena is subtler?

Answer: [No, the two selflessnesses are realized by way of separate reasonings, but the object of negation, inherent existence, is
the same in each case; thus, one is not coarser or subtler than the other. Though the two selflessnesses do not differ in subtlety, the reasonings used for their realization are separate. In order to indicate this the root text says:

There are the two selves
Of persons and [other] phenomena.
The non-existence of these there
Is asserted as the two selflessnesses.
A self of [other] phenomena
Is refuted by the four:
The diamond slivers and so forth.
A self of persons is refuted
By the fivefold and sevenfold [reasons].
Both also [are refuted] by dependent-arising.

Chandrakrfti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred' says, 617

Here 'self is an inherent existence (svabhava) of phenomena, that is, non-dependence on another. The non-existence of this is selflessness. This [selflessness] is realized as twofold through a division into persons and [other] phenomena—a selflessness of persons and a selflessness of [other] phenomena. [77]

Thus, the self to be negated is non-dependence or non-reliance on another, the 'other' being terms, thoughts, and so forth. Absences of this self on its bases—persons and [other] phenomena—are respectively posited as the selflessness of persons and of phenomena. This is the thought of the master Buddhapalita.

Four types of reasonings refute a self of phenomena [other than persons], whereas a self of persons is refuted by the reasoning in sutra and in Nagarjuna's Treatise that is a searching for it in five ways. A self of persons is also refuted in Chandrakrfti's Supplement by the reasoning that is a searching for [but not finding the self] in seven ways. [Chandrakrfti added to the fivefold reasoning] two more refutations based on the teaching that the mere composite of the five aggregates is the basis of the
imputation [and not the I]; these refute the assertions that the mere composite of the aggregates is the self and that the shape [of the body] is the self.

Both selves [of persons and of phenomena] are refuted by the reasoning that they lack being one and many and by the reasoning that they are dependent-arisings. These will now be explained.
4 Refuting Inherently Existent Production

The extensive explanation of the reasonings refuting inherent existence has two parts: reasoning refuting a self of phenomena [other than persons] and reasoning refuting a self of persons together with an elimination of error.

The reasoning refuting a self of phenomena [other than persons] has four parts: (1) the diamond slivers, [78] (2) the [simultaneous] refutation of production of the four extremes and production of the existent, the non-existent, [both, and neither], (3) the refutation of production of the four alternative types, and (4) along with an elimination of error, the reasoning of dependent-arising making known [the absence of true existence in] all phenomena.

DIAMOND SLIVERS

(See pp.57-9, 131-50.) This section has two parts: statement of the reasons and of the proofs for the modes of the reasons.

Statement of the reasons

(See pp. 137-42.) Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Madhyamikas agree that when stating reasons to prove a thesis there should be
Meditation on Emptiness

no statement of proof without first overcoming the pointedness of the wrong view adhered to by the opponent with a demonstration of a [contradictory] consequence. However, here for the sake of easy exposition [a syllogism is put forth] in the root text:

Because production from self,
Other, both, or causelessly
Does not exist, inherently
Existent production does not exist.

The subjects, things which have production, have no inherently existent production because there is no production of them from themselves, from [inherently existent] others, from both, or causelessly—as in the case of a mirror image. Chandrakirti’s Supplement says:619 [79]

Because there is no production from self, or other, or both,
Or without relying on causes, things lack inherent existence.

Atfsha’s Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment says:620

Things are not produced from
Themselves, others, both, or
Causelessly; thus there is no
Inherent existence.

Truly established production would have to accord with one of these four extremes. Furthermore, if something is not produced from any of these four, it follows that it is not truly produced. Not only is this proved by reasoning, but also those who assert truly established production assert such. Therefore, it is not necessary to state a proof here [that not being produced from any of the four extremes entails an absence of truly existent production].

Proofs for the modes of the reasons

Non-production from self

(See pp. 136-40.) The root text says:

If [things] were produced from themselves,
[Their re-production] would be senseless and endless.
That which [already exists in something] is not [produced from] it,
Causes and effects would always be seen,
It would contradict worldly perception,
All objects and agents [of production] would be one. [80]

Some Samkhya's say, 'A sprout exists at the time of its seed or of its [causal] entity. Since the natures of both the seed and the sprout are a partless unit—being mutually each other—there is no confusion of effects with wrong causes, and production is possible. However, if at the time of the cause [the effect] were totally non-existent, a non-existent [effect] could not be produced. If [that which is non-existent at the time of its causes] were produced, then even the horns of a rabbit could be produced.'

The Sautrantikas and above [Chittamatrins and Madhyamikas] agree that in general a non-existent is not produced, and, therefore, an existent is produced. Furthermore, they agree that 'production' is so called because it is the attainment of an existent entity by what is non-existent previous to its production. No one [among the Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Madhyamikas] asserts, like the Samkhya's, that [a thing] is produced from its own entity or that it is produced again.

Hence, it follows about the subjects, things which have production, that their production again would be senseless because they would have previously attained their entity.

Objection: There is no necessity [that if things had previously attained their entity, their production again would be senseless].

Answer: It follows about the subjects, these [things], that their production would be endless because [for you] production again of what is already existent is meaningful.

Here also, the Samkhya might say, 'There is no necessity [that, if production again of what is already existent is purposeful, the production of things would be endless. For we Samkhya's say that what already exists in a non-manifest state must be produced or made manifest.]

However, his answer does not hit the mark because he does
not assert that what was previously non-existent [a non-existent manifestation] is newly produced. [Thus, he cannot say that a manifestation of the sprout which was previously non-existent is produced since he would fall away from his own theory of the production of the existent.]

Also, [81] it follows that there would be no point in production of something from itself because it would have already achieved its own entity.

Moreover, it follows either that a white seed only continues endlessly or that the production of only a green sprout continues endlessly because that which has already been produced would be produced again.

Furthermore, though a cause such as a white seed has disintegrated and is non-existent, its effect—a sprout—is seen. Thus, even the world does not accept the simultaneity of seed and sprout. [Therefore, the Samkhya's view] also contradicts what is seen.

It follows that the agent and the object of cause and effect [producer and produced] would be one because a thing would produce itself.

Buddhapalita [says in his commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise]:

Things are not produced from their own entities because [if they were] their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless. The production again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. If though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced.

Chandrakrfti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'

There is no point in the production of something from itself [that is, from a cause that is the same entity as itself because it would have already attained existence]. [82]

Also, it is just not reasonable that what already has been produced be produced again.
If it is thought that the already produced is produced again, the growing of a sprout, etc., would not be found here [in the world]; the seed would be produced endlessly.

How could that [seed] be destroyed by that [sprout? For, according to you, seed and sprout are not other.]

For you, the sprout's shape, color, taste, capacity, and maturation would not be different from those of its creator cause, the seed.

If, having forsaken the entity [of the state] of the seed, it becomes an entity [of a state] different from it, then how could it have the nature of that [seed]?

If for you the seed is not other than the sprout here [in the world], just as the seed [is unapprehendable at the time of the sprout], the sprout would not be apprehendable. Or, because they are one, just as the sprout [is apprehendable], so the seed would be apprehendable [at the time of the sprout]. Therefore, this [non-otherness of seed and sprout] is not to be asserted.

Though the cause is destroyed, the effect is seen; [83] thus, even the world does not assert that they are one. Therefore, this ascription of things arising from self is not admissible in reality or even in the world.

If production from self were asserted, the produced and the producer—object and agent—would be one. Since they are not one, production from self is not to be asserted because of the fallacies extensively explained [here and in Nagarjuna's Treatise].

Non-production from other

This section has two parts: the actual exposition of the proofs of non-production from other and an elimination of error.

Actual exposition of non-production from other. (See pp.140-44.)

The root text says:

If things were produced from [what is inherently] other,
Then darkness would arise from a flame,
And all would arise from all,  
Both causes and non-causes.  
Because [cause and effect would be] other,  
They could not be one continuum, like wheat and barley.  
Cause and effect would have to be simultaneous,  
But because it is not so, what production  
Is there of another from another?

If it is claimed that there is inherently existent and thus analytically findable production from what is other, then it contradicts many scriptures and reasons. The reasons are as follows.

It [absurdly] follows that thick darkness arises from a flame because another arises from what is other by way of its own character. Also, the Superior [Nagarjuna] says:

A [naturally existent] otherness  
Of cause and effect is never admissible.  
If there were an otherness of cause and effect,  
A cause would be the same as a non-cause.

Thus, it [absurdly] follows that all would arise from what are its causes and from what are not its causes because cause and effect would be naturally existent others. Chandrakirti’s Supplement says:

If depending on others another arises, then even from a tongue of fire thick darkness would arise. All would also be produced from all because even non-producers [non-causes] would have otherness the same [as producers or causes].

Objection: The fallacies of these consequences do not apply. [Though a cause and its effect are naturally existent others] an effect which is helped [by a cause] is the effect of that [cause]. [85] A substantial cause and its effect are included in the one continuum of [for instance] a seed; they must be one continuum. That which is of a continuum different [from the effect] is not suitable to be [its] substantial cause, etc. For example, a barley seed is the cause of a barley sprout which is in its same continuum but is not a cause of a kimshuka flower.
[In answer to this, there are these contradictory consequences:]

It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, a barley seed—a substantial cause—and a barley sprout—its effect—are not one continuum because [according to you] they mutually are naturally existent others, as in the case of Maitreya and Upagupta or as in the case of wheat and barley.

It follows that a seed and its sprout are not naturally existent others because they do not exist simultaneously and also because, when cause and effect are naturally existent others, the actions of production and cessation, etc., are impossible. The Superior [Nagarjuna says in his *Treatise on the Middle Way*]:

The entities of the things [which are effects such as sprouts] do not exist in their causes [either collectively or individually or in something other than their causes]. If [the effect's] own entity does not exist [at the time of its causes], then how could there be an entity of otherness [in the causes without the existence of the effect in relation to which they are called other]? [86]

Chandrakirti’s *Supplement* says:

*Objection:* Just this is called something's effect because that something is able to create it. That which is able to produce it, even though [a naturally existent] other, is the cause. [Therefore, because of being special others, two things are cause and effect but not because of just being others in general.] Because there is production from what is included in the same continuum and from what is a producer, a sprout of rice is not [produced] from a barley [seed], etc.

*Answer:* Barley, the *kesara* lotus, the *kimshuka* flower, and so forth [because of being other than a rice shoot] are not asserted to be producers of a rice shoot, do not have the capacity [of producing a rice shoot], are not included in the same continuum [as a rice shoot], and are not [what precedes a rice shoot and is] homogeneous
[with a rice shoot]. Just so, a rice seed also does not have these [four qualities] because it is just [a naturally existent] other.

Sprout and seed do not exist simultaneously. [The sprout in relation to which a seed is called 'other' does not exist at the same time as the seed, and thus there is no otherness.] Without otherness how could the seed be other [than the sprout]? Thus, it is not established that a sprout is produced from a seed. Cast aside this position that there is production from the [naturally existent] other.

*Objection:* Just as the ascending and descending of the two ends of a scale are not seen to be non-simultaneous, [87] so the production of what is to be produced and the cessation of the producer are [simultaneous. Therefore, cause and effect exist simultaneously and thus can be other in relation to each other.]

*Answer:* [Even] if [the two activities of the ascending and descending of the two ends of a scale] are simultaneous, here [in what is exemplified] there is no [simultaneity]; it is non-existent. Because that which is presently being produced [for example, a sprout] is approaching production, it is non-existent. That which is presently ceasing [for example, a seed], though existent, is asserted to be approaching disintegration. Thus, how is this similar to a scale [the activities of the two ends of which exist simultaneously]? When [the sprout which acts as the base of the action of growing and thus is] the agent is non-existent, [the existence of the activity of the sprout's] growing is also not an admissible entity.

Here, some Svatantrika-Madhyamikas say:

It is true that there is no truly existent otherness and no simultaneity of [truly existent] actions of production and cessation. However, is it not the thought of the *Rice Seedling Sutra* [when it gives the example of the two ends of a scale] [632] that without analysis the actions of the seed's
cessation and of the sprout's production simultaneously exist from their own side?

However, damage accrues to this view the same as before. The thought of the sutra is that these activities exist conventionally, not from their own side.

*Objection:* [According to you Prasahgikas, production is not admissible because of the non-existence of otherness which in turn is due to the non-simultaneity of seed and sprout. If so, then production would exist because of the existence of otherness in whatever exists simultaneously. For example] an eye consciousness is produced through depending on an eye sense, a visible form, and feeling which just are simultaneous [with the eye consciousness]. Therefore, production from other is just established.

*Answer:* It follows that the subject, an eye consciousness, is not produced from others which exist simultaneously with it and which are its producers—that is, a visible form, an eye sense, feeling, and so forth—because of already existing simultaneously with these as another. Chandrakirti’s *Supplement* says.

*Objection:* An eye consciousness has otherness in relation to its producers, an eye sense and so forth which exist simultaneously [with the eye consciousness] and the discrimination and so forth which arise together [with an eye consciousness].

*Answer:* Of what use is production [to what already exists]?

*Objection:* [An eye consciousness] does not exist [at the time of its causes].

*Answer:* For this the fallacy [that the eye sense etc. would not be other than a not yet existent eye consciousness] has already been explained.

**Elimination of error concerning the refutation of production from other**

(See pp. 144-8.) The root text says:

*That others temporally different are refuted is mistaken.*
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[Using] a mass exactly the same and so forth are also mistaken.  
Because the four extremes are not asserted  
And because production from other is said  
To be non-existent even in the world,  
Its assertion here is a dance of the insane.

As Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement' says,* some Tibetans assert that this refutation of production from other is a refutation of others that are temporally different [without the qualification of being naturally existent]. Also, some Tibetans use 'logical' coercives which are exactly the same [instead of good logic. These assertions] etc. are easily understood to be erroneous.

Dak-tsang, as was explained before [in chapter eleven which is not translated here] here again [89] asserts production from other. This assertion shows the nature of one who wishes to do a dance having cut off the head of a crazy, dancing peacock and hung it on his behind. For, you [Dak-tsang] quoted the *Rice Seedling Sutra.*

Also, when a sprout is produced, arising from its cause—a seed—it is not created by itself, not created by [naturally existent] others, not created by both, not created by Ishvara, and not metamorphosed by time. It does not arise from particles, does not arise from its own nature, and is not produced causelessly.

Also, you are seeking to explicate the system of this passage from Chandrakirti's *Clear Words.*

The world does not employ analysis such as 'from self or 'from [naturally existent] others' and so forth. The world understands only this, 'An effect arises from a cause.' The master [Nagarjuna] presented [cause and effect] this way too.

Also, Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says, 'Production from other is non-existent even in the world.' [90]
Non-production from both self and other
(See p. 148-9.) The root text says:

Because there is no [production]
From self and other separately,
Production from both is refuted.

Both the [theistic] Samkhyas who propound Ishvara as the cause [of all phenomena together with the nature] and the Nirgranthas [Jainas] assert, as was explained before [in chapters three and seven which are not translated here], that pots and so on are produced both from themselves and from others.

These assertions are inadmissible because that part of the assertion which is the production of something from self is damaged by the earlier refutations of production from self and that part which is production from other is damaged by the earlier reasonings refuting production from other. Chandrakftti's Supplement says:

Also, production from both is not an admissible entity because those fallacies already set forth accrue [to the assertion of production of something from both self and others].

Non-production without causes
(See p. 149-50.) The root text says:

If things were produced causelessly,
Exertion would be senseless.
It would contradict perception.
All would be produced from all.

It [absurdly] follows that planting seeds, cooking food, and engaging in commerce for the sake of the arising of temporary and final effects are senseless [91] because, though there are no causes, effects arise. Also, it [absurdly] follows that crows would have the decorations of peacock feathers and that horses would have horns. Also, it [absurdly] follows that, just as a bread-fruit tree would not be a cause of that tree's fruit, so trees bearing nimba [a bitter fruit],
mango, and so forth also would not be the causes of their own fruit.\textsuperscript{641} Also, it [absurdly] follows that the ripening of mangos, \textit{lakucha} [a type of bread fruit],\textsuperscript{642} and so forth would not depend on the seasons because they would be produced causelessly.

Even if these consequences are accepted, it is not admissible because there is much damage [to asserting such]. For instance, not only does causeless production contradict what is seen by the world, it strongly contradicts what is seen by the world. Chandrakirti’s \textit{Supplement} says:\textsuperscript{642n}

\begin{quote}
If it is viewed that [things] are produced only causelessly, then everything would always be produced from even everything, and for the sake of the arising of certain effects the world also would not gather seeds and so forth, doing many hundreds of things [for the sake of those effects].
\end{quote}

These positions were refuted formerly [in chapter two on the Nihilists which is not translated here]. [92]
5 Other Types of Production

SIMULTANEOUS REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION OF THE FOUR EXTREMES AND OF THE EXISTENT, NON-EXISTENT, BOTH, AND NEITHER

(See pp.61-3, 151-4.) The root text says:

If [things] are produced from others, 
Consider [whether the effects are] 
Existent, non-existent, both, or neither. 
Of what use [are causes] for the existent? 
The non-existent lacks object and agent. 
These [reasonings] refute their being both. 
What would causes do for what lacks both?

No things have any of the three—inhertently existent production, abiding, or ceasing—or production from [inhertently existent] others. For the existent, non-existento, both, and neither are not produced. As before, [reasoning and others' systems establish that if things have inherently existent production, abiding, and ceasing or production from inherently existent others], it is necessary [that the effect must be either existent, non-existento, both, or neither].

Furthermore, among the four modes of the reason, [first] that
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which has already attained an existent entity is not produced again because the damages to production from self are incurred. The totally non-existent is not produced because of having no activity. That which is both existent and non-existent is not produced because, since the two—existence and non-existence—are mutually exclusive, they do not subsist in one entity. That which is neither existent nor non-existent is not produced because such does not exist. Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness says: 

Because the existent exists, it is not produced. [93]
Because the non-existent does not exist, it is not [produced].
Because the qualities are incompatible,
The existent and non-existent is not [produced].
Because there is no production,
There is no abiding and no ceasing.

Nagarjuna's own commentary on this says: 

Because a thing (bhava, dngos po) exists, it could not be produced from causes. For the existent is explained as 'the presently existent'. Because the non-existent does not exist, it could not be produced from causes. Because the existent and non-existent are not concordant, such is not produced, for they are mutually exclusive. The existent and the non-existent possess mutually exclusive qualities; hence, due to their incompatibility how could that which is both existent and non-existent be produced? Because there is no [inherently existent] production, there also is no [inherently existent] abiding and no [inherently existent] ceasing.

Chandrakirti's Supplement says: 

If producers are causes producing products that are other [than themselves], it is to be considered whether they produce an existent, non-existent, that which is both, or that which lacks both. If it exists, of what use are producers? What could these producers do for the
non-existent? What could they do for that which is both?
What could they do for that which lacks both? [94]

In Chandrakirti's own commentary the reasons are individually established.\(^{646}\)

Atisha's *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment* says:\(^{641}\)

The production of the existent is not admissible.
The non-existent also is like a flower of the sky.
Because both fallacies are entailed,
That which is both is not produced.

Chandrakirti's *Supplement* applies [this refutation of production of the four extremes] to production from other, whereas the Superior [Nagarjuna] and the Elder Atisha give general explanations [of it without specifying production from other]. They refute not only production but also abiding and ceasing.\(^{648}\)

Moreover, because there are four alternatives to be considered—only existent, only non-existent, both, and neither—this reasoning can be called a refutation of four alternatives [and not just four extremes]. Therefore, do not think that a refutation of the four alternatives (*mu bzhi*) precludes a refutation of the four extremes (*mtha' bzhi*).

**REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION OF THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES**

This section has two parts: the actual exposition of the reasoning and an elimination of error.

*Actual exposition of the reasoning refuting production of the four alternatives*

(See pp.63-4, 155-9.) As is stated in Kamalashila's *Illumination of the Middle Way*,\(^{w5}\) our own Buddhist schools which propound [truly existent] things say:

It is not admissible that there is no true production, for it is said and seen that there is production of many effects and of one effect from one cause—[for example] a seed—
and that many causes and conditions also [95] produce many effects and one effect.

In order to refute the systems that assert such, the root text says:

*Things are not truly produced by causes.*
*One does not produce one, nor many one,*
*Nor one many, nor many many.*

The subjects, things, are not ultimately produced by causes because ultimately one cause does not produce one effect, ultimately many causes do not produce many effects, ultimately one cause does not produce many effects, and ultimately many causes do not produce one effect. For there are reasons captivating to the intelligent. For example, if one eye consciousness has the imprints of many causes, then it would not ultimately be produced by one cause. Also, it would [absurdly] follow that just as the causes are many, the effect which is their imprint would be many consciousnesses. [96] Jnanagarbha's *Discrimination of the Two Truths* says:

*Many do not create one thing,*
*Many do not create many,*
*One does not create many,*
*One does not create many things,*
*One also does not create one.*

Also:

You [Proponents of Truly Existent Things] assert that [an eye consciousness which is] the effect [of three causes —object, eye sense, and former moment of consciousness—] is not plural but that its qualities [that is, the qualities of its being produced in the image of the object, of its ability to apprehend a particular type of object such as visible forms rather than sounds, and of its being an experiencer], are different. Thus, alas, why not [assert] that Ishvara creates [everything]?

Also:
Just as it would be contradictory for an eye consciousness to be simultaneously produced [from a form] and not produced [from a form], so say why it would not be contradictory [for the form to be ultimately \(^{(yang \ dag \ par)}\) a producer [of the eye consciousness] and not a producer [of the eye consciousness]? [97]

Also:

If it is asserted that the [three imprints or qualities] are produced from [the composite of the three] causes, the individual [causes] would not be the producers. Also, if [the three causes] are [individually the producers, the eye consciousness which is] the effect would be causeless.

Also:

If you assert that [the eye consciousness which is] the effect is produced from [the three] causes, then it [absurdly] follows that the [three imprints or qualities which are] plural and the [eye consciousness which is] non-plural would, as before, be causeless.

Elimination of error concerning the refutation of the four alternatives
(See pp. 159-60.) The root text says:

*Because one produces one and
Because the others are suitable,
Not affixing here a qualification
Of what is negated is mistaken.*

Here also Dak-tsun says that because the four alternatives—one cause producing one effect, etc.—are non-existent, [98] a qualification such as 'ultimately' or 'naturally' should not be affixed to what is negated [in the four reasons].\(^{651}\) This is not correct because it is asserted that [conventionally] a cause, such as one instant of the eye sense, produces one effect, one instant of an eye consciousness. Also, Chandrakirti's *Clear Words*, when [giving an etymology of] dependent-arising (*pratityasamutpada*), says: \(^{652}\)
In a passage such as, 'Dependent on an eye sense and forms an eye consciousness arises,' a particular object [of dependence] has been openly accepted [—'dependent on an eye sense']. When the production of one consciousness, which has as its cause one eye sense, has been asserted, how could the term pratitya have the meaning of multiplicity?

Also, the same text at the point of giving the meaning of the term 'direct perceiver' (pratyaksha) says:

Because there is no sense of [an eye consciousness's depending on] a multiplicity [of sense powers], one eye consciousness which has as its base one moment of an [eye] sense could not be a pratyaksha [according to the wrong etymology as 'depending on a multiplicity of sense powers'].

Also, Chandrakirti's commentary on Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:

How could one moment of a consciousness be & pratyaksha [i.e., that which depends on a multiplicity of sense powers, according to the wrong etymology]? For [one moment of consciousness] does not engage [its object] through depending on a multiplicity of sense powers. [One moment of an eye consciousness does not depend on a multiplicity of sense powers of dissimilar type, such as also depending on an ear sense] because they are non-compatible. [Also, one moment of an eye consciousness does not directly depend on a multiplicity of former and later moments of a sense power of similar type, i.e., eye senses] because the moments of the sense power and of the consciousness [99] disintegrate right after they are produced.

Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge, for instance, contains collections of individual sutra teachings explaining that one action [in one lifetime] empowers many bodies [in other lifetimes], that
many actions empower one body, that many actions empower many bodies, and that one action empowers one body. Such is asserted also here in Prasangika texts. Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:

The effects [produced] by one clear consciousness [which is enthusiastic in cultivating the first concentration, etc.] are [births in the rank of] a Brahma, etc. [However, if the mind is not powerful] the effect [of the consciousnesses well as of body and speech is not such because the activity is weak.

Also, as quoted earlier, the fruits of one moment of faith in Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are immeasurable. Also, there is the explanation that if one even makes a ritual object called *sachcha* the essence of which is a relic, one will be born as a universal emperor as many times as there are particles in it.

However, if one's base or mind is weak, though one performs virtues and so on for a long time, [100] the effects are small. Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:

[Buddha] the Knower of Suchness said
That though one performs for a long time
All the repetitions and asceticisms,
Doing them with a mind distracted is useless.

Also, sutra says, 'O monks, asceticisms, recitations, and so forth when the mind is distracted to desire are fruitless.' Also, Shantideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds* says:

Due to a sin done even for a single moment
One dwells in the Most Tortuous Hell for an eon.

Similarly, one should realize [that production of one effect from one cause, and so forth, exist conventionally] through many biographies and [Buddha's] life stories. One should look in Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra*, Shantideva's *Compendium of Learnings*, and so forth [for further confirmation].

In brief, Kamalashila's *Illumination of the Middle Way* says:
Question: Is it not seen that many are produced from one and that one is produced from many? [101] Therefore, how can these [views] be forsaken?

Answer: These are not [ultimately] admissible, but even we are not proving that these are not seen.

Thus, he explains that [the four alternative types of production] are not admissible ultimately but are not not manifestly perceived. Also, Kamalashfla's *Illumination of the Middle Way* says:

The master [Nagarjuna] also saw that cause and effect exist conventionally and that conventionally there is, as reputed, production of many from one and of one from many. Also, he realized that the attributes of an eye consciousness and so forth exist through the operation or non-operation of an eye sense and so forth. Thus, in order to take care of childish beings, when demonstrating the usage of effect-signs (phalalihga, 'bras rtags) he said that if the causes were plural, [the effects] would be plural. However, it is to be known that it is not so ultimately.
6 Dependent-Arising

The presentation of the reasoning of dependent-arising, making known the absence of true existence in all phenomena, has two parts: the actual exposition of dependent-arising and a refutation of errors.

**ACTUAL EXPOSITION OF DEPENDENT-ARISING**

(See pp.53-5, 161-71.) The root text says:

*Because here there are no phenomena That are not dependent-arisings [102] And because dependent-arising [means] Only 'existing upon meeting', 'Existing in reliance', and 'existing dependently'; All phenomena are not able to set themselves up And do not exist from their own side. Profound and extensive, eradicating the two extremes, This is the king of reasonings.*

Unlike the Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things, here [in the Prasangika system] phenomena which are not dependent-arisings are not asserted. For whatever exists must both be
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relatively existent and lack inherent existence. Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* says:\(^{662}\)

Because there are no phenomena
That are not dependent-arisings,
There are no phenomena that are not
Empty [of inherent existence].

Also, Aryadeva's *Four Hundred* says:\(^{663}\)

There is not ever anywhere
Anything's existence without dependence.
Thus there is also not ever anywhere
Any permanent [self]. [103]

Common beings think
Space and so forth are permanent [realities].
The wise do not see these as realities
Even with worldly [understanding].

Also, [the *Questions of the King of Nagas, Sagara,* Sutra] says:\(^{664}\)

The wise realize phenomena as dependent-
Arisings, they also rely not on extreme views.
They know phenomena as having causes and conditions.
There are no phenomena without causes and conditions.

Also, Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* says:\(^{665}\)

Thus, 'There are no phenomena that are not dependent-
arisings,' and dependent-arisings are also empty. Hence,
'There are no phenomena that are not empty.'

Also, Nagarjuna's *Treatise* says:\(^{666}\)

We explain 'arising dependent [on causes and
conditions]' [104]
As [the meaning of] the emptiness [of inherently existent
production].
That [emptiness of inherently existent production] is
dependent imputation.
Just this [emptiness of inherently existent production] is
the middle path.
Also, Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* says:\(^{667}\)

Due to lacking the two extremes of [inherent] existence and non-existence, just this emptiness which is characterized as no inherently existent production is called the middle path, the middle passage. Therefore, emptiness, dependent imputation, and middle path are synonyms of dependent-arising [for one who has generated the Madhyamika view in his continuum].

With respect to the term 'dependent-arising' (*pratityasamutpada*) and its meaning, the Grammarians say that if what depend and meet are cause and effect, then because effect would exist at the time of cause, 'arising' would be impossible. Also, it would contradict the non-assertion of the existence of the effect at the time of its causes. Thus, they do not accept either the term *pratityasamutpada* or its meaning.

Also, the [Buddhist]\(^{668}\) Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things assert that all dependent-arisings are truly existent and are products. [105] Therefore, the attempt to prove a selflessness [which means no true existence] through the reason of dependent-arising proves just the opposite for them. [In syllogistic form, this is: the subject, a sprout, is not inherently produced because of being a dependent-arising. About this]\(^{669}\) Dzong-ka-ba's *Praise of Dependent-Arising* says:\(^{670}\)

How can those who see the opposite [proved] and those who see [the reason] as non-established understand your [i.e., Buddha's] system [of emptiness as no inherent existence]?'

In [Chandrakirti's commentary on] Nagarjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* [a qualm is raised by an objector about whether dependent-arising can serve as a sign of no inherently existent production]:\(^{671}\)

Here some say, 'Your way of speaking is one that never existed before. It is not reasonable that the term "dependent-arising" indicates no production and no cessation.
Just as your saying, "A child was born," would not mean you were saying, "A child was not born," this [usage of dependent-arising to prove no production and no cessation] is just inadmissible.

For extensive [discussion on the Grammarians' non-acceptance and others' misinterpretations of dependent-arising] see Vasubandhu's own explanation of his *Treasury of Knowledge* (*Abhidharmakoshabhashya*) and its Commentary (*Abhidharmakosha-tika*) by Rajaputra Yashomitra\(^{672}\) and also Vasubandhu's Commentary on the 'Sutra on Dependent-Arising'(*Pratityasamutpadadivibhahganirdesha*) and its Explanation by Gunamati.

Because there are also different ways of forming the term *pratityasamutpada*, I have arranged the interpretations of the former great translators and [grammatical references] to Kalapa's Aphorisms (*Kalapasiitra*) and Chandragomin's Grammar (*Chandravyakaranasiitra*) \(^{106}\) and will explain a little the thought of Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* on the topic.

**Correct way of interpreting dependent-arising**

This section has two parts: formation of the term *pratityasamutpada* and explanation [of its meaning].

**Formation of pratityasamutpada**

(See pp.163.) To form *pratityasamutpadah* put down the root for going, *in*. Erase the *n* since it is an indicatory letter. Put down *i*; before it *prati*. [The nominative ending] *su* is added to this. Due to its being an indeclinable,\(^{673}\) *su* disappears.

*Chandragomin's Grammar* (I.iii.129) says,\(^{674}\) 'Ktva is suitable when alam and khalu have a prohibitive [sense]. After *men.* [Affix it] to the former in time of two [actions with] the same agent.' Also, in *Kalapa's Aphorisms* the sixth section on verbal affixes says,\(^{675}\) 'Also, *ktva* [is affixed] when *alam* and *khalu* have a prohibitive sense. After *men.* [Affix it] to the anterior of [actions with] the same agent.' Therefore, [the continuative] *ktva* is added.

*Chandragomin's Grammar* (V.iv.6) says,\(^{676}\) 'In a compound which does not have the negative particle, *lyap* [is substituted]
for *ktva*. Therefore, *ktva* changes to *lyap*. According to the sixth section on verbal affixes in *Kalapa's Aphorisms*, *ktva* becomes *yap*, but Chandrakṛtṛi's *Clear Words* accords with *Chandragomin's Grammar*. [107]

Because the *l* of *lyap* is for the sake of accent and the letter^ is indicatory of the addition of the augment *tuk*, they are erased. Put down *ya*.

*Chandragomin's Grammar* (V.i.69) says, [Affix] *tuk* to a [root ending in] a short [vowel] which has no personal ending when [a verbal affix] having an indicatory *p* follows.' Therefore, *tuk* is added between *i* and *ya*.

Because the *k* is indicatory and the *u* is for the sake of pronunciation, the two are erased. Put down *t*.

In *Kalapa's Aphorisms* the first section on verbal affixes says, [Affix] *t* to the end of a root which has an indicatory/).' [Because] the consonant has no vowel, it is drawn to the latter letter. Thus, *tya* is achieved.

*Chandragomin's Grammar* (V.i.106) says, 'When a simple vowel [is followed by] a simple vowel, the long [corresponding vowel is the single substitute for both vowels].' Thus, joining *prati* and *i*, make [the vowel long], *Pratitya* is achieved; it is a stem.

*Chandragomin's Grammar* (II.i.93) says, 'When the meaning only [of the noun is denoted], the first [case is employed].' Thus, the singular of the first case, *su* is added. According to *Kalapa's Aphorisms* it is *si*.

*Chandragomin's Grammar* (II.i.38) says, 'The case affix is erased after an indeclinable.' *Kalapa's Aphorisms* says, 'After an indeclinable also [the case affix is erased].' Thus, the *si* [or *sm*] is erased; thereby, *pratitya* is achieved. It is used for three [meanings]: 'having met', 'having relied', and 'having depended'. [108] Here in the Prasangika system, it is explained [that *pratitya* refers to any of these three meanings] according to the context and that it does not necessarily mean just one of them.

Also, *pachas* the sense of 'going'. Put down *pad*. Before it, put down the prefix *ut*, and before it put down *sam*. *Su* is added to these two and is erased as before [due to their being indeclinables].
Chandragomin’s Grammar (I.iii.7) says,683 ‘ghan, [the verbal affix a causing the substitution of vrddhi for the preceding vowel, comes] also when an action [is denoted].’ [In Kalapa’s Aphorisms] the fifth section on verbal affixes says,684 ‘[The affix] ghan [comes] after [the roots] pad, ruj, vish, sprsh, and uch.’ Therefore, at the end of the root pad, ghan is added. The significatory gh and the n which signifies vrddhi are erased. Put down the a which is the life otgha. The initial of the root is augmented. Putting [these parts] together in stages, one achieves samutpada.

Chandragomin’s Grammar (II.i.93) says,685 ‘When the meaning only [of the noun is denoted] the first [case is employed].’ Thus, to this add su; erase u. Also, (VI.iii.98),686 ‘For the [final] s and the sh of sajush, ru [is substituted at the end of a word].’ s becomes ru.

Chandragomin’s Grammar (V.i.19) says,687 ‘[The u is the substitute] of ru when [it is followed by] a soft consonant and [preceded] by a non-protracted a.’ Thus, the u, being indicatory, is erased.

Chandragomin’s Grammar (VI.iv.20?) says,688 ‘When there is a pause, visarga [is substituted for r].’ Thus, r is made into visarga; samutpadah is achieved. It is explained at this point as meaning 'arising', 'established', and 'existing'. [109]

Explanation of the meaning of dependent-arising (see pp.164.) Thus, the meaning of pratTtyasamutpada is the arising of things dependent on causes. For prati is a prefix meaning 'meeting', and i is the root for going, in, but—with the continuative ending and modified by the prefix prati—pratTtya is used for 'meeting' and 'relying'. Also, pada with samut before it is used for 'arising' and at other times is also explained as 'existing' (sat) and 'established' (siddha). Chandrakirti’s Clear Words says,689

Prati has the meaning of meeting (prapti, phrad pa). [The verbal root] i has the meaning of going. Here the term pratTtya, a continuative, is used for 'meeting' or 'relying' because of the modification of the meaning of the verbal root by the modifier [prefix]. It is explained, 'The meaning of the verbal root is led forcefully
elsewhere by a modifier [prefix], like the sweetness of the waters of the Ganges [110] [being changed] by ocean water.' [The root] pad preceded by samut means 'arise' (pradurbhava, 'byung ba); therefore, the term samutpada is used for 'arising'. Hence, the meaning of pratityasamutpada is 'the arising of things in reliance on causes and conditions'.

Many commentators who have written about this explanation think that lyap is the [Sanskrit] equivalent of [the genitive particle] kyi [in Tibetan], They are also seen to make coarse errors about prati and iti. Also, though the great translator Sthiramati forms the term pratityasamutpada, it is not clear. Having seen that without understanding these [explanations of the formation of pratityasamutpada] one does not understand the early part of Chandrakirti's Clear Words, I have clearly expounded a little, free from error.

Refutation of error concerning the etymology of pratityasamutpada

This section has two parts: refutation of other commentators' formation and of Bhavaviveka's.

Refutation of the formation of pratityasamutpada by other commentators

This section has two parts: statement of their assertion and refutation of it.

Statement of other commentators' assertion on the formation of pratityasamutpada (See p.163-4.) Some former commentators on Nagarjuna's Treatise, other than Buddhapalita and Bhavaviveka, say:

The term prati has a distributive meaning like 'diversely' or 'this and that'. [III] [The verbal root] i or in has the meaning of 'going', or 'departing and disintegrating'. Itya, which is the affix ya added to the verbal root, means 'that which goes'. Taking itya as a secondary
derivative noun, \textit{[pratTyasamutpada means]} the arising of what possesses departing or disintegrating diversely, diversely.

Chandrakrfti's \textit{Clear Words} says:$^{691}$

Others say that \textit{[the noun]} \textit{iti} means going, disintegrating. \textit{Itya} means that which is conducive to going.$^{692}$ \textit{Prati} has the sense of multiplicity. Having explained that the term \textit{itya} has an ending for a secondary derivative noun, they say \textit{[pratTyasamutpada means]} the arising of those which go or disintegrate, diversely, diversely \textit{(pratiprati ityanam vinashinam samutpada)}.

Bhavaviveka's \textit{Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom'} says,$^{693}$ 'Some others say that the arising of those which disintegrate diversely is \textit{pratTyasamutpada}'. Avalokitavrata's \textit{Commentary (PrajnapradTpatTka)} on this says:$^{694}$

The 'some others' are some other proponents of Madhyamika tenets.$^{695}$ [112] 'The arising of those which disintegrate diversely' means the composition and arising of effects that disintegrate in each diverse moment and have definite, diverse causes and conditions; it is synonymous with 'arising upon meeting'.

[In Bhavaviveka's text] 'is \textit{pratTyasamutpada}' indicates the conclusion of the meaning of the preceding words. It indicates that the composition and arising of effects that disintegrate in each diverse moment and have definite, diverse causes and conditions is \textit{pratTyasamutpada}. Proponents of Madhyamika tenets other than the commentator [Bhavaviveka] himself say this.

When they form the term \textit{pratTyasamutpada}, the \textit{n} of the verbal root for going, \textit{in}, is erased. [The zero affix] \textit{kvip} is added and entirely erased. ' \textit{T} is suitable [to be affixed] at the end of a root which has an indicatory/).'\textsuperscript{696} Because of the sense of 'going' [an action noun], \textit{t} is added. Since it was said, \textit{Ya} [is affixed] also as an affix for derivative nouns [meaning] "good in that you which is
an affix for derivative nouns is added. [The case ending] si is added. [113] When this is joined with prati, there is [the noun] pratTtyah. The rest [of their formation of prati tyasamutpadah] is similar to that given above. Chandrakirti, Bhavaviveka, and Avalokitavrata refute this assertion that there is a case ending [that is, a genitive ending making pratTyam] which has been deleted [in the compound].

Refutation of these other commentators' way of forming pratt tya-

samutpada (see pp.163-4.) Their explanation of prati as meaning multiplicity and itya as being a derivative noun is not correct. For, the explanation of prati as meaning multiplicity, though suitable for just general [applications of the term], does not cover specific applications. A term for 'many' or multiplicity is [hypothetically] suitable when a general [reference for the term is given as in], 'He who sees prati tyasamutpada, that is, the arising of those which depart or disintegrate diversely, [sees suchness].' In yah pratityasamutpadam pashyati the term pratityasamutpadam is a compound; therefore, it is [hypothetically] correct that a case-ending inside the compound could have been deleted. However, when a particular referent is given as in, 'An eye consciousness is produced depending on an eye sense and a form' chakshuh pratitya rupam cha upadaye chakshurvijnanam, multiplicity is not suitable in one particular. Her pratitya is not compounded with anything. It is not suitable [to say that] there is a compound here because the Sanskrit original for 'and' (cha) in 'an eye sense and a form' was not deleted and [the accusative ending] am of 'on a form' (rupam) was not deleted. Also, there is no case ending to be seen from the end of pratitya until chakshuh. This is because [pratitya is here just] fit to be an indeclinable, a continuative. Chandrakirti's Clear Words says: Their etymology would be excellent in a passage such as, 'O monks, I will teach you prati tyasamutpada,' or 'He who sees prati tyasamutpada sees suchness.' For the meaning of multiplicity occurs, and there is a compound [thus allowing for the possibility that pratitya means pratTtyanam].
However, here in a passage such as, 'Dependent on an eye sense and forms an eye consciousness is produced,' a particular object [of dependence] has been openly accepted—'dependent on an eye sense'. When the production of one consciousness, which has as its cause one eye sense, has been asserted, how could the term \textit{pratTtya} have the meaning of multiplicity?

However, the meaning of 'meeting' occurs in the term \textit{pratTtya} even when a specific object is not asserted; arising having met [causes and conditions] is dependent-arising. Also, [the meaning of 'meeting'] occurs when a specific object is asserted, [115] for it is said that dependent on an eye and forms—that is, meeting an eye and forms or in reliance on an eye and forms—[an eye consciousness arises].

If the term \textit{itya} were a derivative noun, then here in 'Dependent on an eye sense and forms an eye consciousness is produced' (\textit{chakshuh pratTtya rupani cha utpad-yate chakshurvijnanam}) the term \textit{pratTtya} would [absurdly] not be an indeclinable. Also, since there would not be a compound, a case termination would be present [at the end of \textit{pratTtya}]. The reading would [absurdly] be: \textit{chakshuh pratTtyam vijnanam rupani cha}, 'That which departs to an eye sense and to forms, a consciousness, [arises].' And [since such is total nonsense] it is not so. Therefore, its etymology as just an indeclinable, a continuative, is to be accepted.

The meaning [is that \textit{pratTtya} must be accepted as a continuative] because \textit{chakshushcha\textsuperscript{702} rupam pratTtya chakshu[rvijnanam]} appears [in the sutra and no case-ending is given for \textit{pratTtya}].

\textit{Refutation of Bhavaviveka's way of interpreting} \textit{pratTtyasamutpada} (see pp.165-6.)

\textit{Incorrectness of Bhavaviveka's refutation of another} Bhavaviveka's \textit{Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom'} states Buddha-palita's way [of interpreting \textit{pratTtyasamutpada}]:\textsuperscript{703}
With respect to *pratityasamutpada*, [116] one [Buddhapalita] says that due to the sense of multiplicity in the prefix *prati* (*rten cing*), due to the sense of 'meeting' (*'brel ba*) in *i*, and due to the sense of 'arising' (*'byung ba*) in the term *samutpada*, *pratityasamutpada* means 'arising dependent on these and those [causes and conditions]' or 'arising upon meeting these and those [causes and conditions]'.

Bhavaviveka also states [the other way of interpreting the term cited] previously [on p.666]. Chandrakīrti, thinking that such an explanation shows Bhavaviveka's lack of skill in stating an opponent's position, asserts that Buddhapalita's thought is not as Bhavaviveka stated it. For Buddhapalita says that *pratitya* means 'meeting' (*praptiphradpa*); and thus *prati* (*rten cing*) does not have a sense of multiplicity, and *itya* (*'brel ba*) does not mean 'meeting'. Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says: 704

Thus, he [Bhavaviveka] states others' positions and refutes them. It is regarded that there is a lack of skill in his stating of others' positions. [117] Why? He [Buddhapalita] who explains the term *pratitya* 705 as meaning 'meeting' does not explain *prati* as having a sense of multiplicity or that *i* means 'meeting'.

Then, what [does Buddhapalita say]? Buddhapalita says that *prati* (*rten cing*) means 'meeting' and *itya* (*'brel bar*) means 'going'. Though individually they have different meanings, when these two are combined, the prefix [*prati*] changes the meaning of the latter word [*itya*]. It is like the sweet water of the Ganges becoming salty when it meets the salt water [of the ocean]. Thus, the two words indicate just one meaning, 'meeting'. Hence, the meaning of *pratityasamutpada* is 'arising upon meeting [causes and conditions]'.

When the term *pratityasamutpada* is applied to all things in the sense of 'arising upon meeting this and that collection of causes and conditions' and one says, *'Hetupratityasamutpada,'*
it is taken as being related with multiplicity. However, [118] Buddhapalita did not assert [that there is any sense of] multiplicity in a specific [application of the term] as in 'Dependent on an eye sense and a form [an eye consciousness is produced].' Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* says:™

Then what [does Buddhapalita say]? He says that *prati* (*rten cing*) means 'meeting'. *I* (*brel bar*) means 'going'. The combination *prati*ya means just 'meeting'.

Now when a consideration of all possible entities is asserted as being expressed by the term *prati*yasamutpada—etymologized as 'arising upon meeting' or dependent-arising—then a relation with multiplicity is being stated: 'Arising upon meeting this and that collection of causes and conditions' is [the meaning of] dependent-arising. [However,] when a consideration of a particular instance is asserted, there is no relation with multiplicity, [as in] 'Having met an eye sense and forms [an eye consciousness arises].'

Such is the unskillfulness of the master [Bhavaviveka] in citing [another's position].

Not only that, but also [Bhavaviveka's] way of refuting the others' system is not correct [119] because [his statement] is reduced to being just the thesis, '[Buddhapalita's explanation] is not correct,' without any reason.

However, Bhavaviveka's thought may have been that because a consciousness has no form, it could not meet an eye sense and a form because meeting exists only between the physical. However, even if that were his thought, it would be incorrect because it is asserted that monks meet [that is, attain] the four fruits [Stream Enterer, Once Returner, Never Returner, and Foe Destroyer, which are not physical], Sutra says, 'This monk is one who has met [attained] the fruit.'

Also, *prapya* ('having met' or 'upon meeting', *phrad nas*) is a synonym of *apekshya* ('having relied' or 'in reliance upon', *Itos nas*). Also, the Superior Nagarjuna [in his *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*] asserts that the term *prati*ya (*rten cing 'brel ba*) means *prapya* ('having met† *phradpa*': m
That which is produced having met this and that
[collection of causes and conditions]
Is not inherently produced.
(Tat tat prapya yad utpannam notpannam tat
svabhavatah.)

Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* says: 709

[Bhavaviveka says,] 'That is not admissible because of the non-existence of the meaning of these two [wrong interpretations of *pratityasamutpada*] 710 in 'An eye consciousness is produced depending on an eye and forms.'

This refutation is not correct. [120] Why? He does not state a reason why there is no occurrence [of a meeting], and, therefore, he has only a thesis.

Then, this might be [Bhavaviveka's] thought: 'A consciousness has no form; therefore, it has no meeting with an eye sense. For it is seen that there is a meeting just of those which have form.'

This is also not admissible because of the assertion of 'meeting' here in, 'This monk is one who has met the fruit.' Also, the term 'having met' (*prapya, phrad nas*) is a synonym of the term 'having relied' (*apekshya, bltos nas*). Also, the master Nagarjuna accepts the term *pratitya* as meaning just *prapti* 'meeting', [or 'having met' when used as a continuative. Nagarjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:] 711

That which is produced having met this and that
[collection of causes and conditions]
Is not inherently produced.
(Tat tat prapya yad utpannam notpannam tat
svabhavatah.)

Therefore, others [Chandrakīrti himself] say that even [Bhavaviveka's] refutation is not admissible.

*Incompleteness of Bhavaviveka's own etymology and meaning of pratityasamutpada*
(See pp. 165-6.) Even Bhavaviveka's own way of explanation is
incorrect [121] because though he asserts that he will [etymologize pratītyasamutpada] explaining [the parts] individually, he does not state individual meanings for pratītya and samutpada. Also, [in his Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom'] Bhavaviveka says no more than,\textsuperscript{712} 'the meaning of "conditionality" is the meaning of pratītyasamutpada—"When this is, that arises; due to the production of this, that is produced"\textsuperscript{713} Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:\textsuperscript{714}

What then is [the meaning of pratītyasamutpada according to Bhavaviveka? He] presents his own system as, 'The meaning of conditionality is the meaning of pratītyasamutpada—when this is, that arises; due to the production of this, that is produced.' This also is incorrect because he did not state a particular meaning for each of the two terms, pratītya and samutpada, and because he asserted that he would give an etymology.

\textit{Objection:} Bhavaviveka says such asserting that pratītyasamutpada is a term the meaning of which is determined by conventional usage and does not have the character set forth in its etymological explanation. It is like aranyetilaka [which literally means 'sesame in the forest'\textsuperscript{715} but is conventionally used to mean anything not answering to one's expectations]. The word 'et cetera' [in Chandrakirti's text, which is soon to be quoted, refers to other such non-literal terms derived] from the transmission of earlier forms of speech, such as 'lakeborn' (saraja) for a lotus grown on dry earth [122] and 'lying on the earth' (mahisha) for a buffalo that is standing.

\textit{Answer:} This also is not correct because the master, the Superior Nagarjuna, individually differentiated pratītya and samutpada as components of the term: tat tat prapya 'having met this and that' [collection of causes and conditions] and utpannam 'arisen'. [Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says,]\textsuperscript{716} Tat tat prapya yad utpannam notpannam tat svabhavatah : That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions] is not inherently produced.'
Also, you [Bhavaviveka] wish, for instance, to explain [the term] in accordance with Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland*:  

When this is, that arises,  
Like long when there is short.

However, even you must explain this as [having the meaning of 'depending' or 'relying' or] 'meeting'. Therefore, that which you have refuted becomes [that which you yourself must assert]. [123] Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* says:

*Objection:* Such is said [by Bhavaviveka] having asserted *pratityasamutpada* to be a conventional term [not necessarily following its etymological meaning] like *aranyetilaka* [meaning anything which does not answer to one's expectations], etc.

*Answer:* This also is not correct because the master [Nagarjuna] asserts *pratityasamutpada* just in relation to its members:  

\[ Tat tat prapya yad uppannam notpannam tat svabhavatah. \]

That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions] is not inherently produced.'

[Bhavaviveka] explains *pratityasamutpada* with:

When this is, that arises,  
Like long when there is short.

Then, does he not assert just that depending (*pratitya, rten te*) on short, meeting (*prapya, phrad cing*) to short, relying (*apekshya, bltos nas*) on short, long comes to be? Therefore, it is not fitting that he assert just what he refutes.

Thus, *pratityasamutpada* means the dependent-arising of products—their arising in reliance on their own causes and conditions. [124] It also means the dependent-arising [of all phenomena, products and non-products]—their existence meeting to or in reliance on their own parts, their own bases of imputation, or their own members. For with regard to the Sanskrit original of
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'arising' (samutpada), Vasubandhu's Commentary on the 'Sutra on Dependent-Arising' explains sam as 'coming together', 'aggregating', etc. Also, Rajaputra Yashomitra\textsuperscript{720} explains pada as 'existing' etc.

Because all phenomena are just existent in dependence upon, in reliance upon, or meeting to [causes and conditions, their parts, and their basis of imputation], they are not able to set themselves up and do not exist through their own power. Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:\textsuperscript{721}

That which has a dependent arising
Cannot be self-powered; since all these
Lack being under their own power,
There is no self [inherent existence].

Also, the Superior Nagarjuna says [in his Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning]:\textsuperscript{722}

That which is produced having met this and that
[collection of causes and conditions]
Is not inherently produced. [125]

Also, it is as Chandrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred' says:\textsuperscript{723}

I am not a proponent of no phenomena (*abhavavadin, dngospo medpar smra ba) because I propound dependent-arising.

\textit{Question}: Are you a proponent of [inherently existent] phenomena (*bhavavadin, dngospor smra ba)?

\textit{Answer}: No, [I am not a proponent of inherently existing phenomena] because I am a proponent of dependent-arising.

\textit{Question}: What do you propound?

\textit{Answer}: I propound dependent-arising.

\textit{Question}: Then, what is the meaning of dependent-arising?

\textit{Answer}: It means no inherent existence. It means no inherently existent production. It means the arising of
effects which have a nature like that of magical illusions, mirages, reflections, magical cities of Smell-Eaters, emanations, and dreams. It means emptiness and selflessness.

Also, here [in the syllogism, 'The subject, such and such, does not inherently exist because of being a dependent-arising'] the profound is the predicate—'does not inherently exist'—and the vast is the reason—'being a dependent-arising'. The way that the profound is fully present in the predicate and the vast is fully present in the reason should be sought in detail in Nagarjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*, Chandrakūrti's commentary on it, Nagarjuna's own commentary on his *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness*, and his *Precious Garland* as well as in Gyel-tsap's commentary, etc. Nagarjuna's *Friendly Letter (Suhrlekha)* says:724 [126]

This dependent-arising is the profound preciousness
Of the treasury of the Conqueror's speech.
Who sees this correctly sees the highest aspect
[Of the teaching] of Buddha, the Knower of Suchness.

Also, Mahamati's commentary on this says:725

This dependent-arising is the preciousness of the Tathagata's speech because one who knows this well realizes correctly the teaching of the Tathagata. 'Profound' means 'solely profound'.

Also:

Or, 'He who sees this correctly...' means seeing just the preciousness of the treasury which is the Conqueror's speech. The profundity is non-creation by self, non-creation by other...

Thus, this dependent-arising overcoming all conceptions of both extremes is the king of reasonings. The foremost lama [Dzong-kar-ba in his *Praise of Dependent-Arising*] says:726 [127]

Among teachers the teacher of dependent-arising
And among types of knowledge the knowledge of dependent-arising
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Are like the Conqueror King [Buddha] among worldly beings.

ELIMINATION OF ERROR CONCERNING DEPENDENT-ARISING

(See pp. 171-3.) The root text says:

Therefore, [asserting] that the ultimate
Is able to set itself up is [like wanting]
To eat space; no one takes 'validly established'
And 'able to set itself up' as synonyms.

Dak-tsang, as was explained before [in the eleventh chapter which is not translated here], asserts that 'ultimate object' (paramartha, don dam), 'able to set itself up' (tshugs thub), and 'validly established' (pramanasiddha, tshadgrub) are synonyms. However, the three—the father, the Superior [Nagarjuna], and his spiritual sons [Aryadeva and Buddhapalita]—explain that dependent-arisings are not autonomous. Therefore, this assertion that an ultimate [an emptiness] is able to set itself up is like asserting that space can be eaten.

Also, Dharmakirti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium of Valid Cognition' (Pramanavarttika) says, 'Because there are two types of objects of comprehension, there are two types of valid cognizers.' Thus, Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, and so forth assert that even generally characterized phenomena (samanya-lakshana, spyi mtshan) [permanent phenomena] are validly established [but, of course, do not accept that they are able to set themselves up]. Thus, there is not even one [school of tenets] asserting that 'able to set itself up' is necessarily present in the meaning of 'validly established'. Therefore, do not scar Buddha's teaching [with such absurdity]! [128]
7 Refuting a Self of Persons

The presentation of the reasoning refuting a self of persons has two parts: actual exposition and elimination of error.

ACTUAL EXPOSITION OF THE REASONING
REFUTING A SELF OF PERSONS
(See pp.31-51, 175-95.) The root text says:729

A self under its own power is non-existent
Because the aggregates are not the person,
The person is not [an entity] other [than the aggregates],
The person is not the base of the aggregates,
The person also does not [ultimately] depend on the aggregates,
The person does not [ultimately] possess the aggregates,
The shape [of the aggregates] is not the person,
Like a chariot. Apply [this analysis] to all phenomena.

With respect to this, I have extensively refuted elsewhere730 many wrong notions about these sets of twos:

1 I and my
2 the view of the transitory collection as a real I and the view of the transitory collection as real my
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3 the conventional, mental valid cognizer apprehending I and
the conventional, mental valid cognizer apprehending my
basis of imputation and phenomenon imputed, etc.

Therefore, here I will just illustrate the difficult points.

Sutra says,⁷³¹ 'O monks, any devotee or Brahmin who views a
self is viewing only these five appropriated aggregates.' Also, the
root text [Chandrakirti's Supplement] says,⁷³² [129] 'There is no
[innate] apprehension [of a self] separate from the aggregates.'
Also, '[The teaching by Buddha that the self is the aggregates] is
[just] a refutation of a self different from the aggregates because
other sutras say that forms and so forth are not the self.' Chan-
drakirti's own Commentary on the 'Supplement' says:⁷³³

The object of observation of [a consciousness viewing
the transitory collection as an inherently existent self] is
the [nominally existent] self. For, that which conceives
an [inherently existent] I has its object [an inherently
existent] self.

Thus, the appearance of a [nominally existent] I, or self, sentient
being, god, etc., in dependence on the transitory aggregates which
are composites of plural [factors] is the [nominally existent] I, or
self, sentient being, god, etc.

Furthermore, Buddhapalita says [in his commentary on
Nagarjuna's Treatise],⁷³⁴ 'That which the self possesses is called
mine.' Thus, the maker into own of eyes and so forth—which are
the things owned and are qualified as being 'own'—is assigned as
own, mine, a sentient being's mine, a god's mine, etc.

A viewing consciousness which, having apprehended a [nomi-
nally existent] I, conceives that I to exist truly [130] is both a con-
sciousness viewing the transitory collection as a real I and an
ignorance. A viewing consciousness which, having apprehended
[nominally existent] mine, conceives that mine to exist truly is
both a consciousness viewing the transitory collection as real
mine and an ignorance. These are explicitly said to be conscious-
nesses viewing the transitory collection [as real I and mine] in
Chandrakirti's own Commentary on the 'Supplement'.⁷³⁵
There [in VI. 120] a 'consciousness viewing the transitory collection' is an afflicted knowledge dwelling in thoughts of such [inherently existent] I and mine.

Also, Chandrakrfti's *Supplement* says:  

Initially adhering to a self, I,  
And then generating attachment for things, 'This is mine.'

His *Commentary on the 'Supplement'* says:  

These worldly beings, before adhering to mine, imagine through the conception of an [inherently existent] I that a non-[inherently] existent self does exist [inherently], and they adhere to just this as true. Then thinking 'mine', they adhere also to all things other than the object of the conception of I [as truly established].

Also, Dzong-ka-ba's *Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'* says in detail:  

The [conventionally existent] I is the base generating the thought T. There is a consciousness observing it which as its mode conceives [the I] to exist by way of its own character. [131] This is both an innate consciousness viewing the transitory collection which [falsely] conceives I and an obscuration with respect to a self of persons. There is a consciousness observing the [conventionally existent] mine which as its mode conceives [the mine] to exist by way of its own character. This is both an innate consciousness viewing the transitory collection which [falsely] conceives mine and an obscuration with respect to the mine of a person.

[Thus, 'mine' refers not to things which are considered as belongings but to the *maker* of things into one's belongings; hence, mine is a type of person.]  

Nevertheless, the person does not become many continuums [I being one and mine being another] due to the fact that I and mine are one entity, differentiated only
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in thought through their isolates. For example, in the Superior Ananda's continuum the I, monk, human, Stream Enterer, Shakya clan member, and royal caste member have different meanings but are one continuum. Therefore, it should be understood that the types of consciousnesses conceiving I in his continuum are manifold.

The appearance as I with respect to the aggregates and the appearance as I in dependence on the aggregates are I. However, not only are the aggregates not I, but also the aggregates appearing as I are not I. For, the appearance as an I established from its own side is not the object I.

Also, eyes, ears, and so forth are bases of the imputation 'mine' (ngayiba) and [132] illustrations [not of the mine but] of what is owned (ngayiyin rgyu), but they are not mine. For they are not that which possesses mine (nga yi can) nor the maker of mine (nga yir byed pa po). Also, the conception of eyes, ears, and so forth as existing by way of their own character is a conception of a self of phenomena; what conceives the mine which appears in dependence on them to be inherently existent is the [false] conception of mine. Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning says:

A consciousness observing a base [such as an eye generating the thought] 'mine' and conceiving it to exist in that way [by way of its own character] is a conceiver of a self of phenomena. Therefore, 'observing the mine' does not refer to observing those [eyes, ears, and so forth which are the bases giving rise to the thought 'mine'].

Also, Kay-drup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate [seems to speak of eyes and so forth as illustrations of mine but actually] is explaining that they are illustrations of things owned (bdag giyin rgyu).™

The eyes, ears, and so forth included within one's own continuum are illustrations of both mine and phenomena in the division [of all phenomena] into persons and phenomena.

Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:
That which pertains to the self is the mine; it means one's own five aggregates.

Still, he is referring to the bases [generating the thought] 'mine' (bdag gi ba’igzhi) [and not mine itself]. Kay-drup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate says:

The eyes, ears, and so forth included within one's own continuum are illustrations of both mine and phenomena in the division [of all phenomena] into persons and phenomena. They appear to innate [non-analytical] awarenesses as mine which is established from the object's own side or they appear to innate awarenesses as mine, and then observing such mine, one conceives that it exists by way of its own character. This is the innate [mis]conception of mine.

Therefore, on the basis that [the eyes, ears, and so forth in one's own continuum] are the objects generating the view of the transitory collection that [falsely] conceives of mine, you should know that when mine appears to a Buddha, he perceives it as only imputed to its basis of imputation and does not perceive the basis of the imputation as the phenomenon imputed. Also, you should know that a composite of the two [mistaken appearance of the mine as inherently existent and the emptiness of such] appears to lesser Superiors.

Furthermore, Dak-tsang and so forth say:

It is wrong that when the conception of self is analyzed, one refutes the identification of a self separate from the aggregates and afterwards refutes the true existence of the aggregates. This is because the self and the aggregates appear as one to the innate [non-analytical intellect], for the root text [Chandrakirti's Supplement] says, 'There is no [innate] conception [of a self] separate from the aggregates.'

Ridiculing the instruction manuals on the view [of emptiness], even one of our own logicians propounds [that there is no innate
conception of the self and aggregates as different]. These assertions are the bad talk of those with partial vision much like the way a one-eyed yak eats grass.

[Contradictory consequences are now stated to refute the view that innate, non-analytical awarenesses perceive the self as one with the aggregates and that, therefore, analysis of the self means analysis of the aggregates.] It [absurdly] follows that an innate [non-analytical] awareness would not conceive [the self and the aggregates] as different as in 'my body' and 'my mind'.

It [absurdly] follows that there would be no innate [non-analytical awareness misconceiving the self and the aggregates as like a master and his subjects].

If it is accepted [that there is no innate non-analytical awareness misconceiving the self and the aggregates as like a master and his subjects], then it [absurdly] follows that Chandrakirti would be wrong to say, 'What is related to [or preceded by] the view of self [that is, of inherent existence] is extinguished.'

It [absurdly] follows that the Sutra on the Ten Grounds concerning the fourth ground [and quoted by Chandrakirti] at this point [in the fourth chapter of his Commentary on the 'Supplement'] would be wrong. There are many [such contradictory consequences].

You seem to be basing your opinion on [Chandrakirti's statement in his Supplement], 'There is no [innate] conception [of a self] separate from the aggregates.' [However,] this refutes [the theory that there is an innate conception of] a self that has a character discordant with the aggregates and that there is an innate conception of a permanent self independent of the aggregates; it does not refute that the self and the aggregates are just different. [For you] it [absurdly] follows that this distinction would be incorrect because of your thesis [that the self and the aggregates appear as one to an innate non-analytical awareness].

The three circles of self-contradiction! [You have accepted (1) the reason, (2) that the predicate of the consequence is entailed by the reason, and (3) the opposite of the consequence.]

If it is accepted [that the self and the aggregates are not merely different], then since the self and the aggregates exist and a
difference between them has been rejected, it [absurdly] follows that the self and the aggregates would be one.

Also, [if it is accepted that the self and the aggregates are not merely different], then it [absurdly] follows that Chandrakirti would be wrong when he clearly states in his root text [that the self and the aggregates are not different entities but are just different]:1 [135]

Those who have fallen down senseless into [lives as] animals for many eons also do not perceive this unborn permanent [self]. Having seen that the conception of [an inherently existent] I operates even in them, [what intelligent being would think that such an unborn permanent self is the base of the innate conception of an inherently existent self?] Thus, there is no self other than the aggregates.

Furthermore, while saying such, [we]7,2 say that the way that the I in a human continuum appears is that it appears undifferentiable from the aggregates and as if standing on its own (hrang hrang ba) and concrete (phob phob pa). About this also, some [Dak-tsang and so forth]753 say, 'Such an appearance of the I is totally incorrect because the I is a non-associated compositional factor [that is, a product which is neither form nor consciousness] and because non-associated compositional factors do not appear this way.'

[Contradictory consequences are stated in response.] It [absurdly] follows that there would be no appearance of I [to the mind] because [according to you] the appearance of the aggregates which are the bases of the imputation 'I' is not the appearance of the I.754 The three circles of self-contradiction!

It [absurdly] follows that when the I appears, an independent I would appear because the I would have to appear without depending on the appearance of the aggregates. The three circles of self-contradiction!

It [absurdly] follows that when the I appears to an innate [non-analytical awareness], without the appearance of the aggregates—the basis of the imputation—the appearance of an I, the
phenomenon imputed which is merely neither form nor consciousness, would occur. For, your thesis is correct [according to you]! [136]

If that were accepted, it would contradict Chandrakirti's statement, \footnote{755 ‘There is no [innate] conception [of a self] separate from the aggregates.’} Not only that but also the way that the I appears to an innate [non-analytical awareness] is that it seems to exist from the side of the aggregates [and not just as an imputation from the subject's side] within the context that the basis of the imputation 'I' and the phenomenon imputed are inseparably mixed like milk and water. For at that time, it must appear by way of a mixture of the appearance of the aggregates, which are the basis of the imputation, and the appearance of the I, which is the phenomenon imputed [in dependence upon them]. If the I appeared separately from the aggregates, then the self would not appear to have the character of the aggregates—production, disintegration, shape, etc., being the feeler, discriminator, accumulator of actions, actor, knower, and so forth. Nagarjuna's \textit{Treatise on the Middle Way} says: \footnote{756 If [the self] were other than the aggregates, It would not have the character of the aggregates.}

Also, Chandrakirti's \textit{Clear Words} says: \footnote{757 If the self were separate from the aggregates, it would have the character of non-aggregates. [137] The five aggregates have the character of suitability as form, experiencing, apprehending signs, composition, and realizing objects individually. Also, just as consciousness [is different] from form, so the self which is being asserted to be different from the aggregates would be established as having a character different [from the aggregates]. Also, its different character would be apprehended just as [the character of] mind [is apprehended separate] from form, but it is not apprehended so. Therefore, the self is not separate from the aggregates.}
Buddhapalita also says such. [If the person and the aggregates appeared totally separately] then a white horse, a speckled bull, and so forth would be impossible.

Also, the Sacred Word of Manjushri by [the fifth Dalai Lama,] the great master and foremost of Conquerors, says:  

Sometimes the I will seem to exist in the context of the body. Sometimes it will seem to exist in the context of the mind. Sometimes it will seem to exist in the context of the other individual aggregates [feelings, discriminations, and compositional factors]. At the end of the arising of such a variety of modes of appearance, [138] you will come to identify an I that exists in its own right, that exists inherently, that from the start is self-established, existing undifferentiatedly with the mind and body which are [also] mixed like milk and water.

This is the first essential [in meditation on the selflessness of I], the ascertainment of the object to be negated [in the view of selflessness]. You should analyze until deep experience of it arises. Having generated such in your mental continuum, you thereby crystallize an identification of the I conceived by the innate consciousness conceiving I as able to set itself up within the context that it and your own five aggregates are like water put in water. [139]

This appears to be an unprecedented good explanation, based on experiencing the meaning of the texts by the father Nagarjuna and his spiritual sons.

The objects generating the thought 'I' in the mind of a person such as Devadatta are not of different continuums, but there is a plurality of gods, humans, animals, and so forth [because he was, is, and will be these at various times over his continuum of lives]. The finer points should be known, such as that the I and the mind of his continuum have operated beginninglessly and that though [the I and the mind] have been produced and have ceased [moment by moment], they have never been destroyed. However, the states of being a god or animal, etc., are established
through assuming such a body, and the states are destroyed through casting off such a body.

Also, since gods, humans, and so forth are differentiated by way of their physical supports [that is to say, their bodies], the I sometimes seems to exist in the context of the body. On the other hand, since the passage of the mere I through to Buddhahood depends on the mind [which leaves one body and assumes another], the I sometimes seems to exist in the context of the mind. If one [wishes to] penetrate the depths of the view, one should analyze these points well in accordance with Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* and Dzong-ka-ba's *Great Commentary* on it. Dzong-ka-ba's *Ocean of Reasoning* says:  

Therefore, do not hold that the two, the human who is the imputer of the designation T and the [conventionally existent] self which is the basis that is being imputed with the designation, are co-extensive. Know that the human is one part of the self. [140]

Also:

When Devadatta's selves of former and later lives are not individually differentiated, the self that serves as the basis of the [valid] conception of I is the mere I which has existed beginninglessly. Therefore, the selves of the individual migrators when they appropriate the bodies of gods and so forth are instances of the formerly mentioned mere I.

Also, it is said in the word of the foremost Conqueror [the Fifth Dalai Lama's *Sacred Word of Manjushri*], 'Sometimes the I will seem to exist in the context of the body. Sometimes it will seem to exist in the context of the mind.'

Also, Chandrakirti's own *Commentary on the 'Supplement'* says:  

There is no [innate] adherence to a self anywhere except with respect to the aggregates. Hence, there is no fifth form of the [false] view of the transitory collection [as real I and mine].
Thus, there are twenty artificial views of the transitory collection, like twenty mountain peaks, and as antidotes to destroy them Chandrakirti states as signs or reasons the meaning of a statement in sutra that he quotes:

Form is not the self; also the self does not possess form. The self is not in form; form is not in the self... Just so, the self is not consciousness; the self does not possess consciousness. The self is not in consciousness; consciousness is not in the self.

[Chandrakirti] establishes [through those reasons] the subtle selflessness, that is, the lack of inherent existence in all phenomena, mentioned in a sutra which says, 'All phenomena are selfless.' Therefore, it is with such in mind that the foremost precious [Dzong-ka-ba] says that the refutation of artificial [misconceptions] is a branch of refuting innate [misconceptions of persons and phenomena]. Also, refutations of extremes with respect to the selflessness of phenomena [other than persons] are used as reasons [in the sevenfold reasoning refuting a self of persons].

Let us summarize the meaning of these sutras. The subjects, a Tathagata or a person, do not exist autonomously or inherently because:

1. they are not the mental and physical aggregates which are the basis of their imputation, that is, they are not one with the aggregates which are the basis of their imputation
2. they are not others separate from the aggregates which are the basis of their imputation, that is, they do not exist as entities separate from these aggregates which are the basis of their imputation
3. inherently they are not like a tub, the support of the mental and physical aggregates which would then be like a juniper
4. they do not inherently depend on the mental and physical aggregates
5. they do not inherently possess the mental and physical aggregates in the manner of a sameness of entity, as in the
case of Devadatta's possessing an ear, and they do not possess the aggregates in the manner of a difference of entity, as in the case of Devadatta's possessing wealth.

In Nagarjuna’s *Treatise* the reason is given with:  

[The Tathagata] is not [inherently one with his own five] aggregates; [the Tathagata] is not [inherently] other than [his own five] aggregates; the aggregates are not [inherently dependent] on him; he is not [inherently dependent] on those [aggregates]; the Tathagata does not [inherently] possess the aggregates.

Then, the thesis is given as:

What [inherently existent] Tathagata is there? [That is, there is no inherently existent Tathagata.]

Also, Nagarjuna’s *Precious Garland* gives the reason with:  

The aggregates are not [inherently one with] the self; those [aggregates] are not [inherently dependent] on that [self]; that [self] is not [inherently dependent] on those [aggregates]; without those [aggregates] that [self] is not apprehendable separately; the self is not mingled with the aggregates like fire and fuel.

The 'mingling' [of the self and the aggregates] refers to possession [in which possessor and possessed] are one entity as explained previously [on page 687] when indicating what is negated [in the view of selflessness]. [143] The thesis is given with:

Therefore, how could a self exist?

Furthermore, the reasons are to be established individually:

If those two [a Tathagata or a person] are one with [their respective] mental and physical aggregates, it [absurdly] follows that they are impermanent. It [absurdly] follows that they are [each] multiple. It [absurdly] follows that a self is not asserted. It [absurdly] follows that remembering other births is impossible.
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Buddhapalita’s Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) Treatise says:7

Respectively, the aggregates are not the Tathagata. Why? The aggregates possess the qualities of arising and disintegration; therefore, it would follow that the Tathagata was just impermanent. Also, the appropriator [the self] is not suitable to be just one with the appropriated [aggregates].

Also, Chandrakirti’s Clear Words says:774

With respect to this [first stanza of the eighteenth chapter in Nagarjuna's Treatise], if the self were thought to be the aggregates, then the self would have production and disintegration because of depending on the production and disintegration of the aggregates. Also, the self is not asserted thus [144] because of the consequence of many faults.775 As [Nagarjuna] will explain (XXVII.12):

- Also it does not arise [newly]
- Not having existed [in a former life]
- For fallacy follows there,
- The self would be a product
- And its arising would be causeless.

And similarly (XXVII.6):

- The appropriated [aggregates] are not the self,
- [For] the aggregates arise and disintegrate.
- How indeed could the appropriated
- Be the appropriator?

Furthermore, this position is to be understood from the extensive analysis in the Supplement:776

- If the aggregates were the self,
- Then because of the plurality of those aggregates,
  the selves would also just be many.
- Also the self would be a substantiality and viewing it as such
- Would not be erroneous if it is acting on a substantiality. [145]
In nirvana annihilation of the self would definitely occur. There would be destruction and production of the self in the moments prior to nirvana. Due to the destruction of the agent, effects of those [actions] would be non-existent. Also another would experience [the effects of actions] accumulated by another.

Here I will not extensively elaborate on it. Thus, respectively the aggregates are not the self.

If these two [a Tathagata or a person] were entities different from their mental and physical aggregates [which are their bases of imputation], then it would [absurdly] follow that they are not aggregates. It would [absurdly] follow that they would not be feelers and so forth. It would [absurdly] follow that they would be permanent. It would [absurdly] follow that they would be apprehended apart from the mental and physical aggregates. It would [absurdly] follow that they would not be existent selves. It would [absurdly] follow that they would be without activity and would not be agents. Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) Treatise says:

A Tathagata also is not other than his aggregates; he does not exist as a separate phenomenon which is not the aggregates. Why? He would not accord with the impermanent aggregates; therefore, he would just be permanent. If [a Tathagata and his aggregates] were other, it would follow that he would be apprehended [separate from the aggregates which are his basis of imputation]. Because he is not apprehended [separate from his aggregates], [146] a Tathagata is not other than his aggregates.

Also, Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:

If the self were separate from the aggregates, it would have the character of non-aggregates. The five aggregates have the character of suitability as form, experiencing,
apprehending signs, composition, and realizing objects individually. Also, if the self is asserted to be different from the aggregates, just as consciousness is different from form, the self would be established as having a character different from the aggregates. Also, its different character would be apprehended just as [the character of] mind [is apprehended separate] from form, but such is not apprehended. Therefore, the self also is not separate from the aggregates.

Even if a self or a Tathagata inherently acted as the base of the mental and physical aggregates [which are in their continuum] or even if these two inherently depended over there on the aggregates, the fallacies of a self different from the aggregates would ensue. Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) Treatise says: \[147\]

Aggregates do not exist in a Tathagata like a forest of trees in snow. Why? Those which are supported [aggregates] and their base [a Tathagata] would be other; therefore, it would follow that a Tathagata was permanent. Also, a Tathagata does not exist in aggregates like a lion in a forest of trees. Why? There would be the fallacy just indicated.

Also, Chandrakirti's own Commentary on the 'Supplement' says: \[147\]

If [the self and the aggregates] were [inherently] other, they would be fit to be the [intrinsically existent] entities of that which is supported and its support like yogurt in a metal bowl, for example. Since the two, yogurt and bowl, are just other in worldly conventions, they are seen to be the entities of that which is supported and its support. However, the aggregates are not thus different [entities] from the self, and the self also is not a different [entity] from the aggregates. Therefore, these two are not the entities of support and supported.
A Tathagata and a person do not possess the mental and physical aggregates in the mode of being inherently different or non-different entities. [148] If they possessed the mental and physical aggregates in the mode of inherent non-difference as if mingled or like a core, the fallacies of their being one with the aggregates would ensue. It would [absurdly] follow that a Tathagata and a person were impermanent, etc. If they possessed the mental and physical aggregates in the mode of inherent difference, the fallacies resulting from a difference of the self and the aggregates would ensue. *Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) Treatise* says:^[781]

A Tathagata does not possess [his] aggregates in the way that a tree possesses [its] core. Why? He would not be other than the aggregates; therefore, there would be the fallacy of his being impermanent.

Also, Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:^[782]

It is not accepted that the self [inherently] possesses the body. For the self [has already been refuted as inherently one with or different from the aggregates and thus] is not [inherently existent]. Therefore, the relationship of the selves possessing the aggregates does not exist [inherently], If it is said that they are other [entities, like Devadatta's] possessing a cow or that they are not other [entities like Devadatta's] possessing his body, [the answer is that] the self is not one with or other than the body. [Therefore, the selves possessing form does not inherently exist.]

Furthermore, Chandrakirti's own *Commentary on the 'Supplement'* says:^[783]

Also, the suffix indicating possession [*mat*- or *vat-pratyaya*] is employed for the non-different in *riipavan devadattah*, 'Devadatta is a possessor of a form [a body].' It is employed for the different in *goman*, 'Devadatta is a possessor of a cow.' [149] Since form and the self do not
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have [naturally existent] sameness or otherness, there is no saying that the self [inherently] possesses form.

Hence, when these are condensed, they are included within [the reasoning that the self and the aggregates] lack [true] oneness and difference. However, Chandrakirti’s *Clear Words* explains that [five positions instead of just two] are refuted in relation to the modes of operation of the consciousnesses viewing the transitory collection [as real I and mine].

This reasoning is able to prove selflessness with respect to all phenomena since when any of the aggregates, constituents, or sources are analyzed into their basis of imputation and phenomenon imputed, they do not exist in any of those five ways. Therefore, one takes as one’s reason that which refutes the object adhered to by artificial conceptions and refutes the innate conception that the phenomenon imputed exists from the side of its basis of imputation. Nagarjuna’s *Precious Garland* says:

> Just as the person is not [established as its own] reality because of being [only designated in dependence upon] a composite of the six constituents,
> So each of the constituents also Is not [established as its own] reality because of being [designated in dependence upon] a composite.

Also: [150]

The three elements are not [one with] earth. The three elements are not [dependent] on this [earth]. This [earth] is not [dependent] on those [three elements]. Without those [three elements] there is no earth. Like [earth] each [of the other three elements] Is not [findable when analyzed in those four ways], Therefore the elements also are false like the self.

Also, some Svatantrikas and some of our own schools which propound [inherently existent] things explicitly posit the mind as the self that takes rebirth. Some propound as the self the special configuration [or shape] of the aggregates because gods
and humans are posited by way of special configurations of the aggregates due to former actions \((karma, las)\). In order to refute these [Chandrakirti] adds two facets of reasons:

The mere composite [of the five aggregates or of the consciousness aggregate] is not the self, and the physical shape is not the self.

Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:\textsuperscript{787}

A chariot is not accepted as other than its members [or parts]. That it is not other [but is one with its members] is not [established. Inherently] it does not possess its members. It is not [inherently dependent] on its members. Its members are not [inherently dependent] on it. It is not the composite [of its members]. It is not the shape [of its members]. The self and the aggregates are similar. \textsuperscript{[151]}

This sevenfold analysis is also a supreme of reasonings for settling everything—forms and so forth—as selfless. Chandrakirti's *Supplement* says:\textsuperscript{788}

All things whatsoever—pots, cloths, tents, armies, forests, rosaries, trees, houses, carts, hotels, etc., and likewise [other things] designated by beings from whatsoever point of view—are to be known [as existing only according to unanalytical renown]. For the King of Subduers did not dispute with the world. Quality, part, passion, definition, fuel, and so forth as well as qualificand, whole, the impassioned,\textsuperscript{789} illustration,\textsuperscript{790} fire, and so forth—these [objects] do not exist in the seven ways when subjected to the analysis of the chariot. They exist through [non-analytical] worldly renown which is other than that.

Also, about this, Dak-tsang says [in paraphrase]:\textsuperscript{791}

The Sammitfyas and so forth assert that the five aggregates are the basis of the imputation 'self. Also, Bhavaviveka and so forth assert that only the mind is the basis
of the imputation 'self. However, none of our own schools asserts that the mind is the self. [152]

Without even reading any of Bhavaviveka's and Chandrakirti's books, Dak-tsang has the courage to make distinctions, thereby making an external display of his own ignorant innards. [Contradictory consequences are offered in response.] Then it [absurdly] follows that when another [non-Buddhist] school proves that the mental consciousness is the self, it would not [for Bhavaviveka] prove what is already established [for him]. Also, it [absurdly] follows that Bhavaviveka would not assert that the collection of the body and the senses are a basis of the imputation 'self. For [according to you] (1) Bhavaviveka does not assert that the mental consciousness is the self and (2) from among the five aggregates, he takes only the mental consciousness as the basis of the imputation 'self. The three circles of self-contradiction!

If both consequences are accepted, then it [absurdly] follows that it is wrong for [Bhavaviveka] to explain in his Blaze of Reasoning [when another school tries to prove that the mental consciousness is the self] that they are proving what is already established [for him]:792

This is a proof of what is already established [for me] since we also actually impute the term 'self to [the mental] consciousness conventionally. Because [the mental] consciousness takes rebirth, it is called the self.

It [absurdly] follows that it is wrong [for him] to say, '[we also] actually impute the term "self" to [the mental] consciousness', that is, that the term 'self is used as an actual name for [the mental] consciousness [because, according to you, he does not assert such], [153] Also, it [absurdly] follows that it is wrong [for Bhavaviveka] to prove that [the mental] consciousness is the self through the reason of its being the taker of rebirth [because, according to you, he does not assert such].

Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that it is wrong [for Bhavaviveka] in his Blaze of Reasoning to explain that the collection of
the body and the senses is a basis of the designation 'self [and thus is the self]:\textsuperscript{793}

Because [the mental] consciousness takes rebirth, it is called the self. It is imputed to the collection of the body and the senses.

Also, it [absurdly] follows that it is wrong [for Bhavaviveka] to cite as a source for this [a sutra] teaching that the collection of the aggregates is the basis of designation [of the self] and thus is the self]:\textsuperscript{794}

It is said, 'Just as one thinks "chariot", for example, with respect to a collection of parts, so in dependence on the aggregates "sentient being" is designated conventionally.'

Also, it [absurdly] follows that, when Chandrakirti quotes this sutra, he would be refuting that the aggregates are the basis of the imputation 'self [instead of that the collection of the aggregates is the self since it is clear that he is refuting Bhavaviveka's interpretation and you claim that Bhavaviveka interprets the passage as showing that the collection of the aggregates is not the person but is the basis of imputation of the person in which case Chandrakirti must be refuting this]. Also, [for the same reason] it [absurdly] follows that Chandrakirti would not assert that the mind and the aggregates are bases of the imputation 'self [whereas he obviously does]. Also, it [absurdly] follows that the two—Bhavaviveka and Chandrakirti—do not differ with respect to asserting or not asserting establishment by way of [the object's] own character (svalakshanasiddhi, rang gi mtshan nyidkyis grub pa)\textsuperscript{154} because [according to you] they are the same in not positing the phenomenon imputed as its basis of imputation. Etc. You have a mass of the three circles of self-contradiction!

ELIMINATION OF ERROR CONCERNING THE REFUTATION OF A SELF OF PERSONS

(See pp.449-51, 505-30.) The root text says:\textsuperscript{795}
They assert that on some occasions there is valid establishment
With the three modes appearing similarly
And that there are just [similarly appearing] reasons.
However, they do not assert self-powered valid establishment,
Therefore, they do not assert autonomous [syllogisms]
That autonomous [syllogisms are asserted] in this system is mistaken.

Dak-tsang's saying that the Prasahgikas assert autonomous syllogisms conventionally is, as was explained before [in chapter eleven which is not translated here],\(^ {796}\) the tremendous mistake of confusing an other-renowned reason and an autonomous reason as the same.\(^ {797}\) For on some occasions when Prasahgikas critically investigate the meaning of the profound [emptiness] among themselves, there is valid establishment, like a magical illusion, with the three modes [of the reason] appearing similarly to both parties in the debate.\(^ {798}\) Also, though the three modes, subject, and reason are established as like illusions and as appearing similarly to both parties in the debate, there is no valid establishment in which the three modes [of the reason] exist under their own power. Also, [Prasahgikas] do not assert that [autonomous syllogisms] exist even conventionally because they assert that inherent establishment does not exist even conventionally.
Appendices
1 Types of Awareness

(See Chart 41; the numbers indicate the progression toward a direct non-conceptual cognition of emptiness.)

A cognizing consciousness or valid cognizer not only is correct with respect to its main object but also is an incontrovertible knower. Therefore, a mind such as correct assumption, since it is not incontrovertible, is not a valid cognizer. Because the Prasangikas do not etymologize the syllable pra in pramana as meaning 'new', but as either 'main' (gtso bo) or 'correct' yang dag pa, pramana does not refer to a 'prime valid cognizer' in the sense of being new but to a consciousness which is non-deceived with respect to its prime or main object. 'Non-deceived' means that the mind is incontrovertible, and 'main object' refers to the object of the mode of apprehension (dzin stangs kyi yul) of the consciousness. A conceptual consciousness such as when thinking about one's house is mistaken with regard to its appearing object (snang yul) in the sense that an image of an object appears to be that object, but a correct conceptual consciousness is not mistaken with regard to the main object to which the image refers. Therefore, a conceptual consciousness can be valid, as in the case of an inferential consciousness, which is incontrovertible with respect to its main referent object (zhenyul).
Chart 41: Types of Awareness

- Direct valid cognizer
  - Sense direct valid cognizer
  - Mental direct valid cognizer
  - Yogic direct valid cognizer
- Inferential valid cognizer
  - Inference through the power of the fact
  - Inference through renown
  - Inference through example
  - Inference through scripture
- Non-cognizing consciousness
  - Correct assumption
  - Doubt
  - Equal doubt
  - Doubt not tending toward the fact
  - Wrong consciousness
  - Appearing but not ascertained

Key
- Underline indicates that there are non-conceptual consciousnesses of this type.
- Italic indicates that there are conceptual consciousnesses of this type.
- Numbers indicate the progression toward a direct non-conceptual cognition of emptiness.
English and Tibetan

Awareness—blo
Cognizing consciousness—rtogs pa’i blo
Valid cognizer—tshad ma
Non-cognizing consciousness—ma rtogs pa’i blo
Non-valid consciousness—tshad min gyi blo
Direct valid cognizer—mgon sum gyi tshad ma
Inferential valid cognizer—rjes dpag gi tshad ma
Wrong consciousness—log shes
doubt—the tshom
Correct assumption—yid dpyod
Appearing but not ascertained—snang la ma nges
A direct valid cognizer (pratyaksha-pramana) is not, for the Prasangikas, necessarily a non-conceptual consciousness; the word 'direct' merely eliminates dependence on a sign or reason. Therefore, the second moment of an inferential consciousness (anumana) is no longer inferential but direct (pratyaksha) in that it perceives its object (emptiness, for instance) without relying on a sign, such as dependent-arising, but through the force of the previous cognition.

In his progress toward a non-conceptual direct cognition of emptiness a yogi's consciousness of the nature of objects changes radically (see the numbers on Chart 41). First he has a strong sense that objects inherently exist; this is a wrong consciousness. Then, through hearing about emptiness and/or reflecting on its meaning, his conception of inherent existence weakens a little, and he merely suspects that objects inherently exist; this consciousness is doubt not tending toward the fact—he suspects that objects inherently exist. Then, he has doubt not tending and tending toward the fact equally, thinking that objects probably do and do not inherently exist. Then, through study and extended meditation he develops doubt tending toward the fact, thinking that objects probably do not inherently exist, but still he only suspects so. Further hearing, study, and extended meditation on the profound brings him to the point of correct assumption—a conceptual understanding of emptiness which can be generated through the processes of inference but is not yet inference because it is not incontrovertible.

Penetrating more and more the reasons for non-inherent existence, he gains a conceptual cognition of emptiness—an inference. An image or concept of the vacuity which is an object's lack of inherent existence appears to him; thus, 'conceptual' does not mean that he is sunk in discursiveness. He has already cognized, for instance, the concomitance of non-inherent existence with whatever cannot be found in the seven ways outlined by Chandrakirti; he has already cognized the presence of the sign (non-findability in the seven ways) in the subject (I). Therefore, at the moment of inference he no longer is considering the preliminary factors of inference but is realizing emptiness. He
attempts to remain in this conceptual cognition as long as possible, developing special insight based on calm abiding, so that he can progress toward his first non-conceptual direct cognition of emptiness in which even the image of the vacuity of concrete findable existence has disappeared, and the subject—the wisdom consciousness—and the object—the emptiness of inherent existence—are like water put in water, undifferentiable.
2 Other Interpretations of Dependent-Arising

Asariga sets forth Buddha's implicit teaching of the twelve members of a dependent-arising of cyclic existence (see Charts 42 and 43). In the implicit teaching there is only one round of dependent-arising, but this is similar only in name to the one round of the explicit teaching which refers to one turning of the wheel of the twelve. In the implicit teaching, a round or unit does not refer to one cycle of the twelve but to one round of cause and effect. This one round is determined by the time of the effect.

Thus, if all of the effect members—'effect consciousness' through 'existence', as well as 'birth' and 'aging and death'—occur in one lifetime, the set of twelve would involve only one round of cause and effect. However, with this interpretation of the meaning of 'round', the explicit teaching which shows the completion of the members in three lifetimes would indicate two rounds of cause and effect because the projected effects, 'effect consciousness' through 'existence', take place in this life, and the actualized effects, 'birth' and 'aging and death', take place in the next life. Since 'rounds' are not determined by the time of cause, the time of the causes does not affect the computation.
Chart 42: A Version of Buddha’s Implicit Teaching According to Asanga (the completion of the twelve members at the least in two lives with one unit or round of cause and effect)

1. ignorance
2. action
3. consciousness
   a. cause consciousness
   b. effect consciousness
4. name and form
5. sources
6. contact
7. feeling
8. attachment
9. grasping
10. existence
11. birth
12. aging and death

Lives A and B are successive.

Asanga’s system is a one round system because all of the effect members occur in the present life. It is a two or three life system because the projecting causes and the actualizing causes might occur in the same life, that is, the immediately preceding life, in which case it would take two lives, or the projecting causes might take place before the immediately preceding life in which case it would take three lives.

Even when Asanga lays out a two-round system (see Charts 44 and 45, he does not consider a future life as in the explicit teaching. The twelve members are divided into two rounds by considering effect consciousness, name and form, sources, contact, and feeling as seeds in the sense that the projecting causes make them ready for actualization. Therefore, the time of the effect—the formation of the seeds—occurs in the same lifetime as the projecting causes—ignorance, action, and cause consciousness.
Other Interpretations of Dependent-Arising

Chart 43: *A Version of Buddha's Implicit Teaching According to Asaṅga* (the completion of the twelve members at the most in three lives with one unit or round of cause and effect)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ignorance</td>
<td>projecting causes: life A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>consciousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>name and form</td>
<td>projected effects: life C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>sources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>contact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>feeling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>attachment</td>
<td>actualizing causes: life B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>grasping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>existence</td>
<td>actualized effects: life C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>birth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>aging and death</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Life A precedes life B at any time, and life B and life C are successive.

Their actualization by the actualizing causes—attachment, grasping, and existence—is birth and aging and death. Since the time of the actualized effects and the time of the projected effects are not the same when considered this way, the set of twelve here consists of two rounds of cause and effect.

By considering 'effect consciousness' through 'feeling' as seeds ready to be actualized, the two sets of causes for the production of a life—the projecting causes and the actualizing causes—are manifestly seen to apply to one lifetime, without relying on inference as in the explicit teaching. Also, the point is emphasized that there is potential suffering in the form of 'effect consciousness' through 'feeling' as seeds, and actual suffering in the form of 'birth' and 'aging and death'.

There also is a teaching, emphasized by the Sautrāntikas,
Chart 44: *A Version of Buddha’s Implicit Teaching According to Asaṅga* (the completion of the twelve members in at least two lives with two units or rounds of cause and effect)

1. ignorance
2. action
3. consciousness
   a. cause consciousness
   b. effect consciousness
4. name and form
5. sources
6. contact
7. feeling
8. attachment
9. grasping
10. existence
11. birth
12. aging and death

Lives A and B are successive.

that the twelve members occur simultaneously. This does not mean that all members occur in the same instant, but in the period of one action. Here, ignorance forms the motivation of the action with the aid of grasping, attachment, and existence. Action is the actual production of the activity with ‘effect consciousness’ through ‘feeling’ as well as ‘birth’ and ‘aging and death’ being further delineations of this action. In this interpretation the order of the twelve does not have reference to temporal sequence.
Chart 45: *A Version of Buddha’s Implicit Teaching According to Asanga* (the completion of the twelve members at the most in three lives with two units or rounds of cause and effect)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1. ignorance</th>
<th>projecting causes: life A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>consciousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>cause consciousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. effect consciousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>name and form</td>
<td>projected effects as seeds: life A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>sources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>contact</td>
<td>actualizing causes: life B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>feeling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>attachment</td>
<td>actualized effects: life C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>grasping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>existence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>birth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>aging and death</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Life A precedes life B at any time, and life B and life C are successive.
3 Modes of Division of the Vaibhashika Schools

Bhavaviveka's three versions of the division of the spiritual community into eighteen schools are preserved in the Tibetan translation of his *Blaze of Reasoning* (P5256, Vol. 96 66.4.4-68.4.4). Exactly the same material is also preserved in the Tibetan translation of his *Nikayabhedavibhahgavyakhyana* (P5640, Vol. 127).

Bhavaviveka's first rendition

(See Chart 46.) The first schism is variously reported to have taken place in 600 A.N. (After the Nirvana), 160 A.N., and 116 A.N.⁸⁰¹ The last accords with Paramartha's description of the schism,⁸⁰² and Jam-yang-shay-ba says that 116 A.N. is correct.⁸⁰³ Paramartha adds the information that at the Council of Rajagrha, held two months after the death of the Buddha, the Samgha was nominally split into Sthaviras and Mahasamghikas, the former being the five hundred Foe Destroyers and the latter being ordinary monks. Later at the second Council in 116 A.N. the division became doctrinal. Both Taranatha⁸⁰⁴ and Jam-yang-shay-ba indicate that Bhavaviveka's first list is the assertion of the Sthaviras with regard to the way the Samgha divided.
Meditation on Emptiness

Chart 46: Bhāvaviveka’s First Rendition of the Eighteen Vaibhashika Schools (as found in his Blaze of Reasoning, Vol. 96 66.4.4ff)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mahāsamghikas</th>
<th>Sthaviras</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Mahāsamghikas (dGe ’dun phal chen pa)</td>
<td>9 Sthaviras (gNas brtan pa) = Haimavatas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Ekavyavahārikas (Tha snyad gcig pa)</td>
<td>10 Sarvāstivādins (Thams cad yod par smra ba) = Vibhajyavādins = Hetuvādins = Muruntakas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Lokottaravādins (’Jig rten ’dus par smra ba)</td>
<td>11 Vatsiputriyas (gNas ma ’i bu pa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Bahushrutiyas (Mang thos pa)</td>
<td>12 Dharmottaras (Chos mchog pa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Prajñaptivādins (bTags par smra ba)</td>
<td>13 Bhadrayānīyas (bZang lam pa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Chaitikas (mChod rten pa)</td>
<td>14 Sammitīyas (Mang bkur ba) = Avantakas = Kurukullas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Pūrvashailas (Shar gyi ri bo pa)</td>
<td>15 Mahāśāsakas (Mang ston pa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Aparashailas (Nub kyi ri bo pa)</td>
<td>16 Dharmaguptakas (Chos sbas pa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Uttariyas (bLa ma pa) = Samkrāntivādins</td>
<td>17 Suvarṣhakas (Char bzang ’bebs pa) = Kāshyapīyas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that the synonyms which Bhāvaviveka gives are synonyms only with respect to this table. For instance, in his first list the Sthaviras and Haimavatas are synonyms, but in his second the Haimavatas are a sect which split off from the Mahāsamghikas who are neither synonymous with, nor a division of, nor the parent of the Sthaviras.
Chart 47: Bhāvaviveka’s Second Rendition of the Eighteen Vaibhāṣikā Schools (as found in his Blaze of Reasoning, Vol. 96 67.2.1ff)

Bhāvaviveka’s second rendition

Bhāvaviveka says that the second list (see Chart 47) has the same ‘foundation’ as the first list. Jam-yang-shay-ba explains that this means that the time and place of the original schism are the
Chart 48: Vasumitra’s Rendition of the Eighteen Vaibhashika Schools (as found in his Samayabhедoparachanachakra, P5639, Vol. 127)

Sthaviras

1 Sarvastivadins (or Hetuvadins)
   10 Haimavatas
   11 Ekavyavaharikas
   12 Bahushrutiyas

Mahasamghikas

13 Prajnaptivadins

2 Vatsiputriyas
   3 Dharmottaras
   4 Bhadrayaniyas

7 Mahishasakas
   8 Kashyapiyas (or Suvarshakas)
   9 Samkrantivadins (’Pho bar smra ba) (or Sautrantikas)

6 Sannagarikas

14 Chaitikas
15 Aparashailas
16 Purvashailas

17 Lokottaravadins
18 Kukkulikas (Bya gag ris)
Chart 49: Vinītadeva’s Rendition of the Eighteen Vaibhashika Schools (as found in his Samayabhedoparachanachakra nikāya-bhedopadeshanasamgraha, P5641, Vol. 127)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mahāsāṃghikas</th>
<th>Sarvāstivādins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Purvashailas</td>
<td>6 Sarvāstivādins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Aparashailas</td>
<td>7 Kashyapiyās</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Haimavatas</td>
<td>8 Mahīśasakas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Lokottaravādins</td>
<td>9 Dharmaguptakas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Prajñāptivādins</td>
<td>10 Bahushrutiyās</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 Tāmrashātiyās</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Vībhajyavādins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(rNam par phye ste smra ba)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sthaviras</th>
<th>Sammitīyās</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 Jetavanīyas</td>
<td>16 Kurukullas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(rGyal byed tshal gnas)</td>
<td>(Sa sgrogs ris)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Abhayagirikas</td>
<td>17 Avantakas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(’Jigs med gnas)</td>
<td>(Srung ba pa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Mahāvihārins</td>
<td>18 Vatsīputrīyas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(gTsug lag khang chen)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

same as in the first list. This is significant in that it indicates that the schism which took place at the second Council in 116 A.N. was a schism into three schools. Both Taranatha and Jam-yang-shay-ba say that this second list is the assertion of the Mahāsāṃghikas with regard to the way the Samgha divided.

Bhāvaviveka’s third rendition
Jam-yang-shay-ba identifies Bhāvaviveka’s third list (see Chart 40, p.340) as the assertion of the Sammitīyās. Bhāvaviveka reports that some say that the Sāṇṇagarikas are a division of the Mahāgirikas and that others assert that they are a division of the Sammitīyās.
Chart 50: Padmasambhava’s Rendition of the Eighteen Vaiśehika Schools (as reported by Jam-yang-shay-ba, GT, kha 6a.7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sarvāstivādins</th>
<th>Mahāsamghikas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Kāshyapaśyas</td>
<td>5 Pūrvashailas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mahāśāsakas</td>
<td>6 Aparashailas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Dharmaaguptakas</td>
<td>7 Haimavatas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Mūlasarvāstivādins</td>
<td>8 Vibhajyavādins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 Prajñaptivādins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 Lokottaravadins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saṃmityyas</th>
<th>Sthaviras</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 Tāmrāshaṭiyas</td>
<td>16 Jetavaniyas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Avantakas</td>
<td>17 Abhayagirikas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Kurukullas</td>
<td>18 Mahāvihārinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Bahushrutiyaśas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Vatsīputrīyas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shākyaprabha’s rendition
Jam-yang-shay-ba reports that Shākyaprabha conceived all of the sub-schools to be derived from the Sarvāstivādins. 808

Vasumitra’s and Vinītadeva’s renditions
Vinītadeva says that he based his list on Vasumitra’s rendition (see Charts 48 and 49) and that it represents the Sarvāstivādins’ assertion. The evident disagreement between the two lists suggests that Vasumitra had another rendition which has not survived.

Padmasambhava’s rendition
Padmasambhava’s version (see Chart 50) is based on the Bhikshuwarsahāgrapruchchhāsūtra (P5649, Vol. 127).

The Ceylonese Chronicles
The renditions of the Ceylonese Chronicles (see Chart 51) have been Sanskritized for the sake of consistency. 809
Chart 51: The Rendition of the Eighteen Vaibhashika Schools according to the 'Dipavamsa' and 'Mahavamsa'

1 Staviravadins
   2 Mahasakas
     3 Sarvastivadins
     4 Kashyapīyas
     5 Samkrantivadins
     6 Sautrantikas
     7 Dharmaguptakas
   8 Vatsiputriyas
     9 Dharmottarīyas
    10 Bhadrayanīyas
    11 Sannagarikas
    12 Sammitiyas
   13 Mahasamghikas
     14 Gokulikas
     15 Prajñaptivadins
     16 Bahushrutivas
     17 Chaitikas
   18 Ekavyavaharikas
4 *Negatives*

Phenomena (*dharma, chos*) are divided into positive phenomena (*vidhi* \(\text{sgrub pa}\)) and negative phenomena (*pratishedha, dgag />a*).\(^{810}\) It is important to note that the basis of division is phenomena and not statements, propositions, and acts of logic, and thus this is not a division of propositions and so forth into positive and negative statements, or logical affirmations and negations. Rather, this is a division of objects, or existents, into those that are positive and those that are negative. Since the divisions are exhaustive, anything that exists is either a positive or a negative phenomenon; there is no third category. Also, every instance of a positive or negative phenomenon is an existent.

Following is a table of synonyms of ‘existent’ with their respective definitions:

1. **existent**: something observed by valid cognition  
2. **established base**: something established by valid cognition  
3. **object of knowledge**: something fit to be taken as an object of an awareness  
4. **phenomenon**: something holding its own entity  
5. **object of comprehension**: something realized by valid cognition
6 object: something known by an awareness
7 object of comprehension by an omniscient consciousness:
   something realized by an omniscient consciousness.

That the above are synonyms means that whatever is a negative
or a positive phenomenon is necessarily an existent, an estab-
lished base, an object of knowledge, a phenomenon, an object of
comprehension, an object, and an object of comprehension by an
omniscient consciousness as well as something observed by valid
cognition, etc. Hence, the mere fact that an emptiness is a nega-
tive means that it is an existent, an object, and so forth.

A positive phenomenon is defined as:

   a phenomenon which is not an object realized by the
   thought consciousness apprehending it in the manner of
   an explicit elimination of its object of negation.

First of all, a positive thing (vídhī) is a phenomenon, an existent;
a non-existent such as the horns of a rabbit could never be a posi-
tive phenomenon. Second, the division into positive and negative
phenomena is made by way of how objects appear to thought or
conceptual consciousnesses; if a conceptual consciousness must
realize the object by way of openly and explicitly eliminating an
object of negation, the object is not positive but negative. For
instance, to realize non-cow, cow must be openly eliminated, but
to realize cow, non-cow does not have to be explicitly eliminated
though indeed it is implicitly eliminated. Thus, non-cow is a
negative phenomenon, and cow is a positive phenomenon.

The definition of a negative phenomenon is:

   an object realized by the thought consciousness appre-
hending it in the manner of an explicit elimination of its
   object of negation.

Again, a negative must be an object, an existent, a phenomenon.
It is also something that must be conceptually realized through
the open or explicit negation of an object of negation. Examples
of negative phenomena are non-pot, \(\text{\text{\textit{bum pa ma yin pa}}}\), non-
non-pot \(\text{\text{\textit{bum pa ma yin pa ma yin pa}}}\), opposite from non-pot
Negatives (bum pa ma yin pa las log pa), and non-existence of pot (bum pa medpa). Although non-non-pot means just pot, it must be realized by way of explicitly eliminating non-pot, and thus it is a negative phenomenon. Although it does not exist as a different entity from pot, which is a positive phenomenon, it is merely different from pot and is a negative.

Negatives are divided into two types—affirming negatives (paruydasapratishedha, ma yin dgag) and non-affirming negatives (prasajyapratishedha, med dgag). In brief, the difference between the two is that the term which expresses an affirming negative suggests something else in place of its negation, whereas the term that expresses a non-affirming negative does not. For instance, the sentence, 'The fat Devadatta does not eat during the day,' expresses a phenomenon, namely, fat Devadatta's not eating during the day, but it does not merely eliminate eating during the day since the mention of 'fat' implies or suggests that he eats at night. Thus, fat Devadatta's not eating during the day is an affirming negative; it is an object, an existent, a phenomenon, and an object of knowledge that is negative, but the expression of it implies something in place of what it negates. Though the determination that it is a negative depends on how it is expressed, it is the phenomenon itself that is thereby determined to be a negative. For, the sentence, 'The fat Devadatta does not eat during the day,' is itself, as a sentence or group of sounds, a positive phenomenon. Thus, it is not the proposition, but the object of reference of the proposition that is the negative.

The formal definition of an affirming negative is:

a negative which is such that the term expressing it suggests in place of the negation of its own object of negation another, positive phenomenon which is its own object of suggestion.

In the example of fat Devadatta's not eating during the day, eating at night, a positive phenomenon, is suggested. Another example of an affirming negative is non-non-pot, which suggests pot. Another is non-pot, which suggests things that are not pots.
Affirming negatives are further divided into four types depending on how the terms that express them suggest positive phenomena in place of their negations—either explicitly, implicitly, both, or by context. These four are:

1. **Affirming negative which is such that the term expressing it explicitly suggests another, positive phenomenon which is its own object of suggestion**

For example, a mountainless plain is expressed by the term 'mountainless plain'. The term eliminates mountains but openly speaks of a plain; thus, a mountainless plain is an affirming negative which explicitly suggests or reveals a positive phenomenon. The same is true of the existence of the absence of inherent existence, for the term expressing it, 'The absence of inherent existence exists', or 'existence of the absence of inherent existence' eliminates inherent existence but openly speaks of the existence of its absence, a positive phenomenon. Thus, though the absence of inherent existence is a non-affirming negative, its existence is an affirming negative of the explicitly suggestive variety. Since meditation on an emptiness means to meditate on a specific non-affirming negative, the object of meditation is not the existence of an emptiness (although it does exist) but an emptiness itself.

2. **Affirming negative which is such that the term expressing it implicitly suggests another, positive phenomenon which is its own object of suggestion**

For example, fat Devadatta's not eating during the day. Also, since non-non-pot eliminates non-pot but does not explicitly suggest pot, it is an affirming negative of the implicitly suggestive type.

3. **Affirming negative which is such that the term expressing it both explicitly and implicitly suggests another, positive phenomenon which is its own object of suggestion**

For example, the phrase, 'The existence of the non-emaciated body of the fat Devadatta who does not eat during the day,' eliminates eating during the day, implicitly suggests eating during
the night, and explicitly speaks of the existence of his body. Thus, the phenomenon which it expresses is an affirming negative the suggestiveness of which is both implicit and explicit.

4 Affirming negative which is such that the term expressing it suggests by context another, positive phenomenon which is its own object of suggestion

For example, in the context of knowing that King Siddhartha is either of the royal or brahmin class, his not being of the brahmin class eliminates that he is of the brahmin class and, through the context of one's having determined that his lineage is either the royal or brahmin class, suggests that he is of the royal class.

In all four of these cases, something is suggested in place of the negation of the object of negation. However, with a non-affirming negative nothing positive is suggested—only an object of negation is negated. Nevertheless, a non-affirming negative is an object, an existent, a phenomenon, and so on.

Thus the definition of a non-affirming negative is:

- a negative which is such that the term expressing it does not suggest in place of the negation of its own object of negation another, positive phenomenon which is its own object of suggestion.

For example, the non-existence of the horns of a rabbit is expressed by the sentence, 'The horns of a rabbit do not exist,' and this does not suggest anything positive in place of the horns of a rabbit. Though it can suggest another non-affirming negative such as the non-existence of the beauty of the horns of a rabbit, it does not suggest any positive phenomenon in place of its object of negation.

In this same vein, an emptiness merely eliminates inherent existence; it does not imply anything positive in its place. Though emptiness is compatible with conventional existence, it does not suggest conventional existence in place of its object of negation; still, it is stressed that a proper understanding of emptiness acts to assist an understanding of conventional existence. An emptiness is the mere elimination of inherent or objective
existence and thus is a mere negative, a non-affirming negative, a mere absence of its object of negation.

Even the emptiness of inherent existence of a table does not suggest a positive phenomenon even though the phrase 'the emptiness of inherent existence of a table', or the sentence, 'A table is empty of inherent existence,' openly and explicitly speaks of table. For, table is not suggested in place of the negated object of negation, inherent existence; it merely is the base of the negation.

Non-affirming negatives are divided into two classes—those whose object of negation does occur among objects of knowledge and those whose object of negation does not occur among objects of knowledge. For example, the non-existence of the horns of a rabbit negates the horns of a rabbit which do not exist anywhere, and similarly the absence of inherent existence eliminates inherent existence which never has nor will occur anywhere. Thus, these two are non-affirming negatives whose object of negation does not occur among objects of knowledge, that is to say, among existents. On the other hand, the non-existence of a pot, such as on a certain table, eliminates the existence of a pot there, but pot does occur among existents at some other place, and thus non-existence of a pot is a non-affirming negative whose object of negation does occur among objects of knowledge.

Through making this division in terms of whether the object negated is, in general, an existent or not, it is being stressed that an emptiness is a lack of something—/inherent existence—that never did nor will exist. Though an emptiness exists, its object of negation never does. Realization of an emptiness, therefore, is not a case of destroying something that once existed or of realizing the passing away of something that did exist; rather, it means to realize a quality of objects, a negative attribute, that is the mere absence of something that never existed but nevertheless was imagined to occur.

The existence of an object right in its own basis of designation never did or could occur, but beings conceive the opposite and thus have been drawn beginninglessly into cyclic existence. Extrication from that misconception can happen only through
realizing the absence of such reified existence, becoming accustomed to it in intense meditation, realizing it directly in meditative equipoise in which nothing but emptiness appears and the mind is merged with it like fresh water poured into fresh water, and over and over again re-entering that direct cognition. Meditation on emptiness is the medicine that, when accompanied by compassionate method, can clear away all obstructions such that unimpeded altruistic activity is manifested. Thus, though emptiness is a mere negative, it is a doctrine neither of nihilism nor of agnosticism, but a confident affirmation of a basic nature, the realization of which yields powerful, beneficial results.
Thu-mi-sam-bho-ta
5 Proof Statements

Chandrakirti gives an example of a five-membered proof which Jam-yang-shay-ba says can be interpreted correctly in two ways.811

1 Thesis: A sound is an impermanent thing.
2 Pervasion: Being an impermanent thing pervades being a product.
3 Example: Being an impermanent thing pervades being a product, as in the case, for example, of a pot.
4 Exemplification: Just as a pot is a product, so a sound is a product.
5 Summary: Therefore, because a sound is a product, it is an impermanent thing.

Or,

1 Thesis: A sound is an impermanent thing.
2 Sign: Because products are impermanent things.
3 Demonstration of the pervasion in an example: It is seen that being an impermanent thing pervades being a product as in the case, for example, of a pot.
4 Applying the example to the meaning: Like a pot, a sound is also a product.
Summary: Therefore, because of being a product, a sound is an impermanent thing.

The Buddhist logicians of the Dignaga-Dharmakīrti school consider such a five-membered statement of proof to be redundant. In their school a correct statement of proof has two members:

1. **Expression of pervasion:** Being an impermanent thing pervades whatever is a product, as in the case, for example, of a pot.
2. **Expression of the presence of the sign in the subject:** A sound is also a product.

The example has been affixed to the expression of pervasion; the thesis, exemplification, and summary are not stated because they are considered to be implicit. The five-membered statement is, therefore, redundant.

However, in the Dignaga-Dharmakīrti school the actual, full process of debate is as follows for proving that a sound is impermanent to an opponent who asserts that a sound is permanent.

1. **Statement of a consequence implying a proof of the opposite**

   It follows that the subject, a sound, is not a product because of being a permanent thing.

   The consequence is stated for the sake of 'breaking down the pointedness or vibrance' of the opponent's adherence to the wrong view. Through the demonstration of inner contradictions in his own system (that a sound is permanent, that a sound is a product, and that whatever is a product is impermanent) he becomes doubtful about his own view. This prepares him for the statement of the reasoning which proves that sounds are impermanent; he becomes a suitable vessel for the second step.

2. **Statement of the reasonings that establish the presence of the sign in the subject, the pervasion, and the counter-pervasion**

   a. **Statement of the reasoning that establishes the presence of the sign in the subject**

      The subject, a sound, is a product because of being produced from causes and conditions.
Proof Statements

The reason of this syllogism need not be established because it is obvious from, for instance, a snapping of the fingers that sounds are produced from causes and conditions. If it were necessary to establish every reason—if there were not an appeal to obvious experience—the number of reasons required to establish the presence of the original sign in the subject would be limitless, and there would be no opportunity to realize the basic thesis. Still, if the opponent is not yet satisfied, it is not the proper occasion for establishing the three modes of the sign, i.e., for proving to him that sounds are impermanent. Other indirect means are required to bring him to the point of recognizing the obvious dependence of sounds on causes and conditions.

b. **Statement of the reasoning that establishes the pervasion**

The subject, a product, is an impermanent thing because of being a momentary thing.

The mind that explicitly realizes the pervasion also implicitly realizes the counter-pervasion and vice versa; therefore, only either the pervasion or the counter-pervasion needs to be established. This is because explicitly realizing that the sign exists in only similar cases implies cognition that the sign is only non-existent in dissimilar cases. Just so, if the sign is explicitly cognized as only non-existent in dissimilar cases, it is implicitly cognized as existent only in similar cases.

If it is necessary to establish that products are momentary things, one can state:

The subject, a product, is a momentary thing because without its disintegration depending on any other cause, it—from its inception—has a nature of disintegration, just as in the case of lightning.

If this is not obvious, further proof is not warranted, and it will be necessary to approach the opponent in a roundabout manner to prepare him for another try at the basic thesis.

c. **Statement of the reasoning that establishes the counter-pervasion**
The subject, space, is not a product because of being a permanent phenomenon.

This reason could, in turn, be established with:

The subject, space, is a permanent phenomenon because of being existent and not being produced from causes and conditions.

No further proof is warranted.

3 Correct statement of proof for similar instances

Whatever is a product is pervaded by being an impermanent thing, as in the case, for example, of a pot; a sound is also a product.

(This is exactly the same as the two-membered statement of proof.) A person of very sharp intellect would also grasp the opposite, and, therefore, for him the next step would not have to be stated. Or, the fourth step might be stated and not the third. The choice of whether to state a proof for similar or dissimilar instances is determined by the type of opponent. If he is dominated by indecision, not being able to decide whether products are permanent or impermanent, a proof for similar instances is stated. If the opponent is dominated by the opposite view that products are permanent, a proof for dissimilar instances is stated. However, to all except the very sharp, both must be proved. The stater bases his decision of what is necessary on the opponent's responses during step two and to questions asked him.

4 Correct statement of proof for dissimilar instances

Whatever is a permanent thing is pervaded by being a non-product, as in the case, for example, of space; a sound, however, is a product.

5 Restatement of the correct statement of proof for either similar or dissimilar instances

This is done for the sake of generating in the opponent a simultaneous awareness of the three modes of the reason, i.e., its
presence in the subject, the pervasion, and the counter-pervasion. This awareness is also called 'a mind apprehending the sign (or reason)' and is the direct cause of the inferring consciousness realizing that a sound is impermanent. At this moment the opponent becomes a correct, or full-fledged, second party of a debate in that he is prepared for the basic reasoning that a sound is an impermanent thing because of being a product. (The first party is the stater.)

6 The statement of the basic syllogism

The subject, a sound, is an impermanent thing because of being a product.

The then full-fledged second party realizes that a sound is impermanent, after which he ceases to be a second party because he has finished realizing the thesis.

Thus, though a statement of proof in the Dignaga-Dharmakirti school has only two members, the actual prescribed mode of debate entails many more. What a Prasangika is saying is that all these steps are not necessary for sharp opponents. The mere statement of a consequence, 'It follows that the subject, a sound, is not a product because of being a permanent phenomenon,' can generate in a proper second party a consciousness inferring the thesis that a sound is an impermanent thing. It is not the usage of consequences that singles out the Prasangika but his assertion that the statement of a consequence alone is sufficient to generate in another a consciousness realizing a thesis.
Glossary

An asterisk beside an entry indicates a reconstruction of the Sanskrit
## Glossary

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### 744 Meditation on Emptiness

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<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>Sanskrit</td>
<td>Tibetan</td>
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<tr>
<td>virtuous/virtuous factor</td>
<td>kushala</td>
<td>dge ba</td>
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<tr>
<td>visible form</td>
<td>rūpa</td>
<td>gzugs</td>
</tr>
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<td>wind/current of energy</td>
<td>prana</td>
<td>rlung</td>
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<tr>
<td>wisdom</td>
<td>prajñā/jñāna</td>
<td>shes rab/ye shes</td>
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<td>Wisdom Body</td>
<td>jñānakāya</td>
<td>ye shes chos sku</td>
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<td>wrong view</td>
<td>mithyādṛśhti</td>
<td>log lta</td>
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<td>Yoga Tantra</td>
<td>yogatantra</td>
<td>rnal ’byor rgyud</td>
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<td>Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika</td>
<td>yogācārāsvātan-trikamādhyamika</td>
<td>rnal ’byor spyod</td>
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<td>pa’i dbu ma rang</td>
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<td>rgyud pa</td>
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Note

Sutras and tantras are listed alphabetically by English title in the first section (p.757); Indian and Tibetan treatises are listed alphabetically by author in the second (p.766); other works are listed alphabetically by author in the third (p.788).

The words aryā and mahāyāna have been deleted from the Sanskrit and Tibetan titles, and many of the English titles are abbreviated.

For modern editions of texts of the Madhyamika school and their Tibetan versions as well as a more complete list of translations, see David S. Ruegg's *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1981).
1 Sutras and Tantras

Bodhisattva Section Sutra
Bodhisattvapitakasutra
Byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod kyi mdo
P760.12, Vol. 22-3

Buddhavatamsaka Sutra
Buddhavatamsakanamamahavaipulyasutra
Sangs rgyas phal po che zhes bya ba shin tu rgyas pa chen
po'i mdo
P761, Vol. 25-6

Chapter of the True One Sutra
Satyakaparivartasutra
bdDen pa po'i le'u'i mdo
[?]

Chapter Showing the Three Vows Sutra
Trisambaranirdeshaparivartasutra
sDom pa gsum bstan pa'i le'u'i mdo
P760.1, Vol. 22

Cloud of Jewels Sutra
Ratnameghasutra
dKon mchog sprin gyi mdo
P879, Vol. 35
Meditation on Emptiness

Compendium of Doctrine Sutra
Dharmasamgftisutra
Chos yang dag par sdud pa'i mdo
P904, Vol. 36

Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Sanchayagathaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sdud pa tshigs su bead pa
P735, Vol. 21

Descent into Lanka Sutra
Larikavatarasutra
Lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo
P775, Vol. 29

Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Ashtasahasrikaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa'i mdo
P734, Vol. 21
Translated by E. Conze, Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita (Calcutta: Asiatic Society Bibliotheca Indica no. 284, 1958; reprinted by Four Seasons Foundation, Bolinas, Cal., 1962)

Eighteen Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Ashtadashasahasrikaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa khri brgyad stong pa'i mdo
P732, Vol. 19-20
See E. Conze's The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom (Berkeley: U. Cal., 1975).

Extensive Sport Sutra
Lalitavistarasutra
rGya cher rol pa'i mdo
P763, Vol. 27

Fifty Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Bhagavatfprajnaparamitapanchashatikasutra
bCom ldan 'das ma shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa lnga bcu pa'i mdo
P740, Vol. 21
Translated by E. Conze in The Short Prajnaparamita Texts (London: Luzac, 1973), pp.154-6
Bibliography: Sutras and Tantras

Five Hundred Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
   Panchashatikaprajanaparamitasutra
   Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa lnga brgya pa'i mdo
   P738, Vol. 21
   Translated by E. Conze in The Short Prajnaparamita Texts, pp. 108-21

Fundamental Tantra of Manjushri
   Manjushrifmulatantra
   'Jam dpal gyi rtsa ba'i rgyud
   PI62, Vol. 6

Great Cloud Sutra
   Mahameghasutra
   sPrin chen po'i mdo
   P898, Vol. 35

Great Drum Sutra
   Mahabheriharakaparivartasutra
   rNga bo che chen po'i le'u'i mdo
   P888, Vol. 35

Guhyasamaja Tantra
   Sarvatathagatakayavakchittarahasyaguhyasamajananamama-
   hakalpara
   De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi sku gsung thugs kyi gsang
   chen gsang ba 'dus pa zhes bya ba brtag pa'i rgyal po chen po
   P81, Vol. 3
   Partial translation in A. Wayman's The Yoga of the Guhya-
   samajatantra (Delhi: Motilal, 1977)

Heap of Jewels Sutra
   Maharatnakutadharmaparyayashatasahasrikagranthasutra
   dKon mchog brtsegs pa chen po'i chos kyi rnam grangs le'u
   stong phrag brgya pa'i mdo
   P760, Vol. 22-4

Heart of Wisdom Sutra
   Prajnahrdaya/Bhagavatfprajnaparamitahrdayasutra
   Shes rab snying po/bCom Idan 'das ma shes rab kyi pha rol tu
   phyin pa'i snying po'i mdo
   PI60, Vol. 6
   Translated by E. Conze in Buddhist Texts Through the Ages
Meditation on Emptiness

Hevajra Tantra
Hevajratantraraja
Kye’i rdo rje zhes bya ba rgyud kyi rgyal po
P10, Vol. 1

Irreversible Wheel Sutra
Avaivartachakrasutra
Phyir mi ldog pa'i 'khor lo'i mdo
P906, Vol. 36

Jewel Mine Sutra
Ratnakarasutra
dKon mchog 'byung gnas kyi mdo
P792, Vol. 31

Kalachakra, King of Tantras, Issued from the Supreme Original Buddha
Paramadibuddhodhrtashrikalachakranamatantaraja
mChog gi dang po'i sangs rgyas las phyung ba rgyud kyi rgyal
po dpal dus kyi 'khor lo
P4, Vol. 1

Kashyapa Chapter Sutra
Kashyapaparivartasutra
'Od srung gi le'u'i mdo
P760.43, Vol. 24

King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra
Samadhirajasutra/Sarvadharmasvabhavasantavipanchita-
samadhirajasutra
Ting nge 'dzin rgyal po'i mdo/Chos thams cad kyi rang bzhin
mnyam pa nyid rnam par spros pa ting nge 'dzin gyi rgyal
po'i mdo
P795, Vol. 31-2
Partial translation by K. Regamey, Three Chapters from the Samadhirajasutra (Warsaw: 1938)

Life Stories
Jatakanidana
sKyes pa rabs kyi gleng gzhi
P748, Vol. 21
Bibliography: Sutras and Tantras  761

*Lion's Roar of Shrimaladevi Sutra*
Shrlmaladevisimhanadasutra
Lha mo dpal 'phreng gi seng ge'i sgra'i mdo
P760.48, Vol. 24

*Mahayana Sutra of Knowledge*
Mahayanabhidharmasutra
Theg pa chen po'i mngon pa'i chos kyi mdo
[?]

*Meeting of Father and Son Sutra*
Pitaputrasamagamasutra
Yab dang sras mjal ba'i mdo
P760.16, Vol. 23

*Nirvana Sutra*
Mahaparinirvanasutra
Yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa chen po'i mdo
P787-9, Vol. 30-1

*One Hundred and Fifty Means Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*
Prajnaparamitanayashatapanchashatikasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i tshul brgya Inga bcu pa'i mdo
P121, Vol. 5
Translated by E. Conze in *The Short Prajnaparamita Texts*, pp. 184-95

*One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*
Shatasahasrikaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag brgya pa'i mdo
P730, Vol. 12-18
See E. Conze's *The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom* (Berkeley: U. Cal., 1975)

*One Letter Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*
Ekaksharfmatanamasarvatathagataprajnaparamitasutra
De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi yum shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yi ge gcig ma'i mdo
P741, Vol. 21
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Translated in E. Conze's *The Short Prajnaparamita Texts*, p.201

*Ornament of the Wisdom Engaging the Sphere of All Buddhas Sutra*
Sarvabuddhavishayavatararajnanalokalamkarsutra
Sangs rgyas thams cad kyi yul la 'jug pa'i ye shes snang ba'i rgyan gyi mdo
P768, Vol. 28

*Perfection of Wisdom in Several Words Sutra*
Svalpaksharaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yi ge nyung ngu
P159, Vol. 6
Translated by E. Conze in *The Short Prajnaparamita Texts*, pp. 144-7

*Questions of Brahma Sutra*
Brahmapariprchnhasutra
Tshangs pas zhus pa'i mdo
P825, Vol. 33

*Questions of King Dharamshvara Sutra*
Dharanfshvararajpariprchnhasutra/Tathagatamahakarunanirdeshasutra
gZungs kyi dbang phyug rgyal pos zhus pa'i mdo/De bzhin gshegs pa'i snying rje chen po bstan pa'i mdo
P814, Vol. 32

*Questions of Sagaramati Sutra*
Sagaramatipariprchnhasutra
bLo gros rgya mtshos zhus pa'i mdo
P819, Vol. 33

*Questions of Suvikrantavikrami Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*
Suvikrantavikramipariprchnhaprajnaparamitasutra
Rab kyi tshal gyis rnam par gnon pas zhus pa'i shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i mdo
P736, Vol. 21
Translated by E. Conze in *The Short Prajnaparamita Texts*, pp. 1-78

*Questions of the King of Nagas, Anavatapta, Sutra*
Anavataptanagarajarajpariprchnhasutra
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kLu'i rgyal po ma dros pas zhus pa'i mdo
P823, Vol. 33

Questions of the King of Nagas, Sagara, Sutra
Sagaranagarajapariprucchhasutra
kLu'i rgyal po rgya mtshos zhus pa'i mdo
P820, Vol. 33

Rice Seedling Sutra
Shalistambasutra
Sa lu'i ljang pa'i mdo
P876, Vol. 34

Seven Hundred Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Saptashatikaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa bdun brgya pa'i mdo
P737, Vol. 21

Translated by E. Conze in The Short Prajnaparamita Texts,
pp. 79-107

Sport of Manjushri Sutra
Manjushrivikriditasutra
'Jam dpal rnam par rol pa'i mdo
P764, Vol. 27

Sutra on the Heavily Adorned
Ghanavyuhasutra
rGyan stug po bkod pa'i mdo
P778, Vol. 29

Sutra on the Myrabolan Fruit
Myrabolasutra
Ba ru ra'i mdo
[?]

Sutra on the Ten Grounds
Dashabhumikasutra
mDo sde sa bcu pa
P761.31, Vol. 25

Translated by M. Honda in 'An Annotated Translation of the
"Dasabhumika" in Studies in Southeast and Central Asia,
ed. D. Sinor; Satapitaka Series 74. (New Delhi: 1968),
pp. 115-276

Sutra Showing the Inconceivable Secrets of the Tathagatas
Tathagatachintyaguhyanirdeshasutra
Meditation on Emptiness

De bzhin gshegs pa'i gsang ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa bstan pa'i mdo
P760.3, Vol. 22

Sutra Showing the Realm of the Inconceivable Qualities and Wisdom of the Tathagatas
Tathagatagunajnanachintyayavishayavataranirdeshasutra
De bzhin gshegs pa'i yon tan dang ye shes bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i yul la 'jug pa bstan pa'i mdo
P852, Vol. 34

Sutra Unravelling the Thought
Samdhinirmochanasutra
dGongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo
P774, Vol. 29

Tathagata Essence Sutra
Tathagatagarbhasutra
De bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i mdo
P924, Vol. 36

Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra
Akshayamatinirdeshasutra
bLo gros mi zad pas bstan pa'i mdo
P842, Vol. 34

Ten Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Ashtadashasahasrikaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa khri pa'i mdo
P733, Vol. 20-1
See E. Conze's *The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom* (Berkeley: U. Cal., 1975)

Three Hundred Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra/The Diamond Sutra
Trishatikaprajnaparamitasutra/Vajrachchedika
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i sum brgya pa'i mdo/rDo rje gcod pa
P739, Vol. 21
Translated by E. Conze in *The Short Prajnaparamita Texts*, pp. 122-39
Twenty-Five Doors Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Panchavimshatikaprajnaparamitamukhasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i sgo nyi shu rtsa lnga pa'i mdo
P124, Vol. 5
Translated by E. Conze in The Short Prajnaparamita Texts, pp. 199-200

Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Panchavimshatisahasrikaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa
P731, Vol. 18-19
Translated by E. Conze, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom (Berkeley: U. Cal., 1975)

White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine Sutra
Saddharmapundarfkasutra
Dam pa'i chos pad ma dkar po'i mdo
P781, Vol. 30
Translated by L. Hurvitz, Scripture of the Lotus Blossom of Fine Dharma (New York: Columbia, 1976)
2 Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises

Akutobhaya (Ga-las-'jigs-med)*

* Akutobhaya's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'
  Mulamadhyamakavrtti-akutobhaya
dbU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa ga 'jigs med
P5229, Vol. 95

Aryadeva ('Phags-pa-lha)

Establishment of the Reasoning and Logic Refuting Error
Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi
'Khrul pa bzlog pa'i rigs pa gtan tshigs grub pa
P5247, Vol. 95

Four Hundred/Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas
Chatuhshatakashastrakarika
bsTan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5246, Vol. 95

Length of a Forearm
Hastavalaprakaranakarika

* Geshe Gedun Lodro suggested that this text had been given the name of its author, as is the case with Buddhapalita's commentary on the same. The text is falsely attributed to Nagarjuna (see p.360).
Asanga (Thogs-med)

*Explanation of (Maitreya's) 'Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle'*

Mahayanottaratantratrasravakhyaka
Theg pa chen po'i rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi rnam par bshad pa
P5526, Vol. 108

Five Treatises on the Levels

*Actuality of the Levels/Levels of Yogic Practice*
Bhumivastu/Yogacharyabhumi
Sa'i dngos gzhi/rNal 'byor spyod pa'i sa
P5536-8, Vol. 109-10

*Compendium of Ascertainties*
Nirnayasamgraha
gTan la dbab pa bsdu ba
P5539, Vol. 110-11

*Compendium of Bases*
Vastusamgraha
gZhi bsdu ba
P5540, Vol. Ill

*Compendium of Enumerations*
Paryayasamgraha
rNam grang bsdu ba
P5542, Vol. Ill

*Compendium of Explanations*
Vivaranasamgraha
rNam par bshad pa bsdu ba
P5543, Vol. Ill

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Two Compendiums

*Compendium of Knowledge*
Abhidharmasamuchchaya
Meditation on Emptiness

mNgon pa kun btus
P5550, Vol. 112


Compendium on the Mahayana
Mahayanasamgraha
Theg pa chen po bsdus pa
P5549, Vol. 112
Translated by Etienne Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asahga, Vol. II. (Louvain: 1939)

Ashvaghosha (rTa-dbyangs)
Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment/Essay on the Stages of Cultivating the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment
Paramarthabodhichittabhavanakramavarnasamgraha
Don dam pa byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa'i rim pa yi ger bris pa
P5431, Vol. 103

Atfsha, 982-1054

Commentary on the Difficult Points of 'Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment'
Bodhimargapravdpapanjika
Byang chub lam gyi sgron ma'i dka' 'grel
P5344, Vol. 103

Explanation of (Shantideva's) 'Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds'
Bodhisattvacharyavataraabhashya
Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i bshad pa
P5872, Vol. 146

Introduction to the Two Truths
Satyadvayavatara
bDen pa gnyis la 'jug pa
P5298, Vol. 101; P5380, Vol. 103

Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment
Bodhipathapradfpa
Byang chub lam gyi sgron ma  
P5343, Vol. 103

Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way
Madhyamakopadesha  
dBU ma'i man ngag  
P5324, Vol. 102; P5326, Vol. 102; P5381, Vol. 103

Avalokitavrata (sPyan-ras-gzigs-brtul-zhugs)
Commentary on (Bhavaviveka's) 'Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) "Wisdom"'

Prajnapradfpatika  
Shes rab sgron ma'i rgya cher 'grel pa  
P5259, Vol. 96-7

Bhavaviveka (Legs-ladan-'byed)
Blaze of Reasoning. Commentary on the 'Heart of the Middle Way'

Madhyamakahrdayavrttitarkajvala  
dBU ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba  
P5256, Vol. 96

Partial translation by S. Iida in Reason and Emptiness  
(Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1980), chap. III. 1-136, pp.52-242

Heart of the Middle Way
Madhyamakahrddayakarika  
dBU ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa  
P5255, Vol. 96

See directly above for partial translation

Lamp for (Nagarjuna 'sj 'Wisdom', Commentary on the 'Treatise on the Middle Way'

Prajnapradipamulamadhyamakavrtti  
dBU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma  
P5253, Vol. 95

Bhavaviveka the Lesser (Legs-ladan-chung-ba)

Precious Lamp for the Middle Way
Madhyamakaratnapradlpa  
dBU ma rin po che'i sgron ma  
P5254, Vol. 95

Buddhapalita (Sangs-rgyas-bskyangs)
Meditation on Emptiness

Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'
Buddhapahtamulamadhyamakavrtti
dBU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa buddha pa li ta
P5254, Vol. 95
Char-har Ge-shay (Char-har dGe-bshes), 18th century
Identification of Elements, Elemental Evolutes, And So Forth
'Byung ba dang 'byung gyur sogs kyi ngos 'dzin
The Collected Works of Cha-har dge-bshes blo-bzang-tshul-khrims, Vol. 10
New Delhi: Chatring Jansar Tenzin, 1973

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Chandragomin's Grammar
Chandravyakaranasutra
Lung du ston pa candra pa'i mdo
P5767, Vol. 140

Chandrakirti (Zla-ba-grags-pa)
Clear Words, Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'
Mulamadhyamakavrttiprasannapada
dBU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba
P5260, Vol. 98; also: Tibetan Publishing House, 1968

Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas'
Bodhisattvayogacharyachatuhsatkatatkka
Byang chub sens dpa'i mal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa
P5266, Vol. 98

Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness'
Shunyatasaptativrtti
sTong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i 'grel pa  
P5268, Vol. 99

*Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning'*  
Yuktishashtikavrtti  
Rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel pa  
P5265, Vol. 98

*Commentary on the 'Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"'*  
Madhyamakavataraabhashya  
dBU ma la 'jug pa pa'i bshad pa  
P5263, Vol. 98

Partial translation by L. de La Vallee Poussin, Museon 8 (1907), pp.249-317; 11 (1910), pp.271-358; and 12 (1911), pp.235-328

*Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'*

Dak-tsang (sTag-tshang-lo-tsa-ba Shes-rab-rin-chen), 1405-?  
*Ocean of Good Explanations, Explanation of 'Freedom From Extremes Through Understanding All Tenets'*  
Grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho  
Photographic reprint in the possession of Khetsun Sangpo; no other data  
Also: Thim-phu: Kun-bzang-stobs rgyal, 1976

Den-ba-dar-gyay (bsTan-pa-dar-rgyas), 1493-1568  
*Analysis of Dependent-Arising*  
rTen 'brel gyi mtha' bcod  
Mey College of Sera Monastery, 1969

Den-dar-hla-ram-ba (bsTan-dar-lha-ram-pa), 1759-?  
*Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many*  
gCig du bral gyi rnam gzhag legs bshad rgya mtsho las btus pa'i 'khrul spong bdud rtsi'i gzegs ma  
Lhasa: Great Press at the base of the Potala, Fire Dog Male year of the sixteenth cycle  
Meditation on Emptiness

Dharmakirtti (Chos-kyi-grags-pa)

Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition

*Analysis of Relations*

Sambandhaparikshavrtti

'Brel pa brtag pa'i rab tu byed pa

P5731, Vol. 130

*Ascertainment of Valid Cognition*

Pramanavinishchaya

Tshad ma rnam par nges pa

P5710, Vol. 130

*Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium of Valid Cognition'*

Pramanavarttikakarika

Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa

P5709, Vol. 130

*Drop of Reasoning*

Nyayabinduprakarana

Rigs pa'i thugs pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa

P5711, Vol. 130


*Drop of Reasons*

Hetubindunamaprakarana

gTan tshigs kyi thugs pa zhes bya ba' ri rab tu byed pa

P5712, Vol. 130

*Proof of Other Continuums*

Samtanantarasisiddhinamaprakarana

rGyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa

P5716, Vol. 130

*Reasoning for Debate*

Vadanyayanamaprakarana

rTsod pa'i rigs pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa

P5715, Vol. 130

Dignaga (Phyogs-glang)

*Compendium of Valid Cognition*

Pramanasamuchchaya

Tshad ma kun las btus pa

P5700, Vol. 130

Dzong-ka-ba (Tsong-kha-pa), 1357-1419

*Essence of the Good Explanations, Treatise Discriminating What is to be Interpreted and the Definitive*

Drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po

P6142, Vol. 153

Translation by R.A.F. Thurman (Princeton: forthcoming)

*Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Points of the 'Afflicted Mind and Basis-of-All', Ocean of Eloquence*

Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' ba'i gnas rgya cher 'grel pa legs par bshad pa'i rgya mtsho

Delhi: Lhalungpa, no date

*Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path'*

The *Lam rim chen mo* of the incomparable Tsong-kha-pa, with the interlinear notes of Ba-so

Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, Sde-drug Mkhan-chen

Ngag-dbang-rab-rتان, 'Jam-dbyangs-bshad-pa'i-rdo-rje, and Bra-sti Dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub

New Delhi: Chos-'phel-legs-lidan, 1972

*Golden Rosary of Eloquence/Extensive Explanation of (Maitreya's) 'Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom, Ornament for Clear Realization', As Well As Its Commentaries*

Legs bshad gser gyi phreng ba/Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rgya cher bshad pa

P6150, Vol. 154

*Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*

Lam rim chen mo

P6001, Vol. 152

Also: Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, 1964

Partial translation by A. Wayman, *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real* (New York: Columbia, 1978)
Meditation on Emptiness

Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"

dbU ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal
P6143, Vol. 154

Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path
Lam rim 'bring
P6002, Vol. 152
Also: Dharamsala: Shes rig par khang, 1968
Partial translation by R.A.F. Thurman in The Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa (Dharamsala: LTWA, 1982)

Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'

dbU ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho
P6153, Vol. 156
Also: Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, no date.
Translation of chapter two by J. Hopkins, 'Ocean of Reasoning' (Dharamsala: LTWA, 1977)

Praise of Dependent-Arising/Praise of the Supramundane Victor Buddha from the Approach of His Teaching the Profound Dependent-Arising, Essence of the Good Explanations
Sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das la zab mo rten cing 'grel bar 'byung ba gsung ba'i sgo nas bstod pa legs par bshad pa'i snying po
P6016, Vol. 153
Translation by Geshe Wangyal in The Door of Liberation (New York: Girodias, 1973)

Quintessential Instructions on the King of Tantras, the Glorious Guhyasamaja, Lamp Thoroughly Illuminating the Five Stages
rGyud kyi rgyal po dpal gsang ba 'dus pa'i man ngag rim pa lnga rab tu gsal ba'i sgron ma
P6167, Vol. 158
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises

Stages of Instruction from the Approach of the Profound Path of Naropa's Six Practices
Zab lam na ro'i chos drug gi sgo nas 'khrid pa'i rim pa
P6201, Vol. 160
Translated by C.C. Chang, *Esoteric Teachings of the Tibetan Tantra* (Lausanne: Aurora, 1961)

Fifth Dalai Lama (Ngag-dbang-blo-bzang-rgya-mtsho), 1617-82
*Sacred Word of Manjushri, Instructions on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment*
Byang chub lam gyi rim pa'i 'khrid yig 'jam pa'i dbyangs kyi zhal lung
Blockprint in the possession of Trijang Labrang, Dharmsala; no other information
Also: Thim-phu: Kun-bzang stobs-rgyal, 1976
Partial translation by J. Hopkins, 'Practice of Emptiness' (Dharmsala: LTWA, 1974)

Gen-dun-cho-pel (dGe-'dun-chos-'phel), 1905P-1951?
*Ornament to Nagarjuna's Thought, Eloquence Containing the Essence of the Profundities of the Middle Way*

Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen (sGom-sde Nam-mkha' rgyal mtshan), 1532-92
*Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, Key to (Chandrakirti's) 'Clear Words', Written by Jam-bay-yang Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen*

Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may (dKon-mchog-bstan-pa'i-sgron-me), 1762-1823
*Beginnings of Annotations on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Essence of the
**Meditation on Emptiness**

*Good Explanations’ on the Topic of Mind-Only, Illumination of a Hundred Mind-Only Texts*

bsTan bcos legs par bshad pa'i snying po las sems tsam skor gyi mch'an 'grel rtsom 'phro rnam rig gzhung brgya'i snang ba

Tibetan blockprint in the possession of HH the Dalai Lama; no other data

*Explanation of the Difficult Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Afflicted Mind and Basis-of-All', Entrance for the Wise*

Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' gnad rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa'i 'jug ngogs

Musoorie: Gomang College, no other data

*Presentation of the Four Truths, Port of Those Wishing Liberation, Festival for the Wise*

bDen bzh'i rnam gzhag thar 'dod 'jug ngogs mkhas pa'i dga' ston

Collected Works of Gun-than dkon-mchog bstan-pa'i sgron-me, Vol. 2

New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972

Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo (dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po), 1728-91

*Precious Garland of Tenets/Presentation of Tenets, A Precious Garland*

Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba

Dharmsala:-Shes rig par khang, 1969


*Presentation of the Grounds and Paths, Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles*

Sa lam gyi rnam bzhag theg gsum mdzes rgyan

Buxaduor: Gomang College, 1965

Gunamati (Yon-tan-blo-gros)
Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) 'Commentary on the "Sutra on Dependent-A rising"'
Pratityasamutpadadivibhariganirdeshatkā
rTEN cing 'brel bar 'byung ba dang po dang rnam par
'byed pa bstan pa'i rgya cher bshad pa
P5497, Vol. 104-5

Gyel-tsap (rGyal-tshab), 1364-1432
Commentary on (Maitreya's) 'Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle'
Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i tfkka
Blockprint in the possession of HH the Dalai Lama; no other information.

Jam-yang-shay-ba ('Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa), 1648-1721
Great Exposition of Tenets/Explanation of 'Tenets', Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings
Grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong
Mussoorie: Dalama, 1962

Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions/Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions, Adornment Beautifying the Subduer's Teaching, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning, Delighting the Fortunate
bSam gzugs kyi snyoms 'jug mams kyi rnam par bzhag pa'i bstan bcos thub bstan mdzes rgyan lung dang rigs pa'i rgya mtsho skal bzang dga' byed
Folio printing in India; no publication data

Great Exposition of the Middle Way/Analysis of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"', Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate
778  Meditation on Emptiness

dbU ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs
Buxaduor: Gomang, 1967

Presentation of Tenets, Roar of the Five-Faced [Lion] Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Good Path to Omniscience
Grub mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa 'khrul spong gdong lnga'i sgra dbyangs kun mkhyen lam bzang gsal ba'i rin chen sgron me
Folio printing in India; no publication data.

Jang-gya (ICang-skya), 1717-86
Presentation of Tenets/Clear Exposition of the Presentations of Tenets, Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer's Teaching
Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan

Song on the Practice of the View
dbU ma'i lta ba nyams su len tshul de kho na nyid snang bar byed pa'i sgron me
MHTL: 3915

Jnanagarbha (Ye-shes-snying-po)

Discrimination of the Two Truths
Satyadvayavibhanga
bDen gnyis rnam 'byed
[Not in P] Toh.3881

Jnanashrfbhadra (Ye-shes-dpal-bzang-po)

Commentary on the 'Descent into Lanka'
Lankavataravrtti
Langkar gshegs pa'i 'grel pa
P5519, Vol. 107

Jnanavajra (Ye-shes-rdo-rje)

Commentary on the 'Descent into Lanka Sutra', Ornament of the Heart of the Tathagata
Larikavataranamamahyanasutravrttitathagatahr-dayalamkara
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises

Langkar gshegs pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo'i 'grel pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i rgyan
P5520, Vol. 107

Kalapa

_Kalapa's Aphorisms_
Kalapasutra
Ka la pa'i mdo
P5775, Vol. 140

Kamalashlla

_Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Shantaraksita's) 'Compendium on Suchness'_
Tattvasamgrahapanjika
De kho na nyid bsdus pa'i dka' 'grel
P5765, Vol. 138
Translated by G. Jha, _The Tattvasahgraha of Santaraksita with the commentary of Kamalasila_, Gaekwad's Oriental Series Vol. lxxx and lxxxiii (Baroda: 1937-9)

_Illumination of the Middle Way_
Madhyamakaloka
dBU ma snang ba
P5287, Vol. 101

_Stages of Meditation_
Bhavanakrama
sGom pa'i rim pa
P5310-12, Vol. 102

Kay-drup (mKhas-grub), 1385-1438

_Manual of Instructions on the View_
ITa khrid mun sel sgron me
Toh.5499

_Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate, Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness_
Zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed
Tibetan blockprint edition in the possession of Geshe Wangyal; no other information. [Toh.5459]

Long-drol (kLong-drol), 1719-94

_Tibetan Buddhist Studies of Kloh-drol bla-ma Nag-dbah-blo-bzah_
Meditation on Emptiness

Mussoorie: Lokesh Chandra, 1963
Also: New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1973

Mahamati (bLo-gros-chen-po)
Clear Words, Extensive Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly Letter'/Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly Letter'
Vyaktapadasuhrillekhatfka
bShes pa'i spring yig gi rgya cher bshad pa tshig gsal ba
P5690, Vol. 129

Maitreya (Byams-pa)
Five Treatises of Maitreya's Doctrine
Discrimination of Phenomena and the Nature of Phenomena
Dharmadharmaatavibhanga
Chos dang chos nyid rnam par 'byed pa
P5523, Vol. 108

Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes
Madhyantavibhanga
dbUs dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa
P5522, Vol. 108
Translated in part by T. Stcherbatsky, Madhyanta-Vibhanga (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1971)

Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras
Mahayanasutralamkararakarika
Theg pa chen po'i mdo sde'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa
P5521, Vol. 108

Ornament for Clear Realization
Abhisamayalamkara
mNgon par rtogs pa'i rgyan
P5184, Vol. 88
Translated by E. Conze, Abhisamayalahkara, Serie Orientale Roma VI (Rome: IS.M.E.O., July 1954)

Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle
Mahayanottaratantrashastra
Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises 781

P5525, Vol. 108

Nagabodhi (kLu-byang)
Classification of the Ends of Actions
Karmantavibhariga
Las kyi mtha' rnam par 'byed pa
P2676, Vol. 62

Nagarjuna (kLu-sgrub)
Commentary on 'Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness'
Shunyatatasaptati vrtti
sTong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i 'grel pa
P5231, Vol. 95

Compendium of Sutra
Sutrasamuchchaya
mDo kun las btus pa
P5330, Vol. 102

Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment
Bodhicittavivarana
Byang chub sems kyi 'grel pa
P2665, Vol. 61; P2666, Vol. 61

Five Collections of Reasonings (see Six Collections and delete the Precious Garland)

Friendly Letter
Suhrllekha
bShes pa'i spring yig
P5682, Vol. 129
Translation by Geshe L. Tharchin and A.B. Engle, Nagarjuna's Letter (Dharmsala: LTWA, 1979)

Peerless Praise
Nirupamastava
dPe med par bstod pa
P2011, Vol. 46

Praise of the Element of Qualities
Dharmadhatustotra
Chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa
P2010, "Vol. 46

Praise of the Inconceivable
Achintyastava
bSam gyis mi khyab par bstod pa
P2019, Vol. 46

Praise of the Mind Vajra
Chittavajrastava
Sems kyi rdo rje la bstod pa
P2013, Vol. 46

Praise of the Supramundane
Lokatftastava
'Jig rten las 'das par bstod pa
P2012, Vol. 46

Praise of the Three Bodies
Kayatrayastotra
sKu gsum la bstod pa
P2015, Vol. 46

Praise of What Surpasses Praise
StutyatiTtastava
bsTod pa las 'das par bstod pa
P2020, Vol. 46

Six Collections of Reasonings

Precious Garland of Advice for the King
Raj aparikatharatnavali
rGyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che'i phreng ba
P5658, Vol. 129

Refutation of Objections
Vigrahavyavartanfkarika
rTsod pa bzlog pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5228, Vol. 95
Translated by K. Bhattacharya, The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna (Delhi: Motilal, 1978)
Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness
Shunyatasaaptatikarika
sTong pa nyi'd bu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5227, Vol. 95

Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning
Yuktishashtikakarika
Rigs pa drug cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5225, Vol. 95

Treatise Called 'The Finely Woven'
Vaidalyasutranama
Zhib mo rnam par 'thag pa zhes bya ba'i mdo
P5226, Vol. 95

Treatise on the Middle Way/Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way, Called 'Wisdom'
Prajnanamamulamadhyamakakarika/
Madhyamakashastra
dBU ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba
P5224, Vol. 95
Translated by F.J. Streng, Emptiness (Nashville and New York: Abingdon, 1967); etc.

Stanzas on the Essence of Dependent-Arising
Pratftyasamutpadahrdayakarika
rTen cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5236, Vol. 95

The Five Stages
Panchakrama
Rim pa lnga pa
P2667, Vol. 61

Nga-wang-bel-den (Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan), 1797-?
Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets \ Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought
Grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol
gbio gsal gees nor
Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1964

Explanation of the Conventional and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets
Meditation on Emptiness

Grub mtha' bzhi'i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i don rnam par bshad pa legs bshad dpyid kyi dpal mo'i glu dbyangs

New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1972

Illumination of the Texts of Tantra, Presentation of the Grounds and Paths of the Four Great Secret Tantra Sets
gSang chen rgyud sde bzhi'i sa lam gyi rnam bzhag rgyud gzhung gsal byed
rGyud smad par khang edition; no other data

Pa-bong-ka (Pha-bong-kha), 1878-1941

Lectures on the Stages of the Path, compiled by Trijang Rinpoche

Lam rim zin bris/rNam grol lag bcangs su gtod pa'i man ngag zab mo tshang la ma nor ba mtshungs med chos kyi rgyal po'i thugs bcud byang chub lam gyi rim pa'i nyams khrig kyi zin bris gsung rab kun gyi bcud bsdu gsam ngag bdud rtsi'i snying po

Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1965

Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba (Pan-chen bSod-nams-grags-pa), 1478-1554

General Meaning of (Maitreya 'sj 'Ornament for Clear Realization'

Phar phyin spyi don/Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rnam bshad snying po rgyan gyi don legs par bshad pa yum don gsal ba'i sgron me

Buxaduo: Nang bstan shes rig 'dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, 1963

Prajnamoksha (Shes-rab-thar-pa)

Commentary on (Atisha's) 'Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way'

Madhyamakopadeshavrtti
dBU ma'i man ngag ces bya ba'i 'grel pa
P5327, Vol. 102

Explanation of (Shantideva's) 'Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds'

Bodhisattvacharyavataraabhashya
Byang chub sms dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i bshad pa
P5872, Vol. 146
Prajnavarman (Shes-rab-go-cha)
Commentary on (Udbhatasiddhasvamin's) 'Exalted Praise'
Visheshastavanatmlka
Khyad par du 'phags pa'i bstod pa'i rgya cher bshad pa
P2002, Vol. 46
Prthivibandhu (Sa'i-rtsa-lag)
Commentary on the 'White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine Sutra'
Saddharmapundarfkanrttii
Dam pa'i chos pundarlka'i 'grel pa
P5518, Vol. 107; Dharma 4017
Rajaputra Yashomitra (rGyal-po'i-sras Grags-pa'i-bshes-gnyen)
Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) 'Treasury of Knowledge'
Abhidharmakosabratkta
Chos mngon pa'i mdzod 'grel bshad
P5593, Vol. 116
Ratnakarashanti (Shanti-pa/Rin-chen-'byung-gnas-zhi-ba)
Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Compendium of Sutra', Orna-
ment Sparkling with Jewels
Sutrasamuchchayabhashyaratnalokalakmaka
mDo kun las btus pa'i bshad pa rin po che'i snang ba'i
rgyan
P5331, Vol. 102
Ren-da-wa (Red-mda'-ba), 1349-1412
Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly Letter'
bShes pa'i spring yig gi 'grel pa
Tibetan blockprint in the possession of Geshe Wangyal;
no publication data
Translated by Geshe L. Tharchin and A.B. Engle,
Nagarjuna's Letter (Dharmsala: LTWA, 1979)
Sha-mar Gen-dun-den-dzin-gya-tso (Zhwa-dmar dGe-bdun-
bstan-'dzin-rgya-mtsho), 1852-1910
Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought, Set Forth to Purify
Forgetfulness of the Difficult Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great
Exposition of Special Insight'
Meditation on Emptiness

I'Hag mthong chen mo'i dka' gnad rnam brjed byang du
bkod pa dgongs zab snang ba'i sgron me
Delhi: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1972

Shantideva (Zhi-ba-lha)

Compendium of Learnings
Shikshasamuchchayakarika
bsLab pa kun las btus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5336, Vol. 102
Translated by C. Bendall and W.H.D. Rouse, Siksa Samuccaya (Delhi: Motilal, 1971)

Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds
Bodhisattvacharyavatara
Byang chub sms dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa
P5272, Vol. 99

Tu-gen Lo-sang-cho-gyi-nyi-ma (Thu'u-bkvan bLo-bzang-chos-kyi-nyi-ma) 1737-1802

Mirror of the Good Explanations Showing the Sources and Assertions of All Systems of Tenets
Grub mtha' thams cad kyi khungs dang 'dod tshul ston pa legs bshad shel gyi me long
Sarnath: Chhos Je Lama, 1963

Udbhatasiddhasvamin (mTho-btsun-grub-rje)

Exalted Praise
Visheshastava
Khyad par du 'phags pa'i bstod pa
P2001, Vol. 46

Vasubandhu (dbYig-gnyen)

Commentary on the 'Sutra on Dependent-Arising'
Pratityasamutpadadivibhariganirdesha
rTen cing 'brel bar 'byung ba dang po dang rnam par dbye ba bshad pa
P5496, Vol. 104

Explanation of the 'Treasury of Knowledge'
Abhidharmakoshabhashya
Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa
P5591, Vol. 115

*Treasury of Knowledge*
Abhidharmakoshakarika
Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi tshig le'ur byas pa
P5590, Vol. 115
For translation, see previous entry

Ye-shay-gyel-tsen (Ye-shes-rgyal-mtshan), 1713-93
*Clear Exposition of the Modes of Minds and Mental Factors, Necklace for Those of Clear Mind*
Sems dang sms byung gi tshul gsal bar ston pa bio gsal mgul rgyan
The Collected Works of Tshe-mchog-glin yons-'dzin ye-ses-rgyal-mtshan, Vol. 16
New Delhi: Tibet House, 1974

*Special Instructions on the View of the Middle Way, the Sacred Word of Lo-sang*
Zab mo dbu ma'i lta khrid thun mong min pa bio bzang zhal lung
Appendix to Guenther's *Tibetan Buddhism Without Mystification*, Leiden: Brill, 1966; translated therein
3 Other Works


Meditation on Emptiness


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Мар-ба
Notes

Since this book is for the most part interwoven with paraphrase of the texts mentioned in the introduction and paraphrase of explanation gleaned from the oral tradition, the main function of the notes, except in the translation sections, is to provide the reader with a key to this weaving through identifying the particular sources. The most commonly cited texts are abbreviated, a list of which is given on pp. 23-4. Entries in the Tibetan Tripitaka Research Foundation publication of the *Tibetan Tripitaka* (Tokyo-Kyoto, 1956) are indicated by the letter 'P', standing for 'Peking edition', followed by the entry number. See the Bibliography for the full Sanskrit and Tibetan titles.

1 Part One, chapter one is mainly a paraphrase of *Jang*. 416.20-421.17.
2 Quoted by Chandrakirti in his *Clear Words*, P5260, Vol. 98 54.4.7.
3 Brackets are from Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement to the Middle Way*', P6143, Vol. 154 81.1.5-7.
4 The source for this and the next paragraph is Kensur Lekden, whose teaching is based on Affsha's *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment* and Dzong-ka-ba's elaboration of it in his *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*.
5 The brackets and the succeeding two sentences are taken from *Ann*, dbu 104a.5ff.
The remainder of the chapter is based on *GT*, cha 32a.4-32b.7.

Part One, chapter two is mainly taken from Kensur Lekden's teachings, which are based on common Ge-luk-ba literature.

The Sanskrit is, for the most part, felicitously reconstructed from the Tibetan. For *svairT*, see *GT*, ca 61 a.1.

Source for this and the next three paragraphs is *Ann*, dbu 68a.Iff and 67a.Iff.

Oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Geshe Lhundup Sopa.

Source for this paragraph and the last three sentences of the next is *Ann*, dbu 68b.2ff, following Buddhapalita (see p.633-4).

Part One, chapter three follows the pattern set by Jam-yang-shay-ba in *GT*, cha 32b.7ff, with other writings as cited below.

Until the next note, the source is Kensur Lekden.

Part One, chapters four through seven are condensations of Part Two, chapters one through five for the sake of meditation; therefore, see the corresponding chapters in Part Two for the specific sources.

Geshe Rapden.

Geshe Rapden.

Geshe Gediin Lodro.


Geshe Gediin Lodro.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama, when bestowing the oral transmission and explanation of Nagarjuna's Six Collections of reasonings in Dharmsala, 1972.

Sources until the next note are Kensur Lekden and *GT*, 33a.2ff.

Tenzin Gyatso, *The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle Way*, p.77.

Part One, chapter eight is mainly drawn from Pa-bong-ka's *Lectures on the Stages of the Path*, compiled by Trijang Rinbochay (Sarnath: Pleasure of the Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1965), 302b.3-315b.6, and Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of the
Notes

Concentrations and Formlessnesses (modern folio printing in India, no place or date of publication), 22b.3-81b.1. The next two sentences are from the latter, 55b.5-56a.4.

27 The section on prerequisites is taken from Lectures, 312b.3-314a.7.
28 Lectures, 315b.4, and Concentrations, 45a.4. The remainder of the paragraph is from Concentrations, 47a.2-47b.1.
29 This sentence is from Concentrations, 45a.6. The rest of the paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Lati Rinbochay.
30 This paragraph paraphrases Concentrations, 57a.5-58a.2.
31 This and the last sentence of this paragraph are drawn from Concentrations, 68a.2-4. The middle two sentences are from the same, 48b.5-6.
32 Concentrations, 45b.3. The next two sentences are from the same, 68a.4-69b.3.
33 This and the next sentence are drawn from Lectures, 306a.8-306b.2.
34 The section on faults and antidotes is drawn from Concentrations, 69b.4-75b.5, and Lectures, 304a.7-31 la.2. The Sanskrit for Chart 2 is taken from Maitreya's Madhyanta-Vibhaga-Sastra, ed. Ramchandra Pandeya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), pp.130-1.
35 Concentrations, 59b.2.
36 Lectures, 31 la.3-3lb.1. The brackets are from Lati Rinbochay's teachings.
37 The section on the nine states is drawn from Lectures, 31 lb.5-313b.3, and Concentrations, 76b.3-77b.3. The Sanskrit for Chart 3 is taken from Asanga's Sravakabhumi, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Volume XIV, ed. Dr. Karuneshha Shukla (Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1973), pp.363-6; and Asanga's Abhidharma Samuccaya, ed. Pralhad Pradhan (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1950), p.75. This sentence is taken from the oral teachings of Lati Rinbochay.
38 Geshe Gedun Lodro.
39 This and the next sentence are drawn from GT, 33a.3.
40 These last two sentences are from Dzong-ka-ba, Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, 1964), 347b.1-4.
41 The section on actual calm abiding is drawn from Lectures, 314a.5-315a.5; and Concentrations, 78a.2-81b.1.
Meditation on Emptiness

42 Lati Rinbochay.
43 This final section of the chapter is based on Geshe Gediin Lodro's commentary on GT, cha 33a.3-7, and Ann, dbu 105a.4ff.
44 Part One chapter nine is drawn from many sources as cited in the following notes. The next sentence is from Concentrations, 49b.3.
45 Concentrations, 84a.5.
46 Concentrations, 39a.6.
47 Concentrations, 81b.3.
48 Concentrations, 83b.2.
49 This sentence and the remainder of the paragraph are taken from Concentrations, 83b.7-84a.2.
50 This paragraph is drawn from Concentrations, 86b.4-7 and 54b.1-55b.4.
51 Until n.52 the text follows GT, cha 33a.7ff.
52 Gn-chok-jik-may-wang-bo, Presentation of the Grounds and Paths, Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles (Buxaduor: Gomang College, 1965), 13b.5-14a.6.
53 Jang, 500.9-501.1. The Hinayana presentation substitutes the Desire Realm and the upper two realms for 'object' and 'subject', according to Geshe Lhundup Sopa.
54 See n.52 for source.
55 Jang, 498.17-506.7.
58 Source for this paragraph is the oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
59 The rest of the chapter is based on Jang, 500.9-501.1, as well as the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden, recounting standard abhidharma teachings as modified by the Mahayana tenet systems.
60 Part One, chapter ten is based for the most part on the oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama which this author translated and edited as the first part of Tantra in Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977). The other sources are Jang, 525.15-531.3, and Nga-wang-bel-den, Illumination of the Texts of Tantra, Presentation of the Grounds and Paths of the Four
Great Secret Tantra Sets (rGyud smad par khang, no date), entire.

61 Source for this and the next sentence is Jang, 529.18.

62 This sentence is from the oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The next is from Nga-wang-bel-den's *Illumination of the Texts of Tantra*, 12a.2.

63 Kensur Lekden.

64 This and the next sentence are taken from the oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

65 For amplification on this and the next paragraph see *Tantra in Tibet* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977). Also see Nga-wang-bel-den's *Illumination of the Texts of Tantra*, 13b.2-14b.2.

66 The remainder of this paragraph is taken from *Concentrations*, 53b.3, and Nga-wang-bel-den's *Illumination of the Texts of Tantra*, 13b.1-4.

67 General source for the rest of the chapter is Nga-wang-bel-den's *Illumination of the Texts of Tantra*, 14b.7ff (see 31b.7 and 33a.6 for the reference to abandoning the innate afflictions).

68 This and the next sentence are taken from *Ann*, dbu 105b.6-106a.1, and Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings.

69 Ling Rinbochay.

70 His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

71 Geshe Gediin Lodro.

72 *Special Instructions on the View of the Middle Way, the Sacred Word of Lo-sang*, 13b.4-5. This is number 48 in Herbert V. Guenther's *Tibetan Buddhism Without Mystification* (Leiden: Brill, 1966).

73 Part One, chapter eleven mainly paraphrases Jang, 506.7-525.15, with amplification from Kensur Lekden.

74 *GT*, cha 49a.8-51a.5.

75 His Holiness the Dalai Lama gave this as an etymology that was meaningful to him though not based on any text.

76 Part Two, introduction is drawn mainly from Jang, the first two paragraphs being from 421.20 and 410.3. The last sentence of the first paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, lecturing in 1972 on Dzong-ka-ba's *Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path*.

77 *GM*, 106b.3ff.

78 *GM*, 142b.5.

79 The main source for this paragraph is Geshe Gediin Lodro. Also see Jang, 183.7-14.
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80 This paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

81 Part Two, chapter one mainly follows Jam-yang-shay-ba's presentation of the diamond slivers, which is translated in Part Six, relying heavily on Ann, as cited below. The first two paragraphs are drawn from Jang, 422.7, and GM, 223b.1 and 197a.3ff.

82 See pp.639ff. The commentary relies heavily on the oral teachings of Geshe Gediin Lodro and Kensur Lekden.

83 Ann, dbu 70 gong a.2ff. See p.640.

84 Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, no date), 387a.6ff.

85 In Sanskrit, evam vicharyamana. See, for instance, Clear Words, (Poussin, 107.13; P5260, Vol. 98 19.1.8 ) yatashchayam gantr-gantavya gamanani vicharyamani na sand).

86 Quoted by Gen-diin-cho-pel in his Ornament to Nagarjuna's Thought (Kalimpong: Mani Printing Works, no date), 13a.2. See also GM, 139b.6 and 256a.4.

87 The section on non-production from self paraphrases Ann, dbu 70 'og a.6ff.

88 This paragraph is drawn from Ann, dbu 70a.3ff.

89 This paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Geshe Gediin Lodro.

90 Kensur Lekden reported that this animal has a split lip, and thus is actually a hare. In this case, 'rabbit' would actually be g.yos in Tibetan.

91 The section on non-production from other, until the refutation of error, paraphrases Ann, dbu 71a.5ff.

92 Jang, 427.10.

93 Sources for the discussion of error, until the next note, are Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations, Treatise Discriminating What is to be Interpreted and the Definitive, P6142, Vol. 153 197.5.5-198.2.2, and Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 37.4.2-37.5.3.

94 Ann, dbu 52a.1.

95 GM, 281b.3ff; GT, ca 37b.4.

96 This and the next paragraph are taken from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

97 Ann, dbu 52a.1.

98 This paragraph paraphrases ChandrakTrti's Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vbl. 98 136.8.7.
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100 Source for this and the next sentence is GT, ka 27a.6.

101 This sentence paraphrases Chandrakmi's Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 137.3.6. This is more cogent than Jam-yang-shay-ba's corresponding passage (p.649-50); perhaps the latter version is corrupt.

102 This paragraph is taken, with amplification from Geshe Gediin Lodro, from Jang, 424.1 Iff.

103 See Jang, 419.16-421.2 and 411.6.

104 Part Two, chapter two is drawn from Ann and Chandrakrtti as cited in n.106 and n.107.

105 Jang, 424.6 and 429.7.

106 Source until the quote from Chandrakrtti is Ann, dbu 52a.2ff.

107 P5263, Vol. 98 122.5.2ff.


109 Bskyed par byed pa should read bskyed par bya ba.

110 Part Two, chapter three is mainly a paraphrase of Ann; see n. 112.

111 Jang, 429.4.

112 The remainder of this section until the last paragraph paraphrases Ann, dbu 52b.2ff and 73a.2ff.

113 Geshe Gediin Lodro.

114 Lati Rinbochay.

115 Part Two, chapter four, until the elimination of error, is mainly drawn from Jang, 443.5-458.9.

116 This paragraph is based on the common usage of 'dependent-arising' among Tibetan scholars.

117 The significance of Nagarjuna's use of prapya is lost in the Tibetan translation which substitutes brten, i.e., pratTya, for prapya. This and the next two paragraphs leave off paraphrasing Jang, offering other opinions and the author's reflections.

118 Avalokitavrata, Commentary on (Bhdvaviveka's) 'Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) "Wisdom"', P5259, Vol. 96 170.2.1.

119 The text returns to paraphrasing Jang', see n.115.

120 See his Length of a Forearm, P5248 (which some Western scholars attribute to Dignaga).

121 Ren-da-wa, Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly Letter', 5 lb.6: sangs rgyas ni chos kyi skus rab tu phye bas rten 'brelgyi gnas lugs las tha mi dadpa'iphyir ro.
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Dak, 71b.5.

This paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Geshe Gediin Lodro.

This paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

Part Two, chapter five is drawn from many sources, but primarily from Jang as indicated below. The first sentence is from GM, 485b.1, with commentary by Kensur Lekden.


Jang, 435.15.

Source for this and the next two paragraphs is Ann, dbu 84a.2ff.

Ann, dbu 129a.2ff.

Except where noted, the commentary paraphrases Jang, 431.18ff.

Ann, dbu 27a.5.

This and the next paragraph are drawn from the oral teachings of Geshe Gediin Lodro.

The commentary returns to paraphrasing Jang, 437.7ff, and Ann, dbu 85a.5ff.

Ann, dbu 81b.8. Source for the remainder of the paragraph is Ann, dbu 82a.8ff.

Commentary returns to paraphrasing Jang, 437.7ff, and Ann, dbu 86a.8ff.

Ann, dbu 86b.6.

Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 53.3.7. The paraphrase of Jang and Ann leaves off; the commentary is now basically the author’s.

This and the next sentence come from the oral teachings of Geshe Gediin Lodro.

Kensur Lekden emphasized this point many times. The next paragraph is also taken from his teaching.

The commentary returns to paraphrasing Jang, 438.1ff, and Ann, dbu 87a.1ff. For the examples, see p.691.

See p.681.

Jang, 438.10.

Ann, dbu 27a.5.

Source for the rest of the paragraph is Kensur Lekden.

This and the next paragraph are from Jang, 439.8ff.

This paragraph paraphrases Jang, 441.20ff.
The remainder of the chapter is mainly based on the teaching of Kensur Lekden.

Jang, 443.2.

See Gen-diin-cho-pel's *Ornament to Nagarjuna's Thought*.


*Commentary on the 'Supplement',* P5263, Vol. 98 111.1.8ff.

Part Three in general is a reflection of Kensur Lekden's embodiment of an approach to Madhyamika that does not eliminate the rich Buddhist presentations of phenomena but incorporates them under the umbrella of dependent-arising and emptiness of inherent existence. The beginning of the Introduction, until the next note, is drawn from *GT*, ca 12a.6ff.

Geshe Gediin Lodro. The 'midnight sky' reference is from *GT*, ca 12b.6.


*Ann*, dngos 55a.8ff. Source for the point of attainment is *Ann*, dbu 121a.4 and dngos 23b.4.

Geshe Gediin Lodro.

Gyel-tsap, *Commentary on (Maitreya's) Treatise on the Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle*, 182a.6-183a.6, chap. III.

IBID, 183a.6-183b.6.

IBID, 184b.1-184b.5.

Part Three, chapter one is based in general on the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden; using 'the selfless' as the source of the chart, rather than 'existent', is his own uncommon quintessential instruction. For the general list see Jang, 87.16-92.7. For discussion of many of the terms see Sopa's and Hopkins' *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider and Co., 1976). The material, for the most part, is usually taught with the *Collected Topics of Valid Cognition (bsDus grva)*, the process of which relies to a great degree on the oral tradition, which Lati Rinbochay imparted at the University of Virginia in the spring and summer of 1976. Geshe Gediin Lodro's and Geshe
Lhundup Sopa's elaborations on specific terms were particularly illuminating.


163 The main source for the section on forms is Cha-har Ge-shay's *Identification of Elements, Elemental Evolutes, And So Forth*, The Collected Works of Cha-har dge-bshes blo-bzang-tshul-khrims (New Delhi: Chatring Jansar Tenzin, 1973), Vol. 10, 389-427. This section deviates at several points from Asanga's *Compendium of Knowledge* as found in *Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga*, ed. by Pralhad Pradhan (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1950), pp.3-4. The Sanskrit terms were mainly taken from Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge*. The etymology of 'form' is from Geshe Gediin Lodro.

164 This paragraph is based on teachings from Geshe Gediin Lodro.

165 This section on forms for the mental consciousness also relies on *GM*, 352a.3ff.


167 Geshe Gediin Lodro.

168 With the exception of the last sentence, which is drawn from the oral teachings of Lati Rinbochay, the paragraph paraphrases Dzong-ka-ba's *Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path* (Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, 1968), 87a.2-5.

169 The main source for the section on non-associated compositional factors is Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may's *Beginnings of Annotations on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Essence of the Good Explanations' on the Topic of Mind-Only, Illumination of a Hundred Mind-Only Texts* (blockprint in the possession of HH the Dalai Lama, place and date of publication unknown), 60a.2-61a.6. His Indian Source is Asariga's *Compendium of Knowledge*; see
pp. 10-11 of the edition given in n.163. The etymology given in
this paragraph is from the oral teachings of Geshe Gediin
Lodro.

170 This section is drawn, for the most part, from Kensur Lekden's
teachings. This first sentence, however, is from GT, kha 10b.6.

171 Geshe Lhundup Sopa.

172 GT, kha 10b.6.

173 IBID.

174 Part Three, chapter two is largely based on Dzong-ka-ba's
Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, P6001, Vol. 152
54.2.5ff. Geshe Lhundup Sopa's explanation of this text was
invaluable. The section is also supplemented with points from
monastic texts, namely, Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba's General
Meaning of (Maitreya's) 'Ornament for Clear Realization' (Buxa-
duor: Nang bstan shes rig 'dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, 1963),
314b.3-332a.1, and Den-ba-dar-gyay's Analysis of
Dependent-Arising (Mey College of Sera Monastery, 1969),
entire.

175 Geshe Lhundup Sopa.

176 Pa-bong-ka, Lectures on the Stages of the Path, compiled by Tri-
jang Rinbochay (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing

177 Part Three, chapter three is drawn from Jang, 126.10-128.4,
Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings, Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-
may's Presentation of the Four Truths, Port of Those Wishing
Liberation, Festival for the Wise, Collected Works, Vol. 2 (New
Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972), 877-914, and Pan-chan
So-nam-drak-ba's General Meaning of (Maitreya's) 'Ornament
for Clear Realization' (Buxaduor: Nang bstan shes rig 'dzin
skyong slob gnyer khang, 1963), 69a.6-74a.1.

178 Presentation of the Four Truths, 887.3.

179 The descriptions are condensed from explanations by Geshe
Gediin Lodro.

180 GM, 184b.3-4. The source for the next sentence is Geshe
Gediin Lodro.

181 Presentation of the Four Truths, 885.3.

182 Presentation of the Four Truths, 908.3, and GT, ca 55a.7.

183 Charts 36-9 are tabular forms of teachings emphasized by
Kensur Lekden and common to Ge-luk-ba teaching.

184 Jang, 179.18ff.
This paragraph followsGM, 179b.5ff. The last paragraph is a summation by the author.

Part Four, chapter one is drawn fromAnn, stod 20b.3-23b.7.

Part Four, chapter two is taken mainly fromGT andAnn. The first section until the separate discussion of Samkhya is drawn fromGT, ka 9b.8-15b.1, andAnn, stod 19b.7-20a.6.

Source for this and the next paragraph isAnn, 33a.6-33b.2.

With respect to the term 'individual analytical cessation', Geshe Gediin Lodro reported that the word 'individual' is usually treated as referring to the individual four truths and their sixteen attributes.

The text until the next note is drawn fromAnn, stod 32b.5ff.

Source for this and the next paragraph isAnn, stod 33a.2-5.

The section on Samkhya is drawn fromGT, ka 29a.2-35b.8,Ann, stod 63b.3-65b.7, andJang, 29.8-37.4.

The rest of the paragraph and the next are drawn from the oral teachings of Kensa Lekden.

The section on Charvaka is drawn fromGT, ka 21a.6-28a.2,Ann, stod 43b.7-44b.7, andJang, 29.8-37.4.

Part Four, chapter three is drawn from several sources, as listed below. For the topic of refuge seeJang, 13.2ff. The next two paragraphs are taken from the oral teachings ofKensa Lekden. SeeGT, ka 13b.6ff.

The sources for the section on Vaibhashika areGT, kha 1-18,Ann, dngos 34b.3-36a.2,Jang, 84.13-97.7, Tu-gen, 25.3-27.1, andGon, 17.12-30.3.

Ann, stod 1 lb.8. The source for the next sentence isAnn, stod 106b.4.

Kensa Lekden.

Geshe Gediin Lodro.

Blaze of Reasoning, P5256, Vol. 96 67.2.6ff.
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209  *GT*, kha 17a.5.
210  *GT*, kha 7b.2.
211  Kensur Lekden. The counter-evidence is from John Buescher.
212  Kensur Lekden.
213  Kensur Lekden.
214  *Dak*, 28a.5.
215  The sources for the section on Sautrantika are *GT*, ga 1-18, *Ann*, dngos 55a.3-56a.6, and *Jang*, 97.8-131.4.
216  *Dak*, 28a.4.
217  Kensur Lekden.
218  Jam-yang-shay-ba emphasizes that such does occur whereas Dak-tsang emphasizes the extreme difficulty of it.
219  The source for the contradictions is *Dak*, 28b.4-29a.2. The Mahayana answer to the first qualm is from Kensur Lekden.
220  This section on generic images or, more literally, meaning-generalities (*arthasamanya, don spyi*) is drawn from conversations with Tibetan scholars over a long period of time—Geshe Sopa, Geshe Gediin Lodro, Kensur Lekden, Geshe Rapden, Ling Rinbochay, and Lati Rinbochay.
221  This section on impermanence is drawn from *Ann*, dngos 27b.6-31a.7.
222  The source for this and the next definition is *Gon*, 17.16 and 30.10.
223  Part Four, chapter four is mostly drawn from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden. The first part until the discussion of Nagarjuna's history reflects a story that he particularly liked to tell. The intention of the chapter is to give an example of a brief traditional history, not a definitive history, in order to give a broader picture of the culture. For a history of Madhyamika, see D.S. Ruegg's *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy In India* (Wiesbaden; Harrassowitz, 1981).
224  The source here is Lati Rinbochay, citing the eighth chapter of Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge*.
226  See E. Obermiller's *History of Buddhism by Bu-ston* (Heidelberg: Heft, 1932), Part One, p.98.
Geshe Gediin Lodro said that these stories, which were related by Kensur Lekden, can be found in *Lho brag chung chung*. The general source for Nagarjuna’s history is *GT*, ca 4a.2fF. See *Taranatha’s History of Buddhism*, translated by Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya (Varanasi, 1964), p.67. The source for this and the next sentence is Geshe Gediin Lodro; then the text returns to a paraphrase of *GT*, as cited in n.228. The source for this and the next sentence is Geshe Gediin Lodro; then the text returns to paraphrasing *GT*, as cited in n.228.

*GT* (ca 3b.4) cites Maitreya, ‘Not formerly prophesied [as arising later], they arose simultaneously.’

The source for the remainder of this paragraph and the first sentence of the next is *Tu-gen*, 13.15ff; then the text returns to paraphrasing *GT*. The text paraphrases *GT* (ca 6b.7ff), except where noted, until the last sentence of this chapter.


Avalokitavrata (see p.462) accepts the book as Nagarjuna’s own work (P5259, Vol. 96 190.2.8).

*Kay-drup*, 88.6. Also, see n.414.

The text returns to paraphrasing *GT*, ca 9a.6ff.


ChandrakTrti openly refutes Bhavaviveka in the first, ninth, and eighteenth chapters of his *Clear Words* and criticizes Vasubandhu, Dharmapala, and Dignaga in his commentary to the third stanza of the colophon to his *Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s) Treatise on the Middle Way*.

*Kay-drup*, 90.1.

Kensur Lekden.

The remainder of this paragraph is drawn from the teachings of Kensur Lekden, who was relating a commonly held Ge-luk-ba interpretation.
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248 See Part Five, chapter one.
249 The Southern Buddhist tradition and Western scholarship generally put Buddha's death date at 483 B.C. The contemporary Nying-ma scholar Khetsun Sangpo, in accordance with an interpretation of the Kalachakra Tantra by Puk-ba Hlun-drup-gya-tso (Phug-pa Lhun-grub-rgya-mtsho), places it at 881 B.C.
250 The source here is the oral teaching of Khetsun Sangpo.
251 Part Four, chapter five is mostly drawn from GT, nga 1-66, Ann, dngos 112b.7-116a.6, Jang, 157.4-275.10, and Gon, 40.7-55.3.
252 This and the next sentence are from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.
253 Kensur Lekden.
254 Kensur Lekden.
255 The rest of this paragraph and the next two are elaborations from Kensur Lekden.
256 The source for the rest of this section through to the Prasangikas' refutation is Jang, 234.18ff.
257 Kensur Lekden.
258 Jang, 251.12ff. The section begins at 250.1.
259 This and the next two sentences are drawn from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.
260 This critique mainly follows the corresponding section in Part Six, chapter two, with considerable commentary from Kensur Lekden.
261 Den-dar, 3b.4. For the rest of the paragraph see GM, 374.6ff.
262 GM, 398b. 1.
263 GT, ca 63a.3ff.
265 GT, cha 37b.2.
266 Jnanavajra (P5520, Vol. 107 246.4.4) identifies these as the sutras teaching a Tathagata essence. This section on the Buddha nature is mainly explication of the corresponding section in Part Six, chapter two, drawn from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.
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267 HH the Dalai Lama gave this etymology, relating that though he has not seen it in the literature, he has found it helpful.

268 *Alaya*, 17a.1.

269 *Ann*, dbu 8b.6.

270 The presentation of the Chittamatra assertion on the mind-basis-of-all is taken from Dzong-ka-ba's *Alaya*, as well as from Geshe Lhundup Sopa's oral teachings.

271 This and the next two paragraphs are drawn from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden, as well as from *Ann*, dbu 25b.ff, and *Tu-gen*, 20.3ff.

272 *Tu-gen*, 22.20.

273 The discussion returns to being based on *Alaya*, 30a.9ff.

274 Kensur Lekden.

275 Kensur Lekden.

276 Geshe Gediin Lodro.

277 *Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may*, *Explanation of the Difficult Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Afflicted Mind and Basis of All', Entrance for the Wise* (Musoorie: [Gomang College], no date), 5b.7.

278 *GT*, ca 48b.3 and 48b.6.

279 P2665, Vol. 61 286.1.6; see *GT*, ca 48b.5.

280 See n.277.

281 The main sources for this section are *GT*, nga 25b.7-27b.1, and *Jang*, 175.8-178.14. The oral teachings of Kensur Lekden are particularly important throughout this section.

282 Kensur Lekden identified this as the position of the Lo-sel-ling College of Dre-bung Monastery.

283 The over-riding source for this section on the three vehicles is Kensur Lekden. Individual texts are cited in further notes.

284 *Gon*, 26-7.

285 *Jang*, 95.2.

286 *GT*, kha 12b.4.

287 The source for this paragraph is *Jang*, 269.7ff.

288 *GT*, nga 14b.6ff.

289 The two etymologies are from *GM*, 16a.3ff. See n.495.

290 Geshe Gediin Lodro.

291 Kensur Lekden mentioned this teaching several times.

292 This paragraph is drawn from *Jang*, 270.8ff.

293 The remainder of the paragraph is taken from *Ann*, stod 89a.4ff.
The background section of Part Four, chapter six is drawn, except for the first sentence and last paragraph, from *GM*, 3b.3-13a.2.


When Jam-yang-shay-ba (*GM*, 8a.6) says that conventional phenomena which are the bases of emptiness are 'suitable to be explicitly indicated [by Nagarjuna's *Treatise*] in a secondary manner' (*stonggzhiphalpa'i tshuldu dngos bstan la rung ba*), he seems to suggest that a Perfection of Wisdom Sutra would also explicitly indicate conventional phenomena such as the paths when it indicates these as bases of emptiness. However, it is said that the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras indicate the path structure and so forth neither explicitly nor implicitly but in a hidden way. The reason for this is that the reasonings proving emptiness only establish a non-affirming negation, not something positive, with the result that a consciousness realizing emptiness realizes only emptiness. Jam-yang-shay-ba would not go against this point; thus, there is a question how he could uphold it. Still, his other point—namely, that the *Treatise* extensively indicates the suitability of conventional phenomena within the rubric of an emptiness of inherent existence—is very well taken, even though whether this shows that it explicitly indicates the path structure and so forth is questionable. Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba and Jay-dzun-ba hold that the *Treatise* does not explicitly indicate the path structure, etc.

See n.295. For more discussion of the title, see n.545.

This section on the two truths is taken mainly from *GT*, cha 19b.2-36a.2, *Ann*, dbu 89a.3-108a.4, and Kensur Lekden's oral commentary.

Kensur Lekden.

Trijang Rinbochay.

*GT*, cha 21b A.

The following reasonings are based on the *Sutra Unravelling the Thought*, see *GT*, cha 21b.4 and 21b.8.

This and the next three paragraphs are drawn from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

P2665 (also P2666), Vol. 61 286.4.1, and *GT*, 22a.3.

Kensur Lekden.

*GT*, cha 21b.4.

*Ann*, dbu 98a.7.

The main source for the discussion surrounding the Jo-nang-bas is Kensur Lekden.

See *Jang*, 356.9, for a listing of these three.

Oral teachings of HH the Dalai Lama.

*GT*, cha 23b.5. The surrounding commentary is drawn from Kensur Lekden's answers to questions.

P5260, Vol. 98 76.2.5. This is in commentary on XXIV.8.

*Ann*, dbu 92b.4.

Geshe Gediiin Lodro.


*GT*, cha 25a.6.


This section on the two types of scriptures mainly follows the corresponding section of Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of Tenets* in Part Six, chapter two, embellished with the oral teachings of Geshe Gediiin Lodro.

This paragraph is taken from *Ann*, dbu 91a.8ff.

*Ann*, dbu 90b.5.

This and the next four paragraphs are taken from Geshe Gediiin Lodro's oral teachings.

See *Jang*, 144.16ff. The commentary is a paraphrase of *Jang*, 162.6.
Geshe Gediin Lodro.

Paragraph paraphrases Jang, 313.9fT.

The parenthetical addition is taken from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.

This and the next paragraph are mainly taken from Jang, 162-6-163.11.

See Dzong-ka-ba's *Tantra in Tibet*, ed. and trans, by Hopkins (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), Part Two, chapter two, for an extensive discussion of this. Dzong-ka-ba's commentary on the first chapter of Chandrakrirti's *Supplement* is even more extensive; see J. Hopkins' *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism*, pp. 150-81.

Part Five, chapter one mainly follows the corresponding section in the translation pp. 586-8, with commentary from Kensur Lekden's oral teachings.

Tu-gen, 15.20.


*Ann*, dbu 59b.3. The commentary is from Kensur Lekden.

This and the next sentence come from a conversation with the junior tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Trijang Rinbochay.


*GT*, ka 16a.2 and *Ann*, stod 25a.4ff.

This sentence and the rest of the paragraph are drawn from *Ann*, dbu 69a.8-70b.2.

This sentence and the next are taken from *Ann*, dbu 67a.3-67b.1. The rest of the section is drawn from the teachings of Kensur Lekden.

Part Five, chapters two through five are drawn almost entirely from *GM*, 224b.5-83a.1. This is Jam-yang-shay-ba's explanation of the controversy between Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka, and Chandrakrirti in their respective commentaries on Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* and especially as recounted by Chandrakrirti in his *Clear Words*. Throughout this explanation, my work at the Buddhist School of Dialectics in Dharamsala during April, May, and June of 1982 figures prominently. During that period I attended daily lectures by the Principal, Lobsang Gyatso of Lo-sel-ling-College, and debated with the class on an almost daily basis. The experience lifted this
important topic out of the textbooks into a living dilemma of interpretation, requiring a far greater grasp of the movement of the controversy than I had previously.

Throughout the explanation, the teachings of Kensur Lek-den from Go-mang College who first introduced me to the topic are important. I have also made extensive use of a textbook on the topic from the Jay College of Se-ra Monastery by Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen: his *Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, Key to (ChandrakTrti's) 'Clear Words', Written by Jam-bay-yang Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen (Thai bzlog gi dka' ba'i gnas gtan la 'bebs pa 'jam pa'i dbyang sgom sde nam mkha' rgyal mtshan gyis mdzadpa 'i tshiggsalgyi Ide mig)* in The Obligatory Texts (Yig-cha) for the Study of Madhyamika of Byes Grwa-tshah of Se-ra Monastery, Madhyamika Text Series, Vol. 4 (New Delhi: Lha-mkhar yons-'dzin bstan-pa-rgyal-mtshan, 1973), entire.

In the syllabus of the Gel-luk-ba monastic universities, this topic surfaces in the Middle Way class during discussion of the refutation of production from self in ChandrakTrti's *Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way', Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination of the Thought* which is his commentary on the former text, and the respective monastic textbook such as Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of the Middle Way* (referred to here as *GM*). Since ChandrakTrti treats the topic in his *Clear Words*, the material from that text is brought over to this class which revolves around his *Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'*. The first phase is called Opposite of the Consequences (*thai bzlog*), this leads into the second phase called Commonly Appearing Subjects (*chos can mthun snang ba*). Then, the texts return to the refutation of production from other which leads to a third phase called Two Truths (*bden pa gnyis*). Pertinent here are the first two phases—centrally important in the Ge-luk-ba educational system for Prasangika-Madhyamika as they are used for acquiring a working knowledge of the differences between Svatantrika and Prasangika. This is our great fortune, for their training program provides highly developed commentaries on this very difficult controversy.

Jam-yang-shay-ba, Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen, and so forth base their expositions on those of Dzong-ka-ba in three of his
works on Madhyamika which in chronological order are as follows.

1 Dzong-ka-ba's fullest treatment of Commonly Appearing Subjects is in the 'Great Exposition of Special Insight' in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path. This is pages 525.1-93.2 in the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path' (The Lam rim chen mo of the incomparable Tsong-kha-pa, with the interlineal notes of Ba-so Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, Sde-drug Mkhan-chen Ngag-dbang-rab-rtan, 'Jam-dbyangs-bshad-pa'i-rdo-rje, and Bra-sti Dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub, New Delhi: Chos-'phel-legs-ladan, 1972). Dzong-ka-ba's text is translated by Alex Wayman in Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (New York: Columbia, 1978), pp. 309-36.

2 Not as full a treatment of Commonly Appearing Subjects as the former but, presenting a slightly different interpretation later in his life is found in Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations (189.10-201.10 of the Varanasi 1973 edition).

3 Opposite of the Consequences is treated at some length in Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (52.2-7.13) after which he refers his readers to the discussion in his 'Essence of the Good Explanations and so forth' for the topic of Commonly Appearing Subjects, suggesting perhaps a preference for the interpretation there over that in the 'Great Exposition of Special Insight' (see n.424).

As both aspects of the controversy had been explained in these works, the topics are mentioned only in passing in Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination of the Thought (80.16-1.1 in the Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition, no date) and are not mentioned at all in his 'Middling Exposition of Special Insight'.

Here I am mainly using Jam-yang-shay-ba's exposition because (1) it synthesizes Dzong-ka-ba's various presentations, while using the Essence of the Good Explanations when the interpretation differs (see n.424), (2) it treats the topics at great length and detail, and (3) it is fairly late, being around 1700, and thus has the advantage of having earlier presentations at hand.

Part Five, chapter two is mainly drawn from GM, 224b.5-
In explaining Chandrakīrti's interpretation of Buddhapalita, Jamyang-shay-ba (GM, 225b.2) gives as the reason of the first consequence, 'because of already existing from the time of its causes' but later (GM, 257b.5) declares, in self-contradiction, that such an interpretation is unacceptable. He says that Buddhapalita's phrase 'things which already exist in their own entities' (svatmanā vidyamananam padarthanam [Poussin, 14.2], dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid du yod pa mams /a) cannot be explained as 'things which exist at the time of their causes' because the passage must indicate a correct other-approved syllogism proving that it is senseless for a sprout, for instance, to be produced again through the reason that it [already] exists in its own entity. This is based on Chandrakīrti's statement that the phrase 'existing in their own entities' holds the reason.

The principle at work is that even though an other-approved syllogism uses tenets asserted by the other party, its members also must be established in general, whereby it is unsuitable to have as the reason of such an other-approved syllogism 'because [things] exist at the time of their causes' since things simply do not exist at the time of their causes. Thus, for the sake of consistency I have used 'because of already existing in its own entity' or 'because of already existing in their own entities' throughout in accordance with Jamyang-shay-ba's own later interpretation.

This section on consequences and syllogisms is mainly drawn from Kensur Lekden's contextualization of the controversy between the three Madhyamika masters.

Geshe Gediin Lodro.

GM, 222b.1-3a.1. The explanations are taken from Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings.


GT, ca la.2.

This and the next sentence are drawn from GT, ca 62a.5.

For the definitions of Svatantrika and Prasangika and so forth, see Sopa's and Hopkins' Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider and Co., 1976), Part Two, chapters seven and eight.
355 Part Five, chapter three is drawn (except as cited in n.372) from

*GM*, 226a.4-31a.6 (see n.346).

356 *GM*, 261b.2.

357 P5242, Vol. 95 75.1.3.

358 P5242, Vol. 95 75.2.2.

359 P5242, Vol. 95 75.1.3-2.2.

360 See n.374.

361 Bhavaviveka's text is P5253, Vol. 95 155.4.7-7.5.2. In Bhavaviveka's text, 155.4.7, read 'di la for 'di las in accordance with Avalokitavrata (Vol. 96 190.2.5) and *GM*, 262a.6.

362 For discussion of the translation of the third fault see n.375.

363 The Tibetan (Vol. 95 155.5.1) lists three points—'things are produced from other, production is fruitful, and production has an end' (dngos po mams gzhan las skye ba 'gyur ba dang skye ba 'bras bu dang beaspa nyid du 'gyur ba dang skye ba thugpayod par 'gyur ba'i phyir)—rather than tying them together, as the Sanskrit does, into the opposite of the original full statement (parasm adutp anna bhava janmasaphalyat janmanirodhat [Poussin, 15.1-2]). The Tibetan seems to accord more with Avalokitavrata's serial lay-out of the three (see pp.465-6), but the mere re-framing of the syllogism in its opposite form leaves more room for the interpretation that Bhavaviveka's complaint is not with Buddhapalita's asserting that production is fruitful but with his holding that the reasoning refuting ultimately existent production implies something in its place, thus making it an affirming negation rather than a non-affirming negation as it should be. For, as Jam-yang-shay-ba (*GM*, 262a.6-b.4) says, the three points show that a Madhyamika tenet, according to Bhavaviveka, has been contradicted; the three points themselves are not the tenet that is contradicted.

'... because production has an end (janmanirodhat, skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir) more literally would be 'because of the cessation of production'. The rendering into Tibetan bothers Poussin (p. 15 n.4), but it seems that the translators wanted to avoid skye ba dgag pa which might be misinterpreted as 'production is refuted' and thus used thug pa, since thug med means 'endless' as in an infinite regress and hence thug pa means that it has an end, is finite, or is not repetitive.

364 Avalokitavrata's commentary is P5259 Vol. 96 190.2.5-1.2.4.

365 Seen.361.
Avalokitavrata is referring to the Akutobhaya which he clearly accepts as authored by Nagarjuna. Dzong-ka-ba and his followers disagree; see p.360 and n.414.

The Sanskrit is taken from ChandrakTrti's Clear Words (see n.374).

The text (Vol. 96 190.5.3) mistakenly repeats the last two sentences.

Vol. 96 191.2.1: read skye ba for skye bas.


GM, 262a.6-b.4.

This and the next paragraph are drawn from GM 27 lb.4-273a.3.

Kensur Lekden.

Part Five, chapter four is drawn from GM, 231a.6-43a.2 (see n.346). The entire text of ChandrakTrti's defense of Buddhapalita's refutation of producton from self and criticism of Bhavaviveka's system, as found in his Clear Words, is cited in sections throughout this and the next chapter (P5260, Vol. 98 4.4.2-7.3.2; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 10 5.14-21.23; Poussin, 14.1-36.2). J.W. De Jong's splendid 'Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapada', Indo-Iranian Journal 20 (1978), pp.25-59, has been used throughout. With each citation, the references to Poussin's edition of the Clear Words in Bibliotheca Buddhica IV and the Tibetan translation in the Tibetan Publishing House gSung rab gees btus dpar khang edition of 1968 (10.11-25.16) are given in the text in parentheses. Stcherbatsky's very free translation is in his The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, pp.98-125.

Here in ChandrakTrti's citation of Buddhapalita the second fallacy reads atiprasangadoshachcha, 'and because of the fault of great absurdity' which is rendered in Tibetan (Vol. 98 4.4.3) as dang shin tu thai bar 'gyur ba'i phyir, 'and because it would be very absurd'. The Tibetan of Buddhapalita's text (P5242, Vol. 95 75.1.6), however, is slightly different due, most likely, to a looser translation spelling out the actual absurdity, dang skye ba thug pa medpar 'gyur ba'i phyir, 'and because production would be endless'. Since the latter is more to the point and is also the reading in Bhavaviveka's text (P5253, Vol. 95 155.4.7) and Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhavaviveka (P5259, Vol. 96 190.3.1) as well as Dzong-ka-ba's commentary on the Treatise (Varanasi 1973 edition, 52.4) I have used it throughout.
With respect to the third fault *prasahgavyatvatvachcha*, this is translated in the Peking edition of Bhavaviveka's text (Vol. 95 155.5.1, translation by Jnanagarbha and Lui-gyel-tsen [gLu'i-rgyal-mtshan]) as:

\[\text{glags yod pa 'i tshig yin pa 'i phyir te}\]

but in the Peking edition of the *Clear Words* (Vol. 98 4.4.4, and in the Shes rig par khang edition, 10.17, these being the same translation by Mahasumati and Ba-tsap-nyi-ma drak [Pa-tshab-nyi-ma-grags]) as:

\[\text{thai bar 'gyur ba'i tshig yin pa'i phyir}\]

and in Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhavaviveka (P5259, Vol. 96 190.3.8) as:

\[\text{glags yod pa 'i tshig yin pa 'i yang phyir te}\]

Only in the last one is the final *cha* of the Sanskrit represented by *yang*, allowing it to be interpreted as a third reason for the unsuitability of Buddhapalita's refutation. In his commentary on the *Treatise* Dzong-ka-ba (Varanasi 1973 edition, 52.12) points out the discrepancy in translation, indicating that he favors *glags yod pa 'i tshig yin pa 'i yang phyir te* as it is in the edition of Bhavaviveka he had before him and in Avalokitavrata in the sense of meaning, '[Buddhapalita's interpretation] is also unsuitable because of having words that afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system]'. Dzong-ka-ba identifies that this is the interpretation of Avalokitavrata, and it indeed is as can be seen in translation in the next citation. (The Tibetan of that, in Vol. 96 190.4.7 is: \(\text{gnas rtan buddha pa li tas bshad pa de ni rgol ba gzhan gyi klan ka 'i glags yod pa 'i tshig yin pa 'i phyir yang rigs pa ma yin noil yang zhes bya ba 'i sgra nigtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjodpa 'iphyir dang gzhan gyis smras pa'i nyes pa ma bsal ba'i phyir rigs pa ma yin par 'ba' zhig tu ma zad gyi/ de ni glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir yang rigs pa ma yin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro).

In this interpretation *prasahgavyatvatvachcha* has the sense of 'because of being a statement that is susceptible to [absurd] consequences' in the sense of affording an opportunity to an opponent to find holes in one's argument, rather than just meaning 'because of being a statement of [absurd] consequences'. Thus,
this is not a description of Buddhapalita's commentary as containing consequences but an indication that it is susceptible to the absurd consequence of contradicting a basic Madhyamika tenet. The remainder of the passage then spells out what that inner contradiction is. In this interpretation the phrase is taken as a third reason, not as a reason beginning the next sentence. This is also Jam-yang-shay-ba's opinion (GM, 264b.2-6), based on Avalokitavrata (see p464-5).

376 See n.347.
377 P5229, Vol. 95 15.1.1.
378 Until the next note, the material is drawn from GM, 273b. 1-2.
379 This quote, as well as the next four, and the general argument are taken from Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, P6001, Vol. 152 156.2.2AF.
380 The source here is the author's own reading in these texts.
381 This and the next paragraph are drawn from Ann, dbu 59a.7ff.
382 This is found in Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations, cited here from GM, 233b.4.
384 The Sanskrit is Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 10 5.16-6.5 and Poussin 15.3-16.10.
385 Poussin's Sanskrit (15.4) reads '... is enquiring in the following way about the purpose in production of the existent...', but Dr. Vaidya (5.17) drops vidyamanasya punarupattau prayojanam in accordance with the Tibetan.
386 In accordance with J.W. De Jong's 'Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapada' (p.29, n.15.5)svata itihetutvena tadeva chotpadyata iti should read svata iti vidyamanam hetutvena bravTshi tadan eva chotpadyata iti, which, as he says, is confirmed by the Tibetan.

About this, Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 265a.4-6) says, 'Yod pa rgyu nyid indicates that with respect to all that involve production their existence acts as a cause, and de nyid skye'bo indicates that all that involve production are produced from their respective existence.' In that, read rang giyodpas for rang giyod pa'i and yod pa de las for yod pa de in accordance with the Nga-wang Gelek edition, 480.5 and 480.6. He cites this passage to show that the Samkhya's '... assert that a sprout exists from the time of its causes and that it is produced from that existence.'
I have translated the first part of this sentence in accordance with his interpretation, but not the second part since the Sanskrit *tad eva chotpadyata iti* does not seem to warrant 'from that', instead meaning 'and just that is produced'.

387 See notes 500 and 501 with respect to the quotations from Aryadeva and Nagarjuna.

388 The brackets in the second stanza of the *Refutation of Objections* are from the *Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path' (New Delhi: Chos-phel-legs-ladan, 1972) 477.5-8.2.

389 *GM*, 234a.1.

390 *GM*, 229a.6.

391 This sentence is from a work on the Opposite of the Consequences (*thai bzlog*) by Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen (*sGom-sde Nam-mkha’-rgyal-mtshan*, 1532-92), Madhyamika Text Series, Vol. 4 (New Delhi: Lha-mkhar Yons-'dzin Bstan-pa-rgyal-mtshan, 1973), 602.5. The two previous sentences are deductions from his commentary. He lists five reasons that the Samkhya use for proving production from self, all of which lack their intended force according to the Buddhist.

392 *Ann*, dbu 59b.2.

393 ChandrakTrti also sees another correct other-approved syllogism in Buddhapalita's statements: The subjects, objects other than the person, are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities, as in the case of the person. See *GM*, 240b.6.

394 Or, according to the Sanskrit, 'and [thus] due to being established [for the Samkhya] here it is held as the example'; the Tibetan does not translate *upadanam* (Poussin, 21.10).

395 De Jong (n.21.13) corrects the Sanskrit to *numanabadhacodanayam*, which would be 'damage', not 'contradiction', but I have stayed with 'contradiction' *gal ba* simply because it is easier to follow in translation.

396 With respect to why cloth, or woolen cloth as the word means in Tibetan, is frequently used as the second example after a pot, it strikes me that it is merely because of the similarity in sound between the two words in Sanskrit, *ghata* and *pata*.

397 *GM*, 240a.1 and 240b.5-1a.3.

398 Jam-yang-shay-ba (*GM*, 240b.6) seems to take 'example' as referring to an example of another syllogism, whereas it might
refer (see Poussin, p.22, n.3) to the example in this syllogism (the person) which does not have the fault of indefiniteness in the sense of being overly vast by including everything and thus incurring the fault that when the example is realized, the main thesis would also be realized. However, the latter interpretation does not appear to fit ChandrakXrti's context. Chandrakrrti seems to be concerned that the subject of the main syllogism, not the subject of the example, include all phenomena that are produced. This is probably why Jam-yang-shay-ba, for the most part, interprets the subject as 'things such as a non-manifest pot and so forth' instead of just as 'things'. In the second syllogism, Chandrakrrti is providing another all inclusive subject; thus it seems that the matter does not revolve around the example (which in the first syllogism is a pot already in its manifest form).

Dr. Vaidya (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 10 p.7, n.4) objects to Poussin's (see p.23, n.1) editing the text from atha vakyani to arthavakhyani in accordance with the Tibetan don gyi ngag 'di dag, but the usage of this same term on 7.22 suggests that Poussin could be right.

This and the next paragraph are my summary.

The remainder of the chapter is drawn from GM, 241b.2-3a.2. The Sanskrit (Poussin, 23.4) reads, 'And, due to that, there is no contradiction with a tenet.'

From Gom-day, 617.6.

Gom-day, 618.4.

GM, 242a.5.

The bracketed additions in this and the next two sentences are from Gom-day, 619.2ff.

Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning, 55.17.

GM, 242b.4.

The identification of what is being refuted in these three cases is from Gom-day, 621. Iff. The bracketed additions in the first citation are from Dzong-ka-ba's commentary, 136.7, Varanasi 1973 edition.

GM (242b.5) reads gzugs nigzugs ni rgyu medpar/ thai bar 'gyur but should read gzugs na gzugs ni, which then would accord more with the Sanskrit (Poussin, 24.10) rupam prasajyate/ ahetukam and with Dzong-ka-ba's commentary (129.1, Varanasi 1973 edition) than the Peking (Vol. 98 5.5.3) gzugs na gzugs kyi rgyu med par/thai bar 'gyur. The bracketed additions in the first
citation are from Dzong-ka-ba's commentary, 128.19, Varanasi 1973 edition. Dzong-ka-ba (129.8) says that this implies its opposite meaning. That the other two do so is my speculation.

411 The glosses are from Dzong-ka-ba's commentary, 443.8, Varanasi 1973 edition.

412 The source for the material up to the citation from Chandrakirti is Dzong-ka-ba's *Ocean of Reasoning*, 56.8-16 (Varanasi 1973 edition).

413 De Jong ('Textcritical Notes' p.30, n.25.3), following Yamaguchi, says that both the first question and the response are spoken by Bhavaviveka; however, Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen (621.3-3.2) divides it as I have, though he does not specify the disputants. It fits the pattern of the section better to have a question being put to the hypothetical Bhavaviveka, his responding, and then being cut off based on his response.

414 As Gom-day, (623.1) points out, it is significant that Chandrakirti does not mention the *Akutobhaya* as an auto-commentary of Nagarjuna, adding credence to the argument that it is not his.

415 Part Five, chapter five is drawn mainly from GM, 243a.2-57b.4.

416 The Tibetan reads 'are definite as not being produced from self (bdag las skye ba med par nges te), but this is not represented in the Sanskrit (see next note). The reason could also be translated as 'because of presently existing' since *vidyamana* is the present middle participle; however, later (Poussin, 33.4) Chandrakirti cites the reason as *sottvad*, suggesting that the particular form makes little difference, this perhaps being why it was translated into Tibetan merely as *yod pa'i phyir* instead of *da Ita bar yod pa'i phyir*.

417 The Tibetan of the example *shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin* must be a mere translation of the Sanskrit *chaitanya* and not an extension of it to include the reason ('existing'). In any case, the reference is to the *purusha*, the person, or pure spirit, pure consciousness. Bhavaviveka's syllogism in full is: *na paramarthata adhyatmi-kanyakayatanani svata utpannani vidyamanatvat chaitanyakavad-iti, don dam par nanggi skye mched mams bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa'i phyir na shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no zhes*.


419 For a slightly different citation of this, see p.648; also see n.637. The Tibetan has 'is not produced causelessly' at the end.
Poussin (p.26, n.3) draws our attention to Shantideva’s *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*, IX. 142, and his *Compendium of Learnings* 219.10.

Poussin identifies this as 210.3-5. Chandrakīrti cites it again in commentary at the end of chapters two and twenty-one. Poussin calls our attention to Shantideva’s *Compendium of Learnings*, 238.10, 239.4.

Since in Ge-luk-ba the nature of phenomena is permanent, here ‘permanent’ is interpreted, as usual, as the extreme of inherent existence.

Stcherbatsky (p. 113) translates this clause extremely freely, adding in considerable commentary as if Chandrakīrti says such in his text: ‘Indeed (Bhavaviveka) himself being a Madhyamika does not admit the transcendental reality of separate mental phenomena and at the same time he composes a syllogism about this very non-existing thing.’ The last clause is total speculation stemming from Stcherbatsky’s assumption that Chandrakīrti does not accept the existence of anything.

Following De Jong’s correction (*Textcritical Notes* p.31, n.28.1) of vastusatam to dravyasatam.

Most of Chandrakīrti’s refutation of Bhavaviveka with respect to Commonly Appearing Subjects is included in Dzong-ka-ba’s *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* and has been translated by Alex Wayman in *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real* (New York: Columbia, 1978), pp.309-35. About the first example, a Buddhist’s proof for a Vaisheshika that sound is impermanent, Wayman (p.309) says, ‘… in regard to (the proposition) “Sound is not eternal” (maintained by the Buddhist on the side of the Vaisesika) … thereby suggesting that the Buddhist is proving that sound is impermanent on behalf of a Vaisheshika to someone else. Wayman is clearly drawing from a mis-reading of *bye brag pa'i ngor* in the *Four Intertwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path'*, 525.5. Though *ngo* means ‘side’ or ‘face’, here with the *ra* ending it means, not ‘on the side’ but ‘to the side’ and thus, in English, ‘to a Vaisheshika’.

That the conventions (*vyavahara, tha snyad*) of inference and object inferred would be non-existent if the subject, predicate, and so forth were qualified with the particular assertions of one school simply means that we could not speak of inferring
anything if the terms were so qualified since the process of inference would get bogged down in merely considering the subject, etc., for the two parties could not come to agreement.

With respect to the second example, a Vaisheshika's proving to someone else that sound is impermanent, Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 346a.5) identifies the other party as a Nirgrantha (gCer bu pa), accepted as another name for Jaina. Stcherbatsky (The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, p. 115) identifies the opponent here as a Mlmamsaka; he inserts the identification into the text as if Chandrakirti so specified it, but he did not do so. Gom-day, 633.2, identifies the other party as a Drpaka (gSalbyedpa) as does the Four Intervened Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 526.4, which says that Drpaka is a sub-division of Samkhya. Wayman (p.310) goes along with Stcherbatsky. In any case, the assertion of the Vaisheshika's opponent is that sound is pre-existent in a non-manifest state and is made manifest by conditions, something which the Vaisheshika himself cannot accept.

The predicate of what Bhavaviveka is proving is an absence or negation of production (ultimately) with respect to the subject, eyes and so forth; in this sense, Chandrakirti says, '... when it is just the case that a negation of production (utpadapratishedha, skye ba bkag pa) is asserted (abhipreta, 'dodpa) as the predicate of the probandum (sadhyadharmo, bsgrub bya'i chos)...' Wayman (pp.311-12) misconstrues the sentence to read, 'At the very time that he denies in this phase (of proof) an arising (in the absolute sense) and believes in a feature to be proved (the sadhyadharmo)...' The Sanskrit double nominative utpada-pratishedho and sadhyadharmo is rendered into Tibetan in a very clear way as an objective nominative skye ba bkag pa and an adverbial accusative bsgrub bya'i chos su; the particle su means 'as' and can in no way be construed as 'and'. Thus, Chandrakirti is giving the context of his following remarks—that of ultimate analysis, such as in this case when a negation of production is being asserted as, or taken as, the predicate of what one is proving. Many Tibetan scholars take this as showing that Chandrakirti is speaking only about occasions of debating about the final mode of subsistence of phenomena and that
his remarks about no commonly appearing subjects should not be extended to times when debating about conventional phenomena such as impermanence, since the question of whether the consciousness certifying the subject and so forth is valid with respect to the mode of subsistence is relevant only when one is debating about that mode of subsistence.

Jam-yang-shay-ba’s text (GM, 247b. 1) mis-reads de’i tshe de kho nar (tadatad eva) instead of de’i tshe kho nar (tadaiva) as the Peking edition (Vol. 98 6.3.3) does and which is confirmed by the Sanskrit (Poussin, 30.1). He strains to include de kho nar somewhere in the meaning of the sentence; disregarding syntax, he puts it with the first clause, reading it as referring to a reasoning consciousness in the face of which production is refuted. Following this reading, the passage would be:

... at this time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production] when it is just the case that a negation of production in suchness [that is to say, in the perspective of a reasoning consciousness] is asserted as the predicate of the probandum ...

Dzong-ka-ba’s Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Lam rim chen mo) has the same mis-reading (Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, 448b.3, and the Four Interwoven Commentaries, 530.3) but with a different interpretation. There, de kho nar is taken in a more syntactically appropriate way as going not with the ‘when’ clause but with what follows. With this placement the passage reads:

That is not so, because at this time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production] when it is just the case that a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of the probandum, this one [Bhavaviveka] himself just asserts that the entity of the subject [an eye]— the basis of that [predicate, non-production from self]— which is found by a mere erroneous [consciousness] has degenerated from [being established] in suchness [that is to say, is not established ultimately since it is found by a mistaken consciousness]. Erroneous and non-erroneous [con- sciousnesses] are different.

In this interpretation, (according to the Four Interwoven
Commentaries, 530.5-31.2) once Bhavaviveka asserts that eyes and so forth are not ultimately established and are not ultimates, it is established that they are falsities. Also, since it would be very contradictory for a consciousness of reality which is devoid of dualistic appearance to take such falsities as its objects in the perspective of its perceiving suchness, they must be objects found by erroneous consciousnesses and objects in relation to which a consciousness comes to be considered a mistaken consciousness. However, the Madhyamika is debating with a Proponent of True Existence who asserts that valid sense consciousnesses are non-mistaken with respect to visible forms and so forth. Therefore, it would be very contradictory for that one object to be that in relation to which a sense consciousness becomes mistaken as in the Madhyamika system and that in relation to which it becomes non-mistaken [read tshad ma ma 'khrul ba'i-yul for tshad ma 'khrul-pa'i-yul, 531.2] as in the system of a Proponent of True Existence. Due to this, there is no subject commonly established for both the Madhyamika and the Proponent: of True Existence. For, an erroneous, mistaken consciousness which is polluted by ignorance and a non-erroneous, non-mistaken consciousness of a Superior's meditative equipoise perceiving suchness are different, that is, are mutually exclusive in terms of how they engage their objects, the one dualistically and the other non-dualistically (according to Kensur Yeshe Thupten).

In this interpretation the last sentence—'Erroneous and non-erroneous [consciousnesses] are different'—refers to the possible consciousnesses that could certify the existence of objects that are established by way of their own character, both being rejected. That which is erroneous—a consciousness to which a non-inherently existent object appears to be inherently existent—cannot certify an inherently existent object because that is the very thing with respect to which it is mistaken. That which is non-erroneous, a consciousness of meditative equipoise that does not involve such mistaken appearance, also cannot certify the existence of a conventionality such as eyes and so forth (the subject of our syllogism about non-ultimate production) because conventionalities do not appear to it, even in the case of a Buddha, in terms of its mode of perceiving emptiness nondualistically since conventionalities can only be perceived in a
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dualistic mode. Also, in this interpretation the 'degeneration' or non-establishment is taken as referring to Bhavaviveka's having to assert that eyes and so forth are not established ultimately, that is to say, not established by way of their own character because of being found or certified as existing by erroneous consciousnesses, this in turn being because even he holds that they are not found by a consciousness of meditative equipoise.

Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations, written later in his life than the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, offers another interpretation of this passage. That text says at the point of explaining ChandrakTrti's response to 'Bhavaviveka's' proposal that the subject and so forth are established because only generalities are used (191.8-192.10, Varanasi edition).

Bhavaviveka himself asserts that the entities of the subjects—eyes and so forth—are not found by mere erroneous [consciousnesses], and [ChandrakTrti] refutes him through demonstrating the reasoning that the erroneous and the non-erroneous are different, a dichotomy, etc. The meaning of [ChandrakTrti’s] statements is this: Mere eyes and so forth devoid of qualification of the two truths are not positable as the subjects in the proof that eyes and so forth are not produced from self because [according to Bhavaviveka] the valid cognizers comprehending those subjects are consciousnesses that are non-mistaken with respect to the nature [inherent existence] of eyes and so forth but false appearances—in which erroneous objects of knowledge appear to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not—do not exist among objects found by non-erroneous consciousnesses that are not mistaken with respect to the nature.

With respect to [Bhavaviveka] asserting the earlier reason [—that according to Bhavaviveka the valid cognizers comprehending those subjects are consciousnesses that are non-mistaken with respect to the nature or inherent existence of eyes and so forth—] in a system [such as that of Bhavaviveka] which asserts that whatever exists exists by way of its own entity, if [a consciousness] is mistaken relative to the appearance of the object's being
established by way of its own character, it cannot be posited as finding [that is, realizing] its object of comprehension. Therefore, whether a valid cognizer is conceptual or non-conceptual, it must be non-mistaken about that with respect to which it is valid, its referent object or appearing object [respectively]. In that case, it must be valid about an entity or nature which is the object's own mode of subsistence and which is not just nominally designated conventionally, and he also asserts this. It is contradictory for whatever is an object found by such a valid cognizer to be an erroneous object of knowledge; thereby, the latter reason [—that false appearances, in which erroneous objects of knowledge appear to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not, do not exist among objects found by non-erroneous consciousnesses that are not mistaken with respect to the nature—] is established. Likewise, it is also contradictory for whatever is an object found by a mistaken consciousness to be a non-erroneous object of knowledge. Therefore, [Bhavaviveka] cannot dispel the fallacy of the non-establishment of the subject.

In this interpretation, Bhavaviveka is said to assert, not that eyes and so forth are not established in suchness because of being found by mistaken consciousnesses, but that these are not found by mistaken consciousnesses because they must be certified by consciousnesses that are not mistaken with respect to the inherent existence of those objects. However, the former is seen as being forced on him because of his assertions whereas the latter is presented as his actual assertion; thus, the change in Dzong-ka-ba's interpretation does not represent an about-face in terms of delineating Bhavaviveka's tenets and instead is a different reading of the text. (Also, in this interpretation the last sentence—'Erroneous and non-erroneous are different'—refers not to consciousnesses but to objects of knowledge.)

About the change in interpretation, Dzong-ka-ba himself says in his *Essence of the Good Explanations* (195.20-196.2):

Although the two—[my] explanation [of this passage] elsewhere [in the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the
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Path] in terms of Bhavaviveka's having asserted that the basal subjects degenerate from [or are not] established as [their own] suchness and this mode [of interpretation]—do not agree, it is not that [my two interpretations] disagree with respect to [the passage's setting forth] the tenet of refuting autonomy.

It is my guess that since in his Essence of the Good Explanations Dzong-ka-ba does not use 'in suchness' (de kho nai, the mis-reading in de'i tshe kho nar) in any way at all, he came to understand it as a mis-reading and, due to this, changed his reading of the text, ingeniously making it mean the same thing, albeit by a very different route. It seems to me that Jam-yang-shay-ba makes the mistake of trying to keep 'in suchness' (de kho nar) when explaining Dzong-ka-ba's new interpretation in his Essence of the Good Explanations and thus goes through the verbal gymnastics of moving it, against all sense of syntax, into the previous clause.

In Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of Nagarjuna's 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (52.2-7.13), Varanasi 1973 edition), written after his Essence of the Good Explanations he refers his readers to the discussion in his 'Essence of the Good Explanations and so forth' for the topic of Commonly Appearing Subjects, suggesting a preference for the interpretation there over that in the 'Great Exposition of Special Insight'; thus, it may be that in the end he did not hold that these two radically different interpretations are both correct. In any case, Jam-yang-shay-ba uses the interpretation in Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations for this passage, and hence the interpretation used here in my translation and commentary is the same.

425 GM, 249b.2.
427 This was cited earlier, p.475. See n.388.
428 For this, see the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 578.5. The summations following are the author's.
428a Wayman (p.312) translates the last line of this citation as, 'You have no answer to this.' However, the Four Interwoven
Commentaries (533.4) make it clear that the reference is to 'Bhavaviveka's' earlier answer: khyed kyang lan btab pa 'di ni don dang mthun pa'i lan ma yin pa nyid do 'The answer which you have given is just not an answer concordant with the fact.' Bhavaviveka's earlier answer (see p.507) was that just generalities are to be used as subject, predicate, and so forth without being qualified by the particular assertions of the two schools. ChandrakTrti's refutation of this is built around his perception that a tenet unacceptable to a Madhyamika is automatically attached to the subject and so forth—inherent existence—because schools that propound inherent existence hold that the consciousness certifying the subject perforce must certify the subject's inherent existence.

429 Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 250a.2) seems to make this conclusion since he does not specify 'Buddhists' here as referring to non-Prasangikas.

430 Gom-day, 633.1, sangs rgyas pa 'og mas. A note by Dra-di-ge-shay Rin-chen-don-drup (Bra-sti-dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub) in the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path' (546.6) identifies the Buddhists here as Svatantrikas and below.

431 Geshe Gediin Lodro and Kensur Yeshe Thupten reported this.

Wayman (p.316) translates the first clause of the second sentence in the following citation as, 'For in that instance (of example) there is no intention to state a difference between the sound universal and the impermanence universal.' However, the reference here is not to a difference between two things but to mere sound and mere impermanence which are not asserted as qualified (avivakshita-vishesa, khyadpar brjodpar mi 'dodpa) with the particular tenets of the two schools. The Four Interwoven Commentaries (545.6-6.3) says: dpe'i skabs der ni sangs rgyas pas bye brag pa la sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa dang bye brag pas gyal byedpa la de Ibar sgrub pa'i skabs su rim pa Ibar 'byung 'gyur dang nam mkha 'byon tangnyis dang byaspa dang sngaryod rkyen gyis gsal bar byas pa gnyis te so so 'i 'dod pas khyad par ma byas par rang gi mtshan nyid kyi grub pa tsam gyi sgrai spyi tsam zhig dang phyis 'byung gi rgyu la Ios pa dang ma Ios pa ganggis kyang khyad par du ma byas pa'i sgrub bya'i chos rang gi mtshan nyid kyi grub pa'i mi rtag pa'am 'jig pa nyid kyi spyi tsam zhig la tshad mar song ba de bkod nas so so'i 'dodpa 'i khyad
par de dag sbyar nas brjodpar mi ’dodpar gnyis ka ’i lugs la mthun snang du grub pa zhig brjod par ’dod na nirgol bade gnyis ka’i lugs la yangyod pa yin... ‘On that occasion of the example when the Buddhist is proving to a Vaisheshika that sound is impermanent and a Vaisheshika is proving the same to a Drpaka, a mere generality of sound which is just established by way of its own character but is not qualified by their individual assertions—respectively, being a derivative of the elements and being a quality of space or being a product and being something previously existent which is manifested by conditions—and a mere generality of impermanence or disintegratedness (the predicate of the probandum) which is established by way of its own character but which is not qualified by either depending or not depending on later causes are stated within the context that these have been certified by valid cognition. If, not wishing to express [a subject and predicate] within affixing those qualifications of their individual assertions, they wish to express [a subject and predicate that are] established as commonly appearing in both of their systems, there is such in the systems of both disputants.’ As Dzong-ka-ba (Four Interswoven Commentaries, 546.6ff) makes clear, ‘sound not qualified by being a derivative of the elements or a quality of space’ refers to sound’s not being so qualified for the minds of the two disputants. In other words, the two disputants can speak of sound without putting in the qualifications of their systems even though the Buddhist holds that there is no sound that is not a derivative of the elements and the Vaisheshika holds that there is no sound which is not a quality of space. Though the Buddhist holds that sound is necessarily a derivative of the elements and the Vaisheshika holds that sound necessarily possesses those attributes (khyad par dang Idanpa), it is not necessary that sound be qualified for their minds (bio la khyad par du byaspa) by being a derivative of the elements or a quality of space. Conceptuality is able to isolate such generalities. Chandrakirti is saying that even if in Bhavaviveka’s example such generalities are possible, there is no possibility of such when proving emptiness since the subject must be certified by valid cognition and a non-Madhyamika feels that this certification also certifies the inherent existence of the subject.

The commentary, as given above, tacks ‘established by way
of its own character' onto the generalities, restricting the range of the example to non-Prasangikas; however, not all scholars hold that this restriction should be made, for even in the Prasangika system generalities of sound and impermanence are possible even when debating with non-Prasangikas since the issue of their being established by way of their own character is not pertinent.

432 This and the next paragraph supply background drawn from Kensur Lekden's oral teachings.

433 The Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 566.2-7.1.

434 Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen ends his commentary at this point.

435 The bracketed material in this sentence is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 561.4fT.

436 The bracketed material in 1.7 is from Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning, 77.3fF (Varanasi 1973 edition).

437 The bracketed material in this sentence is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 562.5.

438 This and the next sentence are teachings frequently emphasized by Kensur Lekden.

439 The Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 569.5, identifies this term as meaning 'something substantially established which is established by way of its own character' (rang gi mthun nyid kyi grub pa'i rdzas grub).

440 Reading ghatasya in accordance with De Jong ('Textcritical Notes' p.31, n.31.14).

441 Following the Tibetan gzhan gyis; the Sanskrit is pare which Stcherbatsky (p.119, n.7) prefers asparaih but De Jong (p.31, n.31.14) decides should be left as it is.

442 The meaning of this is conjectured from discussion with Kensur Yeshe Thupten, who pointed to a statement in Dignaga's Compendium of Valid Cognition (P5700, Vol. 130 3.1.3, 1.4ab): 'Because [the sense powers] are the uncommon cause [of their respective consciousness], that [consciousness] is designated [with the term 'sense direct perceiver' (pratyaksha, dbangpo'i mugon sum)] by way of the sense powers.' (asadharana-hetutvad akshais tad vyapadishyate, thun mong mayin rgyu phyir/de'i
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tha snyad dbangpos byed [the Peking mis-reads deyis tha snyad; de yi would also be suitable; this reading follows Hattori cited below]. For the Sanskrit and M. Hattori’s translation and analysis see his Dignaga, On Perception [Cambridge: Harvard, 1968], p.26 and pp.86-7 n.1.30 and n.1.32). Kensur Yeshe Thupten and Hattori also point out that there is a similar statement in Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Knowledge, 1.45: ‘Since due to their changing [that is, becoming duller or clearer, the respective consciousnesses] change [becoming duller or clearer], the bases are the eye [sense power] and so forth. Therefore, because of being the uncommon [cause], the consciousnesses are called by way of them [that is, a consciousness of visible forms is called an eye consciousness, not a form consciousness].’ (tad-vikarтивikarтивad ashrayash chakshur-adayah/ato ‘sadharanatvach ch va vijnanam tair niruchyate, [Hattori, p.76 n. 1.11]; de daggyurpas ‘gyur nyidphyir/rten ni mig la sogspayin/dephyir thun mong ma yin phyir/de dag gis ni mam shes bstan [148.16, Varanasi 1978 edition].) Thus, a non-Madhyamika is arguing that since the sense powers are themselves causes, they must be ultimately produced.

Stcherbatsky (p. 120) translates the passage as:

Thesis: Internal facts, i.e., mental phenomena really arise, i.e., they have a real existence.
Reason: Because they produce purposive actions directed towards the same objects as our thoughts have been directed to.
Major premise: Whatsoever is efficient is real.

His translation, though a bit strained, is getting at the same point.

In the Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition (22.19), read shes rab kyi mig for shes rab kyis mig in accordance with the Peking (Vol. 98 6.5.5). It seems to me that the Tibetan would be better rendered as: dangos po mams kyiyang dag pa ji Ita ba bzhin nyid nthong ba’i rnal ’byorpa mniam par bzhagpa’i shes rab kyi mig gis skye ba dang ’gro ba la sogs pa dag don dam paryod par bsgrub na ni.

In the Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition (23.4) read sgrub par byed pa layang for sgrub par byed pa layodpa in accordance with the Peking (Vol. 98 6.5.7). Stcherbatsky (p.121) takes
Bhavaviveka’s refutation of going as a refutation of time; though there is a similarity between space and time, this refutation at least explicitly is concerned with motion, being concerned with the second chapter of Nagarjuna’s Treatise, the ‘Analysis of Going and Coming’.

445 De Jong (p.31, n.33.1) corrects the Sanskrit rupavat to svarupa-vat in accordance with Bhavaviveka’s Heart of the Middle Way, III.39ab; thus, the Tibetan would be better translated as rang gzugs bzhin, ‘like its form’, meaning the form that the eye sees.

446 Bhavaviveka’s Heart of the Middle Way, III.27ab; see De Jong, p.32, n.33.2.

447 GM, 253.5: read ’diyang for ’di layang in accordance with Vol. 98 7.1.2. Here, Chandrakirti (Poussin, 33.4) gives the reason of Bhavaviveka’s syllogism as sattvat, not vidyamanatvat as he did earlier (26.1); the Tibetan is yodpa’iphyir throughout.

Stcherbatsky’s interpretation (p. 123) of the objection is quite fanciful. As this passage is not cited in the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba’s) ‘Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path’, or in GM, or in Gom-day whose commentary has ended, the interpretation of the objection as coming from Bhavaviveka is mine. It makes sense since Chandrakirti argued earlier for the all-inclusiveness of Buddhapalita’s syllogism (see n.398).

448 Dzong-ka-ba’s Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, P6001, Vol. 152 160.4.3.

449 Missing in the Tibetan. The Sanskrit (Poussin, 34.5) has asmad-anumananam. The Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba’s) ‘Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path’, 572.4, by glossing this as referring to the inferences appearing in Chandrakirti’s Clear Words and so forth, interprets the statement as referring not to all syllogistic reasoning in general but to those refuting production from self such as those drawn from Buddhapalita’s text. This preserves other-renowned inferences or syllogisms as a means also for positively communicating one’s own tenets. The interpretation seems forced; one is drawn into wondering why, if Chandrakirti meant to be so specific, he did not bother to be this specific.

Later in the same text (573.4), the same passage is glossed this way:’… but we [Prasangikas] do not use autonomous inferences because inferences [used by us Prasangikas] have the fruit
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[or purpose] of only refuting the [wrong] theses of other [parties].' In this version, the added commentary is not aimed at preserving the positive use of syllogisms; however, one could merely say that 'inferences' means not all but some inferences stated by Prasarigikas. In any case, the Gel-luk-ba position is clear: other-renowned inferences are used for both positive and negative purposes.

450 Poussin (34.6) changes parash chakshuh to param chakshuh recognizing (see n.5) that the Tibetan (gzhan) does not confirm the change, preferring that it read gzhan la; however, Dr. Vaidya leaves the manuscript as is, and the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 573.5, follows the same reading, identifying the term as referring to other parties who assert that the eye sees.

451 GM, 255b. 1, read nyid duyang khas for nyid du khas in accordance with the Peking, Vol. 98 7.1.7. The bracketed material in this and the next section is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 573.6-4.2.

452 The bracketed material is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 574.4.

453 Missing in the Tibetan. The Sanskrit (Poussin, 34.11) has asmadanumanaīr.

454 In GM, 254a.6, read gang las for gang la in accordance with Vol. 98 7.2.2.

455 The Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 578.5.

456 The bracketed material is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 591.1ff.

457 The Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 592.2. With respect to 'who do not know suchness' the Sanskrit (Poussin, 36.1) is merely tadanabhijña 'who do not know that [or those, which could refer to "the definitions"]' whereas the Tibetan reads de kho na mi shes pa'i 'who do not know suchness'. The Four Interwoven Commentaries (592.3) takes it even further: chos kyi de kho na nyid ma shes pa'i 'who do not know the suchness of phenomena'. I have followed the Tibetan as it presumably
reflects the reading of *tad* as meaning *tattva* (see Poussin, p.36, n.3) by the translators.

458 The rest of the chapter presents the author's reflections on these topics. This first sentence refers to Aryadeva's famous statement in his *Four Hundred* (the *Four Interwoven Commentaries*, 590.2):

Just as a barbarian cannot be
Approached with another language,
So the world cannot be approached
Except with the worldly.


460 Kensur Lekden frequently mentioned this as an apparent contradiction; it is from Chandrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) *Four Hundred*.

461 Kensur Lekden.

462 Part Five, chapter six is mainly a paraphrase of Jang, 291.9-299.8, supplemented with information from the Nying-ma Lama Khetsun Sangpo, who in 1972 was working on his own compilation of biographies of Tibetan yogis at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharmsala. The identification of the orders of particular scholars and yogis is his, as are the dates with an asterisk. The chapter is not intended as a definitive history of the spread of Buddhism to and development in Tibet, but as a presentation illustrating both the dominance of Prasangika and the active inter-play between the orders.

463 This paragraph is mostly drawn from the oral teachings of Khetsun Sangpo.

464 Snellgrove and Richardson give the date as 779 in *A Cultural History of Tibet* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p.277.

465 This was reported by Khetsun Sangpo.


467 Khetsun Sangpo.

468 Khetsun Sangpo.

469 Khetsun Sangpo.

470 Tibetan Buddhism is usually viewed as having four principal orders, but Khetsun Sangpo follows a system of eight.

471 Part Five, chapter seven is mainly drawn from extended conversations with Kensur Lekden, Geshe Gediin Lodro, and Geshe
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Lhundup Sopa; the chapter attempts to put the Ge-luk-ba teachings on valid establishment in context. The next sentence was repeatedly emphasized by Kensur Lekden.

This and the next paragraph are mainly drawn from the oral teachings of Geshe Gediin Lodro.

This paragraph is mostly from Kensur Lekden.

This was reported by the inner Mongolian scholar Geshe Gelden.

Part Five, chapter eight is drawn from the sources indicated in the subsequent notes in an attempt to contrast the Ge-luk-ba interpretation with other prevalent views on the import of Prasafigika-Madhyaamika. The quote here is taken from the Shes rig par khang edition, 435b.3-5, with the answer being from 440a.3-b.1.

Notes  839

491  Jang.  419.17-420.9.
493  Svarasvati has not been edited to Sarasvati because the sva spelling occurs consistently in many Tibetan texts and accords more with the Tibetan translation of the name as dbyangs, 'melody' or 'intonation'. Kensur Lekden mentioned that Svarasvati and Manjughoshia are special deities for authors, the former assisting with perfect speech and the latter with discriminative wisdom.
494  P6142, Vol. 153 208.5.5 The Peking Edition reads mtshan 'dzin instead of mthar 'dzin.

Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bshad snyingpo) is the ultimate of his works dealing with comparative schools of tenets. Structured around the topic of the interpretable and the definitive in the Mahayana schools, the text is primarily concerned with delineating what the final mode of being of phenomena is according to those schools, on the basis of which the division into what requires interpretation and what does not is made. Thus, the hermeneutical theory of the Chittamatra, Yogachara-Svatantrika, Sautrantika-Svatantrika, and Prasarigika schools is ontologically based, that is, their theories of interpretation of both scripture and objects revolve around what ultimate reality is in contrast to how Buddha spoke to certain trainees in accordance with their interests, dispositions, and capabilities.

As Jam-yang-shay-ba says at the beginning of his commentary on the Essence of the Good Explanations (Buxa edition, 3a.2), Dzong-ka-ba is presenting the essence of all the good explanations (legs bshad thams cad kyi snyingpo), and thus the title, at least according to him, does not indicate that Dzong-ka-ba is saying that his own text has an essence of good explanation or eloquence but that he is presenting the essence of the marvelous explanations on the subject of the interpretable and the definitive from Indian treatises. The title could be translated as Essence of Eloquence or Essence of the Eloquent as long as eloquence was understood as referring to the Indian scholars' discriminative presentation of the subject matter and not to euphony of expression as in beautiful poetic composition or to Dzong-ka-ba's own presentation. Undoubtedly, Dzong-ka-ba's composition comes to be eloquent by way of containing the eloquence of the Indian scholars, but this does not appear to be the intention of his title.
Jam-yang-shay-ba would find support in the last two lines of this quote for his position that Buddhapalita is the founder of the Prasangika system, but those who say that ChandrakTri is the founder would also find support from the statement just above it that ChandrakTri 'opened the chariot way' for Prasangika through clearly differentiating this system from others. I find Jam-yang-shay-ba's position to be insupportable in the face of (1) his own statement that even though Saraha preceded Nagarjuna in holding the Madhyamika view and even though Vimuktisena preceded Shantaraksita in holding the Yogachara-Svatantrika view (GT, ca 10a.5-1 la.4), those two are not posited as the founders of, respectively, the Madhyamika system and the Yogachara-Madhyamika system because they did not clearly set off those schools in contradistinction to other systems and (2) his admission that Buddhapalita did not do that for Prasangika (GT, ca 9a.5-10a.1) whereas ChandrakTri did (see p.584). Jang-gya (288.last line) goes so far as to say that Jam-yang-shay-ba actually did not hold that Buddhapalita founded Prasangika for the above reasons. However, the monastic college that uses Jam-yang-shay-ba's texts, Go-mang, currently holds that Buddhapalita was the founder and that this is Jam-yang-shay-ba's view.

The four types of Superiors (Aryan) are Hearer, Solitary Realizer, Bodhisattva, and Buddha Superiors. Aryan (Phagspa) is translated as 'Superiors' because, according to Kensur Lekden, these are beings who have risen above the level of common beings (prthagjana, so sor skye bo) through cognizing emptiness directly on the path of seeing.

Shravaka (Nyan thos) is translated as 'Hearers' because (GM, 16a.3-5) they hear (nyan) the doctrine, practice it, and then cause others to hear (thos par byed pa) that they have actualized their goal (see Hopkins' *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* [London: Hutchinson, 1980], pp. 102-3). This etymology is built around active and causative uses of the verbal root for hearing, shru; one hears and then causes others to hear, in this case not what one has heard but what one has achieved after putting into practice the doctrines one has heard by announcing that 'I have done what was to be done; I will not know another life,' etc. The translation of the term as 'disciples' loses this etymological meaning which appears to be important in the
tradition as is evidenced by Chandrakirti’s citing it in his Supplement (Tibetan Publishing House edition, 3.11) and Dzong-ka-ba's including and expanding on Chandrakirti in his commentary (Compassion, P. 102).

Chandrakirti (Comm, 3.14, cited by Dzong-ka-ba in Compassion, p. 103) gives a second etymology of Shravaka as Hearer-Proclaimer (GM, 16a.5fl) based on the White Lotus of Excellent Doctrine Sutra (SaddharmapundarTka, IV.53 [P781, Vol. 30 23.3.2; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 6, p.82] which says:

O Protector, today we have become hearer-proclaimers (shravakabhuta).
We will thoroughly proclaim the excellent enlightenment
And will set forth the terms of enlightenment.
Thus we [will be] like formidable Hearer-Proclaimers (Shravaka).

Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 16a.6), expanding on Dzong-ka-ba’s explanation (Compassion, p. 103), interprets this as meaning that Shravakas are so called because upon hearing (thos nas) about the supreme fruit of Buddhahood or about its path from a Buddha they proclaim (sgrogspa) it to others without practicing it themselves. He says (GM, 17b.4) that at this point in the Lotus Sutra Bodhisattvas are saying that they are fit to be derivded because, like Hearers, they are proclaiming the fruit of the Mahayana or the profound path proceeding to that state without practicing it themselves. The context of the sutra, however, appears to be slightly different as can be seen in Leon Hurvitz’s very readable translation in the Scripture of the Lotus Blossom of the Fine Dharma (New York: Columbia, 1976, p.98). The Buddha has told the story of the ‘prodigal son’ (see Whalen Lai’s fine article 'The Buddhist "Prodigal Son": A Story of Misperceptions', Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies,'Vol. 4 No. 2, pp.91-8), and the former Hearer, Mahakasyapa, is re-telling the story, relating it to how he and other Hearers formerly proclaimed the Bodhisattva path but did not practice it:

The Buddha’s sons,
Hearing the Dharma from us
And day and night taking thought,
Engaged in cultivated practice; (p.95)
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Also:

So we, though we preached
The jewel cache of the Buddhadharma,
Had no hope for it
In the same way. (p.96)

Also:

Although we, for the sake of
The Buddha’s sons,
Preached the Bodhisattvadharma,
Wherewith the Buddha Path was to be sought,
Yet, with respect to this Dharma,
We never had any hopes, (p.97)

Mahakashyapa then explains that due to having heard that they have the lot of the Mahayana and thereupon attained the Mahayana path they, like the son in the parable who was gradually led to recognize that he is the son of a wealthy king, have gained something extraordinary which they always had in the sense that they had been preaching it but had no hope to practice it. As Hurvitz translates the stanza in question:

We now
Are truly voice-hearers,
Taking the voice of the Buddha Path
And causing all to hear it.

Thus, Jam-yang-shay-ba is certainly right in saying that the Lotus Sutra is indicating a dual etymology of Shravaka as those who hear about the highest enlightenment of the Mahayana and then cause others to hear about it (causative in Sanskrit, sgros in Tibetan) without practicing it themselves. However, it seems that the specific context here in this stanza is that the now Bodhisattva Mahakashyapa is saying that he and others are now formidable hearer-proclaimers in that unlike their earlier state as Hearer-Proclaimers who heard and proclaimed the Mahayana teaching without practicing it, they have put it to practice, have attained its fruit, and will proclaim it to others. Thus, at this particular point Mahakashyapa does not seem to be saying that ‘we Bodhisattvas are fit to be derided’ as Jam-yang-shay-ba says. This is confirmed in the commentary on the Lotus Sutra.
by Prthivibandhu (Ṣāvṛṛtsa lags), in which reference to this stanza he says (The Nyingma Edition of the sDe-dge bKa’-gyur and bsTan-’gyur, Dharma Publishing, 1981, Text 4017, Vol. 76 663.6), ‘This indicates that, having attained the great fruit, they are fit to help others who are set as Hearer Superiors.’ Mahakashyapa is rejoicing in their new situation.

How the context is interpreted affects the translation of the last line of IV.53, steno vayam shravaka bhishmakalpah, de bas bdag cag nyan thos mi zad ‘dra (GM, 16b.2) or de bas bdag cag sgo gspa mi bzad ‘dra (P781, Vol. 30 23.3.2), ‘Thus we [will be] like formidable Hearer-Proclaimers.’ The term ‘formidable’ (bhishma, mi zad or mi bzad) is missing in Hurvitz’s translation from the Chinese. Louis de la Valley Poussin (Museon, ns V. 11, 1910 [Vol. 29], p.253) renders the line, ‘aussi serons-nous comme d’irrestibles (Jravakas.’ In Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism (p. 103), I translated it as, ‘Thus we are like intractable Hearers,’ assuming that Jam-yang-shay-ba was taking the term in a negative way. ‘Irresistible’, like ‘formidable’, suggests the might and power (bhishma) of their proclamation now that they are proclaiming the Mahayana doctrine on the basis of actual attainment, whereas ‘intractable’ is a reference to the awful or frightful (bhishma) state that they were in when they just caused others to hear about the Mahayana but did not practice it themselves. In either case, there is a play on the contrast with their former state. The translation as ‘formidable’, however, seems to fit the context better.

Based on this etymology of shravaka as hearing of the highest enlightenment and proclaiming it without practicing it, Hurvitz (p.116) explains that ‘….by auditor is meant (italics his) one who lacks knowledge of Emptiness.’ However, as Dzong-ka-ba (Compassion, pp. 150-60) shows, this is not the position of Chandrakirti and other Prasangikas; according to him, in Prasangika the stoutest emptiness must be cognized even to be liberated from cyclic existence and thus Hearers and Solitary Realizers do so. In Dzong-ka-ba’s interpretation of Prasangika, the path that Hearers hear about and proclaim without practicing would be great compassion, the altruistic intention to become enlightened, and meditation on emptiness using a myriad of reasonings rather than just a few. However, with regard to Chittamatra, Dzong-ka-ba and his followers hold that
Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not cognize the subtlest emptiness (see Sopa and Hopkins' Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, pp. 117-18), in which case what Hearers hear about and proclaim without practicing is the emptiness of a difference of entity between subject and object, as well as the paths of great compassion and so forth. The Chittamatin interpretation, therefore, accords with Hurvitz's presentation.

Though this second etymology of hearing and proclaiming without practicing is pejorative, the former is not, as it is frequently reported in sutra itself that upon achieving their goal Hearers report to others the fact that they have completed their path with statements such as, 'I have done what was to be done; I will not know another birth' (Compassion, p. 102). Thus, given the importance that Chandrakīrti, Dzong-ka-ba, and so forth give to the term itself, this non-pejorative etymology can serve as a basis for a literal translation as 'Hearers'.

Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 16b.2) views the two etymologies as built from different roots, but in both cases the Sanskrit seems merely to be a play between the active and the causative uses of shru. In the case of the Lotus Sutra the causative samshravishyamatā (future causative first person plural) was translated into Tibetan as sgrogs rather than as thos par byed pa leading to the tradition that there are two etymologies of shravaka, one as nyan thos and another as thos sgrogs, whereas it seems that the two are variations of the one play on the active and the causative. In the first etymology the Hearers proclaim or cause others to hear that they have actualized their goal whereas in the second they proclaim or cause others to hear the doctrine that they have heard. Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 16b.2) says that the Lotus Sutra etymology is built from the verbal root for 'proclaiming the heard' (thos pa sgrogs pa'i hying), but he does not cite the actual Sanskrit. However, in accordance with his etymology of the ka of madhyamaka as from the verbal root for proclaiming, kai (meaning 'to sound' according to Apte) following an explanation by Bhavaviveka (GM, 4b.3), we can surmise that he is taking the ka of shravaka as built from the verbal root for proclaiming and 'the heard' as shruta from shru. However, though there are two etymologies of shravaka, they are built not around different verbal roots but around the single root shru treated in active and passive modes with different interpretations both of what is heard (the Hīnayāna or
Mahayana doctrine) and what is proclaimed (one's own attainment of the Hfnayana enlightenment or the Mahayana doctrine one has heard but not practiced).

Pratyekabuddha is translated as ‘Solitary Realizer’ because of the explanation (Compassion, pp. 103-4) that pratyekabuddhas are not Buddhas but are called buddha because of having realization of suchness. ‘Solitary’ indicates that in their last lifetime they practice alone without depending on a teacher in that lifetime.

The terms Bodhisattva and Buddha are left untranslated as they are sufficiently familiar in English.

Prasannapada is translated as Clear Words though it would be just as suitable as The Lucidly Worded, or The Clear Worded as Stcherbatsky does in his The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana (rpt Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), or Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way as Mervyn Sprung does in his condensation of the text (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). It strikes me that Chandrakirti gave his commentary on Nagarjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakashastra) this title in contrast to Bhavaviveka’s commentary, Lamp for (Nagarjuna’s) ‘Wisdom’ (PrajnapradTpa) which, due to its brevity and lack of elaboration, is often difficult to fathom and thus unclear. As an example of such difficulty, see Bhavaviveka’s refutation of Buddha’s interpretation of the refutation of production from self on p.461. Also, in the Clear Words Chandrakirti gives a very clear picture of the movement of the refutations by citing the qualm that each step answers, such as in his brilliant commentary on chapter two.

Stcherbatsky, in his The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, however, indicates that at least for him Chandrakirti’s text is not clear and that the title seems ironic (p.75 n.1): ‘Chandrakirti has given to his commentary the title of ‘The Clearworded’ (prasanna-pada) probably not without some dose of irony, since, as Prof. Wassilieff attests, its extreme dialectical subtlety, especially in the first chapter, is equalled by no other work in the whole domain of Northern Buddhist literature.’ In the same vein, Mervyn Sprung (p.xii) says about the first chapter, in defense of his abridgements of the text, ‘... [the abridgements]
are, without exception I believe, concerned with Candrakīrti's controversy with Bhāvaviveka, his rival commentator within the Madhyamika school, or with his support of Buddhapalita, a commentator he attempts to follow, or else with traditional arguments of the Samkhya school having to do with causation. These controversies are important, obviously. Yet to place them with all their meticulous, Indian love of syllogistic detail, in what is otherwise a finely targeted introduction to the entire Prasannapada, however natural they were to Candrakīrti's contemporaries, is to make access to the work for contemporary readers difficult and discouraging. It is interesting to note that in the Ge-luk-ba scholastic centers of learning this very controversy between the three Madhyamika masters is used as the means for gaining access to Madhyamika, as it is the first major topic of debate in the Middle Way class of ge-shay studies at the point of the sixth chapter of Chandrakīrti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'. Chandrakīrti's Clear Words forms the basis of the study with commentaries such as that by Jam-yang-shay-ba used to unravel its meaning; it is because of the clarity which I found in using Jam-yang-shay-ba's commentary that this controversy could be included in Part Five. Thus, I am not making any claims that Chandrakīrti's words in that section were clear to me on their own; still, I think that from his own point of view that section, like the rest of his text, was a good deal clearer than Bhāvaviveka's.

With respect to this citation, the Buddhist Sanskrit Texts edition by Dr. P. L. Vaidya reads madhyamikasya satah which, despite his saying (p. 5 n.5) that it is not rendered in the Tibetan, is rendered in the Tibetan by dbu mapayin na ni (Vol. 98 4.5.3). Poussin's edition (Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, 16.2) reads madhyamikasya svatah which he finds to be missing in the Tibetan (see n.3); however, the Tibetan suggests that satah is correct.

Stcherbatsky (p. 100) seems to follow the Tibetan, loosely translating the passage as, 'But according to the Madhyamika method of dialectics an independent argument is never needed. This method consists in producing a contrathesis and then balancing two conflicting views without admitting either of them.' Sprung (p. 37) follows Poussin's mis-reading, 'It is meaningless for a Madhyamika, because he cannot accept his opponent's
premises, to propound a self-contained argument (svatantrya-anumana) from his own point of view (svatah).' Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 58a.7) interprets the passage differently, 'Here
"autonomous inference" is a syllogism [literally, application of
a sign] which is established from its own side. "Position" is a
word for probandum or thesis. "Another" means [a thesis
which is] other than not established from its own side. There-
fore, the meaning of this passage is: It is not admissible [for one
who is a Madhyamika] to assert the statement of syllogisms
which are established from their own side because [Madhymikas]
do not assert probanda or theses which are established from
their own side.' Thus, for Nga-wang-bel-den the question is not
about asserting something from one's own point of view or
merely playing off others' assertions but about asserting syllo-
gisms and theses that inherently exist.

Jam-yang-shay-ba's interpretation (GM, 232b.5-33a.3) is
slightly more detailed, 'It follows that it is unsuitable for any-
one who is a Madhyamika refuting all extremes as in the King of
Meditative Stabilizations Sutra to use autonomous inferences,
that is to say, syllogisms in which the three modes [of the pre-
ence of the reason in the subject, the pervasion, and counter-
pervasion] are established from their own side because [Madhymikas]
do not have assertions of other positions from among
the four extremes and so forth. That [Madhymikas] do not
have assertions of other positions from among the four extremes
and so forth follows because (1) [Madhyamikas] do not have
positions asserting any extremes—the extreme of existence
which is inherent existence, the extreme of non-existence which
is utter non-existence, the extreme of both existence and non-
existence which is inherent existence and inherent disintegra-
tion, or the extreme of a truly established emptiness or middle
that abandons the two extremes of existence and non-existence
and (2) the honorable Superior [Nagarjuna] says that he has no
thesis contradicting the Madhyamika system.' The format of
such interpretation is clear: every instance where Prasangikas
seem to say that they have no theses is shown, by context, to
mean that they do not have certain theses, not theses in general.

As is evidenced by Stcherbatsky's and Sprung's translations,
they are inserting a good deal of interpretation into the text in
an admitted attempt to make it clearer. I prefer more literal
translating, resorting frequently to bracketed additions, to accomplish similar goals but to try to keep the original text more available. All translation is interpretation, but it seems appropriate, in the face of radically different interpretations, to make the original text as identifiable as possible.

According to Jam-yang-shay-ba (GT, ca 6la.3), the Sanskrit original is svairT. As mentioned earlier, siddha (grubpa) and sat (yod pa) are often used interchangeably, and thus svabhava-siddha is translated here as 'existing inherently' rather than as 'established inherently' merely because it is a little easier to understand in English.

It needs to be borne in mind that Bhavaviveka did not call himself a Svatantrika. The term appears to have been coined in Tibet, perhaps by visiting Indian scholars or Tibetans themselves, based on ChandrakTrti's saying that it is not suitable for Madhyamikas to use svatantra-anumana, autonomous inferences (with the word 'inference' here not referring to a consciousness realizing a hidden or obscure object of knowledge in dependence on a correct reason but to the syllogistic statement itself). Jam-yang-shay-ba here equates svatantra with terms meaning existing under the object's own power, and thus the term has been translated as 'autonomous'. However, most Western scholars and many non-Ge-luk-ba Tibetan scholars have taken the term just to mean a syllogistic statement that the stater himself supports and thus is in his own continuum (rang rgyud). This interpretation is rejected by Ge-luk-ba writers because then Prasangikas would absurdly be Svatantrikas since, at least in the Ge-luk-ba interpretation, Prasangikas themselves do use syllogistic reasoning.

Still, it seems to me that the term svatantra (-prayoga) might refer to the type of syllogism that must on all occasions be stated in order to generate in another party a consciousness realizing a thesis. In other words, the very insistence on the statement on all occasions of a syllogism that oneself supports indicates that one believes in commonly appearing subjects, predicates, reasons, examples, and so forth and thus implies that these inherently exist since the basic appearance to sense perception, for instance, is not being challenged. This meets back to the assertion that the object of negation in the view of selflessness, according to Bhavaviveka, does not appear to sense consciousnesses
but according to Chandrakirti does. Through interpreting the term svatantra in this way, it is not necessary immediately to equate it with ‘existing under the object’s own power’ or ‘inherently existent’; rather, one should see inherent existence as an implication of the insistence that a syllogism that oneself supports in one’s own continuum be stated. To me, it seems that Chandrakirti, in his long critique of Bhavaviveka, is surmising that Bhavaviveka's insistence on finding a syllogism in Buddhapalita's refutation of production from self-stems from the latter's feeling that there are commonly appearing subjects and so forth, and thus his syllogisms are bound by the context of such insistence and all that it implies—commonly appearing subjects and, thus, inherent existence.

In this way, the equation of ‘autonomy’ with ‘inherent existence’ is not just on the basis of a flimsy reference to Amarsinha’s lexicon (Jang, 325.10; GM, 229a.6; GT, ca 61a.3, rang rgyud rang dbang bdag dbang ‘Autonomy, own-power, [and] self-power [have the same meaning].’), nor does one have to squeeze Bhavaviveka's calling for a rang dbang du rjes su dpagpa (a self-powered or autonomous inference) in his commentary on the beginning of chapter thirteen of the Treatise as if this directly indicates that Bhavaviveka himself asserts that ‘autonomous’ means ‘inherently existent’ (GT, ca 61a.7 and Jang, 325.12: da ni sun ‘byin pa ’i lan biab pa dang rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa ’i mthu ‘du byed mams mam pa las ngo bo nyid medpa nyid bstan pa’i don gyi dbang gis rab tu byed pa bcu gsum pa btsams so ‘[Nagarjuna] composed the thirteenth chapter in order to teach the non-entityness of compositional phenomena through the force of giving answers to [others’] refutations and self-powered [or autonomous] inferences.’)

In short, Bhavaviveka never openly said that svatantra, autonomy, equals svabhava-siddhi, inherent existence. Rather, it seems that in such a context he is saying that it is not sufficient merely to refute another’s position negatively—one must positively set forth one’s own position. The implications of this, as explained above, are that Bhavaviveka accepts a quality of objects that appears in direct perception which Chandrakirti refutes. The significance of Chandrakirti’s identifying a subtler object of negation and Bhavaviveka’s confusing the existence of an object with its inherent existence is perhaps more accessible
when the route of the immediate equation of svatantra and svabhava-siddhi is not taken.

498 Brackets are from *Ann*, dbu 58b. 1.

499 To speak of a 'thesis which is a position' might seem redundant since position (*paksha, phyogs*) and thesis (*pratijna, dam bca’*) are often synonymous. However, according to Kensur Lekden, a position of one of the extremes is non-existent because it is an extreme, whereas an assertion or thesis of an extreme position does exist.

500 P5246, Vol. 95 140.2.4, XVI.25. For Chandrakirti’s commentary see P5266, Vol. 98, 279.2ff. This is quoted by Chandrakirti in his *Clear Words* following the last quote, P5260, Vol. 98 4.5.4 (the Buddhist Text Series Sanskrit is No. 10, 5.25; Pous-sin, 16.4).

According to Dzong-ka-ba (*Ann*, dbu 58b.2-59b.6), Chandrakirti cites this passage in his *Clear Words* as a source showing that it is unsuitable for a Madhyamika to assert autonomous theses because existence in the four alternatives is refuted in Madhyamika texts. Also, Dzong-ka-ba points out that in his commentary on the *Four Hundred* Chandrakirti says that this passage indicates that censure cannot be expressed, even over a long period of time, to a proponent of emptiness; thus, this passage certainly does not indicate that Madhyamikas have no assertions at all by way of suggesting that they do not even assert emptiness. Also, Chandrakirti cites the same passage in his own *Commentary on the 'Supplement'* upon saying, 'This propounding of dualism is just unreasonable for proponents of imputed existence (*prajnaptivadin, btagspar smra ba*); therefore, Madhyamikas cannot be defeated in any way through refutations and answers dependent on duality.' As Dzong-ka-ba says, '[This passage] is cited [by Chandrakirti] as a source showing that those who assert imputed existence which negates substantial existence in the sense of [the object’s] being established by way of its own entity cannot be refuted by Proponents of True Existence (*bhavavadin, dngos po yodpar smra ba*) who assert that [phenomena] are established by way of their own entities and by the Proponents of No Things (*abhavavadin, dngos po med par smra ba*) who assert a negation of all capacity to perform functions in things such as forms. Therefore, it is not suitable as a source [showing that Madhyamikas] have no system.’
Based on Dzong-ka-ba, Nga-wang-bel-den goes on to identify the four alternatives here as inherent existence, utter non-existence, both, and a truly established category that is neither. The fourth alternative is specified as 'truly established' since a category that is composed of neither of the positions, that is, that objects are neither inherently established nor utterly non-existent is affirmed since objects do indeed exist conventionally.

Nga-wang-bel-den cites a passage from Dzong-ka-ba's 'Great Exposition of Special Insight' in the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path* that gives a slightly different version of the four and sets forth the basic Ge-luk-ba perspective on the four alternatives. With respect to the first alternative, he indicates that things which are established by way of their own entities are refuted whether these are asserted to be conventional or ultimate truths, whereas things that are able to perform functions are not refuted conventionally (though indeed ultimately). With respect to the second alternative, he says that non-things (*abhava, dngos med*), that is to say, uncaused phenomena, are refuted if they are asserted to be established by way of their own entities (and not if they are only asserted to exist conventionally). Likewise, a combination of the two and a truly established position that is neither are refuted. Dzong-ka-ba concludes, 'All refutations of the four alternatives should be understood in this way. If the four alternatives were refuted without affixing such qualification, when [the first two alternatives, that is, that something is] an existent thing (*dngos po yod pa*) and a non-thing (*dngos po med pa*) are refuted and then both are refuted saying "not both", it would directly contradict one's own assertion to make the refutation, "not not both". If you [stupidly] insist that despite this there is no fault, [I can only say,] "We do not debate with the insane."

In the earlier version, the four alternatives were:

1. inherent existence
2. utter non-existence
3. both
4. a truly established category that is neither.

Here the four are:

1. inherently existent thing
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2 inherently existent non-thing (that is, inherently existent uncaused phenomenon)
3 both
4 a truly established category that is neither an inherently existent thing nor an inherently existent non-thing.

In the first way, one would be considering whether something like a chair is inherently existent, utterly non-existent, both, or some inherently truly established possibility that is neither inherently existent nor utterly non-existent, such as that the chair is inherently established as conventionally existent. In the second way, one considers whether the chair is an inherently existent thing, an inherently existent non-thing, both an inherently existent thing and an inherently existent non-thing, or neither an inherently existent thing nor an inherently existent non-thing within being inherently existent. In both cases, the alternatives must be carefully qualified so that conventional existence is not ruled out. The four alternatives, therefore, are all-inclusive only in the sense of including all possibilities of inherently existent phenomena—when these are refuted, it can be decided that phenomena do not inherently exist. They do not include all possibilities whatsoever. If one does not agree that such qualification is needed upon being shown the self-contradictions that are entailed without it, one is considered to be beyond the pale of sensible discourse; as Dzong-ka-ba says, 'We do not debate with the insane.'

Nga-wang-bel-den identifies another interpretation of the four alternatives by Dzong-ka-ba's student Kay-drup in his Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate; there it is considered whether a chair, for instance, is a truly established existent, a truly established non-existent, a truly established category that is both of those, or a truly established category that is neither. This version is the most symmetrical in that all four alternatives are considered as being qualified by true establishment or inherent existence.

In this tradition of interpretation it is necessary to qualify the first position as 'inherent existence' or 'true existence' because it would be absurd to deny first that something exists and then that the same thing does not exist, for the two are a dichotomy, excluding any third possibility. (The reason why a third possibility of being both existent and non-existent is included is to...
take account of philosophical systems that posit such and probably also to create a sense of the fullness of the refutation in the meditator no matter how absurd the positions are.) Thus, although it is denied that phenomena are inherently existent, utterly non-existent, both existent and non-existent, or some fourth possibility that is neither existent nor non-existent, phenomena are existent, that is to say, conventionally existent. All possibilities of existence are not denied, only existence that would be able to bear analysis by a reasoning consciousness, and a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate cannot refute conventional existence as that is beyond its province.

A result of this qualification is that there seems to be a lack of symmetry in the four positions; the fourth position, as given above in the first two interpretations, is not simply a denial of a combination of the first two. Although a third position which is a combination of inherent existence and utter non-existence (or inherently existent thing and inherently existent non-thing) is suitable to be refuted, a fourth position which is a mere denial of them is not, for phenomena are neither inherently existent nor utterly non-existent since they are conventionally existent. (Phenomena also are neither inherently existent things nor inherently existent non-things because they are conventionally existent things or non-things.) Once the fourth position is qualified as something inherently existent that is neither of those, it is not a mere denial of a combination of the first two positions.

Through qualifying what is negated, the Ge-luk-ba interpreters maintain the commonsense notion that one cannot say that something does not exist and then claim that it also is not non-existent. In this system of interpretation the refutation of four alternatives is not used to lift the mind to a different, non-conceptual level through shock (or perhaps confusion) but to penetrate the nature of phenomena through a reasoned, conceptual process of refutation. When the negation of inherent existence is understood, one's understanding is non-conceptual in the sense of not wandering among many conceptions but remaining on one. Then, through combining that realization with the force of calm abiding, the ability to remain one-pointedly on emptiness is greatly enhanced, but still one needs to alternate stabilizing and analytical meditation on emptiness in order to induce special insight, which in turn is deepened.
over the path of preparation, resulting in a totally non-conceptual realization of emptiness on the path of seeing.

Thus, even though it is sometimes disappointing to encounter the Ge-luk-bas' conceptual qualifications of scriptural passages that seem to lift one beyond conceptuality, it should not be thought that somehow their systemization is intended to intellectualize the profound to a stultifying degree. Rather, they are seeking to put the intellect in its place, using it in a very profound way in a process leading to direct perception.

In this endeavor, Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations are invaluable, as they reveal the systematic background of Jamyang-shay-ba's citations which, without this contextualization, sometimes even seem to be proving the opposite of what he intends. Until one understands that he intends his text as lecture notes for a teacher competent in Dzong-ka-ba's system, many of his citations are baffling. Undoubtedly, Nga-wang-bel-den saw this need and provided the contextualization.

With respect to the definition of a Prasangika given just below, it might be helpful to identify possible English translations for names of the schools of tenets:

**Vaibhashika:** Great Exposition School (so called because they follow the text called *The Great Exposition* *[Mahavi-bhasha]*)

**Sautrantika:** Sutra School (so called perhaps because of their emphasis on sutra rather than on *The Great Exposition*)

**Chittamatra:** Mind Only School (so called because they propound that all phenomena are of the nature of the mind)

**Madhyamika:** Middle Way School (so called because of propounding a middle that is devoid of the extremes of true existence and utter non-existence).
the Sutra School Following Scripture (identified mainly as followers of Vasubandhu),
the Sutra School Following Reasoning (identified as followers of Dignaga and Dharmakirti),
the Mind Only School Following Scripture (these being the followers of Asanga),
the Mind Only School Following Reasoning (these being the Mind Only followers of Dignaga and Dharmakirti),
the Autonomous Middle Way School (Svatantrika-Madhyamika),
the Consequential Middle Way School (Prasangika-Madhyamika).

As school names, the English is quite palatable, but to refer to persons it is a bit more cumbersome though still manageable:

Vaibhashika: Proponent of the Great Exposition
Sautrantika: Proponent of Sutra
   Proponent of Sutra Following Scripture
   Proponent of Sutra Following Reasoning
Chittamatrin: Proponent of Mind-Only
   Proponent of Mind-Only Following Scripture
   Proponent of Mind-Only Following Reasoning
Madhyamika: Proponent of the Middle Way
   Autonomist, Middle Way Autonomist
   Consequentialist, Middle Way Consequentialist.

I feel that it is important gradually to get beyond the use of Sanskrit terms whenever possible in order to lift Buddhist studies out of the arcane. There is no need to translate persons' names, except perhaps in texts such as certain sutras where some names have great meaning, but the translation of technical terminology can be very helpful. With respect to this, I stand directly opposed to the style of the great French Buddhologist, Louis de La Vallee Poussin, though I do not criticize him for not trying to do what I am. Scholars have different tastes and perceive different needs, and the field is wide enough to accommodate many different approaches. In other words, I disagree entirely with those who call for only one style of translation.

As Nga-wang-bel-den says (Ann. dbu 59b.2), 'Since consequences must be stated on all [occasions of] generating inferences in
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others, they are of greater extent [or usage], but since other-approved syllogisms do not have to be stated for certain disputants of sharp faculties, they are described as being of less extent.'

The translation of the rest of this sentence and the next is doubtful, for, more literally, Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be saying,'... but they are not at all mutually exclusive. For, most statements of other-approved [syllogisms] also appear to be consequences.' The reason for preferring the other, more loose translation is that consequences and other-approved syllogisms are indeed mutually exclusive, that is, whatever is the one is not the other. His point, rather, seems to be that an other-approved syllogism can be seen as a consequence merely by switching the format. Or he may be saying that both other-approved syllogisms and consequences are capable of generating an inferential consciousness and thus in this sense are not mutually exclusive.

His example is a reference to Buddhapalita's refutation of the Samkhya view of production from causes that are of the same entity as the effect (see Part Five, chapters 2-5).

Since causes are not produced in dependence upon their own effects, the meaning of 'mere conditionality' is not limited to just the usual sense of pratyaya, condition assisting in production of an object, but refers to the condition or situation that allows the positing of an object, whether that be its own basis of designation or that in relation to which it is posited. A seed is designated in dependence upon its basis of designation, the two halves of the seed, as well as in dependence upon its presumed effect, a sprout. That appearances are posited from the viewpoint of such conditionality 'when there is no analysis and no investigation' does not mean that conventionalities are beyond the sphere of analysis in the sense of the usual worldly investigation of an object to make sure it is there. In other words, conventional phenomena are not just figments of the imagination or even beyond the sphere of logical reasoning in the sense of undergoing investigation by reasoned analysis, for this is how a permanent self and so forth are refuted. Rather, conventionalities cannot
withstand ultimate analysis, analysis into their mode of being, such as investigation into whether the object is one with its basis of designation or a different entity from its basis of designation.

504 P5431, Vol. 103 246.5.2. The Peking edition wrongly reads stong pa guyis instead of stong pa nyid. The brackets are from Ann, dbu 59b.4-7, which confirms the latter reading as does Jang, 409.10. Nga-wang-bel-den says that since Buddha's teaching that all phenomena are selfless cannot be defeated by any opponent, his teaching was proclaimed like the great roar of a lion (whose roar no other animal dares to answer).

The Tibetan scholars with whom I have worked have identified Shura (dPa' bo) as Ashvaghosha. For references to controversy about this, see D.S. Ruegg’s The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1981), 119-21.

Jam-yang-shay-ba uses this passage from Shura’s Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment to show that it is admissible to call Prasangikas Non-Abiding Madhyamikas and Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas. Since Shura’s mere mention that the middle way does not abide in any of the extremes does not establish that he used these terms as names for the school, Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be saying that these are suitable names for Prasangika just because Prasangikas set forth a middle way that does not abide in any of the extremes. However, in that case it would be suitable to call Chittamatra Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas as they also claim to propound a middle way that does not abide in the extremes. In other words, Jam-yang-shay-ba’s evidence is scant.

His position is an attempt to clarify a point made in passing by Dzong-ka-ba in the latter’s Great and Middling Expositions of the Stages of the Path. Dzong-ka-ba says that earlier Tibetans mistakenly used the term ‘Those Who Hold That Illusion is Established by a Reasoning Consciousness’ (sgyu ma rigs grub) for Sva Ratnakas and the term ‘Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas’ (rab tu mignaspa'i dbu ma pa) for Prasangikas’ (Middling, 144a.2 in an unmarked edition of 263 folios). Here, Jam-yang-shay-ba is trying to show that Dzong-ka-ba’s objection was not to the terms themselves but to the meaning assigned these by earlier Tibetans. Jang-gya (290.6-12) agrees, citing this
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as the opinion of the great scholar and adept Nor-sang-gya-tso (Nor-bzang-rgya-mtsho) and identifying him as using this quote from Ashvaghosha for his source. However, other scholars such as Nga-wang-bel-den hold that Dzong-ka-ba was refuting both the meaning and the usage of the terms themselves.

Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 59b.7-62a.1) gives a fascinating rendition of the controversy and Sha-mar Gen-dun-den-dzin-gya-tso (Zha-va-dmar dGe-bdun-stan-'dzin-rgya-mtsho, 1852-1910) an even better one in his Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought, Set Forth to Purify Forgetfulness of the Difficult Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Special Insight' (IHag mthong chen mo'i dka'gnad mams brjed byang du bkodpa dgongs zab snang ba'i sgron me, [Delhi: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1972], 19.4-27.5). The extended attention that they give to the topic is typical of the frequent emphasis on points made only in passing in Dzong-ka-ba's writing. These become fascinating areas in which scholars try to apply the founder's principles of interpretation to specific problems, thereby coming to know those principles better through putting them to creative use. A result is that in literature purporting to be presenting Dzong-ka-ba's established views, scholars such as Jam-yang-shay-ba slip in what is clearly their own opinion on difficult issues as if it were not a matter of controversy. This tradition is maintained even in oral teaching nowadays by some Ge-luk-ba scholars, who will sometimes present a controversial position as if it is the only position on a topic. I have learned over the years to presume controversy based on the fervor and amount of repetition of such topics. I do not mean this as a general indictment, as these same scholars have displayed a remarkable ability on other occasions to present many views on an issue. Rather, the tendency to stone-wall probably comes from their long training in debate, and the resorting to such on certain occasions may simply depend on their mood. I try to get around the situation by presenting positions and asking questions in a way that does not polarize the issue.

In this paragraph Jam-yang-shay-ba paraphrases Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations, P6142, Vol. 153 185.4.4.

The word phyi mo (matrka) has the sense of a root text or model. Nagarjuna, in his Precious Garland (stanza 394), uses the term to refer to the model of an alphabet that a teacher...
would first use in instructing his students. Although the term also means ‘grandmother’, the translation of it as ‘grandmother’ in this context seems a bit inappropriate.

A student of Chandrakirti, as identified in prayers of supplications.

P6142, Vol. 153 185.4.6ff. The quotation was lengthened by including the second clause.

Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 59.6) points out that Dzongka-ba’s Quintessential Instructions on the King of Tantras, the Glorious Guhyasamaja, Lamp Thoroughly Illuminating the Five Stages (P6167, Vol. 158 179.3.7) says that it appears that Nagarjuna, having completed the beginning of the second chapter of The Five Stages (Punchakrama, P2667), had Shakya-mitra complete the chapter.

As above, it is my practice to translate the titles of texts in order to indicate the contents of the text; this, of course, does not imply that the text has been translated. Major translations are indicated in the Bibliography.

A commentarial tradition, reported by Geshe Gediin Lodro, says that the second is Jnanagarbha although it also could be the second Bhavaviveka, known as the lesser (chung ba) who is the author of the MadhyamakaratnapradTpa (P5254) which is not to be confused with the PrajnapradTpa (P5253) by the greater Bhavaviveka, the founder of the Svatantrika system (see Jang, 283.11). Jnanagarbha is the more likely referent here because his works are widely cited whereas the lesser Bhavaviveka’s are not.

P5431, Vol. 103 246.4.8. Kensur Lekden pointed out that the general teaching is that phenomena are like illusions in that just as the latter appear to be real but are not, so phenomena appear to exist objectively but do not and that phenomena are like illusions and not just illusions because they can perform functions whereas illusions cannot.

With respect to this particular quote, Dak-tsang himself (204.1, Thimphu edition) says that this passage ‘... indicates that due to [holding that] illusions and so forth are established [Svatantrikas] do not perceive the inexpressible Manjushn.’ Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be saying that for him this passage does not refute Svatantrika at all. He also (GT, ca 77a.1-4) argues against Dak-tsang for holding that in Haribhadra’s
... an ultimate reasoning consciousness of meditative equipoise establishes [that phenomena are] like illusions and goes on to say that all real conventionalities are established by reasoning (rigs grub), meaning reasoning in general and not a consciousness of meditative equipoise. Jam-yang-shay-ba thereby suggests that it is suitable to call Svatantrikas gyu ma rigs grub, 'Those Holding That Illusory[-Like Phenomena] Are Established By Reasoning' as long as one understands that it is not a consciousness of meditative equipoise that establishes phenomena as like illusions; however, since Prasangikas also hold that conventionalities are established by valid cognition, it is unclear why this is a particularly good name for Svatantrikas, except perhaps that such is emphasized in their literature.

Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 59b.7fT) seems to make the absurd conclusion that Jam-yang-shay-ba agrees with Dak-tsang that this passage does directly refute the Svatantrikas. In that case, Jam-yang-shay-ba would be contradicting his own pronouncement that Ashvaghooshia is a non-partisan Prasangika. The annotator may have missed the meaning of the hypothetical 'if in Jam-yang-shay-ba's refutation of Dak-tsang.

Showing great independence and intellectual honesty, Nga-wang-bel-den often disagrees with Jam-yang-shay-ba, presenting a carefully framed argument in great detail. In the Go-mang College which uses Jam-yang-shay-ba's works as their basic textbooks, Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations are sometimes described as 'not their own system' (rang lugs mayin) and denigrated as 'annotations [that point out only] mis-printings' (yig nor mchan 'grel). For me, they are a necessary key to Jam-yang-shay-ba's work through providing contextualization and giving an example of rigorous, nonpartisan application of scholarly principles. On this point, however, I do not think that the evidence merits his criticism of Jam-yang-shay-ba.

In any case, it is abundantly clear that in Ge-luk-ba works (except for Dzong-ka-ba's Golden Rosary, an early work which presents the view that even in meditative equipoise phenomena which are qualified by emptiness appear, this being dismissed as not Dzong-ka-ba's final position) a reasoning consciousness does not establish conventionalities as like illusions but only establishes emptiness and that this holds true for both Madhyamika systems. When one rises from meditative equipoise on
emptiness, a wisdom consciousness subsequent to meditative equipoise realizes illusory-like phenomena through the continued force of the earlier realization of emptiness and the appearance of conventional phenomena.

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512 P614, Vol. 153 185.4.6ff; the quote has been lengthened by including the first clause. Shakyamitra, Nagabodhi, and Ashvaghosha were students of Nagarjuna according respectively to Ann, dbu 59b.6, Obermiller’s History of Buddhism by Bu-ston, Vol. 2, p.132, and Tu-gen, 15.16.

Dzong-ka-ba’s statement that their books on Madhyamika were not translated into Tibetan is challenged by a hypothetical objector. Jam-yang-shay-ba somewhat apologetically explains that Dzong-ka-ba means that their philosophical treatises on the Madhyamika view were not translated into Tibetan, and Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 62a.1-3) explains that although the text’... is a Madhyamika treatise, it is not a text on the view from among the division into view, meditation, and behavior.' We are to understand that Ashvaghosha’s Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment is a short meditation manual on emptiness according to the Madhyamika system but not a philosophical treatise. Geshe Gediin Lodro explained that this is similar to Nagarjuna’s Collections of Praises (sTod tshogs), his many praises of the mind vajra and so forth, not being included among his Collections of Reasonings (Rigs tshogs) even though they present emptiness by way of limitless forms of reasoning. The premise is that Dzong-ka-ba’s reading was so vast and his writing so free of internal contradictions that he neither could have missed nor could have forgotten about Ashvagosha’s text.

513 Kensur Lekden reported that there were still more of Ashvagosha’s books in Tibetan than Dzong-ka-ba knew because the Sa-gya-bas kept some translations of Ashvagosha secret. Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu, 62a.1ff) points out that some scholars say that the author of this book had the same name as Shura but was not the Shura, i.e., Ashvaghosha, who was contemporaneous with Nagarjuna. However, Jang-gya (409.13) dismisses the idea as a proofless thesis and says that the great scholars all consider the book to be reliably his.

For a discussion of works on practice ascribed to Ashvaghosha, Shura, and so forth see D.S. Ruegg’s The Literature of
The seventeen are six mother and eleven son sutras. According to Kensur Lekden, mother sutras are so called because they contain discussion of all eight 'clear realizations' (abhisamaya, mngon rtogs) which are the subject matter of Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization. According to Dzong-ka-ba's Golden Rosary (P6150, Vol. 154 200.3.6ff) the six are the One Hundred Thousand, Twenty-Five Thousand, Eighteen Thousand, Ten Thousand, Eight Thousand, and Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, and the eleven are the Seven Hundred, Five Hundred, Three Hundred, Fifty Stanza, One Hundred and Fifty Means, Twenty-Five Doors, Questions of Suvikrantavikrami, Kaushika, One Letter, Several Words, and Heart of Wisdom Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. Dzong-ka-ba's opinion is stated by Kay-drup who says (p.46), 'Our own system says that the mother and son sutras are not limited to seventeen because there are many more than that.' Thus, Jam-yang-shay-ba's usage of the formula of seventeen shows that in his opinion Dzong-ka-ba still approved of the designation, though not of a strict determination, as seventeen.

No one who can identify these has been found to date.

P5260, Vol. 98 92.2.1, Colophon, stanza 10a. For the Sanskrit see J.W. de Jong's very helpful article on this Colophon, missing in Poussin's edition of ChandrakTrti's Clear Words, 'La Madhyamakasastrastuti de CandrakTrti' in Oriens Extremus, Jahrg. 9, 1962, pp.47-56 (reprinted in J. W. De Jong Buddhist Studies, pp.541-50 [Rep. of China: Asian Humanities Press, 1979]). This and the next stanza are cited, in pieces, over the next few pages; together, they read:

Having seen the Compendium of Sutra, the Precious Garland of Advice [for the King], the Praises, and with hard work over a very long time the stanzas propounded in the Treatise, the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning, the Finely Woven, the Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness, and the Refutation of Objections,

And having seen the [Four] Hundred and so forth [by Aryadeva, etc.] and likewise many profound sutras as well as the commentary done by Buddhapalita, I have gathered
together the good explanations of Bhavaviveka [and those of these masters] which were transmitted from one to another [and the texts of Shura, Jnanagarbha, etc.] as well as what I received from [Nagarjuna's own] analysis [of the meaning of his words] and have expounded this in order to please those of great intelligence.

The bracketed material in stanza 11 is from GT, ca 42a.3. Those who do not say that Chandrakirti was an actual student of Nagarjuna would not accept Jam-yang-shay-ba's interpretation that Chandrakirti is speaking of analysis gained from Nagarjuna himself. Instead, they would say that it refers to Chandrakirti's own analysis. If Chandrakirti is an actual student of Nagarjuna, it seems strange that he speaks of Nagarjuna's teaching for a long time, his students' teaching for a long time, and then (in stanza 7) Nagarjuna's teaching degenerating over a long time to the point where Chandrakirti needed to compose his texts.

De Jong (p.549 of Buddhist Studies) takes s'ataka as being a sutra ('Et apres avoir lu egalement ces nombreux sutra profonds tels que le Sataka …'), but Jam-yang-shay-ba's reading (GT, ca 42a.2) as Aryadeva's Four Hundred is more plausible especially considering the dang in the Tibetan: rgyapa la sogs de dag dang ni de bezhin…

517 P5260, Vol. 98 92.2.2.
518 P5260, Vol. 98 92.2.3.
519 This Tibetan translation of the title as dbU ma lag pa'i tshad refers to a unit of measure from the elbow to the finger-tips, a cubit, because, as was pointed out by Lati Rinbochay, the text has twenty-four 'feet' (pada) and a cubit has twenty-four finger-widths. Another Tibetan version of the title (Cha shas kiyan lag) means 'members which are parts', this tying in with the presentation of the non-ultimate nature of phenomena through analyzing their parts. The first version (P5248) has twenty-four 'feet', whereas the second (P5244) has twenty-eight.

520 P5260, Vol. 98 92.2.3. Brackets are from GT, ca 42a.3. See n.516.
521 Duk-tsang asserts that one could first attain Buddhahood through the Perfection Vehicle and then enter the Tantra Vehicle, finally to become an unsurpassed Buddha of the Tantra Vehicle. Though the Ge-luk-bas agree that in order to
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attain the final achievement one must enter the Tantra Vehicle, they say that the Buddhahood explained in sutra is that explained in tantra (see Dzong-ka-ba's explanation in *Tantra in Tibet*, pp. 139-42). They add that practice only of the Sutra Vehicle yields only the tenth Bodhisattva ground, not Buddhahood, for which one must practice tantra, specifically Highest Yoga Tantra. The point of difference between Dak-tsang and Jam-yang-shay-ba is whether the Buddhahoods described in both vehicles are the same. As a proof that they are, Jam-yang-shay-ba (GT, ca 58a.iff) points to the fact that the sutras themselves speak of a Buddha as having no inhalation and exhalation and that the winds (*prana, rhung*) which are overcome through the Tantra Vehicle cannot exist without breath.

522 Dzong-ka-ba quotes this in his *Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path* (73b.4 in the 1968 Shes rig par khang edition).


524 P5260, Vol. 98 92.1.6; Colophon, 7.

525 See n.244.

526 According to Geshe Lhundup Sopa, the three vows of Bodhisattvas are not actually separate vows but modes of the Bodhisattva vow. They are the ethics of restraining bad deeds, the ethics which are the composite of virtuous practices, and the ethics of aiding the aims of sentient beings.

527 According to Kensur Lekden, this does not mean that there are bad parts in Atisha's works; rather, Atisha tends to follow the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas with respect to the path, their description being renowned as the general Mahayana explanation.

528 P5260, Vol. 98 7.5.7ff; Poussin, 40.7-2.8. This is partially quoted by Dzong-ka-ba in his *Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'* (P6153, Vol. 156 64.2.3).

Interpretation is not limited to scripture as it also applies to objects. The interpretation or hermeneutic of scripture is called *rjod byed drang rjes*, literally, 'the interpretable and the definitive with respect to means of expression', and the hermeneutic
of objects is called *brjod bya'i drang nges*, literally, 'the interpretable and the definitive with respect to objects of expression'. 'Objects of expression' means objects such as tables, chairs, bodies, emptinesses, and so forth which are the objects or referents of words (means of expression) such as 'table', 'chair', 'body', 'emptiness', and so forth. (From this it is clear that referential language is not the object of negation by Madhyamika reasoning.)

In Madhyamika the division of scriptures into the two categories of the interpretable and definitive is made based on the school's estimation of what final reality is, what the school's interpretation of emptiness is. It is a task of interpretation to determine why Buddha taught the non-definitive in terms of the need, or existential situation, of the listener. Thus, the hermeneutic is ontologically based within being inextricably involved with consideration of the levels of trainees.

With respect to the two classes of objects, emptinesses are definitive in that they are the final mode of subsistence of objects whereas conventional phenomena are in need of interpretation to determine their final mode of subsistence. Thus, a basic task of all beings is to interpret appearances—to recognize that what is appearing is not the final mode of being of those objects and to seek that final nature, not to obliterate the appearance of the object but to know its inner nature and thereby be better able to respond with respect to it.

529 The term *bhagavan* was translated into Tibetan most frequently as *bcom ldan 'das*, the first two syllables meaning 'possessing conquest' and the last syllable meaning 'supramundane' (*jig rten las 'daspa*), having been added (according to Kensur Lekden and so forth) to distinguish the Buddhist *bhagavan* from the non-Buddhist. The term is also recognized as meaning *skal ldan*, Fortunate One (or Blessed One as it is usually translated) because of possessing six fortunes. However, since the dominant translation into Tibetan is *bcom ldan 'das*, I am translating it into English with 'Supramundane Victor'.

530 Missing in the Tibetan.

531 The plaintain tree. I assume this to be referring to the trunk of the tree which, much like an onion, has no core. However, Kensur Yeshe Thupten of Lo-sel4ing College takes it as referring to
the fact that such trees bear fruit only once and are useless thereafter.

Poussin (p.41, n.8) says that these lines are cited in the Samyuttanikaya III. 142.

Translation follows the Tibetan.

The following three quotes are from the Treatise on the Middle Way (XIII.1, XI.1, and XV.7). They are cited by Chandrakirti in his Clear Words (P5260, Vol. 98 8.1.8ff; Poussin, 42.10).

The bracketed additions in this stanza are from Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way', 232.2ff, Varanasi 1973 edition.

P5263, Vol. 98 43.5.7; Poussin, 270.3.

P842, Vol. 34 64.3.6ff. This citation and that in Jang (33.15f) agree, but they differ from that in the Clear Words (P5260, Vol. 98 8.2.2; Poussin, 43.4). The Peking edition of it is a combination of both.

P842, Vol. 34 64.4.2; see previous note. Brackets are from Jang, 315.17. Jang-gya (316.1) points out that the long list of synonyms of self refers also to the instruments and objects related to the agent, the person. Geshe Gediin Lodro said that though the addition of 'inherently existent' in brackets to 'owner' is appropriate, it is not necessary because the word 'self' carries with it the force of inherent existence. He added that this still does not mean that all instances of the word 'self mean either 'inherent existence' or 'inherently existent person', since it often refers to a nominally existent person. Even a Buddha is a person, self, and I, but he speaks of his 'self based on a valid consciousness which perceives a nominally existent self. His words are not based on a false view of a self as existing inherently in its basis of imputation.

Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 62a.3) finds this paragraph inexplicable; however, Geshe Gediin Lodro explained it as if without problem. His commentary with the original underlined is: dgongs gzhi gnas lugs kyi don ni bstan tshul de las Gehun du 'dren pa la dpe yodkyang (cing) de dag dgos pa'i vgo nas drang don du 'grel tshul te drang don gyi mdo sde phal cher la de Itar dgos...
shing brjod bya'i sgo nas drang don du 'grel tshul ni btags don btsal na mi rnyed pa sog kyi rigs pas gnod ...

In any case, a passage is said to require interpretation due to having three factors:

1. A basis in Buddha's thought (dgongs gzhi): this is not Buddha’s intention or purpose in teaching, for example, a mind-basis-of-all but the ontological basis in his own thought, which in this case is emptiness.

2. A purpose (dgos pa): the pedagogical intention, such as providing a means for the connection of actions and effects for those who temporarily are unable to understand such within the context of mere nominal existence.

3. Damage to the literal teaching (dngos la gnod byed): contradiction of that teaching by reasoning and scripture. Even in the case of literally acceptable teachings such as those of the five aggregates, if one took such to be the final mode of subsistence of the phenomena discussed, this would be contradicted by the reasonings proving emptiness and scriptures on emptiness.

Jam-yang-shay-ba is working around this format with the addition of examples that contradict the explicit teaching.

540 Jang, 317.4.
541 P795, Vol. 31 281.1.5, VII.5. This is quoted in the Clear Words (P5260, Vol. 98 8.2.8; Poussin, 44.1).
542 P763, Vol. 27 238.5.6, chapter 25; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 1, 286.10. Translation follows the Tibetan. The Peking edition reads rdul bral.
543 Here svabhava-asiddha is interpreted as meaning svalakshana-asiddha because the Chittamatrans assert that imaginary phenomena are svabhavaasiddha but not svalakshanasiddha according to Gon, 46.7 and 48.8. Thus, 'inherently' in the next sentence means 'by way of the object's own character'.
544 P160, Vol. 6 166.2.2.
545 P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.3, VI.95cd; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.250. See GM, 459a.6ff, and Jay-dzun Chogyi-gyel-ten's Par-chin, 149.6 (Indian edition, no pub. data). The penetrating debates of the monastic courtyards are a cause...
of critical scholarship and a key to Jam-yang-shay-ba's style. As is the case here, he often introduces a topic, such as the four or five sutras requiring interpretation, not with a general presentation but with a rejection of an 'incorrect' interpretation of a minor point. He reports that some say that the number of passages which Chandrakīrti said were to be interpreted are just four. Jam-yang-shay-ba corrects this, pointing out that Chandrakīrti is referring to four types of passages because these four teachings were framed in many, many different ways. As sources for these four Chandrakīrti refers only to the Sutra Unraveling the Thought, but Jam-yang-shay-ba includes other sutras of similar type, the Descent into Lanka Sutra, the Sutra on the Heavily Adorned, etc., without specifying that these are included by implication.

Without a word of explanation, Jam-yang-shay-ba includes a fifth type of passage among those which require interpretation, the teaching of a Tathagata essence (Tathagatagarbha) as in the Tathagata Essence Sutra. In GM (459a.6ff), however, he defends the number five, saying that Chandrakīrti was not necessarily referring only to sutras accepted as literal by the Chittamatrins. Still, Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 63a.5fl) disagrees, citing Dzong-ka-ba who indicates that the passages referred to by Chandrakīrti are all taken literally by the Chittamatrins, and thus there are only four since they do not take the teaching of a permanent Tathagata essence literally.

About the translation of Madhyamakavatara as Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way', see pp.399-405. Kensur Lekden was adamant about taking avatara ('jug pa) as 'add on' (snon pa) rather than 'introduce'. He based this on statements by Dzong-ka-ba and Jam-yang-shay-ba that Chandrakīrti was 'filling in gaps' (kha skong ba); however, the matter is not easily settled since the evidence seems to go both ways. Let us first cite Dzong-ka-ba's explanation in my Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism (pp.97-9), removing the bias of the translation by adding in 'introduce' at every occurrence of 'supplement':

Question: How does Chandrakīrti's text supplement/introduce Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way?

Answer: One person [Jaya-ananda] says that in Nagarjuna's
Treatise conventional and ultimate natures are not taught extensively, but that Chandrakirti teaches these two extensively here and in this way supplements/introduces Nagarjuna's Treatise.

This is not a good explanation because the forms of reasoning ascertaining suchness are far more extensive in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way than in Chandrakirti's Supplement/Introduction. Our own system on this is that Chandrakirti supplements/introduces Nagarjuna's Treatise in two ways, from the viewpoints of the profound and of the vast.... Therefore, one way in which this book supplements/introduces the Treatise is through good determination of the meaning of the Treatise from the viewpoint of these two purposes [distinguishing the suchness of the Treatise from the interpretations by Svatantrikas and by Chittamatrins].

It also supplements/introduces the Treatise from the viewpoint of the vast.... Thus, [Chandrakirti thought that] it would be very good to fill in the gaps in the paths explained in the Treatise on the Middle Way. The second way that this text supplements/introduces Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way is in supplementing/introducing the paths of the Treatise from the viewpoint of the vast.

There is no question that Chandrakirti's text serves to introduce Nagarjuna's Treatise; the question is whether this is the meaning of his title. Jaya-ananda, author of the only extant Indian commentary on this text, sees the mode of its being an avatara as more extensive teaching. At first impression it might seem unsuitable for an introduction to be longer than what it introduces, but given the complexity of Nagarjuna's text, it makes sense that the introduction be longer than the text. What 'extensive' means, however, becomes an issue; Dzong-ka-ba refutes Jaya-ananda on the grounds that the Treatise, though shorter, is more extensive than Chandrakirti's text in terms of presenting emptiness from many, many viewpoints. It would seem however, that Jaya-ananda was thinking of 'extensive' as meaning 'longer' and that he needed correction on just that point. Given that either an introduction or a supplement could
be more extensive than the actual text—either in the sense of length or complexity—we need another avenue of examination.

Tibetan scholars who hold that 'jug pa means 'introduction' assert that the agent, the 'jugpapo, is the trainee and the means, ChandrakTrti's text. They mean not that the introducer is the student reading the text but that the enterer is the student, this being by means of ChandrakTrti's text, and that the entered ('jug bya) is Nagarjuna's Treatise. Within the Ge-luk-ba tradition of the large monastic colleges, there is no question that what is entered or added onto is Nagarjuna's Treatise, but the question of the agent is by no means easy. On one side are these points:

1 Despite much discussion about the 'special trainees of the Madhyamakavatara' ('jug pa'i ched du bya ba'i gthal bya) there is no mention of this topic in connection with the title. One would think that if the agent, the enterer, were the student reading the text, a discussion of who this student is would ensue here, but it does not.

2 There are several statements by both Jaya-ananda and Jamyang-shay-ba in which the enterer/supplementer can only be interpreted as ChandrakTrti or his text. Jaya-ananda says: "bstan bcos 'di de la 'jugpar 'gyur ba'o (GM, 6a.3) and bstan bcos 'di de la 'jugpa'o' (GM, 6b.3), 'This treatise [by ChandrakTrti] supplements/introduces that [one by Nagarjuna].'

Since bstan bcos 'di is in the nominative and not the instrumental case, there is no way to read the sentence as meaning 'a trainee enters that [text by Nagarjuna] through this treatise [by ChandrakTrti].'

3 Dzong-ka-ba does not refute Jaya-ananda on this point, and he would if he disagreed, given his frequent refutations of him and the importance of the point.

On the other side is a remark by Dzong-ka-ba: GM, 1 la.2, de'i phyir gzhung 'di la rten nas dgos pa de gnyis kyi sgo nas rtsa she 'i don legs par ngespa ni gzhung 'dis dhu ma la 'jug pa'i tshul gcig go. This was given above as: 'Therefore, one way in which this book supplements/introduces the Treatise is through good
determination of the meaning of the *Treatise* from the viewpoint of these two purposes [distinguishing the suchness of the *Treatise* from the interpretations by Svatantrikas and by Chittamatrans]. However, it could also be translated as: 'Therefore, one way in which [a trainee] enters the *Treatise* through this book is to determine the meaning …' Furthermore, Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 10b.5) calls such ascertainment the 'measure of having entered [or having been introduced to] Nagarjuna's *Treatise* by way of this [book by Chandrakirti]' (nges pa de 'dli sgo nas rtsa shes la zhugs pa'i tshadyin). There is no way that this last statement can be construed as not referring to a person, a trainee, and thus the enterer here is clearly the trainee.

As there is undeniable evidence on both sides, we can conclude that the term *avatara* in this title has both meanings—as a supplement filling in holes and as a means of entry. I find the former to be predominant in the scholastic literature and thus have chosen 'Supplement', within admitting that the text certainly serves to introduce Nagarjuna's text and that even the title is sometimes taken as referring to a trainee's being introduced to the *Treatise.*

546 The fifth chapter is one, but the other was not located.
547 P6143, Vol. 154 74.5.2.
548 Ann, dbu 62a.4ff. This differs some from the citation by Ratnakarashanti in his Commentary on (Nagarjuna’s) *Compendium of Sutra*, P5331, Vol. 102 151.4.8ff.
549 P774, Vol. 29 10.4.5, chap. 7. Brackets are from the sutra itself, just preceding the quote.
550 Brackets are from Ann, dbu 62a.6.
551 P731, Vol. 18 198.1.8, chapter 14. The same passage also occurs in the *Eighteen Thousand Stanza* (P732, Vol. 19297.1.6, chapter 22) and is quoted in Nagarjuna's *Compendium of Sutra* (P5330, Vol. 102 101.4.2). Brackets accord with the Chittamatra interpretation. For the fuller quote see p. 606.
553 P744, Vol. 29 10.4.8, chapter 7. The bracketed material is from Ann, dbu 62a.8. With respect to the translation of *arhat* or *arhan* (dgra bcom pa) as 'Foe Destroyer', I do this to accord with the usual Tibetan translation of the term and to assist in capturing the
flavor of an oral tradition that frequently refers to this etymology. Arhats have overcome the foe which is the afflictions (klesha, nyon mongs), the chief of which is ignorance, the conception (according to the Prasārigika system) that persons and phenomena are established by way of their own character.

The Tibetan translators were also aware of the etymology of arhat as 'worthy one' as they translated the name of the 'founder' of the Jaina system, Arhat, as mchod 'od 'Worthy of Worship' (see GT, ka 62a.3). Also, they were aware of Chandrakīrti's gloss of the term as 'Worthy One' in his Clear Words: sadēvanāmanuḥshasurasulokat punarhatvad arhanityucyate (Poussin, 486.5), lha dang mi dang lha ma yin du bcas pa'i 'jig rten gyis mchod par 'os pas dgra bcom pa zhes brjod la (409.20, Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition; also, P5260, Vol. 98 75.2.2), 'Because of being worthy of worship by the world of gods, humans, and demi-gods, they are called Arhats.' Thus, we are not dealing with an ignorant misconception of a term, but a considered preference in the face of alternative etymologies—'Foe Destroyer' requiring a not unusual infix to make ari-han. Unfortunately, one word in English cannot convey both meanings; thus, I have gone With what clearly has become the predominant meaning in Tibet. (For an excellent discussion of the two etymologies of Arhat in Buddhism and Jainism, see L.M. Joshi's 'Facets of Jaina Religiousness in a Comparative Light', L.D. Series 85, [Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, May 1981], pp.53-8.)

It has been objected that 'Foe Destroyer' is offensively militaristic and that in communicating Buddhism to the West we need to choose terms more suited to our culture. However, we speak of the 'war on poverty', the 'war on smallpox', and so forth. Also, as a translator, one's job is to communicate another culture on its own terms as well as one can, after which readers can pick and choose what is appropriate in their situation.

A more serious objection is to the basic concept of treating one's own afflictive attitudes and emotions in an anthropomorphic way as if they were other people. (Shantideva prescribes such in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds when he addresses his own afflictions as if they were someone else.) The objection is that using such a bifurcating technique rules out watching the luminous and knowing nature (gsal rig gi rlung...
of a diseased state of mind as a means of causing it to disappear, this requiring intimate closeness with one's own afflictions. However, treating one's own afflictions as foes seems concordant even with this technique in that it introduces the possibility of not identifying with those afflictions and thus the possibility of their disappearance.

A suggested substitute translation is 'saint'; however, one would not want to limit the main use of the word 'saint' to Hnayana. 'Saint' seems more appropriate for aryā 'Superior'.

Translation equivalents are by no means easy to come by; accessibility is very important, but rich meaning after becoming accustomed to terms is also important. Still, I do not deny that 'Foe Destroyer' is, at first, awkward.


555 Chapters 2, 3, etc. according to E. Obermiller's 'The Doctrine of the Prajna-paramita as exposed in the Abhisamayalamkara of Maitreya', Acta Orientalia (Lugduni Batavorum: E.J. Brill, 1932), p.30.

556 P5330, Vol. 102 101.3.8ff. The sutra is the SatyakasatyakTaparivarta which is not listed in the Peking catalogue but which is mentioned in Haribhadra's Abhisamaya-aloka according to Obermiller, IBID, note on p.30. The next two bracketed additions are from Ratnakarashanti (P5331, Vol. 102 151.2.7ff).

557 The translation of dharmadhatu as 'element of qualities' is based on a note by Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 8b.8): khyod la dmigs nas sgom pas 'phags chos kyi rgyu byed pas chos dbyings zhes bya la 'It is called the element of qualities (dharmadhatu, chos dbyings) because meditation within observing it acts as a cause of the qualities (dharma, chos) of Superiors (Arya, 'Phags pa).’ Emptiness, being uncaused, is not itself a cause (element), but meditation on it causes the development of marvelous qualities; thus, emptiness comes to be called a cause, an element producing those qualities.

558 P5330, Vol. 102 101.3.8ff. The original is P731, Vol. 18 198.1.7ff, chapter 14, and P732, Vol. 19 297.1.6. For Conze's
Meditation on Emptiness

translation, see p.205 of The Large Sutra, Part II (College Printing and Typing Co., 1964). Brackets accord with the Prasangika interpretation. For Gyel-tsap’s commentary, see 145a.1 of the Indian folio edition of his Ornament for the Essence.

Source for this and the next set of brackets is Ann, dbu 62a.5.

P5330, Vol. 102 101.4.4ff. Questions of King Dharmashvara Sutra, P814, Vol. 32 300.5.4ff. Nagarjuna’s version is considerably abridged. First brackets are from Ratnakarashanti (P5331, Vol. 102 151.3.1).

Ratnakarashanti, P5331, Vol. 102 151.4.6.

P5330, Vol. 102 101.5.6. Irreversible Wheel Sutra, P906, Vol. 36 105.3.2ff. Nagarjuna’s abridgement is very slight.

The five ruinations are decrease of lifespan, degeneration of views, degeneration of the afflictions, degeneration of beings (for example, more difficult to tame), and degenerate era, according to Das’s Tibetan-English Dictionary, p.501.

P5330, Vol. 102 102.1.2. For the first part of the original see P760.48, Vol. 24 255.5.3 or 255.5.6 or 255.5.8 or 256.1.3. The second part is 258.1.4. The abridgement is considerable. See the translation by A. Wayman and H. Wayman, The Lion’s Roar of Queen Srtmld (New York: Columbia, 1974), pp.81-92.

P760.48, Vol. 24 255.5.1ff. See The Lion’s Roar (op. cit.), pp.80ff.


P775, Vol. 29 37.3.8 and 50.3.2. Suzuki’s translation is p.58 and p.116 (210). For commentary on the second citation, see Jnanashrbbhadra, P5519, Vol. 107 130.5.8ff.

This quote was not found in the sutra.

P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.3, V1.95cd.

P5263, Vol. 98 136.1.1ff, commenting on V1.95cd; Poussin’s translation is Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.250.

P774, Vol. 29 8.2.2, chapter 5.

P775, Vol. 29 34.3.5, chapter 2. Suzuki’s translation is p.44 (123).

P775, Vol. 29 39.5.2, chapter 2. See Jnanashrbbhadra, P5519, Vol. 107 112.3.7. Suzuki’s translation is p.68.
This is quoted in the Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 134.1.5, and in Dzong-ka-ba's Essence, P6142, Vol. 153 196.2.6 as well as in his Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 71.5.8.

P5262, Vol. 98 103.1.8, VI.84; Poussin's translation is Muse'on, n.s. v.12, p.239. Brackets are from his own commentary (P5263, Vol. 98 134.1.2).

P775, Vol. 29 40.2.6, chapter 2; Suzuki's translation is p.70 (139). See JnanashrTbhadra (P5519, Vol. 107 114.1.6) and Jnanavajra (P5520, Vol. 107 247.2.4). This is quoted in Commentary on the 'Supplement' (P5263, Vol. 98 134.2.3).

P775, dbu 65a.8, which is based on Commentary on the 'Supplement' (P5263, Vol. 98 134.3.8).

P761.31, Vol. 25 263.5.6.

P5225, Vol. 95 11.5.3. The 'basis in Buddha's thought' (dgongs gzhis) is not Buddha's intention or purpose in teaching mind-only but the basis in fact that he was working from. According to the Prasangika system, external objects exist; therefore, the teaching of mind-only meaning no external objects is not founded itself in fact. But on what fact is it founded—what was the basis in Buddha's thought? According to Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 65b.6-6a.2), it was founded on the fact that phenomena are designated by way of their aspect or image (mam pa) being posited in the consciousness observing them, and in this sense the elements and so forth are said in Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning to be included in consciousness, for they are only posited by consciousness. With this as the ontological basis in his own thought, Buddha taught that all phenomena are mind-only, intending to communicate that there are no external objects to those temporarily unable to realize this deeper fact. Hence, the thought of the speaker (gsung ba po'i dgongs pa) and the thought of what he said (gsung rab kyi dgongs pa) differ, as he was not, at that time, communicating his own deeper understanding.

A point to be gleaned from this type of explanation (as found in Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations) is that according to this school of thought Buddha spoke from a basis of specific understanding; his skill in means wrought changes
in what he said according to his audience, but it is not that there was no basis in his own thought. Thus, his word needs to be interpreted in terms of both the needs of the listener and his own grounding in actual fact. When the existential need of the trainee was at odds with the ontological fact, his teaching is subject to refutation by scripture and reasoning. Thus, the interpretation of scripture revolves around the triad mentioned above—the basis in Buddha's thought (or the ontological fact), the purpose (or existential need of the trainee), and damage to the explicit teaching (or refutation by valid sources of knowledge).

581 P2665, Vol. 61 285.5.6. Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may (Explanations, 6a.5) says, 'This book is called Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment because it explains the meaning of a stanza on the mind of enlightenment spoken by Vairochana in the second chapter of the Guhyasamaja.'

582 P5658, Vol. 129 181.2.2, stanzas 394-6. Brackets are from Gu, stod 26a.5ff. This is quoted in Chandrakirti's Clear Words in commentary on XVIII.6; Poussin, p. 359.

583 P5262, Vol. 19 103.3.2, VI.94; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.249.

584 P775, Vol. 29 39.5.5ff, chapter 2. Suzuki's translation is p.68. This is quoted in Commentary on the 'Supplement' (P5263, Vol. 98 136.1.4ff). Brackets are from Jnanavajra (P5520, Vol. 107 246.4.4).

585 P5262, Vol. 98 102.2.6, VI.43; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.11, p.322. Commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 127.2.4ff. See Dzong-ka-ba, P6143, Vol. 154 55.5.8. This quote has its own history of disputation because in the Ge-luk-ba interpretation of the Prasangika system the self and the aggregates are asserted to exist conventionally whereas the basis-of-all does not exist in any way whatsoever and yet the three are treated similarly here without seeming to give the self and the aggregates any status which the basis-of-all does not have.

586 P778, Vol. 29 152.2.1.

587 P5263, Vol. 98 127.1.8ff, commenting on VI.42; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.11, p.321. See Dzong-ka-ba, P6143, Vol. 154 55.5.1ff.

588 P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.4ff, VI.97; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.253. Brackets are from Commentary on the
‘Supplement’ (P.5263, Vol. 98 136.3.8ff, and Ann (dbu 66b.4ff).

589 P731, Vol. 19 189.2.1. This is quoted in Dzong-ka-ba’s Essence (P6142, Vol. 153 203.5.8).

590 P5263, Vol. 98 136.4.7ff, commenting on VI.97; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.255. This is quoted in Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination (P6143, Vol. 154 76.3.6ff) and Essence (P6142, Vol. 153 204.5.3ff). See Ann, dbu 66b.6ff, and GM, 464a.2ff. Brackets are from Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination.

591 Treatise, XV.2cd.

592 P731, Vol. 19 190.2.8ff. Brackets are mostly from GM, 462a.4ff. This is discussed in Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations, P6142, Vol. 153 203.4.6. In GM (461b.5-2b.3), Jam-yang-shay-ba identifies the qualm behind Dzong-ka-ba's consideration of this quote as someone's thinking that it is unsuitable to identify the three natures taught in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought as requiring interpretation because (1) this chapter of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra presents the three natures and (2) these are asserted by Ratnakarashanti in accordance with the Chittamatin presentation. In response, Jam-yang-shay-ba explains that this chapter presents the three natures in a different way from the Sutra Unravelling the Thought and that Ratnakarashanti is not to be followed here. This is because the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra speaks of all phenomena as not existing ultimately and only existing conventionally whereas the Chittamatinins say that other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena ultimately exist whereas imaginary or imputational phenomena do not.

Though it might seem that the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra makes a differentiation of status among phenomena like that of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought when it says that imagined forms (imaginaries) do not substantially exist whereas imputed forms (other-powered phenomena) do, ‘imagined forms’ here refer to the ultimate existence imagined of forms which does not exist at all and ‘imputed forms’ refer to forms themselves which exist conventionally and thus it can be understood that ‘substantial existence’ here just means existence, not ultimate existence. Ratnakarashanti is faulted for not having taken the context of the sutra into proper account.
Therefore, since the necessarily correct presentation of the three natures in the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra is different from that in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, the latter is suitable to require interpretation.

P731, Vol. 19 190.1.2ff. This is quoted in Dzong-ka-ba's Essence, P6142, Vol. 153 204.3.8, from which the bracketed material is taken.


GM, 461b.1.

See n.574.

Dzong-ka-ba (Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 56.2.7) identifies the quote as the Mahayana-abhidharmasutra which is cited in Asartga's Compendium of the Mahayana as a source for the mind-basis-of-all and in Asanga's commentary on Maitreyā's Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle as a source for the Buddha nature. See E. Lamotte, Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, troisieme volume (1934-5), p. 171 n.3.

GM, 461b.4.


P5246, Vol. 95 136.2.1, VIII.3. Brackets are from Chandrakirti's commentary (P5266, Vol. 98 229.5.3). Dzong-ka-ba quotes this in his Illumination (P6143, Vol. 154 32.4.2). Gyel-tsap quotes this and the next citation in his commentary on the Precious Garland (edition of 78 folios in library of H.H. Dalai Lama), 20b.6-21a.2.

P5266, Vol. 98 229.5.3, commenting on VIII.3.

P760.16, Vol. 23 198.3.8ff, chapter 26. Chandrakirti briefly cites it in his Commentary on the 'Supplement' (P5263, Vol. 98 145.2.4f), commenting on VI.138-9. Shantideva cites it in his Compendium of Learnings, chapter 14, as does Prajnakaramati in his Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Shantideva's) 'Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds', IX.88.

According to Geshe Gediin Lodro, nails actually are not considered to be conjoined with consciousness.

The term 'Bare Mountains' has been untraceable to date. See Kosha iii.141 for the mountains. For kitadri, see Kosha iii. 147.

P5658, Vol. 129 175.2.6, stanza 80. Dzong-ka-ba quotes it in his Illumination (P6143, Vol. 154 32.5.1). Jam-yang-shay-ba's commentary is based on Gyel-tsap's (2 lb. 1-3).
As Kensur Lekden emphasized, the terms are only hypothetical synonyms because synonyms are existent by definition, and no member of this list exists.

Notes

606 As Kensur Lekden emphasized, the terms are only hypothetical synonyms because synonyms are existent by definition, and no member of this list exists.

607 P5246, Vol. 95 139.2.7, XIV.23. Brackets are from Chandra-kirti’s commentary (P5266, Vol. 98 270.3.6).

608 P5266, Vol. 98 270.3.6, commenting on XIV.23.


610 P5242, Vol. 95 112.1.7ff.; chap. 18.

611 P5260, Vol. 98 56.1.6, commenting on XVIII.7; Poussin, 368.4.

612 ‘... or reliant on causes and conditions’ (hetupratyayan prapya, more literally, ‘meeting to causes and conditions’) is missing in the Tibetan. The translation of the last sentence follows the Tibetan.

613 P760.43, Vol. 24 194.1.2ff. Brackets are from Ann, dngos 77a.7ff and dbu 68b.5ff. There is a similar quote in the Clear Words (Poussin, 358.10).


615 Ann, dbu 69a.1.

616 P5262, Vol.98 103.1.8, VI.83; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.238. Chandrakirti's own commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 133.5.2. Brackets are from Ann, dbu 69a.4ff. The second quote is P5262, Vol. 98 104.5.6, VI. 159d; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.321. Chandrakrtti's commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 147.3.8. The third quote is P5262, Vol. 98 101.5.5, VI.24a; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.11, p.300. Chandrakrtti's commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 123.3.4.

617 P5266, Vol. 98 103.4.4, chapter 12. This is quoted in Dzongka-ba’s Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of Nagarjuna’s ‘Treatise on the Middle Way’, P6153, Vol. 156 66.1.4.

618 Chapters 10 and 22.

619 P5262, Vol. 98 103.4.4, VI.104ab; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.267. Chandrakirti’s commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 138.5.4. Kensur Lekden said that this reasoning is called the ‘diamond slivers’ (rdo rje gzegs ma) because each of the four reasons is capable of overcoming a conception of inherent existence just as a piece of diamond has the hardness and so forth of a diamond. Thus, gzegs ma (kana) means ‘piece’; hence ‘sliver’ should not be thought of as a weak, thin piece but a fragment. According to Apte, the Sanskrit term also means ‘facet’; this would seem to be most appropriate when speaking of
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diamonds (and more appropriate to the meaning since each of the four reasons alone actually is not capable of refuting inherent existence); however, none of my Tibetan sources, oral or written, has explained it this way. The oral traditions that I have contacted are by no means always accurate; nevertheless, when put together, the various oral strains are quite full and no Tibetan scholar to date has given this interpretation (one said that gzegs ma refers to the points of a vajra).

620 P5343, Vol. 103 21.3.6.
621 GM, 225b.3.
622 P5242, Vol. 95 75.1.6ff, commenting on 1.1. Brackets are from GM, 225a.6ff.
623 P5262, Vol. 98 101.3.4, VI.8c-13; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.11, pp.280-4. Brackets are mostly from Chandrakirti's own commentary, P5263, Vol. 98 120.3.4ff.
624 Treatise, P5224, Vol. 95 8.1.1, XX.19cd and XX.20cd. These are quoted in Chandrakirti's Commentary on the 'Supplement' commenting on VI.14ab.
625 P5262, Vol.98 101.4.2, VI. 14; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.11, pp.286-7.
626 Ann, dbu 71a.8.
627 Ann, dbu 71b.2.
628 P5224, Vol. 95 3.1.5, 1.5. Brackets are from Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 14.1.6, commenting on 1.5. Chandrakirti's other interpretation takes parabhava as meaning production from other, but the meaning is roughly the same.
629 P5262, Vol. 98 101.4.3ff, VI.15-19; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.11, pp.288-93. Brackets are mostly from Chandrakirti's commentary, P5263, Vol. 98 121.4.3ff, and Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 38.3.7ff.
630 This might also be kesara; 'Rottiera intcotira; Mimusops Elengi, Mesua Ferrara' according to Poussin (Museon, v.11, 289 n.4). He (IBID, n.5) identifies kimshuka as 'Butea Fron- dosa'.
631 Ann, dbu 71b.2.
632 T8 76, Vol. 34 304.3.5. This is cited in Chandrakirti's Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 122.3.7.
633 Source for the brackets is Chandrakirti's Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 122.4.2.
634 P5262, Vol. 98 101.5.1, VI.20; Poussin's translation is Museon,
n.s. v.11, p.295. Brackets are mostly from his own commentary, P5263, Vol. 98 122.4.5.

635 P6143, Vol. 154 37.4. Iff. I have disregarded snga phyi in the second sentence.

636 GT, ca 37b.4ff.

637 P876, Vol. 34 304.2.8 and 305.4.6, with some variation in the reading. See p. 502 for a citation of this by Chandrakirti with a slightly different reading.

638 P5260, Vol. 98 6.1.8, commenting on 1.1; Poussin, 27.4. For the context of the quote, see p.503.

639 P5262, Vol. 98 102.1.5, VI.1.32d. His commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 24.5.8.

640 P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.5, VI.1.98ab; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.256 (misnumbered as 95ab). His commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 136.5.5.

641 See p. 150 for a different rendition of this.

642 Artocarpus Lacucha.

642a P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.6, VI.1.99; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.239. His own commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 137.2.8.

643 P5227, Vol. 95 13.1.7.

644 P5231, Vol. 95 12.5.6ff.

645 P5262, Vol. 98 101.5.2, VI.21; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.11, p.296.

646 P5263, Vol. 98 122.5.2ff. See pp. 152-4 for Chandrakirti's commentary.

647 P5343, Vol. 103 21.3.5.

648 The instrumental bshad pas is not an actual one according to Geshe Gediin Lodro.

649 This is a paraphrase of Kamalashra's Illumination of the Middle Way, P5287, Vol. 101 76.4.2.

650 The Satyadvayavibhakga is not included in the Peking Tripitaka. Brackets, except where noted, are from Ann, dbu 73b.3ff.

651 Ann, dbu 128b.7.

652 P5260, Vol. 98 3.3.7, commenting on the salutation; Poussin, 6.3-.5. See p.668.

653 P5260, Vol. 98 13.3.7, commenting on 1.3; Poussin, 74.3. For Dignaga's presentation of this, see M. Hattori’s Dignaga, On Perception (Cambridge: Harvard, 1968), p.76 n.1.11 and p.87 n.1.33.
Relics such as teeth and bone are made into powder, molded, and stamped with a holy image. These are called sachcha, or sachchha, perhaps from sack meaning 'to be devoted'.

'The effects are plural because the causes are plural.' Actually, the inference is based on the cause and not the effect; however, according to Geshe Gediin Lodro it is the Buddhist logician's custom to refer even to these as effect-signs.

This is often called a gerund, not like the English declinable noun but the Sanskrit indeclinable continuative indicating often the anterior of two actions.
Notes  883

674  P5767, Vol. 140  5.1.3  *Alamkhalvoh pratishedhe kvā va.*  See *Pa,* III.iv. 18-20. Hereon, the Sanskrit is taken from the *Candravyakaranam* (Jodhpura, 1967). Usually the continuative affix is affixed to the former of verbs in a temporal series; 'After men' indicates an exception.

675  P5775, Vol. 140  45.3.8.

676  P5767, Vol. 140  13.4.7.  *Anansamase kvāh lyap.*  See *Pa,* VII.i.37.

677  P5775, Vol. 140  45.5.4.


679  P5775, Vol. 140  43.3.8.


681  P5767, Vol. 140  6.2.5.  *Arthamatpreprathama.*  See *Pa,* II.iii.46.

682  P5767, Vol. 140  40.6.1.2.  *Supah asamkhyad luk.*  See *Pa,* II.iv.82.


684  P5775, Vol. 140  45.1.3.

685  P5767, Vol. 140  40.6.2.5.  *Arthamatpre prathama.*  See *Pa,* II.iii.46.


688  P5767, Vol. 140  16.1.7.  *Virame visarjantyāh.*  See *Pa,* VIII.iii.15. The citing here is doubtful because the Tibetan quoted and the Peking translation do not, for the first time, agree.

689  P5260, Vol. 98  3.2.8ff; Poussin, 5.1-4.  See the notes in Poussin (p.5ff) throughout.

690  In the Peking catalogue five books are listed as being translated by Sthiramati (*bLo-rtan*).

691  P5260, Vol. 98  3.3.3ff; Poussin, 5.7-8.

692  See *Pa,* IV.iv.98.

693  P5253, Vol. 95  154.1.8.


695  Stcherbatsky (p.90) identifies these others as Hmayanists.

696  This is a paraphrase of Kalapa’s Aphorisms’; see n.679.

697  Ann, dbu  75b.8.

698  *Rice Seedling Sutra.*  P876, Vol. 34  303.3.4.  Here the word dhārma (Tib. chos) equals tathāta (Tib/ de kho na nyid)
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according to Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination (P6143, Vol. 154 147.1.3).

The Sanskrit has rupani, whereas the version given here follows Jam-yang-shay-ba's transliteration into Tibetan letters (see p.668).

P5260, Vol. 98 3.3.5ff; Poussin, 6.1-7.5.

The Sanskrit has only 'eye', not 'eye and forms' in this sentence.

Putting cha between the two words rather than after the second is irregular but still barely possible; thus, I have left it there. The original reads chakshurcha.

P5253, Vol. 95 154.1.6ff. There are minor differences between the Tibetan translations of Bhavaviveka's own passage and ChandrakTriti's citation of it but none of substance.

The Tibetan translators adopted a code for handling this three-part discussion of the formation of pratityasamutpada:

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{prati} &= \text{rten cing} \\
\text{i or itya} &= \text{brel bar} \\
\text{samutpada} &= \text{byung ba}
\end{align*} \]

Their over-riding concern was with having a three-part translation equivalent that, when together, makes sense in Tibetan. As a result, the individual equivalents often make no sense when associated with these various interpretations.

Some Tibetan scholars claim that rten cing and brel bar have different meanings; however, since ChandrakTriti says that prati (rten cing), which itself means prapti (phrad pa), modifies the meaning of itya (brel ba) into meaning prapti (phrad pa), the two words come to have just one meaning, and thus it seems that the two were separated out in Tibetan merely in order to convey, albeit not very well, this discussion of the meaning of the individual parts. Perhaps a better alternative would have been to transliterate the individual parts into Tibetan rather than attempt a translation.

In ChandrakTriti's interpretation, pratTiya has just one meaning as a continuative meaning 'having depended' which in Tibetan is rten nas as in the commonly used rten nas byung ba or rten byung. Strictly speaking, therefore, in Prasangika rten nas byung ba or rten byung is the most appropriate general term, with rten cing brel bar byung ba suitable only as a code.
equivalent for the three-part discussion, *rten 'brel* is a common usage that is neither.

704 P5260, Vol. 98 3.4.6ff; Poussin, 8.1-3.

705 The Tibetan mis-reads *rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba* where it should read *rten cing 'brel bar* in accordance with the Sanskrit *pratTtya*.

706 P5260, Vol. 98 3.4.7ff; Poussin, 8.3-9.

707 For Chandrakīrti *pratī* alone means *prapti* (meeting, *phradpa*) as does *prapatTya* In its continuative form *prapti* (*phradpa*) is *prapya* (*phrad nas*).

708 Though the Tibetan here is *phrad pa*, 'meeting', I have rendered it to accord with Nagarjuna's *prapya*, 'having met'. The alteration in the use of forms is due to Chandrakīrti's and Jam-yang-shay-ba's using the general term outside of this particular usage for the more specific term within this usage as a continuative.

The significance of Chandrakīrti's citation is lost in the Tibetan translation *de dang de brten cing 'byung ba rang gi ngo* *bor de ma skyes* which, nevertheless, is an excellent translation in general in that it conveys the meaning. However, to convey the point here it should read *de dang de phrad gang 'byung ba rang gi ngo* *bor de ma skyes*. (The second line could have been rendered as *de ni rang bzhi gnis ma skyes*.) By using *brten* for *prapya* instead of *phrad* the purpose of Chandrakīrti's stunning citation is lost in the Tibetan.

The text is P5225, Vol. 9511.4.1.

709 P5260, Vol. 98 3.5.2ff; Poussin, 8.10-9.6. The Tibetan reading is followed in the first two paragraphs of the translation.

710 Brackets are from Avalokītavrata (P5259, Vol. 96 170.1.6). He identifies the two interpretations as 'arising upon depending on and meeting these and those [causes and conditions]' and 'the arising of those which possess individual disintegration' (*de dang de la brten cing phrad nas* *'byung ba'i zhes bya ba dang* *so so'i 'jig pa dang Idan pa mams kyi* [text has *kys*] *'byung ba zhes bya ba'i don de gnyi ga med pa'i phyir te*).

711 P5225, Vol. 95 11.4.1.

712 P5253, Vol. 95 154.2.1.

713 *Rice Seedling Sutra*, P876, Vol. 34 303.3.8.

714 P5260, Vol. 98 3.5.7ff; Poussin, 9.7-10.2. Literally: 'That system which is presented as "What then? The meaning..." is also incorrect.'
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Poussin calls attention to Pa, II.i.44.

P5225, Vol. 95 11.4.1.


Ann, dbu 77b.3 (which is actually 76b.3 due to misplacement in printing).

P5260, Vol. 98 4.1.1ff; Poussin, 10.3-9.

P5593, Vol. 116 175.2.3.

P5246, Vol. 95 139.2.7, XIV.23. Brackets are from Chandra-klrti’s commentary (P5266, Vol. 98 270.3.6).

P5225, Vol. 95 11.4.1. ChandrakTrti’s commentary is P5265, Vol. 98 177.1.3.

P5266, Vol. 98 270.3.3, which is commentary preceding XIV.23. Here in the terms dngos po med par smra ba and dngos por smra ba (in Sanskrit most likely abhavavadin and bhava- va-din) the term dngos po (bhava) has two different meanings in Dzong-ka-ba’s mode of interpretation. In the first it means ‘things’, i.e., those which are able to perform a function, or even more widely ‘phenomena’, whereas in the latter it means ‘inherent existence’. Thus, conceptual sense is made out of ChandrakTrti’s saying that he is neither a proponent of abhava or of bhava. Instead of such statements being taken as a direct call away from conceptuality to another level of consciousness beyond the opposites of abhava and bhava, their different sense is explicated such that we are left not with paradox but with a tidy explanation of two extremes and a middle free from them.

In Ge-luk-ba, there is a decided movement away from only smashing two conceptual poles against each other and thereby forcing movement to another level of consciousness in the resulting conceptual hiatus. Rather, a complete conceptual map is laid out with the moves neatly delineated. Still, in order to follow the map, one must undergo the battering and smashing of misbegotten conceptuality, gain the appropriate conceptual realization and then, through becoming accustomed to it, eventually arrive at non-conceptual realization. It would be a mistake to assume that Ge-luk-bas are somehow satisfied with a mere verbal lay-out of intricate philosophy. There is a basic recognition that we are controlled by our ideas, and thus re-formation of ideas in a harrowing process of analytical meditation—involving one’s feelings in the most intimate sense—is of central importance.
Valid certification for Dak-tsang and for Dzong-ka-ba are different; the former sees it as implying self-institution, whereas the latter views it, in Prasangika, as implying non-self-institution. For Dzong-ka-ba the valid certification of an object is itself a sign that the object does not inherently exist. The process of certification itself cannot bear analysis such as whether, when a consciousness certifies the existence of an object, the object is already certified, is being certified, or is yet to be certified. If the object is already certified, then it perforce is not what is undergoing present certification. If it is yet to be certified, how can it be said that it is being certified? If a certifier certifies what is presently being certified, then two activities are required, one for the designation of the consciousness as the certifier and another for the designation of the object as what is being certified. Also, when a certifier begins to certify an object, what is it acting on? Something already certified? Something being certified? Something yet to be certified? Valid certification of objects cannot bear such analysis; thus, valid certification even conventionally does not inherently exist.

Dak-tsang approaches the problem from a different angle; he probably thought that if it were affirmed that objects are validly certified, then students would think that objects as they appear to them would be true, and the knot of cyclic existence would be tied even tighter. Both Dzong-ka-ba and Dak-tsang agree that objects do not exist the way they appear, that our assent to
these appearances binds us in cyclic existence, and that to free ourselves from cyclic existence we must discover the true nature of these objects. Their means are different.

Brackets in the root text are from Ann, dbu 129a.2.

This is quoted in Chandrakṛṣṭi's Commentary on the "Supplement", P5263, Vol. 98 142.4.8, commenting on VI.126. It is also quoted in Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 84.3.7.

P5262, Vol. 98 104.1.7, VI.124b; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.289. The second quote is P5262, Vol. 98 104.2.6, VI.132cd; Museon, n.s. v.12, p.301.

P5263, Vol. 98 141.2.7, commenting on VI.120; v.12, p.283. Brackets are from Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 82.2.8.

P5242, Vol. 95 111.1.2, commenting on XVIII.2ab.

P5263, Vol. 98 141.2.3, commenting on VI.120; v.12, p.282.

P5262, Vol. 98 100.2.5, I.3ab; v.8, p.258.

P5263, Vol. 98 109.3.5, commenting on I.3; v.8, p.258. Brackets are from Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination, Vol. 154 6.5.1.

P6153, Vol. 156 65.5.8ff.

A point of controversy among the Ge-luk-bas is just what is an illustration (mtshan gzhi) of the 'mine'. Jam-yang-shay-ba says that it does not refer to the things which are considered to be mine, such as eyes and ears, but to the person who considers things to be possessions. 'Mine' is a person, but not a second person separate from I because the two are the same entity and different conceptual isolates or opposites of the negatives. 'Mine' cannot be the eyes, ears, tongue, and so forth, because these are the bases of the designation 'mine', and in the Prasàstagika system the basis of a designation is not the phenomenon designated. As Kensur Lekden said, if one watches carefully when the thought 'my' or 'mine' appears, this 'my' often appears more on the subject's side than on the object's. He said that as a form of I it is more extensive and active than I.

Still, Jam-yang-shay-ba's annotator, Nga-wang-bel-den, disagrees (Ann, dbu 78b.3-80b.5) saying that the eyes, ears, and so forth which are included within one's own continuum are illustrations of mine but not the objects observed by the false view.
of mine. For Jam-yang-shay-ba also, the objects of observation of the false view of mine are not the eyes, ears, and so forth but mine itself, which for him is a person, and that person is wrongly conceived to exist inherently.

The problem is largely one of terminology. Since the view of the transitory collection (sādikavādhistī, 'jig tshogs la lha ba) as inherently existent I and mine refers only to a conception of a self of persons, then even 'mine' would seem to refer only to the person involved in ownership, the 'my'. It makes some sense in English to say that my own ear is not an illustration of 'my', as 'my' is that which makes things into mine, but it is difficult to say that my own ear is not an illustration of 'mine', is not mine, just because it is not what makes such things into mine. Jam-yang-shay-ba tries to make this distinction in Tibetan by saying that an ear included in one's own continuum is not an illustration of mine (bdag gi ba'i mtshan gzhi), is not mine (bdag gi ba), but is an illustration of something that is owned (bdag gi yin rgyu'i mtshan gzhi) and thus something that is owned (bdag gi yin rgyu). According to Nga-wang-bel-den, however, 'mine' can refer to phenomena considered to be possessions and included within the continuum of a person, but those phenomena do not have to be the object of observation of a false view of mine—the object of observation perhaps being the I that owns them.

According to Geshe Lhundup Sopa, Jay-dzun Cho-gyi-gyeltsen, the textbook author of the Jay (Byes) College of Se-ra Monastery, avoids the problem by dividing phenomena into not just two categories, persons and other phenomena, but also a third, mine. Here in the false view of mine, 'mine' is not the person and not the eyes, etc., but just the mine itself, technically called the isolate of mine (nga yi ba'i rang Idog), or opposite from non-one-with-mine, which means just mine and not its illustrations, not the things that are mine. The object of observation of the false view of mine is this mine, but the false view of mine is nevertheless a conception of a self of persons since it is conceiving the I involved in mine to be inherently existent. In this way, my own ear is an illustration of mine, and thus is mine, but is not an object of observation of the false view of mine as this is only the isolate of mine.

In any case, the Ge-luk-ba scholars agree that the conception of eyes, ears, and so forth included in one's own continuum as
inherently existent is a conception of the inherent existence of phenomena, not of persons, and that in the false view of mine the mine is something different from the person that is conceived to exist inherently in the false view of I. The controversy over what this is draws one into noticing the I as owner.

740 P6153, Vol. 156 66.1.2.
741 Kay-drup’s *Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate* (blockprint in the possession of Geshe Wangyal), 105a.6ff.
742 P5260, Vol. 98 53.5.8, commenting on XVIII.2cd; Poussin, 347.13.
743 Seen.741.
744 See *GM*, 471a.3ff, for almost the same presentation. Jam-yang-shay-ba attributes this position to Dak-tsang in both *GT* and *GM*, but in neither does he give a source to show that Dak-tsang actually asserts this position. The absence of citation often means that Dak-tsang does not explicitly assert such but that he is ‘forced’ to do so as a consequence of other assertions. As Geshe Gedün Lodro said, it is necessary to determine, when Jam-yang-shay-ba cites a ‘contradiction’ in Dak-tsang’s writings, whether it is an explicit contradiction or whether Dak-tsang is being forced into a particular assertion by logical pressure (*rigs pas phul ba*). As the ascription of fantastic positions explicitly unfounded in Dak-tsang’s writings is a conscious literary device, it does not constitute inaccurate reporting of Dak-tsang’s positions but does indeed make reading Jam-yang-shay-ba’s text difficult.

My guess on this one is that it stems from a criticism by Dak-tsang (see *GT*, ca 47a.8-8b.2) of Dzong-ka-ba for claiming that reasoning refuting artificial misconceptions does not refute the innate. In reply Jam-yang-shay-ba first explains that Dzong-ka-ba should be understood as saying that ‘although one refuted objects imputed by systems of tenets that do not involve the mode of apprehension by innate [misconceptions], this would not damage innate [misconceptions] and although one refuted objects imputed merely and only by systems of tenets, this would not harm innate [misconceptions].’ This means that refuting the I, for instance, does not depend on causes and does not change does not refute the innate misconception of the inherent existence of the I, as the conception that the I is independent and immutable does not constitute the innate conception that the I
inherently exists or exists in its own right. Rather, refuting such can be a branch of refuting the innate conception of inherent existence when it is understood that if things did inherently exist, they could not depend on causes and could not change.

Having clarified Dzong-ka-ba's meaning, Jam-yang-shay-ba proceeds to accuse Dak-tsang of therefore holding that all forms of artificial misconceptions (such as that the person is permanent, unitary, and under its own power) and all forms of innate misconceptions are exactly the same and that, thereby, refuting the grossest of the gross would mean one had refuted them all—a position Dak-tsang obviously does not assert. Perhaps, it is within this absurd 'extension' of Dak-tsang's views that Jam-yang-shay-ba here claims that Dak-tsang holds that the person and the aggregates always appear as one.

Through studying the points Jam-yang-shay-ba displays in framing his refutation, one learns, not so much about Dak-tsang's views, but a great deal about Jam-yang-shay-ba's own views. This type of polemic is a frequently used technique for conveying information basic to one's own system and needs to be milked for that. If one thinks that it is merely polemic to put down an opponent, a great source of subtle distinctions will be lost. After holding one's nose for a while, the points—devoid of the polemic—become fascinating.

The opinion being forced on Dak-tsang here is that it is wrong to refute the existence of a person different from the aggregates first and then refute a self of phenomena, the reason behind this patently absurd view being that a consciousness innately misconceiving the person always views the person as one with the aggregates. Thus, for 'Dak-tsang' the very refutation of the inherent existence of the I constitutes a refutation of the inherent existence of mind, body, and so forth which are phenomena other than the person.

The refutation of this position provides an opportunity to discuss the extremely subtle and intricate topic of the appearance of an inherently existent I and its relation to the appearance of mind and body. Jam-yang-shay-ba's response revolves around considering an innate consciousness apprehending I (ngar 'dzin lhan skyes) in two ways: valid and invalid. He first points out that there are valid conceptions of 'my mind', 'my body', and so forth in which I and mind or body are different and then points
out there is a coarse innate misconception of I in which the I and the aggregates are viewed as like a master and subjects, the assumption being that if the I and the aggregates did not appear to be different such could not be misconceived.

Although when the stomach is sick, persons say, 'I am sick,' they do not innately say, 'I am my stomach.' Jamyang-shay-ba is making the point that even though the appearance of the I is inseparably mixed with that of the mental and physical aggregates like water in milk, when we conceive the I to exist inherently, we do not conceive it to be either one with or different from the aggregates.

Thus, Chandraktra is interpreted as saying that on the fourth ground the Bodhisattva overcomes the corresponding level of the innate coarse misconception of the self in which the I and the aggregates are conceived to be like master and subjects. If the I and the aggregates did not appear differently, such a conception could not take place, in which case Chandraktra would absurdly be wrong to say that on the fourth ground the respective level of that affliction is overcome. See Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, p.226.
Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.290. Brackets in the citation are from Dzong-ka-ba’s *Illumination of the Thought*. P6143. Vol. 154 84.2.5.

752 Jam-yang-shay-ba (*GM*, 481a.1) identifies this as Dzong-ka-ba and his spiritual sons (Gyel-tsap and Kay-drup). In colloquial Tibetan *hrang hrang* is used to depict someone who is alone, someone standing on his own. *Phob phob* seems to mean forthright or concrete, the very sound suggesting the seemingly hard surface of a bubble.

753 *GM*, 481a.2ff. For this same refutation, see *GM*, 481a.1-b.5.

754 Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be saying that the appearance of the aggregates is the appearance of the I; however, his *Great Exposition of the Middle Way* (481b.2) words the same point differently: ‘It [absurdly] follows that when an embodied self appears to an innate [consciousness] it does not have to appear by way of the appearance of the aggregates’ (*lhan skyes la lus can gvi bdag snang ba naphungpo’isnang ba’isgo nas snang midgospar thai*). He is clearly holding the opposite of this absurd consequence, i.e., that when the I appears, it appears by way of the appearance of the aggregates; this does not mean that the appearance of the aggregates is the appearance of the I. Thus, in this reading he is saying only that the I appears together with the aggregates and dependent upon the appearance of the aggregates. This seems the more credible reading since it is clear that he is holding that they appear together but that the I, within that context, appears to be standing by itself and concrete.

When he says that the I and the aggregates appear inseparably, it does not mean that one could not identify the appearance of the I within this conglomerate appearance; it merely means that they appear together and that the I appears by way of the aggregates’ appearing.

In accordance with the passage cited above, the passage here might read better as *nga’i gdags gzhi phung po’i mam pa shar ba’i sgo nas nga’i mam pa shar ba ma yin pa’i phyir* (‘because [according to you] the appearance of the aspect of I is not by way of the appearance of the aspect of the aggregates which are the basis of imputation of “I”’).

55 See n.749.

56 *P5224*, Vol. 95 7.2.8, XVIII. led.

57 *P5260*, Vol. 98 53.3.1ff, commenting on XVIII.led; Poussin, 343.8; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 10 146.20ff.
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758 'Suitability as form' (rupana, gzugs su rung ba) is rendered by J.W. De Jong in his Cinq Chapitres De La Prasannapada (Paris: Libraire Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1949, 4) as 'le pouvoir d’être brisé', 'capable of being broken'. The latter is how Ajitamitra interprets the term in his commentary on the Precious Garland (P5659, Vol. 129 notation lost). Therefore, it appears that the translators into Tibetan were aware of both meanings and chose 'suitability as form' here. Lati Rinbochay said that 'capable of being broken' is not appropriate as a definition of form at least in those schools which assert partless particles as these cannot be broken down either physically or mentally. Perhaps this is the reason why the translation as 'that which is suitable as form', meaning whatever one points to when asked what form is, was preferred. Still, Geshe Gediin Lodro said that partless particles could not be further reduced without disappearing; thus, if we take their physical disappearance as their susceptibility to being broken, this interpretation of rupana as that which is susceptible to being broken would be an appropriate definition of form.

'That which is suitable as form' (gzugs su rung ba) appears to be almost a non-definition since it repeats the very term being defined, form; however, it does illustrate the notion that reasoning meets back to common experience in that with form we are at a level of common experience with little else to come up with as a definition other than saying that it is what we point to when we identify form.

759 Blockprint in the possession of Trijang Labrang, 88a.2ff.
760 P6153, Vol. 156 110.3.3, commenting on XI.3.
761 Blockprint in the possession of Trijang Labrang, 89a.6.
762 P5263, Vol. 98 146.1.1, commenting on VI.144; Poussin’s translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.312.
763 See Chandrakrtri’s Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 146.1.3ff, commenting on VI.144; v.12, p.312.
764 Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 54.5.6ff, commenting on XVIII.5; Poussin 355.5.
765 This is quoted in Chandrakrtri’s Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 54.5.7, commenting on XVIII.5 immediately after the last quote; Poussin, 355.7.
766 Ann, dbu 84b.6.
767 Ann, dbu 84b.5.
Jam-yang-shay-ba now states the syllogisms establishing the emptiness of a person, citing the two subjects which Nagarjuna used, the self (translated here as 'person') and the Tathagata, as in chapters eighteen and twenty-two of the Treatise. In this context 'self is the nominally existent person and not 'self in the sense of inherent existence, and the Tathagata is merely an example of a person, albeit the most exalted person. The implicit point is that if even the most exalted person lacks inherent existence, then, of course, ordinary persons lack it.

In this context the term 'Tathagata' refers to a fully developed Buddha, not to the 'potentiality' for Buddhahood which exists in all sentient beings. The emptiness of the mind is the Tathagata nature or Buddha lineage, which itself is empty of inherent existence and applies to all persons; however, here the referent of 'Tathagata' is just the person of a Buddha. Thus, 'Tathagata and self, the dual subjects in Jam-yang-shay-ba's syllogisms refuting a self of persons, are not synonyms because there are many selves that are not Tathagatas. Jam-yang-shay-ba is merely using the dual subject as a convenient means to establish that not only are persons empty of inherent existence but also, among persons, even a Tathagata lacks it.

Chandrakirti uses this metaphor in his Clear Words P5260, Vol. 98 35.4.3, commenting on X.14; Poussin, 212-13.

P5224, Vol. 95 8.3.3, XXII.1. Brackets are from Ann, dbu 85a.1ff.

P5658, Vol. 129 175.2.8, stanza 82. Brackets are from Ann, dbu 85a.2ff.

Ann (dbu 85a.3) says, 'The self is not inexpressible as either one with or other than the aggregates.' This is the assertion that the self and the aggregates are not mingled like fire and fuel.

P5242, Vol. 95 120.4.1, commenting on XXII.1.

P5260, Vol. 98 53.1.8, commenting on XVIII.1; Poussin, 341.8.

The Buddhist Sanskrit Texts edition of the Sanskrit (145.22) emends the text to read, 'due to the consequence of the fault of manyness'. However, the Tibetan accords with Poussin's Bibliotheca Buddhica edition (p.341) and allows for fallacies other than manyness.

Supplement, P5262, Vol. 98 104.2.1ff, VI.127-8; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v. 12, pp.292-4. Brackets are from his
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own commentary, P5263, Vol. 98 142.5.5ff, and Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 84.5.4ff.

III
P5242, Vol. 95 120.4.2, commenting on XXII. 1. Brackets are from Ann, dbu 86b.8.

P5260, Vol. 98 55.3.1ff, commenting on XVIII. 1; Poussin, 343.8.

P5242, Vol. 95 120.4.4ff, commenting on XXII. 1.

P5263, Vol. 98 145.4.6ff, commenting on VI. 142; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.310. Brackets are from Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 89.1.3ff.

P5242, Vol. 95 120.4.5, commenting on XXII. 1.

P5262, Vol. 98 104.3.7ff, VI. 143; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, pp.310-11. Brackets are from Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 89.1.7ff.

P5263, Vol. 98 145.5.2ff, commenting on VI. 143; Poussin's translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.311.

P5260, Vol. 98 66.5.4, commenting on XXII. 1; Poussin, 435.3. In the eighteenth chapter of the Treatise Nagajuna presents the reasoning which refutes an inherent existence of persons in abbreviated form. There just two positions are refuted: a self is shown to be inherently neither the same as nor different from the aggregates. In the twenty-second chapter on the Tathagata, the five-cornered reasoning is presented.

P5658, Vol. 129 175.2.7, stanza 81 (for stanza 80 see p.631), and 175.2.8, stanza 83. Brackets in the first quote are from Ann, dbu 67b.4-8; in the second, from Ann, dbu 87a.5ff. (In my translation of the Precious Garland, published as Volume 2 of the Wisdom of Tibet Series, I used the Sanskrit edition as well as Ajitamitra's commentary though I cited neither—mea culpa.)

The four elements conventionally exist in mutual dependence; the one cannot exist without the others. However, one of them is not the others because then it would have the character of the others whereby the character of the elements would become confused. They also do not inherently depend on each other, because then they would be inherently existent others, capable of standing alone whereas they are not. They also cannot subsist without the others. This is the fourfold analysis (dependence being considered two ways) which establishes that the elements do not inherently exist, that is, are not established as their own reality.
The term *dngos smra ba* (*bhavavadin*) usually refers to those schools which assert true existence (*bden grub*), these being Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, and Chittamatra, and thus has been translated as 'Proponents of True Existence' or 'Proponents of Truly Existing Things'. However, here the term includes the Svatantrikas, who although they do not propound true existence do assert inherent existence (*svabhavasiddhi*, *rang bzhin gyis grub pa*). That they propound inherent existence is indicated by the fact that they assert the self to be a consciousness, for instance. In other words, when the object designated as 'person' is sought, something is found—a consciousness. (See also n.723.)

P5262, Vol. 98 104.4.6, VI.151; Poussin's translation is *Museon*, n.s. v. 12, p.316. Brackets are from Dzong-ka-ba's *Illumination*, P6143, Vol. 154 90.2.4ff. Chandrakirti's own commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 146.4.Iff.


Dzong-ka-ba (*GM*, 477a. 1) identifies *chags pa* (*rakta*) in this context as referring to the mind or person that is desirous of an object—that which is made impassioned by passion, i.e., the impassioned.

'ILLustration' (*mtshan gzhi*) most likely is *lakshya* in Sanskrit, which is translated into Tibetan both as *mtshon bya* 'definiendum' and *mtshan gzhi* 'illustration', the latter being a basis in which the definition illustrates the definiendum. It seems to make no difference here whether the term is translated as 'illustration' or 'definiendum'. I prefer the latter for broader symmetry but have deferred to the Tibetan translation and used 'illustration'.

*Dak*, 80b. 1-4 (239.5-40.3 in the Thim-phu edition): '[Dzong-ka-ba's] explanation that among our own schools only the Vatslputrlyas propound a substantially existent self and [his] assertion that there are Madhyamikas and Chittamatrins such as Bhavaviveka and so forth who propound the mental consciousness as an illustration of the self are contradictory. Therefore, our own schools, except for the Vatslputrlyas, disagree about the basis of the designation which is imputed as the self
person—all five aggregates, the mental consciousness, the basis-of-all, its continuum, and so forth—but they all only assert the object designated, the actual person, as either a substantially existent or imputedly existent non-associated compositional factor. There is no one who asserts that there is a common locus of form or consciousness and person...

According to jam-yang-shay-ba (for the corresponding presentation in *GM* see 474a.2-6a.4), Dak-tsang is saying that the VatsTputriyas assert that the five aggregates are the basis of the designation 'person' whereas Bhavaviveka only asserts that the mental consciousness is such. Jam-yang-shay-ba refutes the suggestion that for Bhavaviveka the collection of the body and the senses are not the basis of designating 'I' with a quote from the *Blaze of Reasoning* (P5256, Vol. 96 36.4.5) which says the opposite, 'Thus, [the self] is imputed to the collection of the body and the senses.'

Jam-yang-shay-ba's basic point is that if for Bhavaviveka the mental consciousness is just the basis of the designation 'I' and not the I, then there would be no difference between Bhavaviveka and ChandrakTrti with respect to the nature of the conventionally existent I. He is showing that Bhavaviveka asserts that the mental consciousness *is* the I and, thereby, that he asserts that persons (and other phenomena) exist from their own side or are established by way of their own character since when they are sought, something that is them is found. Jam-yang-shay-ba (*GM*, 475b.5-6) clearly makes this point: 'It [absurdly] follows that those [scholars, Bhavaviveka and so forth,] do not assert that the self is established from its own side because [according to you] they do not assert that, when sought, it is found.' In other words, whoever asserts that when an object is sought analytically it is found thereby asserts inherent existence.

It is central to the Ge-luk-ba presentation of the four schools of tenets that only Prasangika asserts an emptiness of inherent existence and thus that all other schools assert that when an object is sought one can come up with something that is it. This is based on comments by ChandrakTrti such as that analyzing the object designated is not suitable in the context of positing conventionally existent phenomena (*GM*, 275b.6) in which he is seen to be refuting the other schools. It becomes incumbent
then to discover what each school asserts the self and so forth to be, and thereby what may have been at most a minor topic in those schools becomes major in the Ge-luk-ba presentation of tenets. Whereas it would have been unthinkable in Indian Buddhism to compile and correlate (at least in print) the assertions of the various Buddhist schools on the identification of the person, in the Ge-luk-ba texts this is found in books often entitled under the topic of 'object-possessors' (yul can) which is sub-divided into the three topics of expressional terms (rjod byed kyi sgra), consciousness (shes pa), and persons (gang zag). In the latter section (see Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, pp. 78, 101, 115, 125, and 136) we learn that:

1. In Vaibhashika, all five aggregates are the person for some SammitTyas and the mind alone for the Avantakas,
2. In Sautrantika, the continuum of the mental and physical aggregates is the person for the Sautrantikas Following Scripture and the mental consciousness, for the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning,
3. In Chittamatra, the mind-basis-of-all is the person for the Chittamatrins Following Scripture and the mental consciousness, for the Chittamatrins Following Reasoning,
4. In Madhyamika, a subtle neutral form of the mental consciousness is the person for the Svatantrikas whereas the mere I that is imputed in dependence upon its basis of imputation, the aggregates, is the person for the Prasangikas.

In the lower schools, the person is designated to the mental consciousness and so forth, meaning that the mental consciousness, for instance, is the person, whereas in Prasangika the person is designated in dependence upon the mental consciousness and so forth and thus is not those phenomena.

Just this point is the pivot of Ge-luk-ba commentary, the brilliant discovery of Dzong-ka-ba’s analysis, the over-riding organizing principle of their philosophical presentations, their dazzling insight into the Indian Buddhist schools, the core of their practice of emptiness, the grindstone for reducing other interpretations to unintelligible powder, the insight that makes the presentation of moral behavior in the four systems feasible, the foundation for making sense out of the controversies between the Indian schools, the cause impelling the drawing of
nearly incredible distinctions about the person, the magnifying
glass for discovering hidden assertions of what the person is,
and the foundation for recognition that even in Buddhism with
selflessness as the core doctrine there are selves, there are per-
sons, there are agents, there is a basis for moral retribution,
there is someone to achieve nirvana, there are other sentient
beings not just on a baseless level of pre-wisdom ignorance but
validly established. It is a magnificent stroke.

It is necessary to search thoroughly among the teachings of
each school in order to find its views on the existent self because
most of their attention is paid to the non-existent self, be it self-
sufficiency, true establishment, inherent existence, etc. In his
Blaze of Reasoning Bhavaviveka says that to prove to him that
the mental consciousness is the self would be a case of proving
what he already accepted. Bhavaviveka also says that since the
mental consciousness takes rebirth, it is called the self.
Jam-yang-shay-ba takes the latter to mean that for Bhavaviveka
the mental consciousness is the self, not just its basis of designa-
tion, since Bhavaviveka says that it is unnecessary to prove to
him that the mental consciousness is the person. Also, Bhavavi-
veka says that the senses and the body are the basis of the desig-
nation ‘self. Thus, (GM, 475a.4) for him there are two types of
selves, a temporary one such as a human merely designated to
the aggregates and a continual one which is a subtle type of
mental consciousness that has travelled ceaselessly in all types
of lives and therefore (according to Kensur Lekden) exists even
during deep sleep, fainting, and meditative absorption in cessa-
tion. Still, Bhavaviveka is not teaching that yogis should engage
in a particular type of practice in order to identify this ever-
present consciousness as the self; the mental consciousness
which he considers to be the person is subtle, and neither he nor
anyone else puts forth practices aimed centrally at realizing or
making manifest this subtle form of consciousness.

According to Kensur Lekden, Jam-yang-shay-ba told his own
students that if a hypothetical Bhavaviveka asked a Prasangika
why the mental consciousness could not be the self, the Prasang-
ika would have difficulty replying. For the mental conscious-
ness travels from life to life right through to the attainment of
Buddhahood, and even the Prasangikas say that ‘mind-only'
sometimes literally means that the mind is the main creator.
However, the Prasangikas say that the reasoning that the selves would be as many as the many moments of the mental consciousness opposes asserting that the mental consciousness is the person. The person and the mental consciousness are related as object imputed and basis of imputation; therefore, the I is not the mental consciousness.

In a similar vein, Dzong-ka-ba and Jam-yang-shay-ba say that the Chittamatrins following Asanga assert the mind-basis-of-all (a subtle consciousness much like Bhavaviveka's subtle type of mental consciousness), which is substantially existent, as the person and thus as the substantially existent person (dravyasat-pudgala, rdzasyod kyigang zag). Like Bhavaviveka, Asanga says that the person itself imputedly exists, but, in this interpretation, that which is the person substantially exists. (The main difference between Asanga's mind-basis-of-all and Bhavaviveka's subtle mental consciousness is that the former is the repository of the seeds which produce the appearance of external objects whereas the latter does not have this function because for Bhavaviveka there are external objects.) Still, it is difficult to find any passage in Chittamatrin literature which proclaims that the mind-basis-of-all is a substantially existent self. Also, the Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Jang, 206.10) is often quoted to show that the mind-basis-of-all should not be conceived as a self: 'I do not teach this [mind-basis-of-all] to children because they would take it as a self.' Jam-yang-shay-ba's commentary is that Buddha is referring to conception of the mind-basis-of-all as a self-sufficient substantially existent person (rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod kyi gang zag). Although the mind-basis-of-all is substantially existent and thus capable of being apprehended self-sufficiently (rang rkya 'dzin thub pa'i rdzas yod), it is not a self-sufficient person like a controller.

Dak-tsang, however, argues that there is no Buddhist school which says that a mind is the person. Dak-tsang accuses Dzong-ka-ba of committing the absurdity of saying on the one hand that the Chittamatrins do not accept that the self is substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient and saying on the other hand that they accept that the mind-basis-of-all is substantially existent and is the self. The Ge-luk-ba answer is that for the Chittamatrins the person itself is not substantially existent, but the consciousness which is the illustration of the person is
substantially existent. Technically (GM, 476.2), the illustration-isolate of the person (gang zaggi chi Idog) substantially exists, but the self-isolate of the person (gang zaggi rang Idog) does not. As Jang-gya (Jang, 190.7) says, ‘... the Proponents of True Existence and below [that is, non-Buddhists] assert that there must be something self-sufficiently substantially existent as the basis of designation of imputedly existent things ...’ It is only the Prasartgikas who do not require this.

The gist is that the Chittamatrinis do not accept the existence of the self as it is usually conceived, but do accept the substantial existence of a consciousness which performs all the functions of rebirth and thus is a self. In practice, the Chittamatrinis present a HTnayana path which concentrates on the non-existence of a substantially existent self and a Mahayana one which centers around the non-difference of entity between subject and object; there are no special reasonings aimed at discovering the mind-basis-of-all as the actual self.

Have these distinctions between self-isolate, illustration-isolate, and so forth made it impossible to reflect on the substantiality of the person according to the lower systems? How could one meditate on the self-isolate of the person and not the illustration-isolate (the thing that is the person)? Is it possible to zero in on the person devoid of everything that is it, recognize that we have been conceiving it to exist substantially, and realize that it does not? Is the ‘self-isolate of the person’ so abstract that it reduces a most profound and emotionally trying meditation to mere superficial intellectual verbiage? Or is there something inside us, quite familiar, that corresponds to this term and the identification of which is aided by such hair-splitting distinctions?

The pressing question is: Why not say that the lower schools present a path to realization of the non-inherent existence of the person but are not able to extend this realization to other phenomena? One would have to say that they are blocked from making the extension that everything lacks inherent existence by views that it would be an extreme of nihilism to go so far and thus hold that the person does not inherently exist but its basis of designation must. After all, realizing that the Atlantic Ocean is deep does not mean that you realize that the Pacific Ocean is deep!
I believe that the answer to this revolves around what realization of emptiness means. As Aryadeva says, the viewer (or person realizing the emptiness) of one thing is capable of realizing the emptiness of all things. As the Dalai Lama said in lectures on Dzong-ka-ba’s *Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path* in 1972, if you want to test your supposed realization of the emptiness of the person, switch to another object such as your head and see if the same realization of emptiness applies to it. He said that if it does not, you have realized something more coarse. Thus, even though, when a yogi realizes that whatever is not findable in the seven ways is not inherently existent, he does not at that time realize the absence of inherent existence of all phenomena, superimpositions contrary to such realization are removed. Therefore, a person capable of realizing the emptiness of inherent existence of the person is capable of realizing the absence of inherent existence of any phenomenon as long as the functioning of that first consciousness has not diminished. Also, because the person is imputed in dependence upon the aggregates, there would be no way to realize the emptiness of inherent existence of the object imputed (the person) without removing the superimposition that the bases of its designation (the mental and physical aggregates) inherently exist. Hence, there is no way to say that the lower schools realize the emptiness of inherent existence with respect to the person but not with respect to other phenomena, in which case what they realize must be coarser. Since the meaning of inherent existence implies that the object can be found under analysis, those schools must be holding that objects, even the self, can be found under analysis. Even though they make a distinction between imputed and substantially existent objects, the former must, in the end, have the latter as their basis of designation. Hence, even the self or person has a substantially existent phenomenon as its basis of designation, and since the person is findable under analysis, that substantially existent phenomenon must be the person. What they refute is that the person, in isolation, substantially exists.

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Notes

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792 P5256, Vol. 96 36.4.5. Jang, 431.1, has brjodpa for dranpa.

793 See previous note. In *GM* (475b.1-3) Jam-yang-shay-ba says that this passage posits consciousness as the self that continuously takes rebirth and indicates (1) that the mere collection of
the body and senses is the self and (2) that the five aggregates—the body and so forth—are the basis of designation of the self, just as, for example, (1) the mere collection of the parts of a chariot is the chariot and (2) its parts are the basis of designation. Here, he words it slightly differently, indicating that the collection is the basis of designation and thus is the phenomenon designated.

PS256, Vol. 96 36.4.6. Throughout this series of consequences Jam-yang-shay-ba is operating based on Dak-tsang’s actual assertions, drawing them out so as to contrast their full import with Dzong-ka-ba’s teachings. This is not a case of pinning a fancied extension of an assertion on Dak-tsang and then drawing absurd contradictions, as sometimes is the case.

Brackets in the root text are from Ann, dbu 129a.6.

GT, ca 40a.5ff.

It is not that Dak-tsang manifestly asserts that in the Prasangika system there are autonomous syllogisms. Quite the contrary, he asserts (Dak, 76a.4, Thim-phu edition 227.4) that it is contradictory to say that there are no autonomous proof statements and still hold that there is inference. Jam-yang-shay-ba feels that Dak-tsang must hold that there are proofs, whereby, due to his own assertion, he is forced to assert that there are even autonomous syllogisms in Prasangika. It is over-play that, for me, falls flat.

Prasaiigikas do not accept that the subject, reason, example, and so forth, of a syllogism appear similarly to a Madhyamika and a non-Madhyamika. For the Prasaiigikas, a valid cognizer which seems to an opponent to establish the subject, etc., is non-existent in the way that the opponent asserts it because a non-Madhyamika views a valid cognizer as certifying that the object is inherently existent, but for a Prasangika nothing inherently exists. In this way, there can be no common establishment.

However, when Prasaiigikas debate among themselves, the subject, etc., are accepted as appearing similarly to both parties in the sense that both assert that the subject and so forth are certified by valid cognizers that are not valid with respect to the inherent existence of the object. As mentioned earlier (p.511-12), there is no way to have commonly appearing subjects with respect to proving emptiness even when Prasaiigikas debate
among themselves, because if they can understand that the subject and so forth are established by a valid cognizer that is not valid with respect to the inherent existence of the object, they have come to be able to distinguish between existence and inherent existence and this can only be done upon having realized emptiness. In that case, there is no need to prove emptiness to such a person. As Dzong-ka-ba's *Essence of the Good Explanations* (194.17 Varanasi 1973 edition) says:

> If the subject is posited as established by a conceptual or non-conceptual mistaken consciousness which is such that [the object] does not exist in accordance with how it appears to be established by way of its own character, then the meaning of the absence of inherent existence—the probandum—has already been established. Therefore, how could [such a person] be suitable as another party for whom that would have to be proved?

Thus, Jam-yang-shay-ba appears to contradict Dzong-ka-ba here when he speaks of commonly appearing subjects within the context of two Prasangikas' examining emptiness. However, in the *Four Interwoven Commentaries* (536.5-7.2) he indicates that a Proponent of True Existence who has discarded his assertion of inherent existence and become a full-fledged second party about to realize the absence of inherent existence simultaneously has become someone for whom dependent-arising is a reason having the three modes of presence in the subject, pervasion, and counter-pervasion. Thus, that person has ascertained with valid cognition that whatever is a dependent-arising is necessarily without inherent existence and is about to realize the particular subject, such as I, as not existing inherently. Jam-yang-shay-ba is saying that at that point the other party has become a Prasangika due to realizing that whatever is a dependent-arising is without inherent existence but has not realized emptiness, though just about to. It is only in such a hair-splitting situation, however, that he can speak of commonly appearing subjects within the context of two Prasangikas' examining emptiness.

799 The source for this appendix is mainly the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden. The teaching is standard to that part of the study of the *Collected Topics of Valid Cognition* (bsDus grva)
Meditation on Emptiness


See n.174 for the sources for this appendix.


GT, kha 6b.

Schiefner (see n.804), p.271 of translation.

*Blaze of Reasoning*, P5256, Vol. 96 68.4.3.

GT, kha 6b.5.


The main source for this appendix is Pur-bu-'ok's *Phur-bu-lcog Byams-pa-rgya-mtsho*, 1825-1901) Presentation of Collected Topics of Prime Cognition, Revealing the Meaning of the Texts on Prime Cognition, Magical Key to the Path of Reasoning (*Tshad ma'i gzhung don 'byed pa'i bsds grva'i nam bzag rigs lam 'phrulgyi Ide mig*), specifically the section on The Greater Path of Reasoning (*Rigs lam che ba*) [modern blockprint, no publication data], 23a.6-36a.4. Only material concordant with Prasangika has been used. Dzong-ka-ba makes a similar presentation in his *Essence of the Good Explanations*, 239.1-41.17, Varanasi 1973 edition.

*GM* 238b.6ff. The material in this appendix is taken from the oral teachings of Geshe Gediin Lodro.
Tibetan Text

for Part Six
Ṣa-gya Paṇḍita Jam-yang-ṣun-ga-gyel-rsen
As mentioned on pp. 567-9, the basis for this critical edition of Jamyang-shay-ba's text is a handwritten copy made at the Go-mang College of the Dre-bung Monastic University in Mundgod, N. Kanara, Karnataka State, India, in 1970. It was first compared with three other editions of the same basic edition (see pp. 691-3), and the many source quotes from Indian Buddhist texts were compared with the Peking edition (Suzuki Research Foundation, Tokyo-Kyoto, 1956) of the canon. Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations, which identify and correct many mis-printings, were used throughout. The shortened quotations were restored to full length, mainly using the Peking edition; these are indicated by a broken underline and brackets in the text. The restorations comprise approximately one third of the final text.

Fortunately, the Dra-shi-kyil edition, which is better in many respects than the other basic edition (see pp. 691-3), was subsequently published with minor corrections by Ngawang Gelek Demo (The Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyans-bzad-pa, Vol. 14, New Delhi, beginning in 1972), allowing comparison with it. The result is the first corrected edition of these pages of Jam-yang-shay-ba's text with all quotes restored to full length, making this an anthology of Prasatigika literature.

The numbers beneath lines in the text refer to the emendations and variant readings given in notes following the text. The Tibetan letters in parentheses under a line indicate a note in Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations.
Annotations (see Bibliography). All poetry is given with a separate line for each 'foot' beginning from the margin, except for Jam-yang-shay-ba's root text which is also indented. The bracketed material without underline was added for the sake of clarification.

With respect to the root text of the Great Exposition of Tenets (written in 1689), there are four versions in the Collected Works:

1 Volume 1, 750-802, with brief annotations which are presumably by Jam-yang-shay-ba himself but perhaps are notes taken by a student; the section corresponding to that given here is found on 789.1-92.4.
2 Volume 3, 807-52, with brief annotations that differ from the former in many places, perhaps taken down by another student but done in the same style; the section corresponding to that given here is found on 840.5-44.1.
3 Volume 14, 1-31, with no annotations; the section corresponding to that given here is found on 22.4-4.6.
4 Volume 14, scattered throughout 33-1091, this being Jam-yang-shay-ba's own lengthy commentary in which he cites the entire root text. (Differences among these four editions are miniscule with respect to the portion of the root text relevant here.)

More helpful than these two very brief sets of annotations are the word commentary to the root text given at the end of each chapter in Ngawang-bel-den's Annotations (the corresponding section being Ann dbu 176b.8-29.6) and Lo-sang-gon-chok's (bLo-bzang-dkon-mchog) White Crystal Mirror, Word Commentary on the Root Text of (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Tenets' (Grub mtha’ rtsa ba'i tshig tik shal dkar me long) found in Three Commentaries on the Grub mtha’ rtsa ba gdon Ina ’i sgra dbyahs of ‘Jam-dbyahs-bzad-pa’i-rdo-rje Nag-dbah-brtson-grus (Delhi: Chophel Legden, 1978), the corresponding section being 216.2-42.3. (In the Three Commentaries the first commentary is Lo-sang-gon-chok's text; the second is the elaboration of contents extracted from Jam-yang-shay-ba's own commentary; and the third is Ngawang-bel-den's Annotations.)

The text of Jam-yang-shay-ba's commentary, the Great Exposition of Tenets, corresponding to that part of the twelfth chapter translated here was written out after the initial editing by Lobsang Dorje in Madison, Wisconsin, in September, 1971. Alterations were subsequently made upon comparison with the Ngawang Gelek Dra-shi-kyl edition, finishing in 1983.
(1) འཕྲོ་བོ་དགུ་གི་ཞིང་། 77.13
   (a) འི་ཉེ་ོི་ི་ི་ི་ 77.15
   1. དོག་ཆོས་བདེ་། 78.4
   2. དོག་ཆོས་པོ་བྱ་ 79.12
      a. ཁ་ཁ་ལས་བྱས་པ་ 79.12
      b. ཁ་ཁ་ལས་བྱས་པ་ 83.8
         1. "དོ་རི་" 83.8
      2. "དོ་རི་ི་ོ་ི་" 88.8
      c. ཁ་ཁ་ལས་ཤིང་ལས་པ་ 90.1
         d. ཁ་ཁ་ལས་ཤིང་ལས་པ་ 90.10
         (b) འཕྲོ་བོ་དགུ་གི་ཞིང་། 91.15
   (c) འཕྲོ་བོ་དགུ་གི་ཞིང་། 94.12
      1. "དོ་རི་" 94.12
      2. "དོ་རི་ི་ི་" 97.11
(d) བོད་གི་དྲི་མོའི་བཤད་ལ་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་བསྒྲུབ་སྦྱོར་བོ་

1. བོད་གི།

a. རྩོལ་པོ་མདོ་

1. དོན་མོ་གཞི་སྤྲུལ་བུརྟག་

2. དོན་མོ་གཞི་སྤྲུལ་བུརྟག་

b. སྒྲོལ་བཞི་དཀུའི

1. དོན་མོ་གཞི་སྤྲུལ་བུརྟག་

a. རྩོལ་པོ་མདོ་

b. རྩོལ་པོ་མདོ་

2. ཚོ་གཏོར་གཞི་དཀུན་ཞིབས་

a. ཚོ་གཏོར་གཞི་དཀུན་ཞིབས་

b. རྩོལ་པོ་མདོ་

2. སྦྱོད་པོ་ཆེ་

(2) དབུད་པོ་འགྲུབ་པར་མཐོང་བུ་

(a) བོད་གི།

(b) བོད་གི།

127.4

128.1

128.2

154.3
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142

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147
西藏 منطقة لدجع نغ ونگ لاک ونگ دونگر

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Emendations

The sources for the emendations are given in abbreviated form (for full entries of texts see the Bibliography):

Ann dbu: the Mādhyamika section of Nga-wang-ūel-den’s Annotations to Jam-ýang-shay-ūa’s Great Exposition of Tenets
ed: the editor
GL: Geshe Gedün Lodrō, a Go-mang scholar at the University of Hamburg until his untimely death in 1979
GM: Jam-ýang-shay-ūa’s Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Jang: Jang-gya’s Presentation of Tenets
Vol.: Volume in the Tibetan Tripitaka Research Foundation publication of the Peking edition of the canon
An asterisk indicates that an emended reading is also suitable.

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<td>2 1.1</td>
<td>ēṣhayā</td>
<td>ēṣhāya</td>
<td>ed</td>
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<td>3 1.9, 77.5, 81.9, 110.14, 116.6, 116.9, 117.5</td>
<td>skyangs</td>
<td>bskyangs</td>
<td>NG 894.3, etc.</td>
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<td>4 1.11</td>
<td>(NG 894.4 reads: mthā' yod do cog)</td>
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<td>las</td>
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<td>kyi</td>
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<td>/NG 897.4 reads: rim pa gnyis pa'i)</td>
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<td>phreng dang</td>
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<td>(twice)</td>
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<td>mas rang</td>
<td>mas kun btags rang</td>
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### Meditation on Emptiness

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<td>ltar sher</td>
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<td>byas te</td>
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<td>las ma grub</td>
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| 126         | 99.10 NG 931.2 mis-reads: zhan pa'i) |
| 127         | 99.12 re l     re re i | NG 931.2 |
| 128         | 101.1 zhe       she  | NG 931.4; Vol. 101 76.4.3 |
| 129         | 101.15 na       la   | NG 932.3   |
| 130         | 102.1 rten      brten | NG 932.4   |
| 131         | 102.6 dbu ma snyi dbu ma las    |

| 132         | 104.6 ggis      gyi   | Vol. 98 78.2.3 |
| 133         | 104.15 kyi       kyiis  | NG 933.4    |
| 134         | 105.1 gis        gis   | ed            |
| 135         | 105.2 du         tu    | NG 933.5    |
| 136         | 105.6 pa las     pa'i 'grel pa las | NG 933.6 |
| 137         | 105.8 NG 933.6 reads: pa 'di ni | NG 933.4 |
| 138         | 106.6 'jigs      'jig  | NG 934.3    |
| 139         | 106.6, 106.12, 106.15 tsandra'i  tsandra'i | Vol. 140 p.1 |

(Contents)

140 (pp. 106-14: In the Ngawang Gelek edition the virama is used under the final consonant in tuk, nany, yap, lyap, ghany, pad, samut, k, s, as, and t. However, it is not used with krt, alam, l, pit, ruj, vish, sprsh, uch, gh, p, am, mut, sam, or sup for no explicable reason; thus, it has been added to these.)

<p>| 141         | 106.8 ktva       ktvå  | Vol. 140 45.2.8 |
| 142         | 106.8 ming       meng  | Vol. 140 45.2.8 |
| 143         | 106.10, 106.14, 108.5 krit  krt  | Vol. 140 46.2.1 |
| 144         | 106.11 kta       ktvå  | Vol. 140 45.3.8 |
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Dedication

May whatever merit there is in writing this book bring freedom and happiness to all sentient beings.
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